Did logistics make the Mongol Empire so vast? Comparing nomadic empires and European colonial rule

Marla_Singer

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The Mongol Empire controlled a huge area interconnected through a vast and sparsely populated heartland. One key to their dominance, beyond sheer military force, may have been logistical: the Yam relay system allowed them to move messages and troops faster than any rival. The Yam was a network of relay stations placed roughly a day’s ride apart, where messengers could change horses, rest, and continue their journey without delay, allowing orders to travel thousands of kilometers in a matter of days.

What strikes me is that this logistical system acted almost like a deterrent. Even if there were no permanent Mongol garrisons in a region, local rulers knew that rebellion could trigger a swift and devastating response. The Mongols could "materialize" from the steppes in a matter of days or weeks. And since no neighboring power had the means to penetrate deep into Mongol-controlled territory, the steppe heartland itself was virtually untouchable.

This reminds me a lot of how European colonial powers later maintained control through naval dominance. By controlling the high seas and establishing fortified coastal outposts, they created a secure supply and communication network that allowed them to hold far-flung territories with minimal presence. Much like the Mongols on land, they didn’t need to occupy everything, just the key points and the routes between them.

So here's my wondering. more than military superiority, should long-lasting Empire be analyzed primarily as logistical networks enabling control over remote areas? Wasn't it logistics (and the ability to move faster than anyone else) that made the Mongol Empire, and later the European empires, so dominant?

Would love to hear your thoughts.
 
I would say that effective logistics is a major component of military power, which partly enables a country to become an empire.

Later European empires had a mixed set of policies on their possessions, some going through local rulers and turning them into vassals or collaborators, others heavily sending in their own nationals as administrators. The British did the former in places like India where you had local kingdoms that were not directly governed from the metropole. I think, and it’s likely I am wrong, that the French had a totally top-down, French-only civil service system in Vietnam, only belatedly recognizing the need for local support.

But getting back to the original question, I think there’s also something to be said about how we are defining empire: would the Arabs and their conquered territories count as an empire? The Chinese dynasties? How did they keep themselves together as singular political entities, and how did their logistics and militaries compare to potential competitors?
 
That seems a matter of communication and logistics, it is one thing to keep a few horses for a courier to replenish, an entire army would need thousands of them, and that requires grass, sometimes called the "fuel of the Mongol army".

While the Mongols could maintain communications in hostile territory, their logistics were for the most part dependent on large plains.

The average Mongolian horse needs about 4 hectares to feed itself year round. An army of 150,000 men, with their 600,000 horses, needed some 24,000 square kilometres if they were to remain permanently. In Mongolia, no problem.

But Hungary’s Great Plain is a mere twentieth the size of Mongolia’s grasslands. Subedei would have very quickly realized that Hungary was not a base to expand from, or retreat into, or for raising reinforcements long term.

It is fair to assume that the two armies knew all about each other, with messengers galloping across 450 kilometres of hostile territory – an achievement so astonishing that it beggars the imagination; yet so obvious and so routine for the Mongols that no one thought to record it; and so secret that no European sources mention it.
(...)
So that night Subedei knew there would be no reinforcements for his enemy and plenty for him if needed
 
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I would say that effective logistics is a major component of military power, which partly enables a country to become an empire.

Later European empires had a mixed set of policies on their possessions, some going through local rulers and turning them into vassals or collaborators, others heavily sending in their own nationals as administrators. The British did the former in places like India where you had local kingdoms that were not directly governed from the metropole. I think, and it’s likely I am wrong, that the French had a totally top-down, French-only civil service system in Vietnam, only belatedly recognizing the need for local support.

But getting back to the original question, I think there’s also something to be said about how we are defining empire: would the Arabs and their conquered territories count as an empire? The Chinese dynasties? How did they keep themselves together as singular political entities, and how did their logistics and militaries compare to potential competitors?

It’s often tempting to define an empire by its administrative style: direct vs. indirect rule, assimilation vs. autonomy. But in reality, even within a single empire (whether Mongol, British or French), local governance varied greatly from one territory to another, sometimes more vassalized, sometimes more centralized. It widely depended on local contexts.

However, in all cases, an imperial power always depended on the cooperation of local elites (political, commercial, and often religious) to hold. These elites had to see a direct interest in aligning with the empire, whether through shared goals, protection, or access to broader markets. For example, the Mongols took control of the Silk Road, and therefore pacified it. This enabled trade to flourish, giving merchant elites a strong incentive to cooperate. But such cooperation was always conditional and inherently fragile. Ambitions for greater sovereignty never disappear.

To keep these partnerships stable over time, the empire also required some form of logistical asymmetry: the ability to reach its peripheries swiftly, while remaining largely out of reach itself. This meant a one-sided capacity to project power and maintain communication across vast distances that couldn’t be matched by vassals. That alone often acted as a stabilizing force and deterrent, dissuading rebellion even in the absence of a standing occupation.

So logistics isn’t just about moving armies. It’s about maintaining the psychological and physical advantage of being able to act decisively anywhere, while being mostly immune from retaliation. That’s what made the Mongol Yam effective. It’s what made European gunboat diplomacy work. And it’s probably key in what distinguishes enduring empire from ephemeral conquests.
 
Some interesting bits of info on the yam system here :

Depending on the size and business of the yam, there could be 200 to 400 horses on the ready for the messengers to ride. The speedy operation of this postal service depended on these horses. A messenger would ride a horse as hard as possible to reach the next yam as fast as possible. They rode so intensely that they had to tie themselves to the horse with tight bands around their head, chest, and stomachs to prevent themselves from falling off. At night, their speed would be reduced as a torch would have to be carried to guide the way. Nonetheless, accounts from that era say that a distance of 200-250 miles could be covered in a single day this way. (Polo, 435).

This system allowed the expedited delivery of goods and messages. For example, a piece of fruit could be harvested one morning in Cambaluc (modern: Beijing, China) and by that evening arrive in Xanadu (modern: Shangdu Town, Inner Mongolia, China), a distance of 220 miles, for the Emperor to enjoy. What would typically be a 10-day journey became a 1-day trip, and a 100-day journey became a 10-day trip under the Mongol horse-post-house, yam, or pony-express type system.

 
Some interesting bits of info on the yam system here :


Indeed, that's what makes me think the yam system allowed the Mongols to take advantage of the vast Eurasian steppes a bit similarly as how the Europeans will later use the oceans. The key was the ability to move faster and farther than anyone else while remaining virtually immune to retaliation deep within the heartland.

This advantage may explain how the Mongols managed to control entire civilizations that were far more populous than themselves, notably China and Persia.
 
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Think it's worth mentioning that the Romans, good as they were at the logistics and organization, side-stepped a lot of the long-term need by also being good at assimilation over a generational time-scale...
 
Think it's worth mentioning that the Romans, good as they were at the logistics and organization, side-stepped a lot of the long-term need by also being good at assimilation over a generational time-scale...
And they built roads wherever they went. Roman roads connected all the far distant provinces of the empire back to Rome. Roads were the Roman Yam.
 
And they built roads wherever they went. Roman roads connected all the far distant provinces of the empire back to Rome. Roads were the Roman Yam.

The Roman Empire is an interesting case because its transportation network was primarily maritime and fluvial. Ships were the only practical way to carry heavy goods over long distances, and this applied to both trade and military logistics. In many cases, moving troops by sea or along rivers was faster and more efficient than marching them overland. In such a context, one can wonder why the Romans still invested so heavily in road networks, even in parallel to rivers or coastlines. I asked ChatGPT about this and learned a few useful insights.

Apparently, ships were rarely used in winter, they were too vulnerable to storms and lacked the sturdiness for rough seas. And although river transport was efficient when going downstream, going upstream was much slower and labor-intensive. The concept of towing boats from the shore did exist but was slow and required manpower or animals walking along the banks. For urgent messages, these limitations made overland couriers more reliable. A single rider could outpace river travel, especially when the roads had relay stations where fresh horses were available.

Roman couriers typically covered only around 80 km per day. In contrast, Mongol messengers, aided by frequent horse changes and riding small, tireless horses trained to maintain a steady marathon-like pace, could cover up to 300 km per day. Marco Polo wrote that they even tied themselves to their horses to avoid falling off during long, uninterrupted rides.

Think that a modern trucker on a motorway hardly drives more than 800 km on average in a day. That gives an idea how 300 km, on horseback and across open terrain, is remarkable.
 
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In such a context, one can wonder why the Romans still invested so heavily in road networks, even in parallel to rivers or coastlines.

I would think that once in place, roads enhanced all non military traffic and expanded the trade capability of every city and town along it. "Last mile" dynamics would be vastly improved too for every kind of logistical need. At some point I'm sure Rome learned the perils of not having a good road system and then fixed the problem as they expanded. There history goes way back, so I guess over hundreds of years they learned more and more about the hows and whys.

From wiki. More good stuff there:
"Roman roads (Latin: viae Romanae; singular: via Romana; meaning "Roman way") were physical infrastructure vital to the maintenance and development of the Roman state, built from about 300 BC through the expansion and consolidation of the Roman Republic and the Roman Empire. They provided efficient means for the overland movement of armies, officials, civilians, inland carriage of official communications, and trade goods. Roman roads were of several kinds, ranging from small local roads to broad, long-distance highways built to connect cities, major towns and military bases. These major roads were often stone-paved and metaled, cambered for drainage, and were flanked by footpaths, bridleways and drainage ditches. They were laid along accurately surveyed courses, and some were cut through hills or conducted over rivers and ravines on bridgework. Sections could be supported over marshy ground on rafted or piled foundations.

At the peak of Rome's development, no fewer than 29 great military highways radiated from the capital, and the empire's 113 provinces were interconnected by 372 great roads. The whole comprised more than 400,000 kilometres (250,000 miles) of roads, of which over 80,500 kilometres (50,000 mi) were stone-paved. In Gaul alone, no less than 21,000 kilometres (13,000 mi) of roadways are said to have been improved, and in Britain at least 4,000 kilometres (2,500 mi). The courses (and sometimes the surfaces) of many Roman roads survived for millennia; some are overlaid by modern roads."

A modern example is the US interstate highway system started by President Eisenhower in the 1950s. It totally changed the country in a few decades.
 
I did not know that. Good for them!
 
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