I doubt anyone will want too but here is the essay that i wrote on the subject.
An unintended by-product of business enterprise'. Do you agree with this description of the VOC Empire in this period?
Unlike both their Iberian rivals, the Dutch became a great colonial power because of their economic success not vice versa argues Price but to what extent can the territory taken by the VOC be considered an empire? Certainly the territories captured by the Company were taken as a means to increase the commercial viability of the monopoly they were aiming to exploit at that particular time, and not through a desire to increase their territorial holdings. Jan Pieterszoon Coen stated that trade could not be conducted without war nor war without trade, but war didnt occur between the United Provinces and the Indonesian peoples, the VOC had the power to defend itself and its monopolies but was not able to pursue an offensive war, in the Dutch name at least. The unintended by-product of business enterprise, certainly, a fully-fledged empire however, it was not. The territories that were supposedly part of the VOC Empire in this period would arguably not become part of an Empire till the VOC itself collapsed. Though Kamen argues it was a period when the foundations of Europes domination of the world economy were laid .
The United provinces had only sought to acquire their independence less than forty years prior to the establishment of the Company. In an attempt to gain economic and social freedom from Spain and the ruling Hapsburg family controlling it coupled with a desire to join in on the growing trade with Asia. The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) was established in 1602 and became the worlds first multinational corporation issuing stock. The Company was guaranteed a monopoly, by the Dutch government, of trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. Prior to the Companys establishment there were upwards of twenty different companies attempting this trade route, Boxer states that it was obvious that these pioneer companies were getting in each others way, and that their internecine competition tended to increase purchase prices in Asia and threatened to lower sale prices in Europe. Thus, seeking a way to guarantee the economic security of the state, the VOC was founded. With backers from all of over the United Provinces but the majority of the initial capital came from Amsterdam, the Company was presided over by the Heeren XVII based in Europe with the Governor General position eventually created to directly control matters. Eventually however, capital would be raised in other countries for the Dutch East India Company leading to the questioning of where the VOC allegiances lay.
Nijman argues that The nature of the Companys presence in Asia varied from place to place, and time to time. An empires presence however, should not theoretically differ from place to place but also an empire should be governed by the ruler of another country or appointed officials. In this case though, agents of the VOC rather than appointments made by the United Provinces governed any territorial conquests made by the company. Whilst there can be little argument that the territorial conquests were in turn changed to colonies, with the exception of the Boers in Africa, few Dutch actually left the United Provinces with the ideals with which colonists left England for America in later during years of religious persecution with McFarlane arguing that The Dutch were, however, always more interested in trading bases than agrarian settlements.
Geyl states that In profits of the spice monopoly the Company saw the only source from which to make good the heavy charges involved in the system of territorial rule, arguing that the Company needed the monopolies garnered from conquests of Indonesian kingdoms to maintain their presence. To an extent this is true but his argument that they desired the territory and then needed the profits resulting from this to support it is the opposite of the majority of other historians arguments including Parry. He argues the opposite of this, that the Company needed the territory to support the growing commercial empire. Parry points to the eighteen percent annual dividend paid on average over the Companys lifetime to shareholders highlighting how the VOC was more than solvent thus not needing the territory to increase profits.
Parry argues that the trade of the Indian mainland was, for the Dutch, secondary to the more lucrative trade with the East Indies. He argues that the trade from India was possibly just as lucrative but it was a lot harder to gain a monopoly on products from India when the majority of European and Middle Eastern powers were trading there, coupled with a dominant Mughal empire which regulated trade with Europeans up until its collapse in the mid eighteenth century. Thus, the VOC duly turned their attention to the East Indies where their only competition was a waning Portuguese shipping empire and later, once the Company had firmly established itself, the English East India Company. Trading posts were quickly established in Indonesia; Jayakarta in 1610 and Banten in 1611.
Jan Pieterszoon Coen was appointed Governor General in 1614, described by Geyl as The Man under whose direction this struggle with fortune was undertaken and the founder of the Netherlands colonial Empire. He took a substantially more militant approach than the VOC was used too, in 1618 he drove the majority of the natives out of Jayakarta renaming it Batavia and transforming the already established Dutch trading post into a fort. However, there wasnt the surge in demand for territorial conquest by the Heeren XVII nor Coens successors as he would have hoped, Boxer states that The Heeren XVII-though they gave their belated approval to his conquest of Jakarta- nor many of his successors had any intention of transforming the Dutch East India Company from a purely commercial concern into a largely territorial power.
Coen quickly tried to establish a monopoly over the cloves coming from Indonesia. He attacked the Bandy islands, destroying the majority of the native population expecting Dutch settlers to come and re-settle the area giving the Dutch the monopoly on Cloves it desired. Crucially however, the VOC differed from the government of the United Provinces, if this had been a government-run Company then perhaps the government would have encouraged settlers to re-settle the islands, as it was, the Heeren XVII did not want open ended financial business, preferring to trade for the materials they wanted rather than directly produce them with Dutch Labour.
In 1652 the Company settled an outpost at the Cape of Good Hope; The McNeills argue that this was done because the natives could not provide the supplies they needed for their long voyages, and by the 1670s brought farmers to the Cape, making it into an agricultural colony. The native population was later indirectly wiped out by the Dutch due to their introduction of Smallpox; the establishment of the colony is probably the only time in the VOCs history where they founded the colony with the intention of moving Dutch citizens to it and its actual realisation of it. However, the founding of the colony was directly as a result of the need to re-supply their vessels coming from the East, there was little motive for the founding of the colony for the sake of territorial expansion of the Dutch Empire.
Wilson argues that even with Coens capture of Batavia territorial conquest remained limited-in Asia to Java, The Moluccas and Ceylon, all of these were directly linked with either the increase in commercial success of the Company or the destruction of commercial opportunities of their rivals, in this case primarily the Portuguese. Crucially among these, was the capture of the Portuguese held city of Malacca, which in 1641 had been the main Portuguese base for trade with China and Japan and was crucial naval base for a blockade of the Malay Straits. Russell-Wood argues that the Portuguese control of these key points was crucial to the maintenance of a Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean and Beyond.
Following Philip IIs of Spains accession to throne of Portugal the Dutch were at war with both Portugal and Spain, therefore Russell-Wood argues that the seventeenth century was characterized by Dutch incursions and inroads onto Portuguese turf, that Portuguese country traders were hard hit by competition from the Dutch and English East India companies, Dutch traders with no Company affiliation, and piracy. Boxer goes a step further and argues that one of the primary reasons for the establishment of the VOC was to curtail Portuguese trade. Though the destruction of Portuguese merchant shipping in the area would have been an attractive proposition for the Dutch government, as it would have directly influenced the Spanish crown they were attempting to gain independence from, it can only be a secondary reason. As, although the VOC was tightly linked to the government, there were a lot of investors involved who were arguably, not interested in the war with Spain and were more concerned with their economic prosperity.
Parry argues that the Dutch simply did not want an Empire by this point so any that did happen were by accident, he states that The Dutch East India Company, like most trading corporations, at first acquired territorial possessions slowly and with reluctance. Crucially, he argues that the Dutch had noticed and learnt from the mistakes of the Portuguese. That often it was not commercially viable for an Empire to be created; therefore any territory they acquired was done with the greatest care and only if there was a commercial benefit behind it, and not in the cases of other empires to obtain the territory and then see if any commercial enterprise could be maintained there. Boxer supports this view adding that The Dutch were content to secure a dominant commercial position by making treaties or contracts with the coastal sultans.
Ultimately, the VOC was a very successful corporation during its early years navigating the difficult Asian trade by establishing trade routes between Asian communities, with over eighty five ships exclusively devoted to trade within Asia, in an attempt to gain capital to buy the products which were desired in Europe rather than use up their limited supply of bullion, including the establishment of the only European trading port in Japan at Dejima. With Kamen arguing that the concentration of mercantile capital promoted the wealth and position of the trading classes, stimulated industry and enhanced the power and prestige of the state, the VOC was certainly vital to the supremacy of the early Dutch nation during this period with Boxer stating that Dutch East and West India Companies-more especially the former-were chief pillar, prop and stay of the commercial prosperity of the United Provinces.
Price argues that the impact the VOC made on the Dutch economy was negligible; that the effect the Company had on the survival of the United Provinces was unimportant. Though the VOC would later decline in the eighteenth century its importance to the survival of the Dutch state cannot be underestimated, not only through the money it brought in to the country, often accounting for over fifteen percent of the countrys national trade but the effect it had on its rivals economies, primarily the Portuguese was devastating, effectively ending any major Portuguese presence in the East.
Parry however differentiates between the empire of Spain and the Dutch, he states that that Spains conquests in the New World meant that No other military outcome, in the long run, was possible, The majority of Company holdings were quite the opposite of that. The VOC were unable to make large inroads into India as they no longer had the support of their navy and the general insecurity in their apparent holdings were apparent with frequent expulsions from certain areas such as Taiwan. Their holdings were also only theirs so long as another major power took no interest in them, highlighted by the loss of almost all their holdings to the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic wars. Parry calls the Dutch Empire a Sea Empire, claiming that instead of ruling the land in a fashion similar to that of Spain they instead held certain key areas allowing them to regulate trade throughout Asia.
Russell-Wood follows a similar argument, he states that a Portuguese noblemen could earn his spurs on the battlefields of North Africa or India, travel extensively east of Goa on official or Semi-official business, stating that Portuguese trade differentiated between that of the Dutch in that it was all official whereas the VOC was specifically not part of the Dutch government. Therefore, the supposed colonies of Dutch rule were not actually presided over by state appointed officials but by Company appointed officials, differing to established colonies of Spain, Portugal and later England and France whose states would appoint people to rule. Bruijn supports this; he argues that the Dutch navy differed entirely to the VOC merchant fleet. Therefore with this difference he argues, that the corporation could never be rulers of an Empire as the only time any merchant shipping was protected by the navy was when it arrived in the Channel, even then it was only to protect against pirates and done for all shipping that arrived in Dutch ports not exclusively the VOC.
Boxer argues that Dutch domination of Malayan and Indonesian waters was being seriously undermined in many regions by the phenomenal growth of smuggling and piracy. Whilst Parry takes the argument further regarding Coens claim that he ruled the majority of islands surrounding the Indian ocean and Indonesia He could not enforce his claim, and neither the directors nor the Indonesian princes took it seriously; indeed throughout much of the seventeenth century the Dutch could not wander far from the town without danger from Bantamese dacoits. Highlighting the lack of control the VOC had on the islands they claimed to hold dominion over but also little control on the shipping lanes surrounding the islands it did have some measure of control over, there were simply too many shipping lanes for the Company to adequately patrol. The VOC empire was therefore not a territorial empire, during the early modern period as it held very little territory it could adequately control, whilst if, as Parry states it was a sea empire, it should be able to adequately stop piracy or the effects of piracy should be negligible to an established empire but the Company couldnt control piracy and the effects piracy had on breaking the monopoly the VOC held can be seen as the prime reason for its collapse at the end of the eighteenth century.
Constitutionally the VOC was not Dutch as the Company expressly requested, this allowed it to make war on Portuguese colonies in Indonesia whilst the Dutch nation was itself at peace with Portugal, though Price states that they fatally undermined the Portuguese trading position, Schnurmann argues that this was a self imposed task, done not for the benefit of the Dutch state at all but for the progression of the Company. Though to an extent it may be true that the Company was wholly focused on profit, the increasingly close relationship between merchants and burgesses puts some strain on this argument as the majority of leading shareholders in the VOC were based in Amsterdam and the majority of Burgesses of the United Provinces were at one time practicing merchants.
Having the Company as a multinational was a bonus in some cases, but it also had negative effects in that the property that owned by the VOC was not exclusively Dutch, as the Heeren XVII told the States-General; The places and strongholds which they had captured in the East Indies should not be regarded as national conquests but as the property of private merchants, who were entitled to sell those places to whomsoever they wished, even if it was to the King of Spain, or to some other enemy of the United Provinces.
The VOC controlled similar territory to that which the Portuguese had controlled decades before. Unlike the Portuguese however, they sought to gain money through trade with these places rather than the charges put on shipping travelling through the areas controlled. The gradual increase in territory was as a result of this drive for money and was certainly not intended to accumulate the basis of an empire. The areas they controlled directly however were coastal cities being likened by contemporaries as crabs on the shore often refusing to move inland but maintaining their monopolies via their navy, highlighting their lack of desire for an Empire.
The VOC simply, didnt desire an Empire believing that the cost was too much to maintain, stressing how easy it was for the Portuguese strongholds to crumble when the Company was able to attack each one individually, the area the Company directly controlled was relatively small and very few colonists left the United provinces to establish colonies with the VOC empire except in the case of the Cape of Good Hope. Crucially however, the VOC was not a governmental power; it had been given pseudo-governmental powers but only to an extent. It was not directly linked with any country, being a multi-national corporation with the Heeren XVII not directly subordinating themselves to the States-Generals and one of the key components of an empire being an empire is that a Monarch, a state or a government, rules it. The territories controlled by the VOC would later become part of the Dutch Empire after their return by England following the fourth Anglo-Dutch war. During the golden age of the VOC Empire however, the territories acquired by the Company, though only obtained almost by accident as an attempt to increase profits, were not large enough, governed correctly enough nor for the most part thought of by their owners as an empire enough to be considered a VOC Empire.
Seemed to go ok the essay, managed to bump up my entire term grade by about 5 or 6 points and seeing as its only worth about 20% i figure it went well. Anyways, thoughts? (not too many i hope because i've forgotton most of the exact detail!)
Spoiler :
An unintended by-product of business enterprise'. Do you agree with this description of the VOC Empire in this period?
Unlike both their Iberian rivals, the Dutch became a great colonial power because of their economic success not vice versa argues Price but to what extent can the territory taken by the VOC be considered an empire? Certainly the territories captured by the Company were taken as a means to increase the commercial viability of the monopoly they were aiming to exploit at that particular time, and not through a desire to increase their territorial holdings. Jan Pieterszoon Coen stated that trade could not be conducted without war nor war without trade, but war didnt occur between the United Provinces and the Indonesian peoples, the VOC had the power to defend itself and its monopolies but was not able to pursue an offensive war, in the Dutch name at least. The unintended by-product of business enterprise, certainly, a fully-fledged empire however, it was not. The territories that were supposedly part of the VOC Empire in this period would arguably not become part of an Empire till the VOC itself collapsed. Though Kamen argues it was a period when the foundations of Europes domination of the world economy were laid .
The United provinces had only sought to acquire their independence less than forty years prior to the establishment of the Company. In an attempt to gain economic and social freedom from Spain and the ruling Hapsburg family controlling it coupled with a desire to join in on the growing trade with Asia. The Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie (VOC) was established in 1602 and became the worlds first multinational corporation issuing stock. The Company was guaranteed a monopoly, by the Dutch government, of trade east of the Cape of Good Hope. Prior to the Companys establishment there were upwards of twenty different companies attempting this trade route, Boxer states that it was obvious that these pioneer companies were getting in each others way, and that their internecine competition tended to increase purchase prices in Asia and threatened to lower sale prices in Europe. Thus, seeking a way to guarantee the economic security of the state, the VOC was founded. With backers from all of over the United Provinces but the majority of the initial capital came from Amsterdam, the Company was presided over by the Heeren XVII based in Europe with the Governor General position eventually created to directly control matters. Eventually however, capital would be raised in other countries for the Dutch East India Company leading to the questioning of where the VOC allegiances lay.
Nijman argues that The nature of the Companys presence in Asia varied from place to place, and time to time. An empires presence however, should not theoretically differ from place to place but also an empire should be governed by the ruler of another country or appointed officials. In this case though, agents of the VOC rather than appointments made by the United Provinces governed any territorial conquests made by the company. Whilst there can be little argument that the territorial conquests were in turn changed to colonies, with the exception of the Boers in Africa, few Dutch actually left the United Provinces with the ideals with which colonists left England for America in later during years of religious persecution with McFarlane arguing that The Dutch were, however, always more interested in trading bases than agrarian settlements.
Geyl states that In profits of the spice monopoly the Company saw the only source from which to make good the heavy charges involved in the system of territorial rule, arguing that the Company needed the monopolies garnered from conquests of Indonesian kingdoms to maintain their presence. To an extent this is true but his argument that they desired the territory and then needed the profits resulting from this to support it is the opposite of the majority of other historians arguments including Parry. He argues the opposite of this, that the Company needed the territory to support the growing commercial empire. Parry points to the eighteen percent annual dividend paid on average over the Companys lifetime to shareholders highlighting how the VOC was more than solvent thus not needing the territory to increase profits.
Parry argues that the trade of the Indian mainland was, for the Dutch, secondary to the more lucrative trade with the East Indies. He argues that the trade from India was possibly just as lucrative but it was a lot harder to gain a monopoly on products from India when the majority of European and Middle Eastern powers were trading there, coupled with a dominant Mughal empire which regulated trade with Europeans up until its collapse in the mid eighteenth century. Thus, the VOC duly turned their attention to the East Indies where their only competition was a waning Portuguese shipping empire and later, once the Company had firmly established itself, the English East India Company. Trading posts were quickly established in Indonesia; Jayakarta in 1610 and Banten in 1611.
Jan Pieterszoon Coen was appointed Governor General in 1614, described by Geyl as The Man under whose direction this struggle with fortune was undertaken and the founder of the Netherlands colonial Empire. He took a substantially more militant approach than the VOC was used too, in 1618 he drove the majority of the natives out of Jayakarta renaming it Batavia and transforming the already established Dutch trading post into a fort. However, there wasnt the surge in demand for territorial conquest by the Heeren XVII nor Coens successors as he would have hoped, Boxer states that The Heeren XVII-though they gave their belated approval to his conquest of Jakarta- nor many of his successors had any intention of transforming the Dutch East India Company from a purely commercial concern into a largely territorial power.
Coen quickly tried to establish a monopoly over the cloves coming from Indonesia. He attacked the Bandy islands, destroying the majority of the native population expecting Dutch settlers to come and re-settle the area giving the Dutch the monopoly on Cloves it desired. Crucially however, the VOC differed from the government of the United Provinces, if this had been a government-run Company then perhaps the government would have encouraged settlers to re-settle the islands, as it was, the Heeren XVII did not want open ended financial business, preferring to trade for the materials they wanted rather than directly produce them with Dutch Labour.
In 1652 the Company settled an outpost at the Cape of Good Hope; The McNeills argue that this was done because the natives could not provide the supplies they needed for their long voyages, and by the 1670s brought farmers to the Cape, making it into an agricultural colony. The native population was later indirectly wiped out by the Dutch due to their introduction of Smallpox; the establishment of the colony is probably the only time in the VOCs history where they founded the colony with the intention of moving Dutch citizens to it and its actual realisation of it. However, the founding of the colony was directly as a result of the need to re-supply their vessels coming from the East, there was little motive for the founding of the colony for the sake of territorial expansion of the Dutch Empire.
Wilson argues that even with Coens capture of Batavia territorial conquest remained limited-in Asia to Java, The Moluccas and Ceylon, all of these were directly linked with either the increase in commercial success of the Company or the destruction of commercial opportunities of their rivals, in this case primarily the Portuguese. Crucially among these, was the capture of the Portuguese held city of Malacca, which in 1641 had been the main Portuguese base for trade with China and Japan and was crucial naval base for a blockade of the Malay Straits. Russell-Wood argues that the Portuguese control of these key points was crucial to the maintenance of a Portuguese presence in the Indian Ocean and Beyond.
Following Philip IIs of Spains accession to throne of Portugal the Dutch were at war with both Portugal and Spain, therefore Russell-Wood argues that the seventeenth century was characterized by Dutch incursions and inroads onto Portuguese turf, that Portuguese country traders were hard hit by competition from the Dutch and English East India companies, Dutch traders with no Company affiliation, and piracy. Boxer goes a step further and argues that one of the primary reasons for the establishment of the VOC was to curtail Portuguese trade. Though the destruction of Portuguese merchant shipping in the area would have been an attractive proposition for the Dutch government, as it would have directly influenced the Spanish crown they were attempting to gain independence from, it can only be a secondary reason. As, although the VOC was tightly linked to the government, there were a lot of investors involved who were arguably, not interested in the war with Spain and were more concerned with their economic prosperity.
Parry argues that the Dutch simply did not want an Empire by this point so any that did happen were by accident, he states that The Dutch East India Company, like most trading corporations, at first acquired territorial possessions slowly and with reluctance. Crucially, he argues that the Dutch had noticed and learnt from the mistakes of the Portuguese. That often it was not commercially viable for an Empire to be created; therefore any territory they acquired was done with the greatest care and only if there was a commercial benefit behind it, and not in the cases of other empires to obtain the territory and then see if any commercial enterprise could be maintained there. Boxer supports this view adding that The Dutch were content to secure a dominant commercial position by making treaties or contracts with the coastal sultans.
Ultimately, the VOC was a very successful corporation during its early years navigating the difficult Asian trade by establishing trade routes between Asian communities, with over eighty five ships exclusively devoted to trade within Asia, in an attempt to gain capital to buy the products which were desired in Europe rather than use up their limited supply of bullion, including the establishment of the only European trading port in Japan at Dejima. With Kamen arguing that the concentration of mercantile capital promoted the wealth and position of the trading classes, stimulated industry and enhanced the power and prestige of the state, the VOC was certainly vital to the supremacy of the early Dutch nation during this period with Boxer stating that Dutch East and West India Companies-more especially the former-were chief pillar, prop and stay of the commercial prosperity of the United Provinces.
Price argues that the impact the VOC made on the Dutch economy was negligible; that the effect the Company had on the survival of the United Provinces was unimportant. Though the VOC would later decline in the eighteenth century its importance to the survival of the Dutch state cannot be underestimated, not only through the money it brought in to the country, often accounting for over fifteen percent of the countrys national trade but the effect it had on its rivals economies, primarily the Portuguese was devastating, effectively ending any major Portuguese presence in the East.
Parry however differentiates between the empire of Spain and the Dutch, he states that that Spains conquests in the New World meant that No other military outcome, in the long run, was possible, The majority of Company holdings were quite the opposite of that. The VOC were unable to make large inroads into India as they no longer had the support of their navy and the general insecurity in their apparent holdings were apparent with frequent expulsions from certain areas such as Taiwan. Their holdings were also only theirs so long as another major power took no interest in them, highlighted by the loss of almost all their holdings to the United Kingdom during the Napoleonic wars. Parry calls the Dutch Empire a Sea Empire, claiming that instead of ruling the land in a fashion similar to that of Spain they instead held certain key areas allowing them to regulate trade throughout Asia.
Russell-Wood follows a similar argument, he states that a Portuguese noblemen could earn his spurs on the battlefields of North Africa or India, travel extensively east of Goa on official or Semi-official business, stating that Portuguese trade differentiated between that of the Dutch in that it was all official whereas the VOC was specifically not part of the Dutch government. Therefore, the supposed colonies of Dutch rule were not actually presided over by state appointed officials but by Company appointed officials, differing to established colonies of Spain, Portugal and later England and France whose states would appoint people to rule. Bruijn supports this; he argues that the Dutch navy differed entirely to the VOC merchant fleet. Therefore with this difference he argues, that the corporation could never be rulers of an Empire as the only time any merchant shipping was protected by the navy was when it arrived in the Channel, even then it was only to protect against pirates and done for all shipping that arrived in Dutch ports not exclusively the VOC.
Boxer argues that Dutch domination of Malayan and Indonesian waters was being seriously undermined in many regions by the phenomenal growth of smuggling and piracy. Whilst Parry takes the argument further regarding Coens claim that he ruled the majority of islands surrounding the Indian ocean and Indonesia He could not enforce his claim, and neither the directors nor the Indonesian princes took it seriously; indeed throughout much of the seventeenth century the Dutch could not wander far from the town without danger from Bantamese dacoits. Highlighting the lack of control the VOC had on the islands they claimed to hold dominion over but also little control on the shipping lanes surrounding the islands it did have some measure of control over, there were simply too many shipping lanes for the Company to adequately patrol. The VOC empire was therefore not a territorial empire, during the early modern period as it held very little territory it could adequately control, whilst if, as Parry states it was a sea empire, it should be able to adequately stop piracy or the effects of piracy should be negligible to an established empire but the Company couldnt control piracy and the effects piracy had on breaking the monopoly the VOC held can be seen as the prime reason for its collapse at the end of the eighteenth century.
Constitutionally the VOC was not Dutch as the Company expressly requested, this allowed it to make war on Portuguese colonies in Indonesia whilst the Dutch nation was itself at peace with Portugal, though Price states that they fatally undermined the Portuguese trading position, Schnurmann argues that this was a self imposed task, done not for the benefit of the Dutch state at all but for the progression of the Company. Though to an extent it may be true that the Company was wholly focused on profit, the increasingly close relationship between merchants and burgesses puts some strain on this argument as the majority of leading shareholders in the VOC were based in Amsterdam and the majority of Burgesses of the United Provinces were at one time practicing merchants.
Having the Company as a multinational was a bonus in some cases, but it also had negative effects in that the property that owned by the VOC was not exclusively Dutch, as the Heeren XVII told the States-General; The places and strongholds which they had captured in the East Indies should not be regarded as national conquests but as the property of private merchants, who were entitled to sell those places to whomsoever they wished, even if it was to the King of Spain, or to some other enemy of the United Provinces.
The VOC controlled similar territory to that which the Portuguese had controlled decades before. Unlike the Portuguese however, they sought to gain money through trade with these places rather than the charges put on shipping travelling through the areas controlled. The gradual increase in territory was as a result of this drive for money and was certainly not intended to accumulate the basis of an empire. The areas they controlled directly however were coastal cities being likened by contemporaries as crabs on the shore often refusing to move inland but maintaining their monopolies via their navy, highlighting their lack of desire for an Empire.
The VOC simply, didnt desire an Empire believing that the cost was too much to maintain, stressing how easy it was for the Portuguese strongholds to crumble when the Company was able to attack each one individually, the area the Company directly controlled was relatively small and very few colonists left the United provinces to establish colonies with the VOC empire except in the case of the Cape of Good Hope. Crucially however, the VOC was not a governmental power; it had been given pseudo-governmental powers but only to an extent. It was not directly linked with any country, being a multi-national corporation with the Heeren XVII not directly subordinating themselves to the States-Generals and one of the key components of an empire being an empire is that a Monarch, a state or a government, rules it. The territories controlled by the VOC would later become part of the Dutch Empire after their return by England following the fourth Anglo-Dutch war. During the golden age of the VOC Empire however, the territories acquired by the Company, though only obtained almost by accident as an attempt to increase profits, were not large enough, governed correctly enough nor for the most part thought of by their owners as an empire enough to be considered a VOC Empire.
Seemed to go ok the essay, managed to bump up my entire term grade by about 5 or 6 points and seeing as its only worth about 20% i figure it went well. Anyways, thoughts? (not too many i hope because i've forgotton most of the exact detail!)
