The "rising bourgeoise" and liberalism

[Arwon]

Fairly simple thread concept.

Basically, the oft-repeated story in the 19th century of a rising bourgeoise or middle class driving modernisation and liberalism in the 19th century is mostly wrong. Liberalism was not their exclusive property, and it certainly wasn't a natural ally of democratisation and the lower classes. In many cases it was a way of preserving the old regime social order on a basis that didn't require an absolute monarch.

To see how instrumental liberalism could be, you only need to look at how easily oligarchs and generals in Spain, Napoleon III in France and Bismarck in Germany managed to co-opt the language of liberalism in order to utterly restrain any possible revolutionary implications it might have had. There's a simple straight line between enlightened despotism, theorists like Burke, and the people who were running Europe in the 1850s, 60s and 70s and even beyond.

Pretty much everywhere, the nature of the governing elites from the second half of the 18th century into the late 19th was quite similar. The "aristocracy-bourgeoise" clash often spoken of in history books didn't exist, in most of the continent the latter was nowhere near strong enough, and in many cases like the UK or even Spain, they basically merged into a single propertied elite. Power remained in the hands of the same people who had been enlightened absolutists a century earlier, they adopted a liberal outlook without actually ever advocating democracy or universal suffrage.

My contention is that there is nothing natural or inevitable in the linkage of liberalism with democracy or egalitarianism. They weren't natural allies and often were actually quite antagonistic -- when democratisation occurred it was against the will of many of these ruling constitutional liberals.

 

[Agent327]

My contention is that there is nothing natural or inevitable in the linkage of liberalism with democracy or egalitarianism. They weren't natural allies and often were actually quite antagonistic -- when democratisation occurred it was against the will of many of these ruling constitutional liberals.

Quite true. Although I'd like to point out that Bismarck was a conservative aristocrat and the 19th century rise of the bourgeoisie was followed by a late 19th century movement in favour of universal suffrage (i.e. full democracy). Indeed this resulted not from mainstream liberalism of those times, but was mostly instigated by socialist movements and (predominantly bourgeois) suffragettes. Those liberal parties clever enough to realize its full potential ultimately went with the flow. While indeed not embracing the idea of democracy overenthusiastically, liberalism has come to accept there being no real alternative - as even a conservative like Churchill conceded.

 

[EnlightenmentHK]

I don't think the connection between the bourgeoise and liberalism/representation is quite as mythical as you seem to think it is. I'm not saying they were any great fans of Democracy, but like most people, they wanted a government that worked for them. During the initial rise of the business and merchant classes, that government largely didn't exist.

The existing system of aristocratic privilege did not benefit them. They essentially wanted to be aristocrats and wanted to reap those benefits for themselves, and many were perfectly content to turn their wealth into influence and essentially do just that. But even if they could pressure a weak or desperate king to cede to their interests in isolated cases, it wasn't a regular event. The fact is these old interests had been established and entrenched for centuries. They weren't as malleable and responsive as the 'new money' of merchants and business owners wanted them to be.

The aristocrats certainly desired access to their wealth and would work with them on occasion, but they generally viewed them with disdain. And when need didn't exist, neither did their cooperation. Elected, representative bodies could be more easily held accountable to moneyed interests than the aristocracy. And so many in the bourgeoise pushed for that, not because because they're great fans of democracy, but because it gave them a better opportunity to exert control and improve their interests.

Economic liberalism at least was in their interests. And they pushed for such reforms. As their wealth, power, and influence rose, they were able to snatch yet more power and influence, and push more of these reforms. If they could find a cooperative monarch or nobility, they would go that route. If the aristocracy was not cooperative enough and the bourgeoise was strong enough, they'd push for a more amenable form of government.

By the time the industrial revolution began, the wealth being generated by these new interests simply dwarfed that of the aristocratic old guard. That 'old guard' either became accommodating and responsive or it got shoved aside.

 

[Masquerouge]

bourgeoisIe. BourgeoisIIIIIe.

Allright, carry on

 

[EnlightenmentHK]

bourgeoisIe. BourgeoisIIIIIe.

Allright, carry on

I've never been able to spell that damned word. Damned french.

 

[Verbose]

I'll grant that Britian worked a bit different, it always has in some ways, and the same might be true about Spain. In the Spanish speaking new world you also got this slew of 19th c. liberal dictators, which doesn't really rhyme with democracy and equal rights etc.

On the other hand, the revolutions in France and Germany were clearly made by the bourgeoisie, under the banner of liberalism.

That said, the way it worked in the German speaking world, the bourgeoisie considered themselves the carriers of the double-whammy of "Bildung" and "Kultur" (works the same in Scandinavia), which doesn't really travel that well into English for instance.

The things is, "Bildung" and "Kultur" requires a standard to be applicable, and if people — specifically the Common people — fail to live up to these standards, then they are unable to responsible fulfill a role as self-determining political subjects. Instead the spectre of a "Halbkultur" marked by dangerous "Halbbildung" looms, you know, like what they have in America.

Consequently in Germany, Scandinavia etc. the liberal 19th c. bourgeoisie spent a lot of time and effort at schemes to instill sufficient "Bildung" and "Kultur" to make the Common Folk (salt of the earth, carriers of the national rawstuff, just in need of bourgeois refining) politically acceptable to the liberal bourgeoisie itself, i.e. politically safe.

When fullblown Socialism rolled around with the working class the traditional bourgeois Liberals went into a godawful funk over the future prospects.

 

[Arwon]

I don't think the connection between the bourgeoise and liberalism/representation is quite as mythical as you seem to think it is. I'm not saying they were any great fans of Democracy, but like most people, they wanted a government that worked for them. During the initial rise of the business and merchant classes, that government largely didn't exist.

The existing system of aristocratic privilege did not benefit them. They essentially wanted to be aristocrats and wanted to reap those benefits for themselves, and many were perfectly content to turn their wealth into influence and essentially do just that. But even if they could pressure a weak or desperate king to cede to their interests in isolated cases, it wasn't a regular event. The fact is these old interests had been established and entrenched for centuries. They weren't as malleable and responsive as the 'new money' of merchants and business owners wanted them to be.

The aristocrats certainly desired access to their wealth and would work with them on occasion, but they generally viewed them with disdain. And when need didn't exist, neither did their cooperation. Elected, representative bodies could be more easily held accountable to moneyed interests than the aristocracy. And so many in the bourgeoise pushed for that, not because because they're great fans of democracy, but because it gave them a better opportunity to exert control and improve their interests.

Economic liberalism at least was in their interests. And they pushed for such reforms. As their wealth, power, and influence rose, they were able to snatch yet more power and influence, and push more of these reforms. If they could find a cooperative monarch or nobility, they would go that route. If the aristocracy was not cooperative enough and the bourgeoise was strong enough, they'd push for a more amenable form of government.

By the time the industrial revolution began, the wealth being generated by these new interests simply dwarfed that of the aristocratic old guard. That 'old guard' either became accommodating and responsive or it got shoved aside.

See, in a lot of places on the continent they ended up liberal a long time before they industrialised, which I think is what the Britain-centric model misses. I don't think the pressure of an industrialising commercial class explains how Italy or Spain or Denmark or even France aquired a constitutional system with private property rights and legal equality before the law. Aside from in the great and essentially medieval eastern empires, liberalism was the dominant language of politics by mid-century and western Europe was all constitutional-based systems... liberalism wasn't just the language of middle class bankers and industrialists.

I don't think it's as simple as saying the aristocracy didn't become businesspeople or capitalists but got supplanted. I think in many cases the aristocracy-bourgeoisie dichotomy wasn't so clear cut, and you could better describe the conflict as a disagreement within different sections of the same elite.

Going back to Spain since that's what I've been studying, it's clearly a case where the same class perpetuated itself and adopted liberalism (economic and legal liberalism) and instituted it on its own terms. Large chunks of the nobility became the business class through having pre-existing wealth and property. Liberalism built a regime where having property put you in the dominant class, regardless of background. The presence of merchants and bankers in liberal politics was actually quite slight compared to the presence of lawyers, military officers and members of the bureaucracy. Most of the lawyers and administrators were hidalgos (low ranking nobility), most Spanish politicians in the liberal era came from rural landowning aristocratic families. The key commonality was that everyone owned real estate and had an interest in protecting property and having a limited franchise. And those were the groups which undertook the political reforms that created this liberal system of property ownership and representative non-democratic government. Aristocratic privilege was gone by 1843, yet the same people remained in charge.

So, in applying this to other places: in order to show that a new class actually ascended and shoved the other guys aside and made reforms against the old elite takes archival evidence about things like changing occupational and family background status among those in power. I haven't looked at it in great detail, but my understanding is that even in France during its revolutionary decades, the old image of a bourgeoisie-aristocrat dichotomy is breaking down in the face of a simple lack of evidence that there actually was two unified classes identifying themselves as being in opposition to each other.

 

[Agent327]

So, in applying this to other places: in order to show that a new class actually ascended and shoved the other guys aside and made reforms against the old elite takes archival evidence about things like changing occupational and family background status among those in power. I haven't looked at it in great detail, but my understanding is that even in France during its revolutionary decades, the old image of a bourgeoisie-aristocrat dichotomy is breaking down in the face of a simple lack of evidence that there actually was two unified classes identifying themselves as being in opposition to each other.

Classes didn't exist legally until the 19th century, as social strata were still being defined along medieval lines. The French Revolution changed all that, up to a point.* Napoleon, a hidalgo from Corsica if you will, didn't promote the bourgeoisie as a class, he inflated the aristocracy by awarding noble status to all those profiting from the upwards mobility through achievement instead of heritage. The Napoleonic regime's conquests ensured that this and other aspects of the Code Napoléon were exported to various countries outside of France proper and to a great extent these remained as part of the legal systems after Napoleon's fall.

I would say it's quite true that, apart from Britain, liberalism preceded industrialism and was more closely linked to the (petite) bourgeoisie and, as you stated, lower or poorer nobility than to industrialists, who in most countries would have constituted a relatively small part of the population anyway - as they still do today.

*I'd also say that Marx and Engels (who was an industrialist)'s analysis of the French Revolution as a class revolution was correct, in that it essentially brought little profit for the working classes who had to wait until the establishment of full democracy, for which liberal movements originally showed no real concern - unlike the social movements of the late 19th century.

 

[EnlightenmentHK]

So, in applying this to other places: in order to show that a new class actually ascended and shoved the other guys aside and made reforms against the old elite takes archival evidence about things like changing occupational and family background status among those in power. I haven't looked at it in great detail, but my understanding is that even in France during its revolutionary decades, the old image of a bourgeoisie-aristocrat dichotomy is breaking down in the face of a simple lack of evidence that there actually was two unified classes identifying themselves as being in opposition to each other.

I think the clear and distinctive separation of these classes is more historical construct than reality. There was certainly significant overlap. After all if you had an entrepreneurial noble, they'd clearly be in a better position than most to play venture capitalist on a new trade route or investment opportunity. But certainly some of it is simplified and classified for ease of study. Just about any situation is more complex once you get into the details, but for a brief overview bourgeoisie supplanting aristocrats works...sort of.

I'd always understood the relationship to be somewhat symbiotic. Bourgeoise largely wanted to be aristocrats themselves and the nobles who hadn't branched out from the 'get my wealth from peasants working the land' model that had reigned for centuries were very interested in gaining access to the wealth this new class generated. Some cooperation, mingling, and even some marriages were likely.

But so was what could generally be described as inter-class struggle. Your earliest bourgeoisie-esque wealth generators were merchants and traders. These earliest expeditions were typically financed by the crown and the taxes or profits from these trades dolled out as favors to select nobles. Essentially state granted monopolies that benefited a few and didn't sit well with the less enfranchised nobility and relevant non-nobles. The earliest efforts to liberalize and 'spread the wealth' were no doubt prompted by this dissatisfied nobility who shared common cause with said relevant non-nobles.

Given the stratification of medieval society, its quite likely that much of this new bourgeoisie class rose from the lesser nobility. Some random commoner could not begin to have the clout or resources to launch such ventures. But your major landed noble had been living their privileged lifestyle of letting the land generate wealth and accepting favors from the crown for centuries. The status quo worked for them. It worked well and there'd have been little incentive for them to 'go into business' per se. Their goal would have been the maintenance the status quo and keeping these 'upstarts' in check.

As for the pre-industrial liberalization elsewhere, again I think it comes back to merchants and traders. For a couple centuries the Hansiatic league wielded power and influence greater than many individual kingdoms, exacted concessions from many of them, had its own fleet, and generated tons of wealth for its members. Little Venice was one of the wealthiest kingdoms in Europe via its access to eastern trade goods. The Dutch were a trading empire that created great wealth as they supplanted the Hansiatic cities and explored eastward. These interests easily played the role of bourgeoisie, demanding concessions and liberalization long before the industrialists became a factor.

As for Spain, I've always understood that to be a special case where aristocratic hierarchy was much more rigid, entrenched, and conservative. Leaving much of the country lagging behind the rest of Europe in terms of infrastructure and trade once they had expended the considerable wealth from their ventures in the Americas.

 

[frekk]

Given the stratification of medieval society, its quite likely that much of this new bourgeoisie class rose from the lesser nobility. Some random commoner could not begin to have the clout or resources to launch such ventures.

Primogeniture was still the rule. Most of the nascent bourgeouisie actually were nobility, the second and third sons who inheirited no land. The same people who sought their fortunes as crusaders, explorers, colonial players, etc.

The 'rags to riches' notion of the bourgeois commoner, on inspection, usually turns out to be more mythical than fact. Such an example may be found in Dick Whittington, who is (or at least, was) the stereotypical example in Britain. However, Dick was hardly a commoner: he was a younger son of Sir William de Whittington, an estate owner from Staffordshire.

Such individuals were under no obligation to practice primogeniture, and could divide their holdings among their offspring as they saw fit. After a generation or two, they could also marry as they saw fit. This, I believe, is the real origins of the early middle classes: debased nobility. However, this wasn't a very suitable 'creation myth' for a confident class that was quickly maneuvering to seize political power.

 

[Arwon]

Point generally taken, I guess the historical construct is always gonna be a bit simplified, and I still maintain that aristocracy isn't that useful a category of analysis when you consider that includes everyone from the richest grandees to landless gentlemen barely better-off than peasants.

LONG POST AHOY

In the case of Spain, I don't think it's the aristocracy's inherent strength that is key, but rather the weakness of everything else. I think the most important difference in the 19th century was the War of Independence (which you probably know as the Peninsular Campaign), and the three big consequences of that: the impact on the elites of Spain, the impact on the military, and the weakness of the crown. These three things conspired to give Spain a very strong elite consensus in favour of the most conservative variety of liberalism, coupled with a lack of ability to achieve stability or development within a system defined by that liberalism.

Observe!

1808. Forced succession by Ferdinand VII to Joseph Boneparte. French troops are in the peninsula in force, Spanish people rise against them. The war really destroyed the ancient regime in Spain and it never recovered. The rising against France happened against the wishes of the Bourbon crown, technically there had been a legitimate cession of the crown to the Bonapartes, so everyone was breaking with the crown in the name of "the nation" or "the people", even the traditionalists.

After the war there was a few years of absolutism after 1814. Spain was significantly poorer than it had been in 1808. The colonies had revolted and were in the process of gaining independence, the country was exhausted, many cities lost significant percentages of population (Zaragoza went from 100 000 to 15 000 people). So the king died in 1833 and there was a civil war over the succession, liberals backing Isabella, absolutists and traditionalists backing Don Carlos (the Carlists). You had the weird irony of a popular revolt in favour of absolutism against an elite and oligarchic liberalism which threatened to destroy the social order to the detriment of a lot of people (people in a seignorial situation had rights and guarantees against their landlords that private property would destroy, the "losers" under liberalism would be significant chunks of the peasantry, the landless nobility which often lived as peasants themselves, and the lower clergy).

The Carlists never had a chance despite some significant popular backing in some zones, notably Catalonia and the Basque Country (yes them. That's not a coincidence). The entire establishment backed the liberal government, which won after about 10 years of war. They dissolved the feudal property system during wartime, essentially transferring the church's land and other expropriated lands to their own hands (ie, without the peasants gaining any) with the government using the funds to wage war. The result was a constitutional government, but the people in charge were all the functionaries, lawyers, aristocrats, bankers, military officers etc, that had been the bulk of the governing elite in the 18th century. It's not that the hierarchy was rigid or entrenched nor specifically aristocratic - it wasn't, except by poverty and education keeping most people out. It's just that the class, as a whole, was self-perpetuating and quite ideologically homogeneous, even as people moved around within it. Aristocracy was a common characteristic, but not universal. Historians used to speak of a "pact" between bourgeoisie and aristocracy, but this doesn't make sense as they were never a differentiated class... the common denominator is property, not peerage.

The military impact was also huge. Politics was heavily military-dominated from 1814 until 1974, at one point mid-century 80% of government functionaries were military men. Spain's military had expanded hugely during the war, with people of all classes being promoted based on actual merit. Its cohesion as an aristocratic body was destroyed. The next 50 years saw constant military discontent fuel instability - opposition politicians curried favour with disgruntled officers, basically whoever didn't have political and military officers conspired to take it, leading to a series of pronunciamientos (something like a vote of no confidence by a section of the army) with little or no ideological content except to put another faction and another group of notables in charge of the parliament.

It wasn't the military as an institution doing this, and it wasn't a dictatorship, but rather sections of it in a situation where civil authority was very very weak. The general opinion in the military was liberal (after all, it was the first meritocratic institution in spain) but also obsessed with heirarchy, law and order and discipline, making them natural allies of the elite liberal consensus and the essential guarantor that the system would stay within a moderate liberal position.

The third thing was the weakness of the crown. As I said, the Crown essentially lost most of its prestige in the War and only managed to regain any power in cooperation with the bureaucratic elite and military. Isabella II was an idiot, too, which didn't help matters. The crown had an arbitration role in the post '43 constitutional system, but utterly failed to reimpose itself against the continued instability and chaos. The conservative liberal elites ruled only because, even though they were themselves too weak and divided to govern effectively, they were strong enough to negate any other possible counterweight from above (crown despotism or a Bonepartist solution) or below (more radical liberals).

There was a revolution in 1868, with radical liberals taking power (note that this was 3 years prior to the Paris Commune...), but after 6 years of chaos, order was restored and the same people taking power back. The difference was the new system managed to end the pronunciamiento culture and establish a much more stable two-party system. This situation persisted into the 20th century, when the working class began to get strong enough to threaten the established order.

 

[frekk]

You had the weird irony of a popular revolt in favour of absolutism against an elite and oligarchic liberalism which threatened to destroy the social order to the detriment of a lot of people (people in a seignorial situation had rights and guarantees against their landlords that private property would destroy, the "losers" under liberalism would be significant chunks of the peasantry, the landless nobility which often lived as peasants themselves, and the lower clergy).

Weird, but not unprecedented. English Civil War.

The way allegiances fell was paralleled too: while Basques stood with the Carlists, so Irish Catholics stood with the Royalists.