From a couple people over the 'net, I've taken a minor interest in Ayn Rand's philosophy of Objectivism, I suppose mainly because of what it claims to be: objective. When someone claims their entire viewpoint on just about everything, including politics, is entirely objective (not something your average person claims), methinks this warrants further investigation.
Rand had several books on her philosophy published, the most popular being Atlas Shrugged, and I've never read a page of any of them. I'm too lazy to do so, that is until I discover beforehand that Rand is a genius.
The Wikipedia article on the subject seems good enough for my purposes, and it's what I'm going to be quoting in this post.
Anyone's welcome to comment on all things Objectivism, particularly any resident Objectivists we may have here. (I know there's at least two....)
What about schizophrenic people, after all? What is the proper course of action for an Objectivist schizophrenic? Refuse to take medication from those silly doctors who say his visions and auditory perceptions aren't real? And as soon as you accept that schizophrenics are "wrong," you must accept the possibility of your own perceptions being incorrect. How can you say you are any different?
And if she did just pull it out of Aristotle's butt, then it seems like she now must confront the regress argument. Is Objectivism a type of foundationalism, with the law of identity, etc. as foundations? If so, then who's to say these foundations are more correct than other philosophy's foundations?
A world without the AS dichotomy is one where you can't formulate a classification, and then associate this classification with something else outside of the classification, which is necessary for intellectual advancement. For example, let's say I want to make the claim, "All triangles have three sides." Note that I'm not DEFINING a triangle as something with three sides; rather, my definition is "something with three angles." Thus, in the above claim I am claiming that anything with three angles has three sides, and if someone manages to find something contradictory to this, with the AS dichotomy, they can prove me wrong, and I will gradly recant in the name of mathematical progress. However, without the AS dichotomy, if someone manages to find something with three angles and four sides, they haven't proven me wrong because I can just say, "It's not a triangle!" The statement "All triangles have three sides" thus really has no meaning whatsoever, besides some arbitray classification of mine.
Any analytic statement is by its nature universal, of course. When a universal synthetic statement is formulated (for example, "All triangles have three sides"), this is actually a significant claim that can be falsified, unlike a universal analytic statement, which is just a classification. And a universal synthetic statement cannot be formed through inductive reasoning alone. (To use the classic example, no matter how many white sheep I see and how long I live my life without seeing a black sheep, I can't say with absolute certainty that there are no black sheep.) And correct me if I'm wrong, but inductive reasoning is how concepts are obtained, according to Objectivism. So then how can a universal be a concept?
In a supposedly "voluntary" transaction, my neighbor and I might agree on a price for my computer, and then I sell it to him. In this transaction, each person evaluates what is best for himself. Now let's say I go to another neighbor, and this time when I sell him another computer of mine I decide to point a gun at him and threaten to shoot him in the foot if he doesn't pay me, say, $2500 for the computer. An Objectivist would be quick to label this "coercive" and "involuntary," and our common sense tells us that this is the case. But when you think about it, why is this really so? Even in this "coercive" scenario, the supposedly coerced person is making his own decision. He didn't HAVE to buy the computer; he wouldn't be breaking the laws of physics if he didn't. He CHOSE to buy the computer and not be shot in the foot (along with receiving a computer). He evaluated the consequences of buying the computer and not buying it. So what makes it involuntary? Perhaps the fact that he had to consider something besides the transaction at hand? Well then what makes the threat of gunfire not part of the transaction, something "extra" that shouldn't be there? Plus, in just about every transaction, there are "outside" things to consider. If I never threatened the neighbor with a gun, but instead the guy had a nagging wife, and he had to worry about what she would think of the computer, and the man decides not to get the computer when he really wants it, is that voluntary? How is it different from threats of physical force? Again, why is physical force in a league of its own?
Also, a thought-provoking scenario: Let's say I'd like to get rid of my computer, and my neighbor wants my computer. I'm not willing to sell it for less than $1250, but my neighbor only values it at $1000. We discuss the issue and can't agree on a price. I'm annoyed by this, so then, each night for the next week, I go right next to the guy's house (making sure I'm not actually on his property), get a megaphone, and yell into it, "HEY BOB, BUY IT FOR $1250! BUY IT! BUY IT! BUY IT NOW!" I repeatedly yell this, preventing the guy from sleeping and making him very, very irritated. Finally he agrees on the price of $1250.
According to the tenets of Objectivism, this transaction was a voluntary one, since no physical force (nor any threats of it) took place.
Then there's psychological abuse. You can replace yelling in the megaphone with insulting the guy, constantly putting him down, spreading embarrassing rumors about him, etc. Why is physical force bad but psychological harm okay?
Oh, and what exactly constitutes physical force in the first place? Theft and fraud are supposedly indirect forms of physical force, although I never figured out how.
And two closing questions/points:
1) Is whether or not something is in someone's best interests objective (as in it isn't just a matter of opinion)? Should it be determined by the individual? I'm under the impression that the answer to both questions is "yes," which seems contradictory to me. You'd think that if self-interest is objective, you should be able to objectively determine what's in someone else's best interests, and dictate this to them. And if it should be determined by the indvidual, what if someone decides it's in his/her best interests to kill people?
2) see next post
Rand had several books on her philosophy published, the most popular being Atlas Shrugged, and I've never read a page of any of them. I'm too lazy to do so, that is until I discover beforehand that Rand is a genius.

Anyone's welcome to comment on all things Objectivism, particularly any resident Objectivists we may have here. (I know there's at least two....)

This certainly isn't self-evident, so let's continue...Rather, Rand contends that properly formed concepts and values are objective in the sense that they meet the specific needs of the individual human person.
So mind cannot be reduced to matter, yet it's impossible that mind can exist without matter? How is this so? Sure, I have yet to see some sort of mind functioning without any physical entity behind it, but I don't see how it's completely impossible.Objectivism accepts the "primacy of existence" premise and offers in its support the proposition that consciousness is always consciousness of something that is in some way logically prior to the state of consciousness itself.
Objectivism further offers the "primacy of existence" premise, supported by this argument, as a refutation of both theism and idealism. Objectivism grants, of course, that some parts of reality are mental events and mental creations. But if what fundamentally exists is independent of any consciousness, Objectivism contends, then the universe as a whole is neither the creation of a divine consciousness nor itself mental.
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Objectivism rejects the mind-body dichotomy, holding that the mind and body are an integrated whole, neither one of which can exist without the other, and neither of which can be interchanged between persons. Objectivism therefore rejects not only theism and idealism but also materialism, as well as any value judgment that is based upon a dichotomy between mind and body. Objectivism does not propose or favor any particular metaphysical or scientific explanation of the relationship between mind and body.
"Valid" in what terms? Surely not valid from an "outsider's" viewpoint (keep in mind the primacy of existence that Objectivism supposedly upholds)? It may be utterly pointless for an individual to completely reject his senses---What else is he going to go by?---but that doesn't mean that his senses are automatically *valid* in an absolute sense.Sensory perception is considered axiomatically "valid", on the grounds that it is self-contradictory to deny the efficacy of the senses as sources of genuine knowledge. (Objectivism argues that such an assertion implicitly relies upon the validity of the senses, since the senses are the only possible source of the alleged knowledge of their invalidity.)
What about schizophrenic people, after all? What is the proper course of action for an Objectivist schizophrenic? Refuse to take medication from those silly doctors who say his visions and auditory perceptions aren't real? And as soon as you accept that schizophrenics are "wrong," you must accept the possibility of your own perceptions being incorrect. How can you say you are any different?
Where do these supposedly non-arbitrary rules come from? The law of identity, for example: it started this whole epistemological shebang, did it not? Well where did Rand get it from? She couldn't have just pulled it out of Aristotle's butt, right?Not all supposed concepts represent genuine knowledge. In order to constitute knowledge, concepts must be formed validly, in accordance with certain non-arbitrary rules which must be adhered to if we wish to reach valid conclusions. These rules include the laws of identity, noncontradiction, and causality, as well as various principles intended to prevent pseudoconceptual groupings of entities that are not genuinely or relevantly similar.
And if she did just pull it out of Aristotle's butt, then it seems like she now must confront the regress argument. Is Objectivism a type of foundationalism, with the law of identity, etc. as foundations? If so, then who's to say these foundations are more correct than other philosophy's foundations?
This way of looking at things only works for true statements; since we humans aren't perfect beings that are right 100% of the time, it is important that distinctions be made between different types of statements. The analytic-synthetic dichotomy obviously wouldn't make any sense if all synthetic statements were certainly true ("true" meaning there are no contradictions, and the synthetic statements align with analytic ones, which are based on observations and assigned classifications), but that's not the case.Objectivism also explicitly rejects the analytic-synthetic dichotomy (and, implicitly, the distinction between sense and reference at least as applied to concepts). Objectivism holds that a concept means, or subsumes, all of its referents together with all of their properties, arguing moreover that it is for this very reason that the human mind is able to engage in inductive reasoning. For Objectivism, then, all propositions are "necessary" in a sense: each (true) proposition reduces to a statement of identity, i.e., a statement that an entity is one of the things that in fact it is. For instance, it might be claimed that while the proposition "1+1=2" is "necessary" because true in all possible realities, the proposition "the atomic mass of hydrogen is 1" is "contingent" because not similarly constant across possible worlds. Objectivism would reply that the second proposition is just as "necessary" as the first: if the atomic mass differed, the substance in question would not be hydrogen. Objectivism recognizes no legitimate meaning of "necessity" other than this one.
A world without the AS dichotomy is one where you can't formulate a classification, and then associate this classification with something else outside of the classification, which is necessary for intellectual advancement. For example, let's say I want to make the claim, "All triangles have three sides." Note that I'm not DEFINING a triangle as something with three sides; rather, my definition is "something with three angles." Thus, in the above claim I am claiming that anything with three angles has three sides, and if someone manages to find something contradictory to this, with the AS dichotomy, they can prove me wrong, and I will gradly recant in the name of mathematical progress. However, without the AS dichotomy, if someone manages to find something with three angles and four sides, they haven't proven me wrong because I can just say, "It's not a triangle!" The statement "All triangles have three sides" thus really has no meaning whatsoever, besides some arbitray classification of mine.
This of course relates to the AS dichotomy thing above.Objectivism offers the foregoing account as the solution of the problem of universals. This problem has throughout the history of philosophy been regarded as a problem of metaphysics, but Objectivism asserts that its proper resolution lies in epistemology. Traditional solutions to the problem divide generally into realism and nominalism. Objectivism regards the first as "intrinsicism" (the view that universals are "intrinsic" to reality) and the second as "subjectivism" (the view that universals are arbitrary creations of the human mind). The proper resolution, Objectivism says, is that universals are concepts, created to meet the unique cognitive needs of the human mind, but objective so long as they are validly formed.
Any analytic statement is by its nature universal, of course. When a universal synthetic statement is formulated (for example, "All triangles have three sides"), this is actually a significant claim that can be falsified, unlike a universal analytic statement, which is just a classification. And a universal synthetic statement cannot be formed through inductive reasoning alone. (To use the classic example, no matter how many white sheep I see and how long I live my life without seeing a black sheep, I can't say with absolute certainty that there are no black sheep.) And correct me if I'm wrong, but inductive reasoning is how concepts are obtained, according to Objectivism. So then how can a universal be a concept?
Okay, so valuing reason, etc. may be necessary for our survival as human beings (although that logic seems pretty circular, considering a human is supposedly by definition a reasonable being), but from where does Rand get this worship of "full humans"? What's so special about us?["Ethics: rational self-interest" section]
Well then what about emergencies?Objectivism argues that this is not possible under normal circumstances (though it may happen in emergencies).
And why is that? What's so special about physical force?Furthermore, Objectivism holds that physical force is the only kind of force; that is, it holds that physical harm (or threat of physical harm) is the only way a person may be coerced to take an action against his or her will. Therefore, all actions which are taken in the absence of such threats are voluntary according to Objectivism, and, as a result, they are considered to be moral and fair by definition.
In a supposedly "voluntary" transaction, my neighbor and I might agree on a price for my computer, and then I sell it to him. In this transaction, each person evaluates what is best for himself. Now let's say I go to another neighbor, and this time when I sell him another computer of mine I decide to point a gun at him and threaten to shoot him in the foot if he doesn't pay me, say, $2500 for the computer. An Objectivist would be quick to label this "coercive" and "involuntary," and our common sense tells us that this is the case. But when you think about it, why is this really so? Even in this "coercive" scenario, the supposedly coerced person is making his own decision. He didn't HAVE to buy the computer; he wouldn't be breaking the laws of physics if he didn't. He CHOSE to buy the computer and not be shot in the foot (along with receiving a computer). He evaluated the consequences of buying the computer and not buying it. So what makes it involuntary? Perhaps the fact that he had to consider something besides the transaction at hand? Well then what makes the threat of gunfire not part of the transaction, something "extra" that shouldn't be there? Plus, in just about every transaction, there are "outside" things to consider. If I never threatened the neighbor with a gun, but instead the guy had a nagging wife, and he had to worry about what she would think of the computer, and the man decides not to get the computer when he really wants it, is that voluntary? How is it different from threats of physical force? Again, why is physical force in a league of its own?
Also, a thought-provoking scenario: Let's say I'd like to get rid of my computer, and my neighbor wants my computer. I'm not willing to sell it for less than $1250, but my neighbor only values it at $1000. We discuss the issue and can't agree on a price. I'm annoyed by this, so then, each night for the next week, I go right next to the guy's house (making sure I'm not actually on his property), get a megaphone, and yell into it, "HEY BOB, BUY IT FOR $1250! BUY IT! BUY IT! BUY IT NOW!" I repeatedly yell this, preventing the guy from sleeping and making him very, very irritated. Finally he agrees on the price of $1250.
According to the tenets of Objectivism, this transaction was a voluntary one, since no physical force (nor any threats of it) took place.
Then there's psychological abuse. You can replace yelling in the megaphone with insulting the guy, constantly putting him down, spreading embarrassing rumors about him, etc. Why is physical force bad but psychological harm okay?
Oh, and what exactly constitutes physical force in the first place? Theft and fraud are supposedly indirect forms of physical force, although I never figured out how.
I find it hard to imagine that it's in the best interests for the most powerful to not coervice the less powerful a little, to tilt the slide in their own favor. This is especially true in settings where the less powerful have actually been convinced themselves that they have no infringed-upon rights (an example being feudal Europe). You're telling me that it would have been in the best interests for a lord to give up all the land and property he obtained through force, and instead work for what he obtains, and form a laissez-faire community where everyone else can do the same and be "valuable trading partners"? Yeah, right.On the Objectivist account, the rights of other human beings are not of direct moral import to the agent who respects them; they acquire their moral purchase through an intermediate step. An Objectivist respects the rights of other human beings out of the recognition of the value to himself or herself of living in a world in which the freedom of action of other rational (or potentially rational) human beings is respected.
According to Objectivism, then, one's respect for the rights of others is founded on the value, to oneself, of other persons as actual or potential trading partners. Here is where Objectivism's claim about conflicts of interest attains its full significance: on the Objectivist view, it is precisely because there are no (irresoluble) such conflicts that it is possible for human beings to prosper in a rights-respecting society.
And two closing questions/points:
1) Is whether or not something is in someone's best interests objective (as in it isn't just a matter of opinion)? Should it be determined by the individual? I'm under the impression that the answer to both questions is "yes," which seems contradictory to me. You'd think that if self-interest is objective, you should be able to objectively determine what's in someone else's best interests, and dictate this to them. And if it should be determined by the indvidual, what if someone decides it's in his/her best interests to kill people?
2) see next post