Clausewitz vs Jomini

[lynx028]

On War or Treatise on Grand Military Operations?
Whose theories on warfare would you adhere to?

 

[Dodge_272]

Been playing Victoria: an empire under the sun?

 

[lynx028]

Been playing Victoria: an empire under the sun?

nope......... just popped into my head.

 

[Dachs]

I think that the best criticism of de Jomini is that he attempted to essentially reduce warfighting to a math equation. Von Clausewitz does a much better job of taking uncertainty into account. This is, of course, only insofar as either is "opposed" to the other, they're not exactly polar opposites.

 

[LightSpectra]

I think that the best criticism of de Jomini is that he attempted to essentially reduce warfighting to a math equation. Von Clausewitz does a much better job of taking uncertainty into account. This is, of course, only insofar as either is "opposed" to the other, they're not exactly polar opposites.

Why couldn't uncertainty be part of Jomini's equation?

 

[Dachs]

I'd tell you to ask him but he's dead

 

[LightSpectra]

I don't know why he thought he'd be taken seriously as a military strategist when he was just as prone to death as everybody else.

But point taken.

 

[Agent327]

OK...

I'd tell you to ask him but he's dead

I think it would be more to the point answering why variables weren't part of de Jomini's mathematical theory. If Clausewitz included uncertainty in military theory, so could de Jomini; if he didn't, that'd be a major oversight on his part - which then answers the OP question.

 

[Dachs]

I think it would be more to the point answering why variables weren't part of de Jomini's mathematical theory. If Clausewitz included uncertainty in military theory, so could de Jomini; if he didn't, that'd be a major oversight on his part - which then answers the OP question.

I apologize for answering the question in a backhanded fashion, which sacrificed clarity for perceived lulz. Since Sir Michael Howard is a much better writer than I am, I shall let him do the talking for me from here on out. I presume he shall be more clear and probably more amusing.

"...A more formidable exponent of such views was Antoine de Jomini, Clausewitz's contemporary and rival, a military analyst whose depth, scope, and readability made him the most influential writer on military affairs outside Germany until the end of the nineteenth century. Jomini believed that there was a common formula underlying the successes of both Napoleon and Frederick the Great that could be summarized as 'directing the mass of one's forces successively on the decisive points in the theatre [sic] of war, and as far as possible against the communications of the enemy without disrupting one's own': an object that could be best achieved by the mastery of what he termed (as everyone else has ever since) 'interior lines'.

Clausewitz denied the validity of such formulations, not because they were oversimplifications, but because they ignored what he saw as the essence of war.

They aim at fixed values; but in war everything is uncertain, and calculations have to be made with variable quantities. They direct the inquiry exclusively towards physical quantities, whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects. They consider only unilateral action, whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites.

No theory could be of any value, he maintained, that did not take account of these interconnected elements - the uncertainty of all information, the importance of moral factors, and, lending emphasis to both of these, the unpredictable reactions of the adversary. The element of uncertainty arose very largely from the impossibility of gauging enemy intentions and reactions, something that was particularly difficult when there were no overmastering political incentives to determine his military decisions. [Note: i.e. in the wars of Hitler, Napoleon, Friedrich, and others.] At best one could only work on probabilities, and in doing this, however good one's judgment, there would always be a substantial element of sheer luck. Even the best generals were successful gamblers who had the nerve to back their judgment. No amount of theory could, in a moment of crisis, tell them what to do."

"...This was where the talents of the strategist were necessary; the coup d'oeil to distinguish the decisive point and the resolution to concentrate everything available against it, stripping forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives. This had been the secret of Bonaparte's success, but it did not take a Clausewitz to discern it. Jomini, as we have seen, made the same point in his own writings, and expounded it at far greater length - only to receive from Clausewitz the dismissive comment, 'to reduce the whole secret of the art of war to the formula of numerical superiority at a certain time in a certain place was an oversimplification that would not have stood up for a moment against the realities of life'. Jomini's own formula does not at first look very different from Clausewitz's own - 'the best strategy is to be very strong; first in general, and then at the decisive point'. But whereas Jomini spent many chapters in analyzing where and what the decisive point might be, Clausewitz saw the main problem as the moral one; the capacity of the commander to maintain his determination, in spite of all temptations to the contrary, to concentrate his forces against that decisive point."

 

[Dragonlord]

I definitely favor Clausewitz.
Mathematics have their place in warfare, but flexibility and initiative are more important.