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The American defeat in Vietnam

YNCS

Ex-bubblehead
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In OT, in a discussion about gun control, someone made a comment about how the U.S. was defeated in Vietnam. He made the erroneous conclusion that the North Vietnamese military were victorious in the war. The following is an argument that the U.S. suffered a political, but not a military, defeat.

American troops were not defeated in Vietnam, but the American people refused to pay the price of victory. That's an important distinction. Several presidents got sucked into Vietnam because, first, they didn't want to offend France, and, later, no one wanted to risk appearing reluctant to confront Communist aggression. And make no mistake, the North Vietnamese were the aggressors in the war.

Once Lyndon Johnson realized he could not generate enough popular opinion to get the forces he knew he needed to win the war, he simply quit politics and retired. The next president, Richard Nixon, got elected on the promise to "get America out of Vietnam," and he did just that, although it took a long time. This is not without precedence. As early as the War of 1812, the American people showed a marked reluctance to support what it would take to win the war. In 1812, it was the conquest of Canada (or at least some parts of it). In 1952, Dwight Eisenhower got elected on the promise of "getting America out of Korea."

It takes a lot to get Americans into a war big time, always has, and probably always will. As the casualties mount and especially if there is no dramatic progress, public support quickly wanes. In our long wars, such as the Revolution, the Civil War, and World War II, it became very difficult to keep things going on the home front towards the end.

We still commemorate the harsh Winter of 1777-78, when George Washington pulled off a seeming miracle by keeping his army together during that season of discontent. Had Washington not been able to hold things together that winter, the British would have likely won the war the following spring and summer. During the Civil War the number of Union voters eager for a negotiated settlement grew as the 1864 elections approached. Abraham Lincoln had to jump through a lot of political hoops to head off the peace movement. Even WW2, seen as "the good war," found the American people quite warweary in 1945. Despite what many feel we should have thought then, the use of nuclear weapons was enthusiastically received by a people quite tired of war and its sacrifices.

There's little doubt the U.S. could have defeated the Vietnamese Communists, but it would have meant a risk of war with China and/or the USSR and the application of much more airpower and infantry. There might have been twice as many American dead and many more Vietnamese dead. Still, it was certainly possible. But too many of the people were not behind the war. That's how a democracy works. Sometimes you can't win, or don't want to win. That doesn't mean you're necessarily defeated, but you have to change your goals. This was successfully done in Korea, where the goals were changed from utter defeat of the North Koreans to resumption of the status quo ante. In 1964, America wanted to keep the Communists out of South Vietnam. By 1968, most Americans just wanted to keep Americans out of South Vietnam. The American people got what they wanted.
 
Very nice, I agree. however, you missed one part about Nixon and the aggressors: The invasion of Cambodia and the susequent Khmer Revolution. Other than that, your right on! :D

This instance of military victory over political one has come up often. The Korean War (a victory, for sure) was seen as less so by some because we were pushed back to the status quo. However, militarily, the Chinese lost 10 times more men in battle.

One could also look towards Somalia as another example. People claim it to be a defeat, but 1000 dead enemy combatant Somolis for 19 Americans is one of the best kill ratios in a battle in history, especially when one considers it was in hostile territory...in the capital, no less! Sure, it may have been politically disasterous, but we must ask ourselves this. Who makes it so disasterous?

It is obviously ourselves...the American public...plus the European public and democracies all across the globe. It happens, but it sure beats living under a dictatorship, eh?
 
I've heard that the government had the ability to negotiate an end to American involvement but Nixon convinced them to hold off on that so he could get elected on the premise of getting America out of Vietnam.

Is this true? If so, my already low opinion of Nixon drops even lower...

[Its pretty unrelated, but with a Vietnam thread, I thought I'd ask.]
 
Originally posted by cgannon64
I've heard that the government had the ability to negotiate an end to American involvement but Nixon convinced them to hold off on that so he could get elected on the premise of getting America out of Vietnam.

Not fair: the actual turn of events is probably the reverse of that.

0. Nixon is elected in 1968 on a promise that he has a plan to achieve "peace with honor" in Vietnam. He later articulates this as meaning that he won't simply abandon the country without strengthening it first, and begins withdrawing troops, to be replaced by beefed-up South Vietnamese forces - the so-called "Vietnamization" process, in which US-sponsored air power would be used to support an all-vietnamese ground force. Despite historical myths to the contrary, this policy largely succeeds in cases where the RSVN forces are defending territory near their homes. By 1972, most US soldiers in Vietnam are support personnel, pilots or advisors, although large units of marines remain in theatre. Nixon specifically states that 35,000 US troops will remain in Vietnam until the DRVN agrees to release US POWs; Hanoi refuses to do so until US troops are first withdrawn from South Vietnam.

1. Mid-1972, negotiations break off over the POW issue, and Hanoi's demand that it be allowed to keep troops in place in South Vietnamese territory. Hanoi launches a major offensive in March, which stalls - much as Tet did - in the face of US/RSVN air power applied at the conventional logistics net of the expanded North Vietnamese force operating in the south. Negotations resume, and Hanoi starts stalling in anticipation of the election, hoping that peace-now candidate McGovern will win (The North Vietnamese were actually legendary for manipulative negotiation tactics - given that they talked as long as they fought, the legend is clearly deserved).

2. Worse, the South Vietnamese start to balk at the deal. The Nixonites are paranoid that the South Vietnamese might want to break the negotiations up, and the North starts to publicly rant that the Americans are backing off. So, Kissinger stands up just days before the election to announce that negotiations are in fact going well and "peace is at hand."

3. Nixon wins in November by a landslide - but the polls suggest he would have won with or without Kissinger's claim.

4. The South Vietnamese come to the table with changes. Pissed, the North Vietnamese sit on their hands and stop negotiating, so Nixon bombs the *** out of Hanoi and Haiphong in December to force them back to the table, playing his "mad anti-commie" card. Despite bitter protests at this "Christmas bombing," the gambit works, and Hanoi comes back to the table and cuts a deal that has major compromises on both sides - but mostly on the Allied side. To make the deal stick in South Vietnam, Kissinger and Nixon guarantee US aid in the event that the North Vietnamese break the treaty.

5. In 1975, the NVA breaks the deal and attacks; Nixon is out of office; Congress petulantly votes to ban the provision of any aid to South Vietnam despite Nixon's guarantee, and although the South Vietnamese initially hold firm against the attacks, their forces melt as the loss of US supplies and assistance takes its toll on aircraft and ammunition stocks.

R.III
 
PS: re: the thread itself, (!) military action IS political, and so a political failure is a military failure. Why bother otherwise? Military action is taken to achieve things, not just to rack up body counts. The Carthaginians killed a lot of Romans, but the Romans founded the western world as we know it, and Carthage is a pretty pile of sand.

With that in mind, I think that US forces did very well against the North Vietnamese, and did best in situations like '68 and '72 when changes in NVA tactics made massive use of airpower against troop concentrations possible. However, it WAS a political failure - a failure based in large part on the fact that backing the better horse didn't mean backing the "right" one; the Southern regime was too corrupt in its existing form to win the popular support needed to save it - at home AND abroad. A lesson for future US soldiers and policymakers to consider. :D

R.III
 
Originally posted by Richard III
PS: re: the thread itself, (!) military action IS political, and so a political failure is a military failure.
The point of my initial post was that Vietnam was a political failure for the U.S. government but not a military failure.

In his book On Strategy, Harry G. Summers (a retired U.S. Army colonel and Vietnam War historian) describes a conversion he had at the end of the war with a North Vietnamese colonel:

Col. Summers: "You never defeated us on the battlefield."
Col. Tran: "This is probably true. It is also irrelevant."

For instance, Tet '68 was a crushing defeat for the North Vietnamese (DRV). On January 30, 1968 the traditional lunar new year holiday ("Tet" in Vietnamese) started. Shortly after midnight several cities were attacked and by noon on January 30 all U.S. and ARVN units were placed on maximum alert. At 0300 on January 31 the North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Viet Cong (VC) launched what became known as the Tet Offensive. Simultaneous attacks were made on Hué and other major cities, towns and military bases throughout South Vietnam. Initial media reports stated the that U.S. and ARVN (Army of the Republic of Vietnam) forces had been surprised and defeated.

But it was not the U.S. and ARVN that were defeated on the battlefield. It was the NVA and especially the VC. Their "general offensive and general uprising" had been a tactical disaster. Not only had their military forces been resoundingly defeated, but their ideological illusion that the South Vietnamese people would flock to their banner during the "general uprising" proved false. After Tet, the DRV realized that it would not be able to attain its political objectives with guerrilla forces and increasingly the war became an affair for the regular forces of the NVA.

But if the U.S. had won tactically, it suffered a fatal strategic blow. False expectations had been raised that the war was virtually won ("the light at the end of the tunnel"). Public opinion turned against the war. Tet cost the U.S. government and military the confidence of the American people. Not only did the American public turn against the war, but President Johnson seemed pyschologically defeated by the Tet Offensive. Challenged within his own party for renomination and with public support slipping away, he publically announced he would not seek reelection.

Although the war would continue for another seven years, the war for the support of the American people was lost on January 30, 1968. From then on, the problem was not how to win the war but how to disengage.
 
I concur entirely with the argument on it being a political defeat, rather than a military one. Linebacker II, even at the end of the US involvement, showed the capability and what could have been.
 
I agree with everything you've said YNCS, ditto Simon, but that's exactly my point. Clearly, North Vietnamese/VC forces were dealt a blow at Tet and in '72, ditto the earlier offensive (65?). But the US war EFFORT was dealt a bigger blow.

Reading a great book by a journalist who was there, "Big Story," essentially written to explain why reporters didn't get their facts straight in reporting the Vietnamese failure as a sign of strength.

R.III
 
France left Vietnam in the mid 50s by UN decree. The US then slowly expanded engagement in Vietnam as a corollary to the war on Communism rather than out of France's interest. The US inherited the role of policeman of Vietnam, but not colonial power in Vietnam.

The war in Korea was over w/ by the election of '52. Truman backed out of Korea to avoid having to expand that war to China (and then -- very possibly -- the USSR...) I would think it would be a non-issue on election day.

Truman, Kennedy and Johnson were hawkish because the Democratic party took a lot of political damage when China fell to Communism in '49. Imagine how
different the world would be in Dewey HAD defeated Truman in '48...

The gov't in S Vietnam was corrupt and it was hard to work up righteous enthusiasm for supporting them. Better, maybe, but not much better. And by the early 70s a WHOLE GENERATION realized that the anti-Communist propaganda it had been fed was an over-simplification. The N Vietnamese gov't was TERRIBLE, but by then the US gov't had already done much to erode faith in the propaganda against Communism because of obvious exaggerations that had been uncovered.

I don't know about you, but it would take a lot to convince me that it's in my interests to be overseas in a jungle fighting a war to protect a gov't that I don't even like all that much. It seems like those who suffer the most are the people caught in the crossfire. Objectively, peace is easier on a civilian population than war, even a tyrannical peace.
 
We lost the battle, but in the end, we're winning the war.

Vietnam is not rich, Vietnam is not free, and when they're building tanks, gulags, and guns, we're building amusement parks, stadiums, and skyscrapers.
 
Originally posted by Mojotronica
France left Vietnam in the mid 50s by UN decree.

You are too kind, sir. France doesn't have to obey UN decrees, since they can veto them. Ergo, a decree is a suggestion.

Rather, they left Vietnam in the mid 50s because they had gotten their asses kicked, per usual.

(referring to the usual result of colonial wars against the Vietnamese, of course ;) )

R.III
 
RIII laid it out pretty well, but I'd like to add an important military component in the American operations that contributed to the ultimate defeat:

Namely, that the military mission was ill-defined. The Geneva Agreement of 1955 partitioned Vietnam between North and South after the French disaster at Dien Bien Phu, and almost immediately the North began to working to destabilize the South. As RIII has already noted, a notoriously corrupt government in the South aided the communists' efforts, as did a traditional rivalry between northern and southern Vietnam, based on wealth and privilage. The U.S. under Eisenhower began to send advisors, and the American effort escalated under Kennedy and Johnson. The question at hand was, what was the U.S. military to accomplish in Vietnam? Obviously to save the South, but the only true way to have done so would have been a full-scale invasion of the North, and this the Americans never contemplated for political reasons. The source of the South's military instability lay in the North, both directly through its military forces and indirectly through the various insurgencies it supported. The U.S. made a massive commitment of men and materials to protect the South but as long as the North could operate freely, the South would not be safe or stable. This is a faulty military model. The U.S. won nearly every major military engagement of the war, but for naught.

Benderino wrote:

Very nice, I agree. however, you missed one part about Nixon and the aggressors: The invasion of Cambodia and the susequent Khmer Revolution.

Southeast Asia was seething with insurgencies and virtual civil wars by the late 1960s, quite independent of outside intervention. If you read this week's news headlines you can see the Hmong of northern Laos are being exterminated by the Laoatian government, a blow-back to some of the ethnic strife and bloodshed of the 1960s and 70s. It might help to remember that the Americans intervened in Laos and Cambodia because the North Vietnamese were already operating there, using these countries as supply routes and maneuvering grounds for attacks. They were able to do so in part because they aided communist insurgents or local authorities in these countries in their local ethnic wars. Both the communists and the Americans took advantage of this local strife by employing and arming local ethnic units who were as busy killing one another as the enemies their sponsors wanted them to.
 
War is simply a means of achieving political ends. If you invade my country and I want to kick you out, I don't care if I do it by killing all your soldiers, or if public opinion forces the army to go home. If you leave then I win.

I don't think you can separate the ability to fight and the will to fight. Both are required if you are to achieve victory.

I don't know of anyone who believes that the NVA would have won in a stand up fight in the USA, but Vietnam did show the world that if you kill enough american soldiers then the political will to fight is lost. The situation in Iraq appears to be confirming this perception.
 
Thank god - some sanity at last

As for this nonsense -


"We lost the battle, but in the end, we're winning the war.

Vietnam is not rich, Vietnam is not free, and when they're building tanks, gulags, and guns, we're building amusement parks, stadiums, and skyscrapers."


You consider yourselves STILL at war with Vietnam? You are SUCH bad losers... :rolleyes:
 
Perhaps poverty could have something to do with an American trade embargo that lasted for decades?

"if they really wanted to they could have drafted alot more and sent alot more there"

Yes, and the Brittish Empire still stands, 'cause if they really wanted to, they could have nuked all of Africa...and Iraq never got defeated, they just chose to not send every man woman and child in the country towards the US troops with bombs strapped to themselves...and Argentina never lost the Falklands, they just chose no to commit their entire army over there...

Going home to take a flame thrower to all history books I've ever read...
 
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