Battles the result of which is disputed by historians

[Dachs]

It's rather unfortunate that Pyrrhic victories came to be named after Pyrrhos. Pyrrhos' failure was not that his battles were too costly, in terms of casualties. He repeatedly fought them, after all; more such battles, contrary to the quote, did not destroy him. What did destroy him was his inability to focus on any one campaign and carry it through to a finish. Pyrrhos proved that he was capable of achieving astounding victories and then equally capable of leaving those jobs unfinished, leaving to pursue another opportunity, and losing everything during his absence. That's what happened when he tried to take the throne of Makedonia (twice), fight the Romans in Italy (also twice), and even when he established his empire in Sicily. Abandoning the siege of Sparta to attack Argos caused his ultimate defeat and death. The man could not sit still. He had classical conqueror ADHD.

I don't like the name "Kadmeian victory" much better, but it does at least have the right idea: taking an outrageously high number of casualties in a victory. Kadmos' casualties weren't unsustainable, which is supposedly the idea that people are trying to get across. Thebes still became one of the great cities of Greece even without all the men who died to try to capture that spring.

 

[Domen]

Let's add, that:

Plutarch records that Hannibal ranked Pyrrhus as the greatest commander the world had ever seen,[2] though Appian gives a different version of the story, in which Hannibal placed him second after Alexander the Great.[14]

 

[privatehudson]

I suppose it depends on the historian really and how mainstream they are. I listened to an audiobook recently in which the author argued that Stalingrad and Kursk were not defeats, but in essence victories for the Germans. Mostly the argument seemed to concentrate on the relative loss of life for each side, but to be frank I lost interest after a while. Right around the time that it started to imply that Hitler was a military genius who would have won the war if only those pesky generals hadn't keep undermining his ideas.

 

[Domen]

(...) argued that Stalingrad and Kursk were not defeats, but in essence victories for the Germans. Mostly the argument seemed to concentrate on the relative loss of life for each side (...)

Silly ideas, indeed.

Stalingrad was the most catastrophic of all Axis defeats in WW2 up to that point. It resulted in actual destruction of many divisions.

Did he add Stalingrad's Axis (mostly German & Romanian) POWs who died in Soviet captivity to the "loss of life" figures? Regarding Kursk - the Kursk offensive was launched by 777,000 Axis attackers vs. 1,338,000 Soviet defenders. So the Soviets could afford suffering a greater loss of life from the start:


Link to video.

BTW - one of myths of WW2 is the myth of "unlimited manpower reserves" of the Soviet Union. In fact Germany and other Axis states controlled half of Europe and had more manpower available in territories under their control, than the Soviets had throughout most of the war (especially after the initial loss of western territories in 1941). Yet Germany and other Axis states FAILED to make use of that manpower, while the Soviets made good use of their limited manpower.

The Wehrmacht tried to stick to the concept of elite, expensive, well-trained divisions and equipment spearheading each operation.

The Soviets, on the other hand, preferred bigger numbers of mediocre units with average equipment, easier to replace and faster to mobilize.

Not only did the Soviets manage to mobilize a larger % of their available manpower, but also they were better at economizing resources such as ammunition and fuel. Another misconception is, that the Soviets had a lot of ammunition compared to the Axis. This is not true - which is why the Soviets preferred short but intense artillery barrages, rather than long-lasting exchanges of fire. The Soviets had more artillery guns, but experienced shorategs of ammo per gun.

The German way of using ammunition was more efficient in terms of inflicting casualties, but it inevitably lead to huge consumption of ammunition.

The Soviets were sending their infantry and tanks to unsupported attacks and sparing ammo wherever they could afford suffering high losses. On the other hand, ammunition was being collected and amassed before every major breakthrough assault. And then used in short yet violent preparatory barrages.

High Soviet loss of life was often the result of large-scale "reconnaissance attacks" - which were very frequent in Red Army operations.

Those large-scale "reconnaissance attacks" were being launched without much preparation against heavily defended sections of enemy frontline.

They had several purposes - to recon the enemy strength, to confuse the enemy as to real directions of planned Soviet main strikes.

Basically such things like The Dieppe Raid was an every-day routine for the Red Army - and it produced heavy losses among manpower (yet they could afford those losses). But they were useful for the Red Army, because those attacks were confusing the enemy as to real directions of Soviet main offensives, and were also providing a lot of information about situation of the enemy (information was being collected from survivors of those "reconnaissance attacks").

 

[privatehudson]

I can't say I remember now, as I said I lost interest when it started to get silly. Although I do recall him drawing upon some of the points you mentioned - notably the limited (rather than limitless) manpower of the Soviets and the elite formations of the Wehrmacht. I wouldn't have finished the book at all but for the fact that I was on holiday and it was the only one left on my phone.