Oh my. I knew all the discussions, i had them on several forums. It's always about a penis competition. And it's always the same. Anyone who is in sympathy with USSR talks like you, many Hitler-romantics are talking about the poor and strong economy of Hitler-Germany. Really, I am sick of it.
I hope you do not interrupt my post as having a go at you. I was merely trying to contribute more info to this discussion. I have no particular bias to USSR, Germany or any major power during WWII and find all aspects interesting. The Eastern Front just happens to be a main focus of my curiosity in the last few years.
What I was hoping to do was set straight some of the misconceptions about the USSR and its capabilities during WII. I agree on your point about other historic forum discussions degenerating into a slinging match (one of the reasons I don't join those types of forums). Thus why I provided some starting links in my post to emphasis that my reply in no way was a flame starter, but a 'take a look and reconsider' post. Also, it is not smart of me to have a go at someone on a moderator's very own forum section.
how many steel was fabricated in USSR at the beginning of the war? How many Aluminium was produced?
Good questions. For those interested:
German Steel/Coal industry analysis:
http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/SteelCoal.html
Take note of comments around iron ore bottlenecks, Martin/Bessemer steel used for armaments and train capacity issues.
Soviet Industry Production:
http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/sovprod.html
Take note of dropping capacity due to disruption and evacuation of industry. Lend lease does play a key role here. However natural resources are quite high. Unlike Germany, fuel overall is not a real issue. Caucasus provided the bulk of the fuel but other oilfields were later exploited near Volga regions
Finally comparison of natural resources in 1937:
http://www.sturmvogel.orbat.com/resources.html
Good info for all ww2 modders.
Probably a better question is 'Did Germany have an advantage on the Eastern Front and was it a strategic advantage?
Here is a good read on this subject if interested:
http://www.feldgrau.com/dreichsbahn.html
Quantity does not necessarily dictate an advantage in this case.
Also here is a link to a discussion which does indeed revert into one of those measurement debates you mention

:
http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=132150
What's left are mighty ressources and productive capacities and last but not least many soldiers spread throughout the country. Take a look on the map of USSR und guess the distances.
Correct. This was what I was talking about. Germany had no real chance of conquering the USSR. Many now acknowledge this fact. The Soviets would have just kept moving back and the Germans would have continued to extend their supply lines. Thus exactly what you say but applied to the Germans. Don't forget that the German army relied primarily on horse transportation.
How would all the lets say thousands of T-34 get to the front?
The front on most cases was a few miles ahead and most vehicles were driven straight off the production line and into battle (Leningrad siege, Moscow siege, Stalingrad, Kharkov and so on). The Trans-Siberian and other Southern Ural lines provided the bulk capacity for Ural production sites. This question is probably more relevant for the Germans based on the previous rail link I provided.
How would all the soldiers survive or fight without 15 Million pairs of shoes and million tons of food and cloth? It would have been a total desaster in comparison to what it was actually.
From Colossus Reborn (David Glantz) (p441):
Although it obtained most of the Red Army's uniforms and other clothing from Soviet light industry, the clothing directorate also collected clothing voluntarily or on a requisition basis from workers in Soviet industry and civilians. For example, the UVS (Directorate for Clothing Supply) provided more than 38 million military greatcoats, 70 million sets of uniforms, 117 million sets of underwear, 64 million pairs of leather boots, 20 million padded jackets and quilted trousers, and 2 million sheepskin coats to the Red Army's troops during the war.
Hope this puts things into perspective with regards to clothing and boots. Also, the rough correlating strength at any given year for the total Red Army was around 8-10 million men.
On food, I wont quote at length from the same book, but summarize it as the Red Army soldier was always hungry and the problem was never resolved even towards the end of the war. To quote "
Red Army soldiers quickly learned how to survive on their own by developing the practice of scavenging to a high art". Vodka kept their minds off hunger and that is a known fact. It surprises me how a mostly drunk army conquered the world most professional army at the time!

. However, David Glantz does emphasis the contribution lend-lease made with food, but there was never enough of it to make a difference in this area.
Have a look at the pure numbers and guess what impact it would have on the production of your mentioned vehicles/guns/whatever, if you had to produce, support and organize all the stuff that was delivered by lend&lease.
USSR/Germany (39-45)
Aircraft: 158,218 / 117,881
Tanks: 105,232 / ~57,300
Artillery: 547,348 / ~92,000
Source: The Oxford Companion to World War II (p826)
The figure do the talking and thats not including Lend-Lease. From memory, lend-lease vehicles and aircraft contributed less that 10%. I could be wrong on this percentage
Hopefully this information provides some clarity and helps others who might be interested in these topics.