1962 India-China War

[silver 2039]

1962 War: The War Begins

China was infuriated by increased Indian military activities along its borders and had a fair idea about the state of Indian troops in the area.

At 8 A.M on 8 September 1962, about 600 Chinese soldiers crossed Thagla Ridge and surrounded Dhola post. The Chinese had chosen the spot and the timing well: Thagla Ridge, which overlooked the key Chinese garrison at Leh, was an exceedingly remote area with terrain that was not conducive for troop movement. Further, it was a Saturday and it would take a long time for the information to reach Delhi along the chain of command.

Nehru, who was attending the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London at that time, immediately flew back to India. His cautious response to media was, "Our instructions are to free our territory. I can't fix a date'. But, some media reports misquoted him, and exaggerated his response. This led to certain misconceptions.

The GoC, 4th Division Gen. Niranjan Prasad presided over an urgent meeting on the issue. The meeting decided to tell the Dhola post commander to stay put and to send Assam Rifles wing at Lumla, which was two days march away, to go Dhola. It was also decided to move detachments of 9 Punjab at Shakti and Lumpu to Dhola and the ones at Towang to Lumpu.

Brig. Dalvi, Commander, 7th Brigade, who was first communicated about the Thagla Ridge intrusion, knew that Towang, along with Tsangdhar and Hathungla, were vital positions that had to be defended at all costs. Any diversion of 9 Punjab to Dhola would leave Towang defenseless.

Operation Leghorn: Despite these objections, 9 Punjab was ordered to leave for Lumpu. Thus began 'Operation Leghorn' with the limited aim of persuading the Chinese to leave Indian territory.

On 12th September, a meeting was held between Commander, Eastern theater. Gen LP Sen, Gen. Umrao Singh and Gen. Niranjan Prasad.

The Chinese resorted to their old methods adopted in Longju and Khenzemane. The Namka Chu, a fast moving riverlet with 4 bridges crossing it, had now become the de-facto military boundary, and later, the front.

All 9 Punjab could do at this point was to dig in opposite the Chinese to prevent further incursions. 9 Punjab was pinned down opposite to Chinese posts and couldn't mount an attack due to the Chinese being on higher ground.

When the 9 Punjab finally reached Dhola on the morning of 15th September, they found Chinese troops on both sides of the Namka Chu river. Chinese controlled whole of Thagla Ridge area. When challenged, the Chinese told the Indians to withdraw as they 'had decided' to demarcate it 'sacred Chinese land.'

On 17th September, COAS HQ ordered 9 Punjab to "capture" Thagla Ridge. Experts have said, quoting records, that Brigadier Dalvi who was the only senior commander in the area, refused to execute the order given the ground situation. Dalvi advised HQ that Dhola, Hathungla and Karpola posts should be abandoned as they had become indefensible. However, by now, Dhola had become a prestige issue.

On 20th September, a Chinese sentry near Bridge II on Namka Chu threw a grenade on Indian position resulting in heavy firing from both sides. Four Chinese and five Indians were killed.

At this point, all the PM, the Defence Minister and the Finance Minister were abroad. In their absence, the officiating Defence Minister Raghunath called a meeting to discuss the Thagla situation with Gen. Sen. The meeting decided to evict the Chinese from the North bank of Namka Chu, to contain the Thagla Ridge and to patrol Tsangle areas.

The plan called for a limited flanking movement from Bridge V at western edge of the valley. This move was to be in 3 stages: Lumpu to Tsangdhar via Karpola, Tsangdhar to Muskar and then to Tseng Jong.

Clash At Tseng Jong: The 50-member patrol party of 9 Punjab, under Maj Chaudhary reached Tseng Jong on the 9th of October. Early on October 10, about 800 Chinese troops backed by heavy mortars attacked 9 Punjab. 9 Punjab was heavily outnumberd yet fought gallantly and repulsed the first Chinese assault inflicting heavy casualties. The Punjabis had 6 dead and 11 wounded. Major Chaudhary was wounded and asked Brig. Dalvi permission to withdraw.

Dalvi ordered Punjabis to fall back to Bridge IV.

THE CHINESE ATTACK

Kaul reached Delhi on 11th October and met Prime Minister to apprise him of the latest developments at the border. Gen. Sen opined that 7 Brigade would hold against the Chinese and recommended that it remain in the current position. He was backed by Thapar and Kaul on this.

Meanwhile at Thagla, 7 Brigade was reinforced by 4 Grenadiers. Experts point out that they had arrived from Delhi only a few weeks ago and were in summer clothing with three days rations and fifty rounds of ammunition per rifle, bringing the total to 2,500 men there. By 16th October they were further reinforced by 450 Border Roads Pioneers to assist in carrying loads and collecting airdrops.

Efforts were made to build up 7 Brigade by increasing the tempo of airdrops between 15th and 19th October.

The Chinese launched two major attacks on 20th October. The well-coordinated attacks were 1000 km apart in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namkachu river.

The Chinese attacked with an artillery bombardment of 76 mm and 120 mm mortars at the Indian positions of Bridge III and Bridge IV. Massive infantry assaults followed in divisional strength. The Rajput and Gorkha positions in Dhola area were attacked with 2 brigades.

By 9 am, the Chinese had completely wiped out the two regiments of the Rajputs and the Gorkhas. Out of 513 Rajputs, 282 killed were killed, 81 wounded and captured and 90 unwounded and captured. Brig. Dalvi, finding that 7 Brigade was being run over by the Chinese, tried to lead a small retreating party of Indian troops back to Indian lines but was taken prisoner at Dhola. Indian posts at Tsangle were eliminated giving the Chinese control over the western end of NEFA.

At the eastern edge of NEFA, fighting commenced near the Indian strongpoint of Walong. Also on 20 October, the Chinese attacked the forward posts in Ladakh. The Galwan post fell within a few weeks.

India shocked: India was shocked at the Oct 20 events. Nehru felt that China had betrayed India and had forced an unwanted war on India.

After the Namkachu debacle, Indian Army tried to find reinforcements for dispatch to the NEFA front. Hence new divisions in NEFA were raised.

A strategic plan for NEFA was developed by Army HQ. It focused on the two great ridges in NEFA; one some distance behind the other. The Army went in with enthusiasm to implement the strategy.

On 16th November, the Chinese launched probing attacks on north-west and north-east approaches at Se La. 62 Brigade at Se La put up a stiff resistence, but were ordered to fall back to Dirang Dzong. Fighting became heavy and there was vicious hand-to-hand combat. As dawn broke, 62 Brigade was in full retreat from Se La. Indians inflicted heavy casualties on Chinese, giving approximately five times more than was received.

The Chinese assault into had extended their line of communication and supplies much too far.

Being unable to maintain it, they made a virtue of necessity and declared a unilateral cease-fire on October 24, 1962. While not withdrawing claim, they withdrew occupation to the pre-war boundaries north of the McMahon Line in the eastern sector, but kept a Switzerland-sized area 38,000 Sq. km of seized territory up to their Line of Actual Control (LAC) in Ladakh district. Further, Pakistan illegally gifted China with a 2,600 Sq. km tribute of Jammu and Kashmir territory in 1963.

India rejected tha taks offer and tried to regroup during the lull in the fighting.

By November 18, Chinese forces had penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly 50 km from Assam-North-East Frontier Agency border. The Chinese didn't advance further and on November 21 declared a unilateral cease-fire. The US Air Force flew in massed supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.

The People's Republic of China also does not recognise the merger, initiated by Sikkimese popular vote, of Sikkim state and India.

 

[silver 2039]

1962 Sino-Indian War
HindustanTimes.com

Eleven years after it invaded Tibet, Peoples Republic of China on October 16, 1962, launched an attack on Himalayan India ended a long peaceful co-existence between the two Asian giants.

The short Sino-Indian war was triggered by a dispute over the Himalayan border in the Aksai Chin. The disputed area was strategic for China as it had a major road between Tibet and Xinjiang. Approximately 43,000 square kilometres of Indian territory remains under Chinese occupation.

CAUSES: ASKAI CHIN & FORWARD POSTS POLICY

Aiming to consolidate its hold in Tibet, China started developing infrastructure in Himalayan regions. A ring road was constructed which led from China to Tibet and from there via Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. Indian Ladakh district of Askai Chin region of J&K obstructed the road and would have forced Chinese to build through the harsh Takla Makan desert. But, t


Chinese soldiers monitor Indian Army movements
aking advantage of the point that they hadn't actually signed the agreement reached at Simla Conference, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them. It refused the de-facto McMahon line in East of India that demarcated the border and control of the land. India discovered the road only in October 1958, triggering public outcry in the country.


The two countries had fairly good relations through most of 1950s and even agreed on the famous 'Five Principles of Co-existence' in 1954. However, border tensions began to surface since 1956.

After the Chinese occupation of Tibet, Indian government adopted a policy of forward military posts in its areas bordering China. China reacted angrily, disputing India's claims about border areas.

Indian deployment was spread over a large
area and logistics were difficult to maintain, since the road network was poor. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had relied on US diplomatic support. However, in October, 1962, US attention was focused on Cuban Missile Crisis with Soviet Union.


The War

Hostilities began on October 16, 1962. The Chinese said they were responding to Indian provocations.

On Oct 20, 1962, Chinese People's Liberation Army launched two major coordinated attacks 1000 km apart in the Chip Chap valley in Ladakh and the Namkachu river. After taking control of a substantial portion of the disputed territory, Chinese forces made an offer for talks on October 24. India rejected this offer and tried to regroup during the lull in the fighting.

By November 18, Chinese forces had penetrated close to the outskirts of Tezpur, Assam, a major frontier town nearly 50 km fromAssam-North-East Frontier Agency border. The Chinese didn't advance further and on November 21 declared a unilateral cease-fire. The US Air Force flew in massed supplies to India in November, 1962, but neither side wished to continue hostilities.


Results of the War

India's defeat in 1962 led to an overhaul of Indian Army in terms of doctrine, training, organisation and equipment.

Nehru Govt decided to take control of many territories that he saw as a source of espionage and resupply to potential enemies. In 1965 India seized Goa and the then-independent state of Sikkim.

LOAC Controversy, Status Quo Continues

Indians continue to regard territorial acquisitions by China as an illegal occupation. And so, the proposals to formalise Sino-Indian border at the Line Of Actual Control have not made any headway. However, both India and China don't want to disturb the status quo and the disputed boundary, called by Line of Actual Control or the McMahon Line is not considered a major flashpoint. Military commissions from India and China meet regularly to discuss the status of the border. The war also altered the course of the Cold War.

 

[silver 2039]

1962 War: The Background

The roots of the war between China and India can be traced to Chinese annexation of Tibet.

Before annexation, Tibet’s transactions with the outside world were conducted mainly through India because of the centuries old ties between the two countries and also due to unstability in China due to civil war. Both India and China had their missions in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet.

After the defeat of Chiang Kai Shek’s Nationalist Govt in Chinese civil war, the Tibetan govt on July 8, 1949 asked Chinese mission to "vacate", exercising its rights as an independent country.

China invited Tibetans early in 1950s to "accede peacefully" and stationed its army near Chamdo city East of Tibet. On October 7, 1950, the day the Tibetan delegation was scheduled to arrive, 80,000 soldiers of People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China attacked Tibet and announced its 'peaceful liberation'. The Dalai Lama was forced to sign a "17-Point Agreement of May 23, 1951".

India was completely taken by surprise. Nehru complained but to no avail as protests intensified in the country.

Before Indian independence, the British had earmarked Tibet as a neutral buffer zone in view of British India's defence environment vis-à-vis the similar imperialistic leanings of China and Russia. Most Indian politicians failed to anticipate the strategic ramifications of the Chinese aggression and loss of this buffer.

Nehru held the view that newly independent India could ill afford a confrontation over Tibet. Later, Nehru not only recognised Chinese sovereignty over Tibet but also went to great lengths to assure that friendship with China was the keystone of India's foreign policy and India along with China could mutually hold the non-aligned balance of power in Asia.

Sardar Patel, however, favoured a strong line to be adopted against Chinese aggression.

 

[silver 2039]

1962 War: The Tibet Controversy

China never recognised the McMahon Line that demarcated Sino-Indian border. When PLA invaded Tibet, China said it did so to "liberate three million Tibetans from imperialist aggression, to complete the unification of the whole of China". But the main reason, say the experts, was to control highly strategic crossroads of Tibet that led to the heart of Western, Central, South and South East Asia.

The autonomous Tibetans and the Dogra rulers of the kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir in 1842 signed a non-aggression pact recognising the "old, established frontiers." But the boundary wasn't specified. In 1847, the British delineated a boundary from the Spiti river up to Pangong lake.

But again, the area further north up to the Karakoram Pass was left out. First boundary alignment here was recorded in 1865 when WH Johnson of the Survey of India trekked across the Aksai Chin and drew a map including this in Jammu and Kashmir. Later the Govt decided to push the border further to the Kuen Lun range to absorb Aksai Chin and to put a British controlled buffer in between to prevent any Russian advance.

In 1892, China put a boundary marker at Karakoram Pass and told the British officer and adventurer Capt. Young that its territory began there and that the boundary ran along Karakoram range. The reasons given for this was that Askai Chin was an "integral" part of Tibet, which the Chinese claimed.

In 1904, a British military expedition was sent to China under Colonel Young.
An Anglo-Tibetan treaty was signed with China that granted Britain trading rights. An Anglo-Chinese treaty of 1906 followed up the previous treaty. However, the Chinese tried to capture Tibet many times until 1913 but failed.

In 1913, Tibet declared independence and a conference was held in 1914 in Simla regarding Tibetan independence.

The Simla Conference was to be a tripartite one between the Tibetans, the Chinese and the British. Tibet demanded recognition of their de facto sovereignty but China remained adamant. The conference decided to divide Tibet into an Inner and an Outer-Tibet. The Outer-Tibet was to accept Chinese "suzerainty" if its autonomous status was recognised. But in the end, China refused to sign the treaty due to disagreement over 'China-inner Tibet' border.

So, Britain and Tibet, represented by Sir Henry McMahon and Lonchen Shatra Shatra respectively, reached an agreement to settle the border dispute among themselves. The the 'McMahon Line' came into existence. Chinese were not invited for any meeting about the McMahon line.

Till now, the Chinese claim to Indian areas is based upon non-recognition of the McMahon Line.

Territories that became disputed: The territories that came in dispute between India and China due to the latter's claims to Tibet were:

Eastern sector: 90,000 Sq. km under Indian control then called the North-East Frontier Agency or NEFA.
The Middle sector: 20,000 Sq. Km on either side of the Himalayan watershed and passes.
The Western sector: 30,000 Sq. Km of high plateau country known as the Aksai Chin in the district of Ladakh of Jammu and Kashmir state bordering Tibet and Xinjiang province of China.

'Panchsheel' Principles

Indian and China signed Panchsheel pact on 29 April 1954. Under the agreement, India gave up all extra-territorial rights and privileges it enjoyed in Tibet, which it inherited from the British. India formally recognised Tibet to be a region of China. The five principles were:

1. Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty
2. Mutual non-aggression
3. Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
4. Equal and mutual benefit working relationship
5. Peaceful co-existence

 

[silver 2039]

1962 War: Border Tensions (1955-1960)

The period between 1955 and 1960 was marked by increasing tension at the Sino-Indian border.

Aiming to consolidate its grip on Tibet, China started developing infrastructure in the region's strategic areas. It planned a ring road from China to Tibet and from there via the Karakorum Range to Sinkiang and Mongolia and then back to China. India's Ladakh district of Askai Chin region of Jammu and Kashmir obstructed this road. It could have forced China to build the road through the harsh Takla Makan desert. But, asserting that they had not signed 1914 Simla agreement, China published maps showing that Aksai Chin belonged to them and rejected the McMahon line.

India discovered the road only in October 1958. Both sides exchanged angry messages, charging each other with territorial transgressions. Nehru was severely criticised, both in Parliament and on streets.

Before these border incidents, Nehru had recommended that both sides take a look at historical proofs and recommend where the border should be. On November 7, 1959, Chou en-Lai suggested complete demilitarisation of the entire border to a depth of 20 km using the McMahon line in the East and the "Line Of Actual Control" in the West. This would effectively have jeopardised India's defencive positions in the East.

Neru proposed that in Ladakh, the troops should withdraw behind the border claimed by China while the Chinese troops should withdraw behind the border claimed by India, leaving the territory in between a "no man's land" pending a negotiated settlement. He pointed out that in the east there were no Chinese south of McMahon line save at Longju, which India could not allow.

But the Chinese were rapidly changing their maps. On Dec 17, 1959, Chou rejected Nehru's proposal as "unfair" to China.

Tensions grew when India welcomed Dalai Lama in March 1959 after he crossed over to India along with 20,000 followers. Mao felt humiliated. Many experts say the Chinese claim of NEFA was the aftermath of the 1959 Tibetan revolt.

Khenzemane Incident:

Nehru and Chinese foreign minister Chou En-Lai decided in a 1959 that two countries won't send patrols within two miles of McMahon Line in NEFA. However, On August 7, 1959, about 200 Chinese troops intruded into Indian border at Khenzemane in the Kameng frontier division at east of Thagla Ridge. China claimed that the international border ran through Drokung Samba bridge.

Longju Incident:

On 25th August 1959, around 300 Chinese troops crossed into Longju region of the Subashin Frontier division and captured an Indian post. In both cases the Chinese heavily outnumbered Indians.

The Chinese excusions became more frequent by late 1959. As a result Indian Army was given total control of Indian border in NEFA. The 4th Indian Division was sent to Assam from Punjab. Although ill-quipped, it was told to defend the entire McMahon line from Bhutan tri-junction to Burma border.

Chou En-lai visited Delhi in April 1960. Nehru was keen to reach a settlement with China. En-lai had earlier indicated that China would agree to India's claim in the north-eastern sector, but went back on this when India didn't agree to Chinese claim-line in Ladakh. So, the talks broke down and a good opportunity to solve the dispute was lost.

Amid accusations in media that China was training Maoists in India, Chou made an anti-India statement in Nepal flaring up tensions.

Each side tried to extend its line of actual control.

 

[silver 2039]

1962 War: Forward Posts Policy

OPERATION ONKAR

As the frequency of Chinese incursions increased, Indian leaders went into a huddle on Nov 2, 1961 to evolve a response.

The meeting at Pdt Nehru's house was attended Defence Minister Krishna Menon, Chief of Army Staff Lt. General Thapar and Quarter Master General Lt. General Kaul among others. The meeting decided that:

• In Ladakh sector, Indian Army would patrol forward areas. Posts would be established on the border of Indian territory to prevent further Chinese intrusions.

• The same would also apply to areas in Uttar Pradesh on Indo-China border where posts would be established as far as possible in Indian territory.

These activities angered China. The Forward Posts orders were given to the Eastern and Western commands on December 5, 1961. The whole exercise was codenamed "Operation ONKAR".

 

[silver 2039]

1962 War: Indian Army in 1962

India Army was grossly ill-equipped to implement the orders to set up Forward Posts in Ladakh and in NEFA. No roads and infrastructure were there to help them in one of the highest battlefields in the world. Almost all the forward posts depended on airlifts. Nearly everything had to be air dropped, right down to the daily rations. But due to bad terrain, it was later estimated that only 30 per cent of supplies actually reached the troops.

The troops' rations had a calorific value suited for warfare on the plains rather than the high-calorie diet that is required for mountain warfare. Reports sayd that pressure cookers were unavailable due to "administrative delays" while oil cookers, essential for keeping warm and cooking, were also in short supply. Medical facilities were also poor.

Even the Russian-made helicopters used for airlifts were inadequate for high-altitude operations. The army had no means of carrying heavy loads in the mountains and hence its mobility and firepower was severely reduced. Its main means of transport in the era of jets were mules and human porters.

Troops also lacked the training for a war in such difficult areas. TO make it worse, almost all equipment and weapons were of 1950s vintage.

At this time, a "feud" between the then Finance Minister Morarji Desai and the Defense Minister Krishna Menon made the matters worse.

 

[trader/warrior]

hm.. i have not heard about that war before

 

[lz14]

I won't go into the details that lead up to the actual conflict. Both sides have their own stories.

But the bottom line of the story is the "MacMahon line" which is illegal.

In 1911(or the whereabouts) Britain and China held a meeting discussing the border of Tibet and Chinese inland. i.e inner Tibet and outer Tibet. It was an attempt to separate Tibet from China. In any case it was NOT about the border of Tibet and India. However, in the SECOND round, MacMahon sneaked the question and his map into the treaty. But it wasn't signed by the Chinese anyway.

Britain did not publish the "MacMahon line" untill in 1936 after an explorer incident. In 1938, they destroyed the original copy of 1929, and changed it with a new version that says the treaty was about border of India and Tibet. This was actually a relative recently discovery by Chinese and Indian scholars. As there are still original copies survived.

 

[Anubisdk2]

Its interesting to think about it, but China has a border dispute with almost every neighbor it has....wonder if they will ever try and push them around to get what they want?

 

[Knight-Dragon]

Much of the attitude was fr the time of the empire of China. To the imperial orthodoxy, there're no such thing as 'borders'. The emperor was the Son of Heaven and ruler of All Under Heaven, theorectically. The way they interpretated it, the Chinese emperor was the rightful ruler of the world; limited only by the barbarity of frontier tribes and their unenlightenment; their non-acknowledgement of rule by the Chinese emperor.

The idea of actual borders on maps is a modern phenomenon, fr the West.

 

[allhailIndia]

I think some of the effects of the war need to be established a bit more.

For a start there was a major overhaul as mentioned by silver2039. It also meant that the govt. stopped interfering in appointments made to the highest post in the Army , after Kaul, who was basically a political appointee, was shown up to be so ineffective.

An element of real-politik also entered into India's diplomacy. Till then India had practiced her diplomacy on the belief that by staying neutral, you won't antagonize anyone and be friendly to all. This meant that too much emphasis was put on Non-Alignment and the Panchsheel at the expense of the nation's defence. My political science prof. who lived through this war, told me that at the beginning of the war, in Parliament, the defence minister, Krishna Menon, was made to face the embarassing fact that ordinance factories had spent more time producing coffe machines than actual armaments!

This war also broke Nehru's spirit completely. A great statesman of the 50's and India's unquestioned leader, he was now seen as a blundering old fool by the Indian public after the war, so much so that everything that went wrong In India after his death was blamed on him!

However, on the positive side, this war dispelled all notions of the inability of the Indians to unite. It had always been a contention of our ex-imperialistic masters, that leaving India to rule herself would result in a catastrophic "Balkanization" of the country.

No such thing happened. Even the Dravidian movement, which was vociferously threatening secession if Hindi was made the national language, since most South Indians did not speak the language anyway, quietly melted into the backgroudn and discontinued its agitation. It is said that a few days after Nehru declared that Tezpur would fall soon, an old couple came to his gate and asked the security guard to let them in. Assuming them to be petitioners for some cause, the guard let them in and they walked up to Nehru and handed him a document. When he asked them what it was, the old man said, "Sir, I have a few acres of land outside the city [Delhi]. This is a sale deed handing it over to the government for use of defence purposes."

This is only one of the anecdotes of the kind of unity and feelings of patriotism that gripped the country. IN this time also was composed one of India's greatest songs, "Ae mere watan ke logon"( Oh people of my motherland), sung by one of India's greatest singers, Lata Mangeshkar. It is said that Nehru was moved to tears when he heard this song, and almost overnight,it became a sort of anthem of the war. People will place this song, even today among the pantheon of the great patriotic songs of India. Even today, few people, esp of the older generation can hear this song, without instantly casting their mind back to 1962.

However, Pakistan didnt seem to notice this feeling of patriotism and unity and seeing India as weak after the 1962 war, sought to attack Kashmir in 1965. By then India had built up its military considerably and Shastri, despite his humble demeanour, was no pushover. He ordered a retaliation into Kutch and Punjab provinces in Pak. Ceasefire came with Soviet influence, only when the Pakistani forces were stopped and an Indian unit was in the outskirts of Lahore, after heavy losses to the Pakistani Army.