Ah. Smart
Explanation for the Pirate Problem using reverse engineering:
A proposes: he gets all 100
B proposes: no matter what B proposes, A will reject so that he gets the entire treasure chest.
C proposes: A will always reject C so that he can then kill B and get it all. B will always accept C so that B at least gets to live. C can therefore propose [0, 0, 100] which will always pass.
D proposes: C will always reject D so he can propose his own deal. D needs 3 votes [himself, A, and B]. To get their votes he needs to give them more gold than they'd get from C. Therefore
D proposes [1, 1, 0, 98] which passes - because A and B get nothing if C gets to propose [since B will always vote for 0-0-100 so he at least gets to live], so A and B settle for 1 coin each.
That far I'm sure of - now what about E?