Objectivism

[Aphex_Twin]

If such a system were introduced to a system of order (ie a computer), you'd be introducing order to chaos. Effects would occur without cause. In fact, researches at MIT years ago came to the same conclusion. Machines could not possibly possess such free will.

This is interesting. Do you have a link?


To test the hypothesis that a decision that was made could only be made one way you would have to travel back in time, more than once, then return to your original frame of reference.

My own idea is that as long as there is no way a cause can be assigned to an effect it is as if and equivalent to "there is no cause". "Causes" just may be human contraptions.

"How do computers difer from humans?" Dynamics? The electronic connections of a computer chip are set in stone, the number of circuits that can form are finite and (almost) completely determinable. Brains evolve, change connections and so can form a potentially infinite number of circuits. Still, this does not give any more credit to the idea of free will.

In the end, if it's more reasonable to believe: "There is free-will" then the validity of that statement does not matter.

 

[Ayatollah So]

How do we normally view the abstract of free will? Well, I view it as the ability for man to pick an option among several choices, when those choices exist.

What it comes down to is that humans are determined in their choice making. Our own contexts (experiences, knowledge, instinct, etc) automatically determine which option we choose. This model of self-determinism is actually equivalent to free will in all by one respect. Self-determinism states that the choices you have made WERE made and could NOT have been made any other way. You're contexts determined that you could not have possibly chosen otherwise. Doing so would have resulted in a blatant violation of causality.

Paragraph one is an excellent start But I have some problems with some of the language in paragraph two.

"the choices you have made WERE made and could NOT have been made any other way" - potentially misleading. I think talk about what choices a person "could have made" refers to their options. An option is a future course of action whose realization depends on the intelligence of the person involved. So for example: If you are massively stronger than me, and throw me off the top of a house, whether I will hit the ground is not an option for me. But, if I have a little athletic skill, whether I hit the ground feet-first is an option for me. It depends on what I decide.

I make my decision for reasons. I want to live, I want to break as few bones as possible, etc. And those reasons have causes - they wouldn't be reasons if they didn't; if they didn't respond intelligently to my experience. And feet-first is the logical consequence of those reasons. But that doesn't mean that head-first and butt-first weren't options. They were, because which of them happened or didn't happen depended on my intelligent decision-making process. I could have landed butt-first, because if I had concluded in favor of it, that's how I would have landed.

In other words, people who imagine a conflict between determinism and freedom are confusing two different uses of the word "could". One, the moral/pragmatic context, is about options. The other context is about causal possibility. Given all the details about me immediately prior to the violent incident, it was causally guaranteed that I'd land feet-first. That means that an observer who knew enough about me and about causal laws could not have concluded other than that I would land feet-first.

With one very interesting exception: if the "observer" is me. If I concluded in favor of landing butt-first, I would land butt-first. That is one of the relevant causal laws: the way my psychology works: I do what I decide to do. That is why I have no epistemic obligation to "figure out what nature has in the cards" for me. I can conclude whatever I want, without fear of being mistaken. I am the author of the story of my life, not a mere reader.

 

[Ayatollah So]

Words aren't magical entities that inherently correspond to the real world. They are just made up. When someone feels like creating a word, his/her espousal of the word's assigned meaning, along with any statement whose truth is contained within this definition, is an analytic statement. It's analytic because it's not really right or wrong (or, if you prefer, always right) because it's simply a label made by the creator of the statement.

For example, how about you define for me the word cat. Then, since this is apparently not analytic, explain how the scientific method might demonstrate that your definition is wrong.

Sure, stipulative definitions do exist, which is why I'm not going so far as to say the analytic/synthetic distinction is totally bogus. But for the most part, as Newfangle so correctly points out, concepts are open-ended. Or rather, for the whole part, because stipulated definitions rely on other concepts, which in turn are open-ended.

Consider that when language was just beginning, all definitions had to be ostensive. At least, I don't see any other way. So how do you know which things are "covered" by a word a member of your tribe just invented, when he only pointed to a few of them? What analytic statements could you possibly make using the new word? Point again and repeat the word? But now you're assuming that while you weren't looking, the items in question didn't go away and get replaced by very similar ones.

In the "cat" case, I suppose I'd start out by referencing the order Carnivora, subset of the class Mammalia and kingdom Animalia, and then try to distinguish cats from the rest of the order. One obvious way this could go wrong is if the "order" "Carnivora" turns out to be a bogus hash of animals with little in common. Not bloody likely at this point, of course, but it's the kind of thing one needs to keep an open mind about.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Fair enough, but remember, that as rational beings, we are restricted to perceptual evidence. We may only form value-judgements based on what we know, rather than what is not.

"May"? This would seem to refer to a prescriptive rule of some such - are you simply stating a tenet of your philosophy?

(If "rational beings" is supposed to refer to humans, I doubt I agree, but we'd need a legalistic definition 'fore I can tell.)

It refers to a divergence with the school of thought called materialism, something which was prominent a century ago. I don't quite remember the intricacies of materialism, but it differs from Objectivism in both metaphysics and epistemology. As such, Objectivism is not rejected what exists, but rather, a specific interpretation of what exists.

OK.

I've never heard such model.

In the context of Objectivism, or at all? It, basically, refers to the hypothesis that consciousness is a non-material "thing" whose state is determined by the physical state of the brain (or computer, if artificial consciousness is possible), but cannot affect that physical state.

(If interpreted literally, it follows that consciousness is not even in principle detectable by physical means, wherefore Occam's razor tells us the hypothesis would be improved if we assumed consciousness doesn't exist at all. I hardly need say I find a such model for consciousness very unsatisfying.)

BUT, I did find an interesting essay that might be exactly what you're looking for:

http://laissez-fairerepublic.com/MONISM.htm

The most important point to be taken:

Materialism does not accept ALL of reality -- only the material part of it. Idealism imagines that there is something MORE than reality -- "another" reality somehow existing "outside of" or "above" everything. Of these three views, only Objectivism accepts ALL of reality (including matter and consciousness and whatever else) and ONLY reality.

As far as I can tell, it comes down to how precise one's definitions are.

I'll take a look at that when I find the time. I'll just note I see no reason to assume that consciousness isn't material (or at least a property of material configuration - I suppose you could say that tornado isn't material either, but something that happens to matter).

 

[newfangle]

I ask because according to determinism, at least as I understand it, contexts COULDN'T have devoloped in other ways; they HAD to develop in such a way that I chose red.

That is, of course, a big possibility. Coincidently, it is a BIG problem too.

 

[newfangle]

In the end, if it's more reasonable to believe: "There is free-will" then the validity of that statement does not matter.

Ah, you're opting for the "axiom" root for free will.

My only problem with this, is that if we assume "not free will" the world doesn't destroy itself (as it would with the denial of other axioms).

Another problem is that free will in and itself is not self-evident, which is the basic property of axioms.

 

[newfangle]

In other words, people who imagine a conflict between determinism and freedom are confusing two different uses of the word "could". One, the moral/pragmatic context, is about options. The other context is about causal possibility. Given all the details about me immediately prior to the violent incident, it was causally guaranteed that I'd land feet-first. That means that an observer who knew enough about me and about causal laws could not have concluded other than that I would land feet-first.

With one very interesting exception: if the "observer" is me. If I concluded in favor of landing butt-first, I would land butt-first. That is one of the relevant causal laws: the way my psychology works: I do what I decide to do. That is why I have no epistemic obligation to "figure out what nature has in the cards" for me. I can conclude whatever I want, without fear of being mistaken. I am the author of the story of my life, not a mere reader.

YES! think this is what I was trying to get at.

Unfortunately my opinion was expressed more in support of classical determinism. This is NOT my view.

The degree in complexity of an ogranism is proportional to how much that organism is the author of his life.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

Ah, you're opting for the "axiom" root for free will.

My only problem with this, is that if we assume "not free will" the world doesn't destroy itself (as it would with the denial of other axioms).

Another problem is that free will in and itself is not self-evident, which is the basic property of axioms.

If there is no free will, then there is no qualitative diference between action and idleness. Meaning, as long as whatever I do is predetermined, I can as well do nothing as in either case I accomplish nothing.

 

[newfangle]

According to the classical definition of determinism, yes.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

Then what is the O(o)bjectivist motivation to Act? Or am I going by wrong definitions?

 

[newfangle]

In essence, to become as self-determined as possible.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

But if the self is completely determined, what room for freedom and hence room for self gratification would the prospective O(o)bjectivist have? Could he take any responsibility for a course of events that was bound to happend?

(Practicing the pretentious language for an incoming English paper )

 

[newfangle]

Well, the part that I failed to elaborate on was the "self" part of "self-determinism."
In short, since our consciousness, by its nature, creates concepts, it is these concepts that primarily determine our actions after they are formed.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

The same question can be asked. If the "consciousness" is an exterior instance generating concepts (randomly?), then what weight does the "individual" have on decision making. If he has none, what credit can he take for those decisions? Does the individual have any role in the creation of the said concepts?

 

[newfangle]

I don't know. (whew, that took guts).

But when I do know, you shall know as well.

 

[Sayounara]

Man, this philosophy takes too damn long to explain.

From what I read in Atlas Shrugged, I think its interesting, just a little extreme.

What? You haven't read about Ayn Rand summing up her philosophy standing on one foot? lol, Just kidding. The genius also explained philosophy can't be talked about on one foot and that it requires volumes of thought .

Sends this probably hasn't been mentioned yet... I recommend her Lexicon dictionary as the best book about objectivism. It's very enlightening, I read through just about all of it in a week or so 3 month ago. Not that I understand it fully or am applying it or anything.

As for her own written books, all I've finished reading is Anthem. I want to read Atlas Shrugged next. The Fountainhead I already watched a video of it already--and it is VERY enlightening and witty. I recommend it.

I've also read she also said she was the greatest genius to have ever lived (not in books though). I don't know abotu that, but why would anyone say that about themselves?

 

[newfangle]

I've never heard of her saying that, but she certainly lacked modesty at times.

If you've enjoyed Anthem and Fountainhead, you'll probably enjoy Atlas Shrugged the best. It is by far the most detailed of all her works, fiction or otherwise.

The Lexicon is good too. I don't own it myself, but it is certainly the most efficient way of finding a defition or derivation.

 

[The Last Conformist]

Some comments on the article newfangle linked to:

Man is neither a bodiless ghost nor a mindless robot. Man is an integrated being composed of both matter and spirit which function together as a unit.

I guess this answers my original question. So, Objectivism embraces a version of dualism.

Note that Objectivism embraces a naturalistic view of consciousness, not a materialistic view, and certainly not a supernatural view. Both the idealists and the materialists attempt, without evidence or warrant, to equate this natural world with "matter" only; Objectivism, however, does not fall into this error.

Fair enough - it's certainly a possibility that the natural world contains non-material entities. However, in the abscence of actual evidence it does contain such, the null-hypothesis certainly must be that it does not.

Hold on. Now it gets really weird:

Each side, of the idealist/materialist argument, for its own motives, makes the mistake of assuming that consciousness is somehow not of this world but of a supernatural (i.e., non-natural) realm in another dimension; the only difference is that while idealists claim that the other dimension exists, the materialists claim that it doesn't. Both sides reject consciousness as being a legitimate part of this natural world. Peikoff writes:

"The facts, however, belie any equation of consciousness with mysticism. Consciousness is an attribute of perceived entities here on Earth. It is a faculty possessed under definite conditions by a certain group of living organisms. It is directly observable (by introspection). It has a specific nature, including specific physical organs, and acts accordingly, i.e., lawfully. It has a life-sustaining function: to perceive the facts of nature and thereby enable the organisms that possess it to act successfully. In all this there is nothing unnatural or supernatural. There is no basis for the suggestion that consciousness is separable from matter -- let alone opposed to it -- no hint of immortality, no kinship with any alleged transcendent realm.

"Like the faculty of vision (which is one of its aspects), and like the body, the faculty of awareness is wholly this-worldly. The soul, as Aristotle was the first (and so far one of the few) to understand, is not man's ticket to another reality; it is a development of and within nature. It is a biological datum open to observation, conceptualization, and scientific study."

How can anyone possibly write the above without reflecting on the possibility that consciousness, quite simply, is material, doing away with any need to posit a non-material spiritual component in the natural world? I might have stated exactly the same as an argument for monism.

The answer comes a couple paragraphs further down:

"As far as philosophic usage is concerned, 'matter' denotes merely the objects of extrospection or, more precisely, that of which all such objects are made."

Certainly, if we chose our terminology so as to exclude the observer's consciousness from being matter by definition, it follows that it's not material. But there is no particular reason to believe that this definition of matter is coterminus with "matter" as understood in physics. Indeed, I'd take the points about the naturality of consciousness above as weighty evidence of the opposite.

So, Objectivism asks me to accept dualism, but instead of offering some actual evidence it - or at least this article - presents a definition of "matter" that conveniently excludes the one thing whose existence we cannot self-consistently doubt. Clever, no doubt. But it gives me no reason to suppose there is any great gulf between "matter" and "non-matter", nor that there is no more elegant description that transcends the dualism by showing they are fundamentally the same. Indeed, Objectivism itself suggests a such framework by claiming that the "material" and the "spiritual" is both part of the "natural"*.

In short, I can't see that the article gave me any reason to disbelieve the notion that consciousness is a material phonomenon, if material is taken to refer to the matter known from physics.

* Incidentally, one might wonder what meaning "natural" might have in a system that categorically denies the existence of anything "supernatural". We don't expect to find "unnatural" atoms out there, do we? And "unnatural" cannot reasonably refer to the products of human consciousness either, since that is "natural" (according to Objectivism). Needless to say, the same applies to any concept that's meant to include all of existence.

 

[aneeshm]

Newfangle - there might be a way provided by physics itself to your free will problem .

The universe is not deterministic in nature . What happened one way did not have to happen that way . The quantum mechanical model states that there are no certainties with regard to the trajectories/states of a subatomic particle - only probabalities . The electronic impulses jumping around in our brain also have to be probabilistic in nature , not deterministic . Thus , free will is not deterministic even while obeying the laws of physics . The larger the entity , however , the smaller the probabilistic effect - gravity is nto affected much by probability , but sub-atomic particulte collision is .

Thus , had an electron behaved differently during the formation of the earth , our choices might have been different . We may not even have existed . Can an electronic impulse , then , not be probabalistic too ?



That also leads to the conclusion , strangely enough , that a true AI can only be programmed at a very small , physical , subatomic level , with thought being regulated physically instead of by a program in a deterministic reality ( that of the computer chip ) . What do you have to say about this ?

 

[The Last Conformist]

While QM kills off determinism, it's not obvious how this helps free will as commonly thought of - we don't feel our choices are random, do we? For those interested in the matter, however, I'd recommend reading Roger Penrose's books The Emperor's New Mind and The Shadows of the Mind.