Best WW2 General

[Case]

Originally posted by Adler17
Monty is the most overestimated General of ww2. His only main victory El Alamain

I take it that you've never heard of Operation Overlord then

...was only a victory because of the lack of German supplies. Therefore he nearly lost the battle before the lack became serious.

Monty never came close to losing El Alamain - while the first few days of the battle went poorly (due to a combination of flawed plans and the poor level of training in much of the 8th Army), Monty was able to reshape his plans and emerge victorious. Incidently, the victory at El Alamain was due to more then just material and numerical superiority (though these were critical) - the elite Australian 9th Division played a critical role by simply outfighting the Germans at the northern end of the battle area.

Also, Rommel's defeat at El Alemain was also due to his foolish decision to try and defend the place, and not one of the more easily defended places to the east. While many blame Hitler for this, in reality, Rommel deserves the blame due to allowing himself to become over-extended after the great Gazala victory.

Incidently, fans of Rommel need to consider his insane plan to defend the Atlantic Wall - a plan which ignored the repeated evidence that German, Italian and Japanese were unable to stop any invasion force from getting ashore due to the Allies overwealming naval support. This leason should have been learned from Scily, Salerno, Tarawa, etc.

Over 1 million own soldiers at Stalingrad

Zhukov wasn't in command at Stalingrad - he was busy conducting Operation Mars near Moscow (which ended in disarster and 500,000 Soviet killed and wounded). Incidently, German losses at Stalingrad were proportionatly worse - 500,000 fatalities seems to be a reasonable estimate (if you include POWs).

1 intact German army would have been able to retake the Berlin, the Oder line, Breslau and perhaps Königsberg until Russian troops copuld have stopped them.

There were no intact German divisions, let alone armies. By the logic you're using, the Americans made a major mistake invading Okinawa using forces from Hawaii - after all, an intact Japanese fleet and expeditionary army would have been able to take Honolulu.

Going all out for Berlin was a sound plan to bring the war to the fastest possible conclusion. The key Soviet mistake was Stalin's decision to encourage the various Fronts to compete for the honour of capturing the city - this, and the resultingly poor liason between the fronts, resulted in unessesary haste and casulties.

Churchill wanted indeed having the German divisions intact for a war with Russia.

...briefly, before his military advisors talked some sence into him. The British cabinet would never have approved such a plan, and if they had the Americans would have vetoed it.

Perhaps if he died in 1944 and the Prussian coupe d´état under Stauffenberg was successfull a democratic Germany and the allies would have also been able to liberate Russia.

In 1944 the Allies wanted to utterly destroy Germany, and not join with it in any kind of alliance. Unconditional surrender was more then a slogan; it really was the Allies rock-solid war aim. The only place where an Anglo-German alliance against the Soviets was taken seriously was in the fevered minds of the Nazis. The Allied governments certainly didn't want to wage war on their Soviet allies, especially not on the side of the hated Germans (remember, the Allied public was fairly well informed on what the Germans were getting up to in the countries they had conqured, especially the Soviet Union).

 

[Case]

Originally posted by Mobilize
MacArthur would be the best. Vowing to return to the Philipines and doing so.

OTOH, returning to the Philipines wasn't necessary to win the war in the Pacific - Taiwan would have been a better choice as a jumping off spot against Japan.

His other offenses in the Pacific were well-done

Not true - MacArthur should have been sacked for his bungling of the Papuan campaign, which resulted in thousands of unessary Allies casualties, and the sacking of some very fine Australian and American generals. The landings on Biak in 1944 were also a stuff up.

MacArthur deserves condemation for his disarsterous attempt to defend Luzon in 1941-42. Aside from the famous blunders which resulted in the destruction of his air forces, his idiodic decision to drop the sound pre-war plan of only defending Bataan in favour of a lashed-together attempt at stoping the Japanese on the beaches resulted in an easier Japanese victory.

 

[AngryGerbil]

Woah, I can't believe I'm the first person to vote for Eisenhower. Are you people talking about the same WWII that I am? =)

Rommel indeed....bah. I think the question was "Best WWII General" not "Most talked about General on The History Channel"

 

[privatehudson]

Ike had his failings too, he did after all permit such campaigns as Market Garden to go ahead, either without checking on the plans (which were blatantly flawed) or not recognising the problems inherent in it. Some accuse him of being overly cautious in regards to supplies in the NW europe campaign also, hampering the advances of the less cautious generals like Patton.

 

[AngryGerbil]

I thought Market Garden was Monty's screw up?

Either way, it doesn't matter, Ike owns all of the other pansies on this list hands down. He would whomp Rommel's ass with one hand and MacArthur with his other while kicking the crap out of Zhukov and Guderian blindfolded all while Bradley and Monty would just fall down and die at the thought of even messing with The Man. Ike > *.

 

[privatehudson]

Monty planned it, Ike certainly gave the go ahead, I doubt an operation on that scale could have proceeded without the basic outline if not overall plan passing Ike's eyes. He holds ulitmate responsibility for overall planning. Montgomery was a cautious general not given to fighting campaigns without severe levels of planning. If you're going to give anyone's plan for a race into Germany the go ahead, Monty would not be it.

Other than that I find your wholehearted generalisation of Ike's abilities a little basic. Ike was a grand strategist, if he had an opposite it was Rundstedt, Von Kluge, Hitler even. Rommel, Bradley and Montgomery and most of the others were on a totally different level.

I agree he was reasonably good at his job but this idea that he'd run rings round people who weren't on the same strategic level as him I find intruiging. Are you suggesting that given command of any size of force that Ike was the finest of them all? I dispute this.

He was a good grand strategist, he had his faults and permitted a number of half thought out campaigns he should have vetoed. He was not god, nor would he have been likely to have been as good at commanding battlefield corps or divisions as the others.

 

[Adler17]

Case, Monty had poor plans as you admit. And sure after Gazala the Afrikakorps had big supply problems, bigger than before. But that was Hitlers fault. As he was unwilling to send Rommel the supplies he needed and didn´t take Malta, which would have been meant the splitting of the allied forces, he doomed this campaign nearly from the beginning. So Montys victory was not worthy to become a masterpeice in the art of war.
The German casualities in Stalingrad were a bit over 250000 men, not more. And in the same month German troops were able to destroy at least 4 Soviet armies completely, ironically also the 6th Soviet army.
Concerning the last thought of retaking Berlin I said this was possible if there was any Army. But there wasn´t. So this was hypothetically.
Also hypothetically was the situation of a successfull coupe d´état in 1944. Would the allies make peace with a democratic Germany fighting against a regimes which was as bad as Hitler or even worse or fighting with that regimes? Many allies were foes of the soviets and so it wasn´t unlikely that this alliance would break. And it broke indeed.

Adler

 

[Case]

Originally posted by Adler17
Monty had poor plans as you admit.

Sure, not everything that came out of his planning was a brilliant gem of strategy. However, he was generally quick to recongise when things went wrong, and adjust his strategy to correct for whatever problems had showed up. That's a perfectly valid way of operating. Montogmery's biggest personal blunder was his ceaseless addempts to deny that this was how he operated - he prefered to cultivate a myth that all his battles went according to his plan.

And sure after Gazala the Afrikakorps had big supply problems, bigger than before. But that was Hitlers fault. As he was unwilling to send Rommel the supplies he needed and didn´t take Malta

No commander ever has unlimited resources - all have to work within their logistical constraints set by external factors. Rommel gambled that the British army would collapse at El Alemain, and lost spectacularly. A more sensible strategy would have been to stop at a defencible position once supply problems became critical.

Concerning the last thought of retaking Berlin I said this was possible if there was any Army. But there wasn´t. So this was hypothetically.

Yet you were using this 'hypothetical' army to criticise the Soviet's strategy of focusing on Berlin, which was a valid strategy considering that there was no such full strength German Army. If the Germans had had a full strength Army on the Soviet's flanks it's safe to assume that the Soviets would have used a different strategy then the one they historically used.

The German casualities in Stalingrad were a bit over 250000 men, not more.

I'd say that that's much too low - at least 100,000 were killed after the Soviets encircled the city (see Beevor's Stalingrad) with about another 100,000 going into captivity. As the Soviet 'one million' figure rightfully includes casualties incurred in the entire campaign in the Stalingrad region, German casualties should be calculated on the same basis, and this means more then just the 6th Army's losses in the final stages of the battle. As the Germans experianced the same meatgrinder fighting in the city that the Soviets did before their counter-offencive and were lucky that they didn't lose an Army Group following the encirclement of the 6th Army, their losses would have been much higher then those incured at Stalingrad per-se. I'll conceed that the figure of 500,000 fatalities is too high, though not by much.

Would the allies make peace with a democratic Germany fighting against a regimes which was as bad as Hitler or even worse or fighting with that regimes?

No. It really is as simple as that. Despite their propaganda, the Allies weren't on some kind of crusade to rid the world of brutal totalitarian governments - they were out to destroy the countries which had attacked them. If the Germans had somehow elected a democratic government(!) they would have insisted that it surrender unconditionally to the Allies and USSR. If it failed to do so the war would have continued. As I wrote previously, the Allies knew what the Germans had been getting up to in their occupied territories. It defies belief that they would have even considered helping the Germans re-invade the USSR.

The Allies bent over backwards to help the Soviets in full knowledge of the nature of Stalin's regime. All ideological and moral differences were put aside in the name of the common goal of defeating Germany. As Chuchill famously said in defence of aid to the USSR 'If Hitler invaded Hell I'd give the devil a favourable word'.

Many allies were foes of the soviets and so it wasn´t unlikely that this alliance would break. And it broke indeed.

Yeah, after the Germans had been defeated. Before that, the Allies were constantly looking for ways to increase their co-operation with the Soviets during and after the war. The Allies never even considered making a seperate peace with the Germans, having signed a treaty with the Soviets promising to never do such a thing. When Himmler tried to get the Allies to join in a common cause against the Soviets his representative was dismissed out of hand. As I said before, the only place where the alliance between the Western Allies and USSR was going to break was in the fevored minds of the Nazis.

 

[Adler17]

The problem you do not see, Case, are the big differences in the governments even in the war. And I critizise the Soviet "strategy" not only because of the exhausting by taking Berlin. They had only one strategy: mass attacks coûte que coûte. That´s why Zhukow is not the best WW2 general. And I stay and say IF there was a German army intact (if there was not Ardennen offensive or attempt of retaking Budapest there would have been 4 reserve armies left) they would have driven the soviets out of Berlin. I know there wasn´t.
The other thing is the allies knew the Russian are poor allies. They knew they were also devils (I mean the government). And don´t you think the things changed very much if Hitler would have been killed? All Nazi attempts to make peace were useless, but also a free Germany were unable to make peace with the allies? In 1944 it was POSSIBLE to block both sides to make peace with one side. IIRC Stalin wanted to make a seperate peace with Hitler even in 1944... So I think a peace with Germany without an unconditional surrender was possible. And the Morgenthau plans you try to mention to destroy Germany were never realistic nor had only one chance of being exercized.
Churchill was also a foe of the Soviets. So this alliance was doomed at the point when Hitler was away. And reality shows us that was right.

Adler

 

[jpowers]

He didn't have a chance to do much militarily during the war, but De Gaulle was the only French general to speak out against the idiotic Maginot Line that gave Germany such an unbelievable head start in the war. He was a proponent of a mobile, mechanized army supported by air. He was overruled by the nitwits that preferred to dig bunkers.

 

[Case]

Originally posted by Adler17
In 1944 it was POSSIBLE to block both sides to make peace with one side.

Sure, it was possible. It wasn't going to happen though. The Allies knew that they had won, are weren't going to let the Germans off lightly. They were out to punish Germany for having started two world wars in 25 years.

IIRC Stalin wanted to make a seperate peace with Hitler even in 1944...

That's the first I've ever heard of that - what's your source? Stalin tried to make peace in 1941, but seems to have concluded that he could beat the Germans following their defeat outside Moscow. By 1944 Stalin would have known that complete victory was almost inevitable, so I can't see why he'd want to make peace.

And the Morgenthau plans you try to mention to destroy Germany were never realistic nor had only one chance of being exercized.

Sure, the Morgenthau plan was too extreame to ever be put into place. But the Allies did destroy Germany. During 1944-45 they deliberatly bombed German cities to bring the realities of war home to German civilians. Following the peace Germany was broken up into occupation zones, and wasn't allowed to have it's own military forces until the mid 1950s. If the Western Allies and Soviets hadn't fallen out after the war, this occupation would have been more severe.

Churchill was also a foe of the Soviets.

Sure. But he was also the leader of a bankrupt second-rate power with a rapidly declining ability to wage war against anyone. By 1944 Roosevelt was calling the shots, and he was very keen to stay on good terms with the Soviets. Anyway, even if the Germans been able to surrender to the Allies, Churchill wouldn't have remained on the scene for long - the British people were totally sick of the Conservative government, and would have voted him out in the election which he had to hold as soon as the fighting was over (much like they did in 1945).

 

[Adler17]

I nevertheless think the chance for peace would be there in 1944. An unconditional surrender could have been avoided. The western powers were not very keen about the rising power of the soviets. They WERE the new enemy in their points of view after the war. Sure Churchill was not elected after the war and Atterly (IIRC his name) was a big fool. Nevertheless if Churchill/Roosevelt made peace with Germany Atterly/ Trueman didn´t have the chance to change much.
I read about a secret try of Stalin in the beginning of 1944 to make peace with Germany. He was a very careful man who wasn´t sure about his victory- and he wasn´t sure about his allies! So it should have been much easier for Germany to make peace in the status qou ante than you think. Sorry I do not remember the source.

Adler

 

[Case]

The western powers were not very keen about the rising power of the soviets.

How do you explain Yalta and Churchill's 'zones of influence' deal with Stalin then? The allies seemed to be perfectly willing to let the Soviet's hold on to Eastern Europe.

 

[Adler17]

Yalta was in the beginning of 1945, or am I wrong? So I speak of 1944. Germany had still strong forces. Italy was a long and bloody war, Germany had enough resources to make the war longer if Hitler didn´t make his foolish orders. So Yalta was at the end of the war when everything was nearly too late. But in 1944 a democratic Germany could ahve made at least a seperate peace in the west forcing Stalin to make also peace. If not he would have lost the allied help. That would not be so good for him.

Adler

 

[privatehudson]

Atlee was not a big fool, he and his government brought in the welfare state to this country, something that alone would bring him credit. Having said that I do not personally feel that the western allies, and especially not the Russians would ever accept the notion of a democratic united germany remaining free of their immediate post war control due to the threat such a nation could pose. Russia was more than capable of crushing Germany alone by attrition after about 1943, though it would certainly have taken time.

The point about 1944 would depend on the date taken. If prior to D-Day I can think of no reason why the allies would sue for peace against a Germany that still controlled most of western Europe. If during the Normandy fighting, again the allies would demand concessions and the liberation of europe. If post Normandy, your point about the armed forces is irrelevant, what forces the Germans had in the west were mostly decimated in the Falaise pocket, any deal done then wouldn't leave many troops to send to the eastern front as most of the divisions had ceased to exist as coherent formations by then. Given that the allies had no logic in suing for peace when they could just as easily as they saw it crush the remnants of the German forces. After this date the only period during which the German army held any coherent mass in the west would have been the Bulge period, and by this stage the Russians were far too close to victory for such forces to have much effect overall. Because of this I conclude that any western allied peace would lead to Germany being crushed by Russia sooner or later, and being occuppied by Russia completely. This would never be acceptable to the west.

Beyond this I don't agree on your assumption that the Allies would sue for peace with a democratic Germany. Germany even without hitler and his goons in the Waffen SS and Gestapo (whom would have vehemently opposed such a nation being formed and comprised a fair proportion of germany's strike units) was still something the allies would have found unpalatable. Not only would it have been a military threat, it would have had to return land taken under Hitler, loose it's connections to Austria and so on. The armed forces were rife with officers who supported the Nazi cause, some vehemently, the allies would certainly have had issues with allying with a country who's army consisted of many a Nazi sympathiser.

I doubt the allies would have considered the surrender of Germany simply because they had seen the results of not enforcing the peace of WWI on the country. They knew by then that the German nation and army was shot through with Nazi ideology and even removing Hitler would not ensure that another might not rise in his place later, doing to the democracy what Hitler did to the republic of the 20s and 30s. No I think that the only way the western allies would have considered such a move would have been in the event of a serious military catastrophe such as the failiure of D-day or similar. They were on the up, the western allies had the bomb to deter Russia and the Germans on the run. Neither millitarily, or politically did it make sense to allow conditional surrender. Simply making the country democratic would not have been enough to satisfy the west, this time the country had to be taught the lesson that WWI failed to teach.

 

[covok48]

"Incidently, fans of Rommel need to consider his insane plan to defend the Atlantic Wall"

The Atlantic Wall required YEARS in order to be "invasion proof." Rommel had several months to fix the gaping holes. Fighting the Allies in the interior would be even more distaterous which was proven in the Hedgerows of Northern France.

By then Allied numerical superiority was far too great to defend against.


"The allies seemed to be perfectly willing to let the Soviet's hold on to Eastern Europe."

The Allies had no other choice. These states were under firm Soviet control. The only muster of hope for Democracy in the region was the '45 Pole rebellion in Warsaw.

Seeing that the resistance was pro-democratic, Moscow allowed the Germans to crush it before entering the city themselves.

 

[rilnator]

Originally posted by Case


How do you explain Yalta and Churchill's 'zones of influence' deal with Stalin then? The allies seemed to be perfectly willing to let the Soviet's hold on to Eastern Europe.

I think Churchill was shrewd enough to realise that Stalin would do what he pleased with the conquered territory so he did his best to make a deal to have British influence in the futures of Greece and Yugoslavia.

 

[Archbob]

Rommel would not have lost in Africa had he actually had fuel and ammo--both which Hitler did not reinforce him with believing that German tanks were superior even without fuel and ammo.

 

[Case]

Originally posted by covok48
The Atlantic Wall required YEARS in order to be "invasion proof."

Actually, it was never going to be 'invasion proof'. For all intents and purposes, Omaha Beach was one of the complete sectors of the wall. It delayed the Allied breakout into the interior by a few hours and inflicted a few thousand casualties. Once naval fire support was brought to bear, the defences were quickly destroyed. Painful, but in the scheme of things it was no big deal - the Omaha beachead ended up being the one which the allies had the easist time expanding!

The Allies had no other choice. These states were under firm Soviet control. The only muster of hope for Democracy in the region was the '45 Pole rebellion in Warsaw.

Originally posted by rilnator
I think Churchill was shrewd enough to realise that Stalin would do what he pleased with the conquered territory so he did his best to make a deal to have British influence in the futures of Greece and Yugoslavia.

I agree with both of you here. As I pointed out, the Western Allies had no particular desire to liberate Eastern Europe from totalitarian rule - they just wanted to crush Germany and end the war. Whatever thier differences with the Soviet Union, they certainly didn't extend to any desire to wage war against it. Their basic strategy was to give the Soviets what they wanted so that the war could be brought to the quickest and most 'neat' conclusion.

Incidently, I don't think that the Warsaw rebels were fighting for 'democracy' - they were nationalists fighting in the name of the remnants of Poland's pre-war dictatorship. While I *suspect* that many of them favoured democracy over a return to dictatorship, their main goal was to give the anti-soviet Polish forces a propaganda victory by liberating Warsaw themselves (much like Tito suceeded in doing by grabbing Belgrade ahead of the Red Army). Unfortunatly, their timing was as bad as their political judgement, so the revolt ended in a tragic failure.

The Czech uprising of 1945 is a much better example of a 'pro-democracy' movement.

Originally posted by Fallen Angel Lord
Rommel would not have lost in Africa had he actually had fuel and ammo--both which Hitler did not reinforce him with believing that German tanks were superior even without fuel and ammo.

What's your source for this 'belief' of Hitler's?

While Hitler was a murderous warmongering idiot, he wasn't that foolish (or at least not until 1944-45).

 

[Archbob]

The joke about Hitler's belief wasn't serious, but hitler refused to send Rommel desparately needed reinforcements.