Once the decision had been made to intervene in Korea, a commander had to be selected for the forces to be sent there. The first choice had been Lin Biao, who had successfully directed the campaign to seize Manchuria during the civil war and had the reputation of having never lost a single battle. The 13th Army Group that was to be deployed in Korea was also from his original command; part of the forces he had raised in Manchuria during his campaign there. However, he opted out, on the pretext of illness. Lin Biao had been one of those who strongly opposed fighting the Americans.
Instead, Peng Dehuai was given the command. Peng had joined the Communists way back in 1928. He joined up with Mao soon after and fought alongside him to defend the Jiangxi Soviet for 6 years, before participating in the legendary Long March, as the commander of the advance guard. In Yenan, he was the commander of the First Front Army, with Mao as the political commissar. After the Red Army was reorganized into the 8th Route Army (after the Xi'an Incident and the forced common front with the KMT against the Japanese invaders) in 1937, he was assigned as the deputy commander. In 1940, he launched the 'Hundred Regiments Campaign' to attack the Japanese positions, but this eventually failed after the Japanese counter-launched their 'kill all, burn all, destroy all' campaign.
After the Japanese were defeated, Peng was assigned to NW China and Inner Mongolia to accept the surrender of Japanese units in this vast region. When the civil war resumed, he remained in command there and fought a difficult and eventually successful campaign to destroy the KMT armies in the region. Peng was a competent military tactician and organizer, but was considered as only an average strategist. He was supremely loyal to Mao, having supported him during critical phases in the long struggle but he never hesitated to speak out when he disagreed with Mao. (This eventually led to his downfall in the years after the Korean War.) He was apparently also popular in the army and well-known for his concern for the well-being of his men.
On 8 Oct, Peng flew to Shenyang (formerly Mukden) and took command of the NEFF, now redesignated as the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). The plan for now was to fight north of the 38th parallel, and engaged any forces crossing the 38th. Then in spring, when the CPV had been equipped (the Soviets were expected to provide up-to-date arms and equipment), they would launch a counteroffensive and drive the US forces out. The CPV was to begin moving into N Korea on 15 Oct.
Peng only learned then of the actual estimates of the forces he would be facing (the front-line UNC force was estimated to be at 130,000; the total in all Korea was estimated to be at 400,000). Urged by his Army commanders, he requested that the 9th and 19th Army Groups to be moved earlier, and that another Army should be sent to cover him. The original plan of sending only 6 divisions into N Korea was also scrapped - all 12 would cross at one go. Mao approved.
Then the Soviets broke their word. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao had flown to Russia earlier and met with Stalin at his Black Sea villa. After much diplomatic maneuvering, Stalin finally agreed to send materiel, but not troops or air forces. Zhou flew to Moscow again on 12 Oct and was shocked to learn that the Soviets had changed their minds. The military materiel would not be forthcoming. So much for the Communist brotherhood. Zhou notified Beijing immediately.
Mao quickly halted all movements, while the Chinese again agonized on whether to continue. Peng was recalled to Beijing for an emergency meeting. For the next 2 days, the Chinese continued agonizing and reviewing all their plans. Eventually, Mao managed to prevail upon the Politburo to continue with the plans. He had believed that armed conflict with the US was inevitable and had never believed the US pledge not to assist the KMT (the 7th Fleet was eventually sent to patrol the Taiwan Straits once the Korean War broke out; even during the civil war, the US continued to send non-military aid to the KMT and only the KMT despite its pledge of neutrality). The paranoid Chinese would not believe that the US forces would stop at the Yalu (esp with all the MacArthurian posturing going around). With or without Soviet aid, the Chinese would fight.
The final decision was communicated to Moscow. The Soviets relented. Arms and equipment would be provided but not air cover. The Chinese began to move their forces again. Peng returned to Shenyang and continued with the preparations. 4 days were lost; in the meantime RoK forces had taken Wonsan and began to advance on Hamhung on the east coast. On the west, I Corps had broken through and was advancing on Pyongyang.
(During this crucial period, the X Corps, containing the 2 strongest US divisions this side of the planet, was sightseeing the seas around Korea, as part of MacArthur's 'brilliant' plan to execute another amphibious landing at Wonsan. The Chinese did not know this yet.)
Throughout all of this, the CPV troops continued to receive training. However, morale had sagged throughout the ranks. The question on everyone's mind (indeed on everyone's mind throughout China) was 'Can we fight the Americans?' After all, it was America who had defeated the hated Japanese and carried on a war at the same time in Europe. The Americans were well-armed and well-equipped. And worst of all, the Americans had the terrible A-bomb. The Chinese soldiers began referring to the Yalu river bridges as the 'Gates of Hell'. An apt description.
The political section seeked to remedy the situation. Using intense political doctrination and propaganda, the commissars whipped up the soldiers' frenzy. On 16 Oct, Peng himself gave a speech to his senior officers, in which he gave his frank assessment of the situation and laid out the tactics to use. He ended his speech by exhorting the troops to respect the Korean people, not to criticize the Korean Communist Party and to maintain discipline in accordance with the Three Main Rules and the Eight Points of Attention. As a result, the Chinese soldiers were highly-motivated and well-disciplined. But lacking in weopans, equipment, training and support services to meet the requirements for modern warfare.
Logistics preparations had begun earlier, on 11 Oct. Service troops had moved munitions and whatever equipment they had in advance to supply depots in N Korea. On 16 Oct, the 124th Division, of the 42nd Army, had crossed the Yalu; they had the furthest to go of all the CPV units and were permitted to depart earlier. On the evening of 19 Oct, the main body of the CPV began moving into N Korea. The 42nd and 38th Armies would cross at Jian; then the 42nd Army would cover Changjin while the 38th Army would turn south down the Chongchon valley to Huichon. The 40th and 39th Armies, on the other hand, would cross at Andong-Sinuiju and at Changdian. The orders were for the crossings to begin at dusk and stop at 4 a.m. each day. By 5 a.m. the troops would take cover. This was to maintain top secrecy in movement and avoid detection. By the morning of 20 Oct, elements of 5 divisions had entered Korea but deployment was very slow on the following days.
In addition, each Army would also organize an advance party composed of one battalion from each division, form them into a composite 'unit' and send them 1-3 days in advance of the main body as a covering force. And furthermore, to uphold the diplomatic fiction that they were willing volunteers joining their Korean brethren to fight the American invaders, each Army was redesignated with a new number. E.g. the 38th Army was now the 54th 'Unit'; the 39th Army the 55th 'Unit'.
Consequently, on the morning of 19 Oct, Kim had sent someone over to request immediate assistance. Peng headed across first, leaving his deputy commander in charge of the crossing. On the morning of the next day, Peng met Kim to brief him on Chinese preparations and to learn of his situation. Kim reported that all he had left were 2 infantry divisions, 1 tank division, 1 workers' regiment and 1 tank regiment. The Chinese would have to take charge of the situation and cover the whole battlefield. Chinese plans were dashed by this revelation and the surprising speed of the UNC advance. Peng and Mao had to revise their plans. Both men had different ideas in mind; they were arguing back and forth over what to do next.
Then sometime on 22 or 23 Oct, Mao learned of the plan to land the X Corps in Wonsan (way behind MacArthur's schedule by now). Orders were given for Song Shilun, commander of the 9th Army Group (12 divisions) to report to Beijing and for the Army Group to complete its training and have one Army ready to move to Manchuria immediately. The 19th Army Group in W China was also ordered to begin moving on 24 Nov.
On 23 Oct, Mao and Peng finally agreed on a plan of initial action. The 40th Army would be positioned in the Onjong-Unsan area; the 39th in the Unsan-Taechon area. The 38th Army (not all of whom were across yet, at Jian) would drive down the Chongchon valley, move to the SE of Huichon and encircle the rear of the RoK forces advancing up the valley. All forces were ordered to remain well back in the hills and let the RoK forces advance deep into the valleys. In the east, one division of the 42nd Army would defend the Changjin area, while the remainder two would remain on the east side of the Nangnim range as an army group reserve. The plan was to take advantage of the enemy's unawareness of the Chinese entry into the Korean war and destroy 2 or 3 RoK divisions as an 'initial victory'.
Peng also asked for more troops. He requested for the entire 9th Army Group (now on the way to Manchuria), as well as the 50th and 66th Armies. The 50th Army (already on the way earlier) was a former KMT formation which had defected wholly during the civil war. The 66th Army was seen as a reliable formation and was originally deployed to guard Beijing itself. Advance elements of the 66th Army began moving to Sinuiju, to be followed by the remainder.
The chess pieces were set. And the Americans were completely unaware of the CPV forces. Check.
Reference: -
The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War - Jun-Dec 1950
Instead, Peng Dehuai was given the command. Peng had joined the Communists way back in 1928. He joined up with Mao soon after and fought alongside him to defend the Jiangxi Soviet for 6 years, before participating in the legendary Long March, as the commander of the advance guard. In Yenan, he was the commander of the First Front Army, with Mao as the political commissar. After the Red Army was reorganized into the 8th Route Army (after the Xi'an Incident and the forced common front with the KMT against the Japanese invaders) in 1937, he was assigned as the deputy commander. In 1940, he launched the 'Hundred Regiments Campaign' to attack the Japanese positions, but this eventually failed after the Japanese counter-launched their 'kill all, burn all, destroy all' campaign.
After the Japanese were defeated, Peng was assigned to NW China and Inner Mongolia to accept the surrender of Japanese units in this vast region. When the civil war resumed, he remained in command there and fought a difficult and eventually successful campaign to destroy the KMT armies in the region. Peng was a competent military tactician and organizer, but was considered as only an average strategist. He was supremely loyal to Mao, having supported him during critical phases in the long struggle but he never hesitated to speak out when he disagreed with Mao. (This eventually led to his downfall in the years after the Korean War.) He was apparently also popular in the army and well-known for his concern for the well-being of his men.
On 8 Oct, Peng flew to Shenyang (formerly Mukden) and took command of the NEFF, now redesignated as the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV). The plan for now was to fight north of the 38th parallel, and engaged any forces crossing the 38th. Then in spring, when the CPV had been equipped (the Soviets were expected to provide up-to-date arms and equipment), they would launch a counteroffensive and drive the US forces out. The CPV was to begin moving into N Korea on 15 Oct.
Peng only learned then of the actual estimates of the forces he would be facing (the front-line UNC force was estimated to be at 130,000; the total in all Korea was estimated to be at 400,000). Urged by his Army commanders, he requested that the 9th and 19th Army Groups to be moved earlier, and that another Army should be sent to cover him. The original plan of sending only 6 divisions into N Korea was also scrapped - all 12 would cross at one go. Mao approved.
Then the Soviets broke their word. Zhou Enlai and Lin Biao had flown to Russia earlier and met with Stalin at his Black Sea villa. After much diplomatic maneuvering, Stalin finally agreed to send materiel, but not troops or air forces. Zhou flew to Moscow again on 12 Oct and was shocked to learn that the Soviets had changed their minds. The military materiel would not be forthcoming. So much for the Communist brotherhood. Zhou notified Beijing immediately.
Mao quickly halted all movements, while the Chinese again agonized on whether to continue. Peng was recalled to Beijing for an emergency meeting. For the next 2 days, the Chinese continued agonizing and reviewing all their plans. Eventually, Mao managed to prevail upon the Politburo to continue with the plans. He had believed that armed conflict with the US was inevitable and had never believed the US pledge not to assist the KMT (the 7th Fleet was eventually sent to patrol the Taiwan Straits once the Korean War broke out; even during the civil war, the US continued to send non-military aid to the KMT and only the KMT despite its pledge of neutrality). The paranoid Chinese would not believe that the US forces would stop at the Yalu (esp with all the MacArthurian posturing going around). With or without Soviet aid, the Chinese would fight.
The final decision was communicated to Moscow. The Soviets relented. Arms and equipment would be provided but not air cover. The Chinese began to move their forces again. Peng returned to Shenyang and continued with the preparations. 4 days were lost; in the meantime RoK forces had taken Wonsan and began to advance on Hamhung on the east coast. On the west, I Corps had broken through and was advancing on Pyongyang.
(During this crucial period, the X Corps, containing the 2 strongest US divisions this side of the planet, was sightseeing the seas around Korea, as part of MacArthur's 'brilliant' plan to execute another amphibious landing at Wonsan. The Chinese did not know this yet.)
Throughout all of this, the CPV troops continued to receive training. However, morale had sagged throughout the ranks. The question on everyone's mind (indeed on everyone's mind throughout China) was 'Can we fight the Americans?' After all, it was America who had defeated the hated Japanese and carried on a war at the same time in Europe. The Americans were well-armed and well-equipped. And worst of all, the Americans had the terrible A-bomb. The Chinese soldiers began referring to the Yalu river bridges as the 'Gates of Hell'. An apt description.
The political section seeked to remedy the situation. Using intense political doctrination and propaganda, the commissars whipped up the soldiers' frenzy. On 16 Oct, Peng himself gave a speech to his senior officers, in which he gave his frank assessment of the situation and laid out the tactics to use. He ended his speech by exhorting the troops to respect the Korean people, not to criticize the Korean Communist Party and to maintain discipline in accordance with the Three Main Rules and the Eight Points of Attention. As a result, the Chinese soldiers were highly-motivated and well-disciplined. But lacking in weopans, equipment, training and support services to meet the requirements for modern warfare.
Logistics preparations had begun earlier, on 11 Oct. Service troops had moved munitions and whatever equipment they had in advance to supply depots in N Korea. On 16 Oct, the 124th Division, of the 42nd Army, had crossed the Yalu; they had the furthest to go of all the CPV units and were permitted to depart earlier. On the evening of 19 Oct, the main body of the CPV began moving into N Korea. The 42nd and 38th Armies would cross at Jian; then the 42nd Army would cover Changjin while the 38th Army would turn south down the Chongchon valley to Huichon. The 40th and 39th Armies, on the other hand, would cross at Andong-Sinuiju and at Changdian. The orders were for the crossings to begin at dusk and stop at 4 a.m. each day. By 5 a.m. the troops would take cover. This was to maintain top secrecy in movement and avoid detection. By the morning of 20 Oct, elements of 5 divisions had entered Korea but deployment was very slow on the following days.
In addition, each Army would also organize an advance party composed of one battalion from each division, form them into a composite 'unit' and send them 1-3 days in advance of the main body as a covering force. And furthermore, to uphold the diplomatic fiction that they were willing volunteers joining their Korean brethren to fight the American invaders, each Army was redesignated with a new number. E.g. the 38th Army was now the 54th 'Unit'; the 39th Army the 55th 'Unit'.
Consequently, on the morning of 19 Oct, Kim had sent someone over to request immediate assistance. Peng headed across first, leaving his deputy commander in charge of the crossing. On the morning of the next day, Peng met Kim to brief him on Chinese preparations and to learn of his situation. Kim reported that all he had left were 2 infantry divisions, 1 tank division, 1 workers' regiment and 1 tank regiment. The Chinese would have to take charge of the situation and cover the whole battlefield. Chinese plans were dashed by this revelation and the surprising speed of the UNC advance. Peng and Mao had to revise their plans. Both men had different ideas in mind; they were arguing back and forth over what to do next.
Then sometime on 22 or 23 Oct, Mao learned of the plan to land the X Corps in Wonsan (way behind MacArthur's schedule by now). Orders were given for Song Shilun, commander of the 9th Army Group (12 divisions) to report to Beijing and for the Army Group to complete its training and have one Army ready to move to Manchuria immediately. The 19th Army Group in W China was also ordered to begin moving on 24 Nov.
On 23 Oct, Mao and Peng finally agreed on a plan of initial action. The 40th Army would be positioned in the Onjong-Unsan area; the 39th in the Unsan-Taechon area. The 38th Army (not all of whom were across yet, at Jian) would drive down the Chongchon valley, move to the SE of Huichon and encircle the rear of the RoK forces advancing up the valley. All forces were ordered to remain well back in the hills and let the RoK forces advance deep into the valleys. In the east, one division of the 42nd Army would defend the Changjin area, while the remainder two would remain on the east side of the Nangnim range as an army group reserve. The plan was to take advantage of the enemy's unawareness of the Chinese entry into the Korean war and destroy 2 or 3 RoK divisions as an 'initial victory'.
Peng also asked for more troops. He requested for the entire 9th Army Group (now on the way to Manchuria), as well as the 50th and 66th Armies. The 50th Army (already on the way earlier) was a former KMT formation which had defected wholly during the civil war. The 66th Army was seen as a reliable formation and was originally deployed to guard Beijing itself. Advance elements of the 66th Army began moving to Sinuiju, to be followed by the remainder.
The chess pieces were set. And the Americans were completely unaware of the CPV forces. Check.
Reference: -
The Dragon Strikes: China and the Korean War - Jun-Dec 1950
. 
). Besides, it's unlikely that the tank would use its missile on the person. And if the tank does, it's worth it if you look at it from the standpoint of a poorly equipped army with lots of people. He person charging is more likely to be ran over by the tank or be shot by enemy soldiers, but that might happen even if he doesn't charge.
