The 2024 US Presidential Election

This reminded me of something funny I noticed lately... Democrats in the news/media have been criticizing and mocking Republicans in Arizona for using a (Civil War era) "1864 law" to enact an abortion ban, the implication being that its ridiculous to use such an old and antiquated law for such a modern case/issue. The first time I heard such a criticism/label "1864 law" I cringed :cringe:, because Democrats have been for months arguing that Trump should be disqualified based on the Civil War era Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, that bans insurrectionists from office and was originally used on Confederates to keep them out of office.

So its pretty ironic for Democrats to now be complaining about Republicans using an "1864 law" to accomplish their goals. I haven't heard anyone on the news call out this irony/contradiction yet, but it jumped out at me immediately.
 
I'm not talking about the writing, I'm talking about the moment it became clear that the rebel army would be badly mauled and gain nothing in exchange.
Grant and brilliant and relentless Union engineers won the battle of Gettysburg through the successful Vicksburg siege. Lee realized the war would be lost unless he could pull an inside straight with a successful invasion of the North. And this was not wrong as things would not get better for the South. I think we can see the third day as part of the necessary and inevitable blood sacrifice needed for the remittance of its sins. If any chance of winning the war existed, they went by the wayside due to the failures to occupy defensive terrain on the first day and move to right before the second day of battle. Lee's actions on the third day can't be whitewashed.

But it was the Vicksburg campaign that forced the error. Credit to Union war planning and Grant's execution.
 
This reminded me of something funny I noticed lately... Democrats in the news/media have been criticizing and mocking Republicans in Arizona for using a (Civil War era) "1864 law" to enact an abortion ban, the implication being that its ridiculous to use such an old and antiquated law for such a modern case/issue. The first time I heard such a criticism/label "1864 law" I cringed :cringe:, because Democrats have been for months arguing that Trump should be disqualified based on the Civil War era Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, that bans insurrectionists from office and was originally used on Confederates to keep them out of office.

So its pretty ironic for Democrats to now be complaining about Republicans using an "1864 law" to accomplish their goals. I haven't heard anyone on the news call out this irony/contradiction yet, but it jumped out at me immediately.
Heheh. It doesn't even register anymore.
 
Trump's brain trust apparently is eyeing a devaluation of the dollar after his victory.
 
This reminded me of something funny I noticed lately... Democrats in the news/media have been criticizing and mocking Republicans in Arizona for using a (Civil War era) "1864 law" to enact an abortion ban, the implication being that its ridiculous to use such an old and antiquated law for such a modern case/issue. The first time I heard such a criticism/label "1864 law" I cringed :cringe:, because Democrats have been for months arguing that Trump should be disqualified based on the Civil War era Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, that bans insurrectionists from office and was originally used on Confederates to keep them out of office.

So its pretty ironic for Democrats to now be complaining about Republicans using an "1864 law" to accomplish their goals. I haven't heard anyone on the news call out this irony/contradiction yet, but it jumped out at me immediately.

I dunno, to me the greater irony seems to be that the right-wing courts basically rewrite the Constitution because they don't like the consequences of following it in the case of Trump being disqualified by the 14th, but when laws or constitutional provisions that are centuries old lead to consequences they like, well then we have no choice but to follow the law as written and damn the consequences...
 
This reminded me of something funny I noticed lately... Democrats in the news/media have been criticizing and mocking Republicans in Arizona for using a (Civil War era) "1864 law" to enact an abortion ban, the implication being that its ridiculous to use such an old and antiquated law for such a modern case/issue. The first time I heard such a criticism/label "1864 law" I cringed :cringe:, because Democrats have been for months arguing that Trump should be disqualified based on the Civil War era Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, that bans insurrectionists from office and was originally used on Confederates to keep them out of office.

So its pretty ironic for Democrats to now be complaining about Republicans using an "1864 law" to accomplish their goals. I haven't heard anyone on the news call out this irony/contradiction yet, but it jumped out at me immediately.
There is a little bit of a difference. The one is a part of our Constitution, the other just a law. The theory is that the matters that make up the Constitution should be so fundamental as to be almost immune to change (not fully immune, of course, but by virtue of the higher standard for enacting them and the higher standard for changing them at least somewhat more perdurable). It is almost expected of mere laws that they will have to be altered with changing knowledge and sensibilities and circumstances.
 

The Supreme Court effectively abolishes the right to mass protest in three US states​

It is no longer safe to organize a protest in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas.

The Supreme Court announced on Monday that it will not hear Mckesson v. Doe. The decision not to hear Mckesson leaves in place a lower court decision that effectively eliminated the right to organize a mass protest in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.

Under that lower court decision, a protest organizer faces potentially ruinous financial consequences if a single attendee at a mass protest commits an illegal act.

It is possible that this outcome will be temporary. The Court did not embrace the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision attacking the First Amendment right to protest, but it did not reverse it either. That means that, at least for now, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is the law in much of the American South.

For the past several years, the Fifth Circuit has engaged in a crusade against DeRay Mckesson, a prominent figure within the Black Lives Matter movement who organized a protest near a Baton Rouge police station in 2016.

The facts of the Mckesson case are, unfortunately, quite tragic. Mckesson helped organize the Baton Rouge protest following the fatal police shooting of Alton Sterling. During that protest, an unknown individual threw a rock or similar object at a police officer, the plaintiff in the Mckesson case who is identified only as “Officer John Doe.” Sadly, the officer was struck in the face and, according to one court, suffered “injuries to his teeth, jaw, brain, and head.”

Everyone agrees that this rock was not thrown by Mckesson, however. And the Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware (1982) that protest leaders cannot be held liable for the violent actions of a protest participant, absent unusual circumstances that are not present in the Mckesson case — such as if Mckesson had “authorized, directed, or ratified” the decision to throw the rock.

Indeed, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor points out in a brief opinion accompanying the Court’s decision not to hear Mckesson, the Court recently reaffirmed the strong First Amendment protections enjoyed by people like Mckesson in Counterman v. Colorado (2023). That decision held that the First Amendment “precludes punishment” for inciting violent action “unless the speaker’s words were ‘intended’ (not just likely) to produce imminent disorder.”

The reason Claiborne protects protest organizers should be obvious. No one who organizes a mass event attended by thousands of people can possibly control the actions of all those attendees, regardless of whether the event is a political protest, a music concert, or the Super Bowl. So, if protest organizers can be sanctioned for the illegal action of any protest attendee, no one in their right mind would ever organize a political protest again.

Indeed, as Fifth Circuit Judge Don Willett, who dissented from his court’s Mckesson decision, warned in one of his dissents, his court’s decision would make protest organizers liable for “the unlawful acts of counter-protesters and agitators.” So, under the Fifth Circuit’s rule, a Ku Klux Klansman could sabotage the Black Lives Matter movement simply by showing up at its protests and throwing stones.

The Fifth Circuit’s Mckesson decision is obviously wrong​

Like Mckesson, Claiborne involved a racial justice protest that included some violent participants. In the mid-1960s, the NAACP launched a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. At least according to the state supreme court, some participants in this boycott “engaged in acts of physical force and violence against the persons and property of certain customers and prospective customers” of these white businesses.

Indeed, one of the organizers of this boycott did far more to encourage violence than Mckesson is accused of in his case. Charles Evers, a local NAACP leader, allegedly said in a speech to boycott supporters that “if we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”

But the Supreme Court held that this “emotionally charged rhetoric ... did not transcend the bounds of protected speech.” It ruled that courts must use “extreme care” before imposing liability on a political figure of any kind. And it held that a protest leader may only be held liable for a protest participant’s actions in very limited circumstances:

There are three separate theories that might justify holding Evers liable for the unlawful conduct of others. First, a finding that he authorized, directed, or ratified specific tortious activity would justify holding him responsible for the consequences of that activity. Second, a finding that his public speeches were likely to incite lawless action could justify holding him liable for unlawful conduct that in fact followed within a reasonable period. Third, the speeches might be taken as evidence that Evers gave other specific instructions to carry out violent acts or threats.
The Fifth Circuit conceded, in a 2019 opinion, that Officer Doe “has not pled facts that would allow a jury to conclude that Mckesson colluded with the unknown assailant to attack Officer Doe, knew of the attack and ratified it, or agreed with other named persons that attacking the police was one of the goals of the demonstration.” So that should have been the end of the case.

Instead, in its most recent opinion in this case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Claiborne’s “three separate theories that might justify” holding a protest leader liable are a non-exhaustive list, and that the MAGA-infused court is allowed to create new exceptions to the First Amendment. It then ruled that the First Amendment does not apply “where a defendant creates unreasonably dangerous conditions, and where his creation of those conditions causes a plaintiff to sustain injuries.”

And what, exactly, were the “unreasonably dangerous conditions” created by the Mckesson-led protest in Baton Rouge? The Fifth Circuit faulted Mckesson for organizing “the protest to begin in front of the police station, obstructing access to the building,” for failing to “dissuade” protesters who allegedly stole water bottles from a grocery store, and for leading “the assembled protest onto a public highway, in violation of Louisiana criminal law.”

Needless to say, the idea that the First Amendment recedes the moment a mass protest violates a traffic law is quite novel. And it is impossible to reconcile with pretty much the entire history of mass civil rights protests in the United States.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. leads marchers in what the Fifth Circuit calls an “unreasonably dangerous” activity. Morton Broffman/Getty Images
In fairness, the Court’s decision to leave the Fifth Circuit’s attack on the First Amendment in place could be temporary. As Sotomayor writes in her Mckesson opinion, when the Court announces that it will not hear a particular case it “expresses no view about the merits.” The Court could still restore the First Amendment right to protest in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in a future case.

For the time being, however, the Fifth Circuit’s Mckesson decision remains good law in those three states. And that means that anyone who organizes a political protest within the Fifth Circuit risks catastrophic financial liability.
 
My wife told me tonight that AZ's 1864 law regarding abortion also sets the age of consent for girls at 10 years old.
 
My wife told me tonight that AZ's 1864 law regarding abortion also sets the age of consent for girls at 10 years old.
Who could write a law like that? You would think they wouldn't even use the concept of consent if they were going to set it that low.

I remember the crap I used to hear when I was a kid, if it's bleeding its breeding. This is a mindset that still exists across the world. Especially in Afghanistan where Biden betrayed all of those girls.
 
Kennedy is entitled to be a bit conspiracy minded in my view. If you had a family history like his and didn't question things obsessively then you are probably a cow.
 
Who could write a law like that? You would think they wouldn't even use the concept of consent if they were going to set it that low.
To clarify; here is the full Howell Code link.
The Howell Code

The age of consent is in a different section and is actually a separate law within the Howell Code, Chapter X Section 47, that set the age of consent for females at 10 years old. Because these were different statutes, the Arizona Supreme Court's 2024 decision had no effect on the state's current consent laws. (By the time Arizona became a state in 1912, the age of consent was 18, for the record.) The Howell Code is a 400 page document and much of it has been superseded. The age of consent talk today is part of the context of 1864 AZ and the mind set of the person who wrote the code. The Howell Code also banned inter-racial marriage.

SEC. 47. Rape is the carnal knowledge of a female, forcibly and against her will. Every person of the age of fourteen years and upwards, who shall have carnal knowledge of any female child under the age of ten years, either with or without her consent, shall be adjudged to be guilty of the crime of rape, and shall be punished by imprisonment in the Territorial prison for a term not less than five years and which may extend to life.

Under the Howell Code, and contemporaneous with the law banning abortion, Arizona's age of consent was 10 years old.
 
Especially in Afghanistan where Biden betrayed all of those girls.

How, by leaving? Which, for the record, was negotiated by Trump before he left office?
 
There is a little bit of a difference. The one is a part of our Constitution, the other just a law. The theory is that the matters that make up the Constitution should be so fundamental as to be almost immune to change (not fully immune, of course, but by virtue of the higher standard for enacting them and the higher standard for changing them at least somewhat more perdurable). It is almost expected of mere laws that they will have to be altered with changing knowledge and sensibilities and circumstances.
Lets see if that registers
 
To clarify; here is the full Howell Code link.
The Howell Code

The age of consent is in a different section and is actually a separate law within the Howell Code, Chapter X Section 47, that set the age of consent for females at 10 years old. Because these were different statutes, the Arizona Supreme Court's 2024 decision had no effect on the state's current consent laws. (By the time Arizona became a state in 1912, the age of consent was 18, for the record.) The Howell Code is a 400 page document and much of it has been superseded. The age of consent talk today is part of the context of 1864 AZ and the mind set of the person who wrote the code. The Howell Code also banned inter-racial marriage.



Under the Howell Code, and contemporaneous with the law banning abortion, Arizona's age of consent was 10 years old.
And probably at least newly progressive for its moment. The law wasn't passed for no reason.
 
I dunno, to me the greater irony seems to be that the right-wing courts basically rewrite the Constitution because they don't like the consequences of following it in the case of Trump being disqualified by the 14th, but when laws or constitutional provisions that are centuries old lead to consequences they like, well then we have no choice but to follow the law as written and damn the consequences...
That's the pattern with all the Constitutional issues that come up... the ongoing sham of "textualism" and/or "originalism" and similar Constitutional interpretation. The Justices that profess to follow it... well... don't. They just use it as a convenient excuse to rule in favor of their ideological position.
There is a little bit of a difference. The one is a part of our Constitution, the other just a law. The theory is that the matters that make up the Constitution should be so fundamental as to be almost immune to change (not fully immune, of course, but by virtue of the higher standard for enacting them and the higher standard for changing them at least somewhat more perdurable). It is almost expected of mere laws that they will have to be altered with changing knowledge and sensibilities and circumstances.
Sure, it makes sense that the Constitution, by definition and by design, is much more difficult to change than state or federal law... so Constitutional law is going to tend to be much older than other laws. Another point, is that if even Constitutional law is subject to "changing knowledge and sensibilities and circumstances" then surely state and federal law would be as well. Textualists/Originalists might say no, but they've exposed that as nothing but a contrivance, discarded whenever it suits their ideological goals.
 
Some contrivances arr required to rhetorically rebut the perpetual and ongoing process of contrivance against rights. Snipping here, snipping there.
 
Can be. Isn't always.
 

The Supreme Court effectively abolishes the right to mass protest in three US states​

It is no longer safe to organize a protest in Louisiana, Mississippi, or Texas.

The Supreme Court announced on Monday that it will not hear Mckesson v. Doe. The decision not to hear Mckesson leaves in place a lower court decision that effectively eliminated the right to organize a mass protest in the states of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas.

Under that lower court decision, a protest organizer faces potentially ruinous financial consequences if a single attendee at a mass protest commits an illegal act.

It is possible that this outcome will be temporary. The Court did not embrace the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit’s decision attacking the First Amendment right to protest, but it did not reverse it either. That means that, at least for now, the Fifth Circuit’s decision is the law in much of the American South.

For the past several years, the Fifth Circuit has engaged in a crusade against DeRay Mckesson, a prominent figure within the Black Lives Matter movement who organized a protest near a Baton Rouge police station in 2016.

The facts of the Mckesson case are, unfortunately, quite tragic. Mckesson helped organize the Baton Rouge protest following the fatal police shooting of Alton Sterling. During that protest, an unknown individual threw a rock or similar object at a police officer, the plaintiff in the Mckesson case who is identified only as “Officer John Doe.” Sadly, the officer was struck in the face and, according to one court, suffered “injuries to his teeth, jaw, brain, and head.”

Everyone agrees that this rock was not thrown by Mckesson, however. And the Supreme Court held in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware (1982) that protest leaders cannot be held liable for the violent actions of a protest participant, absent unusual circumstances that are not present in the Mckesson case — such as if Mckesson had “authorized, directed, or ratified” the decision to throw the rock.

Indeed, as Justice Sonia Sotomayor points out in a brief opinion accompanying the Court’s decision not to hear Mckesson, the Court recently reaffirmed the strong First Amendment protections enjoyed by people like Mckesson in Counterman v. Colorado (2023). That decision held that the First Amendment “precludes punishment” for inciting violent action “unless the speaker’s words were ‘intended’ (not just likely) to produce imminent disorder.”

The reason Claiborne protects protest organizers should be obvious. No one who organizes a mass event attended by thousands of people can possibly control the actions of all those attendees, regardless of whether the event is a political protest, a music concert, or the Super Bowl. So, if protest organizers can be sanctioned for the illegal action of any protest attendee, no one in their right mind would ever organize a political protest again.

Indeed, as Fifth Circuit Judge Don Willett, who dissented from his court’s Mckesson decision, warned in one of his dissents, his court’s decision would make protest organizers liable for “the unlawful acts of counter-protesters and agitators.” So, under the Fifth Circuit’s rule, a Ku Klux Klansman could sabotage the Black Lives Matter movement simply by showing up at its protests and throwing stones.

The Fifth Circuit’s Mckesson decision is obviously wrong​

Like Mckesson, Claiborne involved a racial justice protest that included some violent participants. In the mid-1960s, the NAACP launched a boycott of white merchants in Claiborne County, Mississippi. At least according to the state supreme court, some participants in this boycott “engaged in acts of physical force and violence against the persons and property of certain customers and prospective customers” of these white businesses.

Indeed, one of the organizers of this boycott did far more to encourage violence than Mckesson is accused of in his case. Charles Evers, a local NAACP leader, allegedly said in a speech to boycott supporters that “if we catch any of you going in any of them racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”

But the Supreme Court held that this “emotionally charged rhetoric ... did not transcend the bounds of protected speech.” It ruled that courts must use “extreme care” before imposing liability on a political figure of any kind. And it held that a protest leader may only be held liable for a protest participant’s actions in very limited circumstances:


The Fifth Circuit conceded, in a 2019 opinion, that Officer Doe “has not pled facts that would allow a jury to conclude that Mckesson colluded with the unknown assailant to attack Officer Doe, knew of the attack and ratified it, or agreed with other named persons that attacking the police was one of the goals of the demonstration.” So that should have been the end of the case.

Instead, in its most recent opinion in this case, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Claiborne’s “three separate theories that might justify” holding a protest leader liable are a non-exhaustive list, and that the MAGA-infused court is allowed to create new exceptions to the First Amendment. It then ruled that the First Amendment does not apply “where a defendant creates unreasonably dangerous conditions, and where his creation of those conditions causes a plaintiff to sustain injuries.”

And what, exactly, were the “unreasonably dangerous conditions” created by the Mckesson-led protest in Baton Rouge? The Fifth Circuit faulted Mckesson for organizing “the protest to begin in front of the police station, obstructing access to the building,” for failing to “dissuade” protesters who allegedly stole water bottles from a grocery store, and for leading “the assembled protest onto a public highway, in violation of Louisiana criminal law.”

Needless to say, the idea that the First Amendment recedes the moment a mass protest violates a traffic law is quite novel. And it is impossible to reconcile with pretty much the entire history of mass civil rights protests in the United States.

Dr. Martin Luther King Jr. leads marchers in what the Fifth Circuit calls an “unreasonably dangerous” activity. Morton Broffman/Getty Images
In fairness, the Court’s decision to leave the Fifth Circuit’s attack on the First Amendment in place could be temporary. As Sotomayor writes in her Mckesson opinion, when the Court announces that it will not hear a particular case it “expresses no view about the merits.” The Court could still restore the First Amendment right to protest in Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas in a future case.

For the time being, however, the Fifth Circuit’s Mckesson decision remains good law in those three states. And that means that anyone who organizes a political protest within the Fifth Circuit risks catastrophic financial liability.
This is where the 6-3 majority is critical for the authoritarians. 5-4 wasn't sufficient, because it only takes 4 justices to agree to take a case. With a 6-3 majority they can simply avoid ruling on a case, when they're worried they'd have to overturn the lower court's decision.
 
Clarence Thomas has been absent from the Court with no explanation. He is also the oldest serving on the SCOTUS.

Justice Clarence Thomas absent from US Supreme Court session​

April 15 (Reuters) - U.S. Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas was not on the bench on Monday as the other eight justices heard arguments, with no reason given for his absence.
Thomas, 75, is the oldest and longest-serving member of the court and is part of its 6-3 conservative majority. He was appointed to the top U.S. judicial body in 1991 by Republican President George H.W. Bush.
Chief Justice John Roberts noted the absence of Thomas at the beginning of the arguments in the first of two cases before the court on Monday, but did not offer an explanation.
https://www.reuters.com/world/us/justice-clarence-thomas-absent-us-supreme-court-session-2024-04-15/
 
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