insurgent
Exhausted
NOTE: This is not meant as an article. I'd just like to hear your objections to this thesis.
WWI was not inevitable. It was the direct result of active and conscious decisions by European leaders in 1914.
It was not the result of imperialist or expansionist ambitions. When the war started, none of the major powers had imperialist ambitions with the war.
The pacifist and liberal British Asquith government did not have expansionist ambitions. It intended to maintain the balance of power and peace in Europe. Its imperial exploits in the Mideast and elsewhere came later.
The Russian government was too preoccupied with internal problems and strife to consider expanding the empire and thus increasing antagonism inside the empire.
The French government was of a pacifist leaning and desperately afraid of Germany. It had long abandoned its dreams of revanche and reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine.
Austria did in fact not attack Serbia to annex, neither fully nor partially. The Austrian government was terrified at the thought of increasing the number of Slav inhabitants.
Germany harboured no imperialist or expansionist intentions with the war. The famous September programme by Bethmann-Hollweg was from, as the name states, September and was thus a reaction to the war.
World War I was not a giant scheme by the elites of Europe to suppress and distract internal conflict. The perspectives of a war were far too grim and the dangers of internal strife were far too low in 1914 for that theory to stick.
World War I was the result of two sets of factors. First of all these were the reasons for the war between Austria and Serbia:
The Austrians were terrified at the prospects of a Piedmont in the Balkans - the Southern Slavs in Serbia were dangerously ambitious to the multicultural Austria. In this respect, the clash of nationalism with the old European systems of state was the dominant cause. Secondly, the Austrians were afraid that the Germans wouldn't support them against Russia if the Vienna government did not make haste and start a war to Germany's wishes. Whether they knew the full consequences of this is uncertain.
The Germans on the other side were different. The German emperor had allowed the hawks of German reactionaries come to power. His reasons for this were his personal emotions of paranoia and anger after the murder of his personal friend Franz Ferdinand. Furthermore, he was sure that the Russians were bluffing. The reactionary hawks, represented by Moltke and Falkenhayn, were, however, intentionally aiming at confrontation. They saw war as desirable because they feared the Russian threat to German power. They thought that war between the Teutons and the Slavs was inevitable, and they preferred to take the battle now rather than later, as they expected Russia to grow much stronger than Germany in the time to come.
The Russians thought the Germans were bluffing, as they were not ready for a war. Their armament plan was to finish in 1917, and they were still weak after the defeat and turmoil in 1905. They felt that they owed their Serbian friends a favour after the affair with Albania in 1913 after the Balkan Wars. Furthermore, Germany had backed down twice before in 1905 and 1911 and failed to back Austria fully in 1913. This was perfectly normal power play by the Russians.
So, what basically caused the war? The direct and conscious actions of a prominent of Prussians in the German leadership.
It is quite likely that this faction of war hawks would have influenced the same development almost no matter how the social and economic conditions were.
Nationalism had little to do with the Great War per se. It was used as motivation after the explosion, but it was not a cause. The development of British popular opinion clearly illustrates this.
So, is this naïve? Wrong?
WWI was not inevitable. It was the direct result of active and conscious decisions by European leaders in 1914.
It was not the result of imperialist or expansionist ambitions. When the war started, none of the major powers had imperialist ambitions with the war.
The pacifist and liberal British Asquith government did not have expansionist ambitions. It intended to maintain the balance of power and peace in Europe. Its imperial exploits in the Mideast and elsewhere came later.
The Russian government was too preoccupied with internal problems and strife to consider expanding the empire and thus increasing antagonism inside the empire.
The French government was of a pacifist leaning and desperately afraid of Germany. It had long abandoned its dreams of revanche and reconquest of Alsace-Lorraine.
Austria did in fact not attack Serbia to annex, neither fully nor partially. The Austrian government was terrified at the thought of increasing the number of Slav inhabitants.
Germany harboured no imperialist or expansionist intentions with the war. The famous September programme by Bethmann-Hollweg was from, as the name states, September and was thus a reaction to the war.
World War I was not a giant scheme by the elites of Europe to suppress and distract internal conflict. The perspectives of a war were far too grim and the dangers of internal strife were far too low in 1914 for that theory to stick.
World War I was the result of two sets of factors. First of all these were the reasons for the war between Austria and Serbia:
The Austrians were terrified at the prospects of a Piedmont in the Balkans - the Southern Slavs in Serbia were dangerously ambitious to the multicultural Austria. In this respect, the clash of nationalism with the old European systems of state was the dominant cause. Secondly, the Austrians were afraid that the Germans wouldn't support them against Russia if the Vienna government did not make haste and start a war to Germany's wishes. Whether they knew the full consequences of this is uncertain.
The Germans on the other side were different. The German emperor had allowed the hawks of German reactionaries come to power. His reasons for this were his personal emotions of paranoia and anger after the murder of his personal friend Franz Ferdinand. Furthermore, he was sure that the Russians were bluffing. The reactionary hawks, represented by Moltke and Falkenhayn, were, however, intentionally aiming at confrontation. They saw war as desirable because they feared the Russian threat to German power. They thought that war between the Teutons and the Slavs was inevitable, and they preferred to take the battle now rather than later, as they expected Russia to grow much stronger than Germany in the time to come.
The Russians thought the Germans were bluffing, as they were not ready for a war. Their armament plan was to finish in 1917, and they were still weak after the defeat and turmoil in 1905. They felt that they owed their Serbian friends a favour after the affair with Albania in 1913 after the Balkan Wars. Furthermore, Germany had backed down twice before in 1905 and 1911 and failed to back Austria fully in 1913. This was perfectly normal power play by the Russians.
So, what basically caused the war? The direct and conscious actions of a prominent of Prussians in the German leadership.
It is quite likely that this faction of war hawks would have influenced the same development almost no matter how the social and economic conditions were.
Nationalism had little to do with the Great War per se. It was used as motivation after the explosion, but it was not a cause. The development of British popular opinion clearly illustrates this.
So, is this naïve? Wrong?
