History Questions Not Worth Their Own Thread VIII

[PhroX]

Which ww2 eastern front operation was the most decisive for the conclusion of the war?

There's some talk that, if one doesn't mean to examine the opening stage, with Barbarossa, then the critical point was how little was gained with operation Blau. While the objective had been to secure enough oil, it didn't even reach the main oil-producing regions, and ultimately prepared the ground for the russian counterattack (operation Ouranos).

I guess it depends on what you mean by "most decisive". Certainly, I'd agree that by the end of Case Blue, there's no plausible route to a Nazi victory so in the sense that it settled the victor of the war, it was pretty decisive. But then, the Nazi's chances weren't at all good before the '42 campaigns. Anything they could try was, in hindsight, a longshot. Barbarossa's failures left them in a bad position. The battle of Moscow was possibly a big turning point - while I wouldn't say that the fall of Moscow would have definitely lead to a Nazi win, it would've seriously harmed the Soviet Union and massively upped the former's chances. But even then, was Moscow actually a winnable battle for the Nazi's? Probably not. They simply didn't have the logistics to reach the city in force, let along actually take it. So maybe we go back further. I've seen decent arguments that the most important battle was Smolensk. While the Nazi's ultimately won there, the closing of the final 20 odd miles of the encirclement was meant to take days, but instead it took weeks. Weeks in which the Soviets evacuated around half the encircled men. Weeks in which the Nazi forces weren't able to advance. And weeks in which their elite armoured and motorised forces were caught in static battles of attrition from which they never fully recovered.

But personally, I think the single most decisive operation regarding how the war concluded was the very first day of Barbarossa. When the Nazi's were fighting just the British Empire, they were in a decent shape - they couldn't really beat Britain, but the reverse was also true. Neither side had any real means to threaten the other (they could hurt, but not defeat). But, in hindsight, Bararossa's chances were always pretty slim. The relative forces, economies and logistical capabilities were heavily stacked against them, such that even a performance like that seen historically in '41 would leave them no where near victory. By invading the SU, the Nazi's went from having a huge European empire and a relatively static war, to being in an existential fight for survival that they were odds on to lose. And lose, as we know, they did. So, yeah, IMO, that one day did more to decide the war's winner's than anything else on the eastern front.

 

[danjuno]

Given the British blockade in the West, Hitler would be at Stalin's mercy for supplies, especially oil. Hitler believed he could knock out the Soviets in a single blow (he didn't), but knowing what we do now, Hitler painted himself into a corner where he either he remains dependent on his self-proclaimed mortal ideological enemy or throws himself the opponent with the greatest ability to trade land and casualties in a war of attrition.

 

[Kyriakos]

Some history channels promote the idea that Hitler's original plan was to use the bulk of the forces to go south (oil fields), but generals on their own went for the center and Moscow, which likely wouldn't have lead to a soviet defeat even if taken (particularly if the soviets in that scenario would still, as it played out, have moved critical industry to the Urals, where the germans couldn't possibly reach regardless).

 

[Samson]

Given the British blockade in the West, Hitler would be at Stalin's mercy for supplies, especially oil. Hitler believed he could knock out the Soviets in a single blow (he didn't), but knowing what we do now, Hitler painted himself into a corner where he either he remains dependent on his self-proclaimed mortal ideological enemy or throws himself the opponent with the greatest ability to trade land and casualties in a war of attrition.

Had they put 10% of the effort they put into Barbarossa into north Africa they could have taken the middle east from the UK and had all the oil they needed.

 

[Kyriakos]

Maybe it wasn't possible to land that many more troops in italian Africa?
Would it be viable if they occupied parts of Turkey and reached the Caucasus from there? (though, again, they'd need to at least control the Hellespond, which might be doable with mines, though?)

 

[PhroX]

Some history channels promote the idea that Hitler's original plan was to use the bulk of the forces to go south (oil fields), but generals on their own went for the center and Moscow, which likely wouldn't have lead to a soviet defeat even if taken (particularly if the soviets in that scenario would still, as it played out, have moved critical industry to the Urals, where the germans couldn't possibly reach regardless).

Is this suggesting a push to the Caucuses in '41? I can't see how that's going to happen. The distances are just enormous and would blow apart the Nazi's already fragile logistics. And I'm pretty sure even they knew that. There definitely were incidences of Nazi commanders pushing towards Moscow without orders from Hitler, such as immediately after Smolensk, but as far as I know, they were trying to preempt the turn south into Ukraine to defeat the Soviet forces there, which was then to be followed by an attack towards Moscow (i.e. what happened) rather than a full on push into the Caucuses.

And it's worth noting that, while it's a common suggestion, attacking straight towards Moscow after Smolensk wouldn't have helped. You're putting battered units at the end of a supply line about 250 miles further from their railheads that the historic Operation Typhoon with the best part of a million hostile troops on the flank of your salient....

Had they put 10% of the effort they put into Barbarossa into north Africa they could have taken the middle east from the UK and had all the oil they needed.

Maybe it wasn't possible to land that many more troops in italian Africa?
Would it be viable if they occupied parts of Turkey and reached the Caucasus from there? (though, again, they'd need to at least control the Hellespond, which might be doable with mines, though?)

And, it's logistics again. Putting 10% of the effort of Barbarossa into North Africa just isn't practical. By the time the Nazi's reach Egypt, their supply lines across the desert are horribly overstretched - they weren't even close to keeping the historical Afrika Korps supplied, and that's with a disproportionate amount of logistical support compared to the size of force. They could certainly do better with more trucks, but not practically to a level which would matter. And that's before you get to the Italian Merchant Marine shipping all this through a contested sea. Meanwhile, Britain can easily ship in men and supplies from India and, on the defensive in Egypt, have very short land based lines. Without Barbarossa, I don't see Britain being able to take the offensive in North Africa, but for the Nazi's to defeat them, at least in the short term, is a pretty big stretch.

The success of both Operation Compass and the Afrika Korps prior to El-Alamein 1 were due to catching unprepared enemies on the bounce and looting supplies, and there's a big difference between that and fighting a prepared foe while having to bring in your supplies over a thousand miles of desert.

As for Turkey, taking the European parts, and even crossing the Bosphorus will be pretty easy. But then you run into Anatolia and the L-word. Keeping a modern (for the time) motorised army supplied across 1940s Anatolia is again a nightmare.

Of course, I probably should've pointed this out in my last post, but while invading the Soviet Union was a huge mistake for the Nazis, it was also inevitable for the Nazis. The destruction of Communism, the acquisition of Lebensraum and the enslavement of the Slavic race were fundamental ideological principles for them. You get rid of those, and we're in the territory of "Notzi". And at that point, you've probably butterflied away the whole war, let alone Barbarossa....

 

[Kyriakos]

It'd be (due to much smaller size) easier to move through Anatolia, than the Barbarossa territories. Although they'd need to secure the Hellespont along with moving tanks (through bridge-building). Maybe USSR would declare war if a significant amount of the german army was fighting in the middle east?

 

[danjuno]

MENA's Oil industry was in it's infancy in the early 1940's, so a German victory in Egypt would be more significant for blocking the Suez Canal than anything.

 

[r16]

you are going nowhere through Anatolia , unless Ankara is allied to you . Tried to do , to both sides , anyone but the Soviets , due a failure of understanding the Soviets . Russians , if you ask them politely , will tell you the lot with the best level of understanding the WW II Soviets were neither the Germans nor the Soviets .

half the Luftwaffe would defeat anything the British could throw at them in the Mediterranean and the Italian merchant marine , far braver in the actual case than many would have believed , would have supported enough German forces to secure the Suez . Which then would have allowed a rush to Iran , which had a viable oil industry and stuff . Which would have supported Stalin's desires to remain allies with Adolf which then would have like would have meant the end of the British Empire . Maybe America coming in by 1950 but are you willing to bet the Germans would lack the Bomb ?

May 10th, 1940 . Created a thing about German invincibility . That's why they planned for "3 advances" in Barbarossa , Leningrad , Moscow and South ... first Kiev , then all the way to the Caspian Sea .

 

[Birdjaguar]

I would add that the pre war effort by the Poles in breaking the German enigma coding, that they passed on the the British in September 1939, was instrumental in winning the war. I do not know how much it influenced the Eastern Front. In general, though, I think that June 22, 1941 is the day Hitler lost the war.

 

[r16]

wikipedia article implies the enigma machines were widely exported and the British had cracked (simpler) versions used in Spain by about 1936 and naturally didn't tell anything to the Republicans . And the Polish success meant something only after ghe French intelligence stole material and turned it over to Warsaw . But , yes , Polish success must be supported by all means .

 

[JohannaK]

I do think that victory in North Africa, however transitory, was quite achievable for the Axis. Logistics was indeed critical, and Malta played a big role in this. If the Axis had devoted the necessary resources to its invasion, and this was quite feasible early on, making their shipping lanes a lot more secure, Army Group Africa would have seen more constant and substantial reinforcements over longer distances.

I will say that this would require a different timeline than we saw irl, as by the time the Axis considered it, it would probably be insufficient to change the outcome at El Alamein (indeed the invasion of Malta was called off in order to bolster Rommel during its pursuit into Egypt), and with the Moroccan landings the fete of Heeresgruppe Afrika was kind of sealed.

 

[danjuno]

Circling back to my earlier point, Germany was not only not invincible, the war was pretty much a gamble from the start. So many things went right for them early on, but when events beyond their control stopped working in their favor (i.e. Britain refusing to sue for peace after the fall of France), they were screwed. And not going to war at all requires fundamentally changing who the Nazis were and what they believed.

 

[PhroX]

Circling back to my earlier point, Germany was not only not invincible, the war was pretty much a gamble from the start. So many things went right for them early on, but when events beyond their control stopped working in their favor (i.e. Britain refusing to sue for peace after the fall of France), they were screwed. And not going to war at all requires fundamentally changing who the Nazis were and what they believed.

And even then, German the economy in the second half of the 30s was entirely predicated on going to war, and they'd have been screwed without it.

 

[Kyriakos]

There seems to also be a quote by Hitler about trying to get Japan to declare war on Russia and how that (in theory) would have won the war.
Then again, Japan went to war to gain oil resources. If instead of taking over british/dutch colonies with some oil, it tried to invade Russia, how would it manage to get anywhere near the Urals? (not even Germany could get tanks to the Urals, unless it conquered the caucasus or other energy-rich areas).

 

[Takhisis]

Then again, Japan went to war to gain oil resources. If instead of taking over british/dutch colonies with some oil, it tried to invade Russia, how would it manage to get anywhere near the Urals?

You can produce liquid fuels from petroleum, actually, and in Russian Siberia, north of Mongolia, there are plenty of coal mines. Sakhalin has oil, but it wasn't developed at the time.

In any case, Japan's thing was NATIONAL HONOUR and how its totally-not-samurai government felt that Japan had been slighted after WWI, so it was busy conquering China and its main rival for Pacific domination was, of course, the expanding U.S. of A.!

It was weird, but a lot of Jews from occupied Lithuania got out thanks to the offices of a Japanese diplomat while a lot of Chinese escaped the Japanese occupiers thanks to German diplomats.

Simultaneously it has to be said that until 1934 Mussolini was trying to get Austria to join him against the Germans and until 1938 he was trying to restore a Greater Italy i.e. basically the lost Savoian possessions (Nice, Corsica) and trying to get France to hand them back in exchange for joining him in his LATIN RESTORATION against the GERMANIC BARBARIANS. Dalmatia also should've reverted to them as part of the old Republic of Venice.
Austro-fascism was solved by Austrian Nazis assassinating Engelbert Dollfuss in '34. The Anschluss in '38 would later convince Mussolini that his revanchist plans for a Greater Italy would be more realisable with Germany as an ally than as an enemy, which really means the whole thing was a charade of the type acted out in more recent times by South American or African dictators, before the European mayhem of the last ten years.

And, likewise, Russia wanted to effectively recover its imperial borders (Finland, Bessarabia, &c.) and so it first split up the world with the Germans and then both waited to see who made the first mistake.

Just to reiterate:

 

[Kyriakos]

Germany did occupy half or more of Ukraine in 1941-42, but the massive amounts of coal there didn't seem to matter as fuel :/ Without oil, it probably wouldn't mean much even if they had taken Moscow/St Petersburg, particularly when the factories were moved to the Urals.
Japan, on the other hand, would have needed to traverse an entire continent to get to the Urals.

 

[Cutlass]

Germany did occupy half or more of Ukraine in 1941-42, but the massive amounts of coal there didn't seem to matter as fuel :/ Without oil, it probably wouldn't mean much even if they had taken Moscow/St Petersburg, particularly when the factories were moved to the Urals.
Japan, on the other hand, would have needed to traverse an entire continent to get to the Urals.

While you can make liquid fuels from coal. It's easier to make them from petroleum. So that was the bigger goal.

 

[Kyriakos]

While you can make liquid fuels from coal. It's easier to make them from petroleum. So that was the bigger goal.

Would it even be possible to get that far with japanese tanks?
Assuming they somehow got enough fuel (which already seems impossible).

 

[r16]

the famed Siberians . Two front war keeps Russia from concentrating on Nazis , the existantial threat thing , allowing the Japanese to make a little show and get things . Siberia is too large and too tough . But if Japan manages to gain a foothold it can be a really useful addition to Manchuria ... Letting Japan to declare a truce with China . So that China can be invaded and destroyed later , say , by 1950 or 60 . Except the Russians in the Nomonhan Incident totally crushed the Japanese Army , which was a second rate force when you omit the fanaticism of the troops . On the other hand the IJN was indeed a major naval power , perhaps the best in the world , before the US defence industry got into high gear . Adolf wants a distraction , might even give parts of Siberia to America to make a peace in the West .