Day of Empire

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Book review: Amy Chua, Day of Empire - How hyperpowers rise to global dominance and why they fall

Following an interview with Chua in a Dutch newspaper (NRC, Science section, June 13-14) I found this review:

How to Rule the World


By LANCE MORROW
Published: November 18, 2007
The emperor Claudius thought about the dynamics of imperial ingestion. He reminded the Roman Senate that the founder Romulus would “both fight against and naturalize a people on the same day.” Claudius argued that the Gauls, by logical extension, could be accepted into the Senate because “they no longer wear trousers” — that is, they could be counted on to come to work wearing the Roman toga and thus to have effectively become Romans.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/books/review/morrow.html#secondParagraph
morrow-190.jpg
Hulton Archive/Getty Images


DAY OF EMPIRE


How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance — and Why They Fall.


By Amy Chua.
396 pp. Doubleday. $27.95.





The great Mughal emperor Akbar flourished by practicing a similar “strategic tolerance” — which included what Amy Chua in “Day of Empire” calls “multicultural copulation.” A Muslim himself, the emperor intermarried widely: “By the time of Akbar’s death, he had more than 300 wives, including Rajputs, Afghans, princesses from South Indian kingdoms, Turks, Persians and even two Christian women of Portuguese descent.”
E pluribus unum.
Chua argues that all of the world-dominant powers in history — among them, Achaemenid Persia, imperial Rome, Tang Dynasty China, the Mongol empire, the Dutch commercial empire of the 17th century, the British Empire and hegemonic America — prospered by a strategy of tolerance and inclusion, the embrace (and exploitation) of diversity and difference.
It’s not always an easy case to make. Genghis Khan used his victims’ corpses as moat-fill; he is credited with the memorably barbaric definition of happiness — “to crush your enemies ... and hear the lamentation of their women.” But as Chua says, “relative tolerance” is what counts. Having savored the lamentations of the women, Genghis Khan “embraced ethnic diversity,” decreed religious freedom and drew into his service “the most talented and useful individuals of all his conquered populations.”
The death of empire, in Chua’s thesis — the Kryptonite that vitiates a superpower — is intolerance and exclusivity, an insistence on racial “purity” or religious orthodoxy. Chua wonders how different 20th-century history might have been if Hitler had been a tolerant and accommodating conqueror. “By murdering millions of conquered subjects and hundreds of thousands of German citizens,” she observes, “the Nazis deprived themselves of incalculable manpower and human capital. ... Germany lost an array of brilliant scientists, including Albert Einstein, Theodore von Karman, Eugene Wigner, Leo Szilard, Hans Bethe, Edward Teller and Lise Meitner, many of whom went on to play an integral role in the construction of the world’s first atomic bomb, which the United States used to win the war.” It was history’s most spectacular example of shooting oneself in the foot.
Further unintended consequences of doctrinaire malice: In 1478, the Inquisition, decreed by papal bull, ended an era of relative tolerance in Spain. In 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella gave Jews the choice of either converting to Catholism or leaving. Ten years later, the Muslims of Castile were ordered to convert or emigrate. “The Spanish monarchy had officially embraced intolerance,” Chua writes, “and for an empire hoping to rise in global pre-eminence, this was a staggeringly bad move.”
Chua, the John Duff Jr. professor of law at Yale Law School, unfolds an agreeably plausible case with clarity and insistent simplification, like a lawyer pacing before the jury box, hitting the same points (tolerance, diversity, inclusion) for emphasis as she clicks off centuries and civilizations. Always in the back of her mind is the drama of America.
Chua’s larger historical preoccupations, as she suggests, arise from her own biography. Her Chinese parents came to the United States from the Philippines, where they had grown up and lived under Japanese occupation. When Douglas MacArthur returned in 1945, “my father remembers running after American jeeps, cheering wildly, as U.S. troops tossed out free cans of Spam.” The Chua family became a handsome enactment of the American dream and a dramatization of Chua’s greatness-through-inclusion thesis. Leon O. Chua attended M.I.T. on a scholarship and as an electrical engineer helped to develop chaos theory; he became known as the “father of nonlinear circuit theory and cellular neural networks.” Among the Chuas, the pronoun “we” was a bicultural portmanteau — it meant both “we Han Chinese” and “we Americans.” Her father told Amy — when she was 4! — “You will marry a non-Chinese over my dead body.” She married a Jewish American. “Today, my father and my husband are the best of friends.” Her children speak English and Mandarin.
“This book is a tribute to America’s tolerance,” Chua writes. It is also intended as a warning against empire building — “the use of America’s world-dominant military abroad to achieve regime change and remake other nations by imposing American-style institutions.”
Still, the obverse of Santayana’s famous line — that those who do not learn from the past are condemned to repeat it — is an equally powerful cliché: generals always fight the last war. In other words, those who learn too much from the past may be condemned to be surprised if the world stumbles onto an entirely new way of doing things. After Hiroshima, for example, the calculus of war among the powers was changed forever: the past might, in fact, become useless in making decisions about nuclear weapons.
Few would quarrel with Chua’s absorbing PowerPoint presentation, her shrewd and happy argument that a generous policy of tolerance and inclusion leads on to success and prosperity. Or with her somewhat more intricate (or circular?) case that even the most embracingly inclusive empires eventually disintegrate because they lack “glue” — an overarching political identity to give coherence to the whole.
But in the 21st century, “empire” and “superpower” and “hyperpower” are terms that may require rethinking. They suggest boundaries, borders — even as they connote the expansion of territory and influence. But most of the powerful forces, good and evil, of our new century are borderless, globalized — the almost unimpeded global flow of information (images, ideas, news, music, movies, emotions, hatreds), products, commodities, capital, environmental pollution, climate change and terrorism. Perhaps, eventually, nuclear terrorism. In such a world, an idea (a rage, a grievance, a difference of cultural perspective) may create a superpower without borders, using a cave in Afghanistan or Pakistan as its Pentagon.
And in the new politics and metaphysics of the globalized globe, the problem of the toleration of intolerance — the toleration of evil intentions or atavistic tribal or sectarian angers that now may come armed with advanced technology, including nukes — becomes the sharpest dilemma of responsible power. It may no longer be enough to refer the toleration of intolerance to the First Amendment.
The world’s uneasily dominant hyperpower, the United States, finds itself now (partly through its own incompetence and lack of foresight) in the lobster trap of Iraq: no exit. Saddam Hussein did not have weapons of mass destruction. But suppose that he had had them. Would it then have been right — necessary — for the hyperpower, or someone else, to invade Iraq? An old argument, now congealed into partisan rhetoric. But what will be the responsibilities of the United Nations, or the United States, or China, or the European Union, or any other emerging hyperpower, when — as will undoubtedly happen — some monster-autocrat or some gang of theological throwbacks come along who really do have nuclear or chemical or biological weapons? Empire is a very big word — a Newtonian word, so to speak — in a world that has grown abruptly small and susceptible now to a physics that is new and strange.


Lance Morrow, a longtime essayist for Time magazine, is the author of eight books. He is currently writing a biography of Henry R. Luce.


(Source: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/18/books/review/morrow.html)

Interestingly, Chua ascribes the late 17th century shift in global dominance from the Dutch Republic to the British empire mainly to William III's move to Britain (Glorious Revolution, 1688), in the wake of which parliament accepted the Bill of Rights and the Act of Toleration and Jewish merchants and Amsterdam bankers moved to London.
 
The words "American Politics" spring to mind.
 
I wonder where the Soviet Empire fits into this little scheme - it collapsed as a result of democratization and increased tolerance :lol:

I tend to disagree with the author. Spain, which is cited as a failure, achieved the greatest feats after it became "intolerant" and left a lasting legacy in the world, despite the fact that Spain itself lost its status of major power.

Tolerance coupled with meritocracy helped to maintain empires, but tolerance was not what had built them.
 
I wonder where the Soviet Empire fits into this little scheme - it collapsed as a result of democratization and increased tolerance :lol:

The Soviet Union collapsed as a result of failed policies in the past and bad economy that really could not be easily fixed by whatever Gorbachev tries to do. The democratization of the USSR is only the catalyst. Besides, the USSR lasted for seventy years (and longer if you count the days of the Russian Empire).

India has 28 states speaking different languages and it's not falling apart.

I tend to disagree with the author. Spain, which is cited as a failure, achieved the greatest feats after it became "intolerant" and left a lasting legacy in the world, despite the fact that Spain itself lost its status of major power.

The conquests and building of the Spanish Empire in the Americas took place against poorly-armed indigenous cultures that lost 95% of its population due to disease. The Spanish (and subsequent European colonizers) basically walked into sparsely populated territory facing largely disorganized resistance from cultures devastated by social breakdown following the epidemics. Conquering organized, populous, advanced societies (eg the Mongols against the Chinese, the Ottomans against the Europeans, the Europeans against Asian countries, etc) is a different matter.
 
I wonder where the Soviet Empire fits into this little scheme - it collapsed as a result of democratization and increased tolerance :lol:

I tend to disagree with the author. Spain, which is cited as a failure, achieved the greatest feats after it became "intolerant" and left a lasting legacy in the world, despite the fact that Spain itself lost its status of major power.

Tolerance coupled with meritocracy helped to maintain empires, but tolerance was not what had built them.

Spain was considered the greatest power in Europe during the 1500s. But it was during this so-called Spanish Golden Age that it fell into a second rate power. It was unable to properly put down Netherlands whose intolerance further its revolt. Bankruptcy and inflation due to Spain overspending on its poorly planned wars and holy "crusades" to put down Islamic Ottoman and Protestant Heretics. I cannot believe it did not fall earlier.
 
There's an interesting twist to the Habsburg/Spanish/Dutch/British empire succession. While Charles V ruled an empire "where the sun never set", religious corruption and intolerance caused a major rift across Europe during the Reformation/Counter-Reformation period. Philip II's glorious Spain, while apparently dominating this continent and others, failed in its counterreformatory policies. Chua in effect argues that the expulsion of especially Jews from Iberia (from 1580-1640 Spain was also ruling Portugal) and Protestants from the Spanish Netherlands (and Huguenots from Catholic France) furthered the transition from Spanish to Dutch world power. It is significant that the then dominant power in Europe failed to suppress a local rebellion, while its foreign policy sent the country (repeatedly) into bankruptcy. As mentioned in the OP, the unification of the Netherlands and Britain under the rulership of William III (William I in Britain) and subsequent parliamentary reform measures practically ended Dutch supremacy, while furthering Brtish dominance thereafter. Unlike traditional historians, who tend to blame overextension of Dutch foreign policies vs its financial reserves, Chua looks for the transference of merchants, bankers (and engineers, who were active in dike building and such in East England) from the Dutch Republic to Britain as the main reason for this transition in world dominance.

As for "tolerance", Chua notes that orginally this is perceived as serving state interest (for instance with the Roman tolerance of local rule and deities) rather than personal freedom, a concept developed only after the Middle Ages/Renaissance period. As an interesting example she names the articles on religious freedom in the US constitution, which were based on similar principles expressed in Dutch state law. (Itself ofcourse the US constitution inspired the French revolutionary constitution with its legal emphasis on the rights of man - later to be known as "human rights".) She is also not blind to the discrepancy between legal freedoms and aggressive foreign policy.
 
JEELEN said:
Unlike traditional historians, who tend to blame overextension of Dutch foreign policies vs its financial reserves, Chua looks for the transference of merchants, bankers (and engineers, who were active in dike building and such in East England) from the Dutch Republic to Britain as the main reason for this transition in world dominance.

That isn't a new argument - its one that is favored by institutionalist economists and was a popular one in the earlier part of last century for historians.

aronnax said:
Bankruptcy and inflation due to Spain overspending on its poorly planned wars and holy "crusades" to put down Islamic Ottoman and Protestant Heretics.

The inflation view is now under attack - Spain proper which was a largely agrarian economy aside from losing its nascent industry did not suffer significant inflation. Apparently the burden fell heaviest on France - which soaked up the largest share of silver, - the Brabant which was the recipient of significant amounts of specie and the Italian city states. It's been comptuated that Spain proper had one of the lowest rates of inflation in the period.

aronnax said:
Protestant Heretics

Initially the majority of the United Provinces were not Calvinists - the war had more to do with the heavy handedness of the Spanish Crown other reasons became secondary.
 
The inflation view is now under attack - Spain proper which was a largely agrarian economy aside from losing its nascent industry did not suffer significant inflation. Apparently the burden fell heaviest on France - which soaked up the largest share of silver, - the Brabant which was the recipient of significant amounts of specie and the Italian city states. It's been comptuated that Spain proper had one of the lowest rates of inflation in the period.

Okay..I'll give you that, but Spain was still bankrupted. Even with a room full of Gold and twice of that with silver.

Initially the majority of the United Provinces were not Calvinists - the war had more to do with the heavy handedness of the Spanish Crown other reasons became secondary.

Sure, not all of the United Provinces were Calvinists. Many were fighting for Dutch independence more than religion. And yes it was Spain's large giant hands meddling with the succulent bosom of the Dutch that led to the slap in the face. But Spain, quickly designated the war, the Imperial Project of the Spanish Empire to that of religion, of killing the heretics, under the sanction of the Pope. This intolerance was bred as the reason and the drive for war.
Its like Spain used up all its money to buy the defender of faith title and now needs to protect that title by all means.
 
aronnax said:
Okay..I'll give you that, but Spain was still bankrupted. Even with a room full of Gold and twice of that with silver.

Yep.

aronnax said:
Its like Spain used up all its money to buy the defender of faith title and now needs to protect that title by all means.

EUIII references ftw.
 
I wonder where the Soviet Empire fits into this little scheme - it collapsed as a result of democratization and increased tolerance :lol:

That was a result of its collapse. Its economy melted in the '80s due to the decrease in oil prices, increased defense spending as well as a loss of confidence due to U.S. development of anti-missile defenses.
 
That isn't a new argument - its one that is favored by institutionalist economists and was a popular one in the earlier part of last century for historians.

That then is probably why I didn't come across it at university; glad you pointed this out, though.;)
 
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