and first alpha version released for HK:
https://forums.civfanatics.com/threads/mod-uchronia-another-humankind-history-w-i-p.675974/
https://forums.civfanatics.com/threads/mod-uchronia-another-humankind-history-w-i-p.675974/
Had a lot to cover, even for an introduction. Shucks, Dupuy's original book ran over 300 pages and included multiple lines of equations to calculate combat results, so count your blessings! (Even I am not Mad enough to throw that at the gaming community!)That's a big post...
I hew close to @Zaarin 's general critique. This is just a bit too elaborate. It reminds me of the combat system in Endless Space 1, where you selected the loadouts of your combat ships when building them, but then also selected 3 maneuvers for combat, and it basically worked like 3 rounds of rock-paper-scissors. It wasn't very fun.
One thing I will say is that I hope they tie armies to unit types, rather than tying them to tech types. You wouldn't create a massive army of light skirmishers, but you would create a densely packed army of heavy infantry. The heavy infantry unit types like spearmen and heavy cavalry should be designed around an army system, rather than the ability to form armies unlocking in the late game.
Modern Armies are huge compared to armies of antiquity, but they also cover much more space per warrior/soldier. Dupuy Institute's calculations were that a Classical host of 100,000 men covered about 1 square kilometer. A 100,000 man force in World War Two covered 3000 square kilometers, and even in the Napoleonic Wars (early gunpowder), 100,000 soldiers covered about 20 square kilometers.
So, no matter how you figure it, you cannot cram too many Units into a single tile and still expect them to fight with the weapons they have at the time. This is actually very handy for us gamers, because it means the Stack of Doom is automatically Excluded from discussion: it is impossible after a certain size of Stack, for each given Era.
Using the official historical titles of units for size comparisons is problematic, because no two armies agreed on sizes and the larger units (above division) were not standardized at all: The German 4th Army in front of Moscow in October 1941 had 23 divisions in it, 2nd Army just to its south had 10 divisions. Army Group Center at the time had 3 armies, 1 Panzer Army and 2 Panzer Groups in it, Army Group North had 2 armies with a single Panzer Corπs. As you stated, terrain makes a difference, also the Operational Mission assigned to the formation.The number and type of troops used in a certain geographical area usually depends on the terrain as well as the objective.
You need only a few troops to GUARD an area, but you need more troops to DEFEND the area against an attacker. There is a rule of thumb that the ATTACKER needs around 3 times the combat power to overcome a prepared defender which usually is 3 times the infantry, tanks, artillery, aircraft, etc in modern warfare. If the terrain favors the defender, eg rough terrain, forest, mountains, rivers, coast-lines, the attacker may even need more than 3 times the force.
Concentration of Power to break through a defensive line and turn a static war into a war of maneuver is a key principal of modern military strategy. The game should not set artifical limits for troops per hex which make a breakthrough impossible.
To check how many modern troops may fit into a hex, I usually take a look at the Battle of Kursk (WW2 Operation Citadel) in 1943. The Germans there attacked from both North and South with 3 Panzer-Corps each on a front-line of a few (15-45) kilometers.
Spoiler Kursk :
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As most of you know in brief in WW1 / WW2 military formations (units) were roughly distinguished as :
(see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_organization )
...
(XXXXX : army group = 2+ armies)
XXXX : army = 2+ corps
XXX : corps = 2+ divisions
XX : division = 2+ brigades
X : brigade = 2+ regiments or several battalions
While smaller formations like regiments or battalions are single type formations like infantry, tanks, artillery, the bigger formations starting with brigade (X) may contain mixed types, eg some infantry, some tanks, some artillery under one command which is similar to a (small) army in many computer games.
Considering the size of hexes in CIV-games, I would allow military formations of brigade size up to corps size per hex, maybe slowly going from brigade to corps over time.
A player who concentrates a corps in one hex (for attack) has the trade-off that his units could defend several hexes of frontline instead.
The costs of military units probably should be adjusted that an average city cannot field several corps to avoid that the military map is flooded with corps.
Using big military formations in difficult terrain should be countered by in general higher logistical costs for these terrains, so that defense (1:3) in difficult terrain is more reasonable than offense.
And so this means some form of stackings has to return?Using the official historical titles of units for size comparisons is problematic, because no two armies agreed on sizes and the larger units (above division) were not standardized at all: The German 4th Army in front of Moscow in October 1941 had 23 divisions in it, 2nd Army just to its south had 10 divisions. Army Group Center at the time had 3 armies, 1 Panzer Army and 2 Panzer Groups in it, Army Group North had 2 armies with a single Panzer Corπs. As you stated, terrain makes a difference, also the Operational Mission assigned to the formation.
Kursk is a bit of an anomaly to use to get general figures from: the Soviets were in fortifications laboriously built up over the preceding 3 months and so the battle was more of a siege assault than a field battle and many Soviet formations were in extended formations because hey had the benefit of massive minefields, covered positions, and an enormous amount of non-divisional artillery units, not typical of field engagements even in the Soviet Army until the end of the war.
It's better to use the armies' own standards in their manuals for the concentration they thought it was possible or necessary to fight from. Those are interesting. Virtually all the major armies in WWII thought a single infantry/rifle battalion would normally defend a front 1 kilometer wide, and that remained true from beginning to end of the war. What changed is that that same battalion also deployed by the end of the war 1 kilometer deep - making its defense more of a web than a line, making it harder to target the entire battalion from the start of any action.
At the other extreme, from 1938 a panzer battalion was expected to attack on a front 1 kilometer wide and up to 2 kilometers deep, and a panzer division of 1941, with its infantry arrayed among or behind its 2 panzer battalions, could basically mass the entire division to attack on a front of 2 kilometers. Against 2 rifle battalions, is it any wonder why panzer divisions almost never failed to make the initial breakthrough in the first half of the war?
Following this logic, by 1943 the Soviet Army regularly massed for the attack much more extremely than they had planned before the war. In August 1943, against the German 167th Infantry Division, the entire 4th Guards Army with 8 rifle divisions and 2 artillery divisions massed for an attack, and once they made a breakthrough, the 1st Guards and 5th Guards Tank Armies with 5 tank or mechanized corps drove over the remnants of the 167th. That kind of mass, with the average rifle division attacking on a divisional front of 2 - 3 kilometers with enormous artillery support, was normal for the rest of the war. Such an attacking rifle division, by the way, would be echeloned, with an initial attack by one reinforced regiment on the divisional frontage, followed by a '2nd wave' of another regiment, followed by the divisional reserve of a third regiment with more tank support. The divisional attack formation would be 2 - 3 kilometers wide, and up to 9 kilometers deep, with a mass of emplaced additional artillery among it and behind it.
So, the point remains, that there are limits to how much you can concentrate in a given area and still fight effectively. Terrain that limits visibility so that firing and combat ranges decrease, most obviously Jungle and Urban areas, make it possible to increase 'combat density', but only so much. The extreme urban combat at Stalingrad involved no more than 8 - 10 German divisions at any one time in the urban area, on an urban frontage of over 25 kilometers, so about 3 kilometers per division. This was about twice the concentration for a major attack that would be considered normal in more open terrain.
Dupuy's figures for the concentration densities of historical eras and weapons still holds pretty accurately right up to the present day, with the addition that concentrations that would have been normal in World War Two are proving to be suicidal against modern weapons, as the Russian military is learning in Ukraine: the relationship remains true that more lethality in weapons requires that the target forces spread out more to make smaller targets of themselves, whether that means spreading your line to avoid amassed arrow fire or spreading out your tanks to avoid being targeted by long range precision missiles: the first is a spread of meters, the second of kilometers, but the principle is identical.
'Logistics" - the management of supplies, maintenance, replenishment of units and forces, is a very difficult thing to get right in any game. I've played (and written) rules for 'supply' in board games and miniatures games from the Ancient period to World War Two, and they ALWAYS run the risk of either being too simple-minded or too complex, either ignorable or a major pain in the butt to deal with.Actually.
"Your units can't repair" anywhere (special units/pillaging excepted) outside of the influence of your cities. Why? Instead, replace it with an (obviously uprageable throughout time) "supply" unit that counts as a civilian. Supply units have X charges like builders that they use to repair/re-enforce your existing units.
Extremely easy to understand for players, and a really dynamic idea of "supply lines", which is obviously the most important part of war Civ hasn't ever really even considered. Logistics has been an overarching concern of armies for millennia, a good deal of The Art of War is logistics. By making "logistics' and supply into units it means enemies can capture supplies, players can consider their "supply lines" tactically, etc. etc.
But that would be a poor model for armies in the Ancient Classical, Medieval or Early Modern periods, because armies back then usually lived off the country and brought very few supplies along with them - and only relied on bringing up supplies from somewhere else if they were moving through areas with nothing for supply in them, like a desert.
Actually, the Gold Method was used as late as the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702 - 1714 CE: when Marlborough marched his army through Germany in 1704, his Quartermaster-General, Cadogan, rode one day ahead of the army with an escort of dragoons and bags of hard coins, laying out the camping sites for the units following, and stopping by the nearest towns to tell them to bring supplies to the site starting the next day for payment in hard cash. Marlboriugh's army arrived in Bavaria well-fed, healthy, with horses in perfect condition. The French armies marching through the Black Forest to meet him tried simply 'requisitioning' everything, started up a guerrilla war against them, and arrived with their underfed horses suffering from an outbreak of disease that ultimately dismounted about 15% of their cavalry force at the Battle of Blenheim later that year. A classic example of how Money makes campaigns so much easier.Ancient and medieval armies often carried a large stash of cash, gold, silver, etc to pay the soldiers or mercenaries who then bought goods from locals and traders (sutlers, marketenders) who accompanied the army (tross). These civilian camp followers often also provided weapons, armor, ammo and repairs as well as other services (prostitution) in exchange for cash or valuables (loot).
OFF TOPIC.Actually, the Gold Method was used as late as the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702 - 1714 CE: when Marlborough marched his army through Germany in 1704, his Quartermaster-General, Cadogan, rode one day ahead of the army with an escort of dragoons and bags of hard coins, laying out the camping sites for the units following, and stopping by the nearest towns to tell them to bring supplies to the site starting the next day for payment in hard cash. Marlboriugh's army arrived in Bavaria well-fed, healthy, with horses in perfect condition. The French armies marching through the Balck Forest to meet him tried simply 'requisitioning' everything, started up a guerrilla war against them, and arrived with their underfed horses suffering from an outbreak of disease that ultimately dismounted about 15% of their cavalry force at the Battle of Blenheim later that year. A classic example of how Money makes campaigns so much easier.
ALL Armies relied on Living Off The Land since before the Thirty Year's War, which was the nadir of the system - too many armies trying to live off Germany mean that very few people, military or civilian, could live off Germany after a decade or more of systemic pillaging and contributed to the desolation of large parts of central Europe during that war.OFF TOPIC.
eh. French relied alot more on simple lootings? and thus every German settlements along the way stung French supply lines with guerrillas and someone as bad as highwaymen?
And what kind of Dragoons Cadogan uses? ones that still Mobile Infantry or one that already becomes Cavalry?
With supply model. should Commercial Hub has any option to extend supply lines by any bit? and how far should continiously flown river extend supply lines along the way?
Your view on Attrition Rules of Napoleon: Total War please
With the notable exception of the Inca/Tawantinsuyu. One of the many advantages of the qullqa system was that it allowed the empire’s militaries to avoid inflicting themselves on the local populace as they passed through to whatever border conflict or rebellion they were putting down. Some military supply bonus would be a great addition for the Inca.ALL Armies relied on Living Off The Land since before the Thirty Year's War, which was the nadir of the system - too many armies trying to live off Germany mean that very few people, military or civilian, could live off Germany after a decade or more of systemic pillaging and contributed to the desolation of large parts of central Europe during that war.
Mea Culpa - I should have specified European armies. Different systems and practices applied in the Americas, East Asia and South Asia both before and after this period.With the notable exception of the Inca/Tawantinsuyu. One of the many advantages of the qullqa system was that it allowed the empire’s militaries to avoid inflicting themselves on the local populace as they passed through to whatever border conflict or rebellion they were putting down. Some military supply bonus would be a great addition for the Inca.