Greatest General: Caesar or Alexander
- Thread starter Gandalf13
- Start date
Richard III
Duke of Gloucester
I can't help but chuckle at how much we humans let our partisanship cloud our judgements.
"Ah, Caesar, the master of self promotion."
Give your head a shake, elfstorm. We're comparing Caesar, who wrote some fairly neutral historical books about what he actually saw, and ALEXANDER fer god's sake! Alexander, the same guy who styled himself a God before he was 30! Who had the coins minted with his face! Who made a point of stopping by the Gordion knot to show how cool he was!
Maybe Caesar is self-promotional by comparison to, say, Julius Schmoe, anonymous Roman Governor, who didn't find the time to write a book. But compared to Alexander?
R.III
Self promotion and other PR work would obviously be more useful to a politician than a heridtary monarch.
"Assuredly," Maharbal replied, "no one man has been blessed with all God's gifts. You know, Hannibal, how to win a fight; you do not know how to use your victory."
LIVY
No question Hannibal had his flaws, but on the battlefield he knew what he was about.
LIVY
No question Hannibal had his flaws, but on the battlefield he knew what he was about.
Partisanship??? huh? I called Alexander "thuggish" and said I prefered Ceasar the man! How does that make me partisan towards Alexander??
Ceasar the writer was excellent. He was balanced up to a point, but if you read them you'll notice that when things go wrong they're never Ceasars fault.
Also Caesar's fame is linked to the survival and quality of his writing. There are other great Generals, Scipio for example, but they are not as famous - not due to lack of talent but because they never put pen to paper. Would we think Ceasar was such a great military leader if his writing hadn't survived?
Elfstorm- a general does not have to put pen to paper himself to be considered famous. Scipio was written about by numerous historians. If Caesar's writing's hadn't survived, he would still be just as famous, mostly because of Plutarch's work. Just because he wrote books himself doesn't mean he wasn't as brilliant a general. He did not exaggerate his achievments or lie about his accomplishments. He just said what he did in his Gallic campaign, the plain FACTS. Caesar was not just balanced "up to a point", he actually almost never distorted the facts. He said himself that his own purpose for his books was to just let his achievments speak for themselves. Also, when things went wrong was almost never, and when they did, Caesar always rescued his army from disaster.
Of course a general doesn't have to put pen to paper to be famous! But in our time people like Ceasar and Scipio's fame is dependant, not on their achievements, but on the survival of ancient texts and other historical data. There is far more information relating to Ceasar (and his imperial line) than to Hannibal or Scipio or Alexander or Pomepy etc. Therefore you'll find more scholars studying him and more books written about him.
Julius Ceasar wrote an excellent account of his Gallic Wars. This account was used to teach generations of victorian school children latin. The result of this was that in our time Ceasar became extremely well known. If Ceasar's writings hadn't survived he (probably) wouldn't be as famous as another latin text would have been used in schools.
If you want to study ancient generals and how they made war you have only one first had account (i.e. written by an ancient general) to go on - Ceasars.
4) As for Ceasar being completely unbias - I refer you to the introduction of the Gallic War (1982 - Penguin edition) page 25:
"...the Gallic War is perhaps not altogether a straightforward account of events."
"...the large personel fortunes that he and some of his associates made from his conquests - are discreetly unmentioned while he sometimes seems to dissimulate his real intentions to conceal their relative failure - see, for example, the narrative of the Gergovia campaign."
If I could be bothered I could find passages in the text specifically. But I can't cos it's 20 past midnight. The introduction also states (and I TOTALLY agree with ) that Ceasar offers a comparitively unbias and INVALUABLE historical source.
He was a very excellent fellow. But though I admire him I will criticise him.
Finally Plutrach. Good writer. Not the worlds best historian (nor even second best). Also he was born AD46, so any account he wrote about Ceasar wasn't exactly contemporary.
Actually Elfstorm, Caesar's writings were not the only first hand account f his wars. One of his soldiers wrote the account of the Spanish campaign, and of his adventures in Egypt. Alexander too was written about by his soldiers. To say that "If you want to study ancient generals and how they made war you have only one first hand account (i.e. written by an ancient general) to go on-Caesar's," is not true. First of all, you do not need a generals writing for it to be a first hand account. A soldiers account is also first hand. The Persian invasion of Greece was well documented by many first hand accounts and books, so it's impossible that Caesar's books are the only way to study how ancient wars were waged.
Point taken with the "unbiased" writing of Caesar. I haven't read the Gallic War in some time, and I usually don't memorize introductions.
Point taken with the "unbiased" writing of Caesar. I haven't read the Gallic War in some time, and I usually don't memorize introductions.
Originally posted by Gandalf13
Actually Elfstorm, Caesar's writings were not the only first hand account f his wars. One of his soldiers wrote the account of the Spanish campaign, and of his adventures in Egypt. Alexander too was written about by his soldiers. To say that "If you want to study ancient generals and how they made war you have only one first hand account (i.e. written by an ancient general) to go on-Caesar's," is not true. First of all, you do not need a generals writing for it to be a first hand account. A soldiers account is also first hand. The Persian invasion of Greece was well documented by many first hand accounts and books, so it's impossible that Caesar's books are the only way to study how ancient wars were waged.
Point taken with the "unbiased" writing of Caesar. I haven't read the Gallic War in some time, and I usually don't memorize introductions.
Hello again Gandalf
You've slightly misunderstood me about Ceasar being the only ancient general to write about his campaigns. Your quite right, Soldiers who served under Ceasar and numerous other ancient historians wrote about various Generals and their campiagns. What I meant was that Ceasars account is the only one we have written by an ancient general about his experiences. Unfortantly nothing substantial by Hannibal, Alexander or various others survives
Anyway Gandalf, take your knowledge of Ceasar to the Completed Modpack forum and look for the "Conquest of Gaul" thread. But remember - this was your fault!
Mîtiu Ioan
Deity
I have to disagree with you.
Hanibal was a good tactician ( not a genius, but a good one ) but a catastrophic stategist.
And - if my sources are correct he didn't attack Rome because his army was extremly exhausted and doesn't have enough siege machines.
Regards
Rain
Marquesa
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Its been fairly convincingly proven by historical studies (Delbruck e.g.) that the numbers involved in the battles of ancient times are terrifically exaggerated by the annalists of those periods. Its beyond the realm of proabability that caesar faced anything approaching a force of 100,000. Logistical studies are very convincing in demonstrating that it was impossible to field such numbers in ancient times. Armies of the 17th century only approached such sizes and they were far more advanced in terms of supply and transport. The same is true of the accounts of the persians and alexander. For example, it was claimed by Herodotus that the army Xerxes lead against the greeks numbered 2.5 mil men. Comparing with a 19th century German Army corps of 30k men which had an order of march of 3 miles in length, Xerxes line of march would have 420 miles long and its first troops would have arrived at Thermophylae as the last left Susa on the other side of the Tigris. Like wise Caesar claimed that the Gauls on thier great trek numbered over 368,000 which would have required about 8,500 wagons for transport of provisions an impossibility given the conditions of roads in that time. 
Mîtiu Ioan
Deity
It's perfectfully true what you say.
Congratulations for remember this aspect.
Mats Norrman
Chieftain
Re, Force sizes:
Actually it is mentioned in the annals that the force Ceasar commanded when he conquered Gaul was about 30'000 soldiers, and likely he commanded forces of similar size also elleswhere. This is a somewhat larger force then Alexanders army, and yes, the infrastructure and logistics of the Ancients put a very strict limit upon the biggest size of an army in conquest. When Scipio Africanus marched an army of 65'000 men and brought it over to Zama, south of Khartago, it was considered a remarkable take on the logistics (though it is not very likely that the full force were taken over the sea).
Re, Ceasar vs. Alexander
First of all, Caesar and Alexander are very different to compare for the reason that they were very different in their temperament, not just their thinking. I would see Ceasar as greater on one critical point, and that was that Ceasar was very concerned with Luck, and he knew as a general rule, that luck will come to you if you do like - like emperor Tiberius put it "A good shepherd cut the wool of the sheps, but he doesn't skin them". Clearly said: Alexander didn't know when it was time to stop, and therefore, he will count along the long row of other conquerors who in some way had to face a defeat of some kind. Alexanders defeat was when he entered India - a very vast way from home, not just with the Ancient measuring - and when not even this was enough for him, he wanted to go furthr to China, but then his soldiers refused to follow him, and he was forced to return home. ---- Caesar then, was one of the few conquerors of world history who never was defeted. The reason is exactly that Ceasar, who cried under Alexanders statue, and lived out all his emotions with a intense charisma as result, always has his common sence in judgements still there - he always could calmly calculate the risks of a conquest, and oppress his longing for eternal life. When Ceasar had conquered Gaul, he didn't continue into Germanic soil as such a conquest couldn't be estimated to occupy him for a certain time, he didn't attack Brittannia as the exact size of that continent wasn't known and that also would include a too large element of unsecurity and risk. On the other hand, he knew that he could conquer Gaul, adn he know he would win fame and a good strategic position from it, he didn't enter into Asia Minor as he knew the slumbering strength of the Persian Empire.... It seems that Ceasar always had the ability to choose the road to go that he had the best probabilities to be victorious, and above all the sharpness of mind to execute these conqests as smart as possible. Seemingly he only twice took on projects that were very risky. The first was when he crossed Rubicon and started the Civil War. He could at that point likely count with being victorious in the closest time, but the political and military consequences on a longer perspective must have been very hard to predict. The other case when he had practically won the Civil War, and he attacked Hispania to hunt down his antagonists last bastion. The leader of the republican forces in Hispania was a very intelligent man and a general with much experiance (the name escapes me and I don't have the sources at hand), and Caesar knew he could as likely win as loose. He still took on this campaign as he argued from Hispania a future threat against the Monarchy he tried to etablish could be raised, an he wished to complete his task on that point. Ceasar wrote in "De bello civil" that had he lost this battle he had sought his own death on the battlefield. ----An other difference between Ceasar and Alexander was also bound in temperament, and that was that Alexander acted mainly on impulse, as whole his nature and personality was impulsive, while Ceasar on the other hand planned everything he did like a perfectionist. Ceasar suffered from epilepsy, and at the day for one battle in Gaul, Ceasar was not able to lead his troops in the battle due to an epilepsyattack, still his plans which he had given to his officers were so exact that they could lead the army in his absence, and the fight went like a clockwork after his plans. ----
When one rates a military leader - of any time - two main things have to be considered: his ability as tactican and his ability as strategian. In short the difference is that strategy means taking overlaying desicions which causes the campaign as whole to turn out well, while a good tactican is good at simply concrete execute the plans. Like the strategian moves on the map, but the tactician moves on the battlefield. Hannibal is an example on a general who was a great tactican, but a poor strateg. He brilliantly understood the strengthness of his own armys discipline and the weakness of the enemy armys psyche, and therefore he could totaly destroy a Roman army with the highly original tactic in the battle of Cannae, but in his Italian campaign, he didn't realize that he could easily have won the war with attacking Rome at an early stage, instead he wasted his resources on a lot of messing around. His opponent OTOH, Fabius Maximus, knew exactly from the beginning that he could defeat Hannibal with fooling him to do exactly as he came to do. Fabius avoided to meet Hannibal in a big battle, and fooled him to waste his resources and time on attacking fortified cities, therefore Fabius was a good strateg (another insight F. had was that he wasn't as good tactican as Hannibal and would likely loose if their armies confronted openly). That Fabius maximus has to bear the nickname "Cunctator" (="the slow sausage"), is unfair.
Alexander made some very wise strategical desicions, like when he conquered the Palestine coast and Egypt before striking into Babylonia to prevent the Persians from attacking Greece in his back with fleets, but Alexander was also to much extent in a position where he could trust that his technically supreme infantry units - the phalanxes - would do the hard work. Many times he didn't need to plan extensively at all, it was just to drive over the enemy with this armoured beast, the phalanx, and the fight was won. Much also thanks to he had psychological overtake with countrymen who were very determined to win, meeting an yet bigger enemy force but consisting of soldiers from many coutries, many not very eager to fight for the Persians, and many who would even welcome a Greek victory for other reasons (mainly economical). Ceasar then had after anno 58 at least an enemy who was as determined as him to fight until last chance was outdone, adn he had to take many very good desicions strategically as well as tactically. Ceasar managed to do this, but so he was also an incredibly intelligent human being, and in my opinion more provenly a greater general then Alexander. The reasons I have explained above.
Mats Norrman
mats.norrman@home.se
Actually it is mentioned in the annals that the force Ceasar commanded when he conquered Gaul was about 30'000 soldiers, and likely he commanded forces of similar size also elleswhere. This is a somewhat larger force then Alexanders army, and yes, the infrastructure and logistics of the Ancients put a very strict limit upon the biggest size of an army in conquest. When Scipio Africanus marched an army of 65'000 men and brought it over to Zama, south of Khartago, it was considered a remarkable take on the logistics (though it is not very likely that the full force were taken over the sea).
Re, Ceasar vs. Alexander
First of all, Caesar and Alexander are very different to compare for the reason that they were very different in their temperament, not just their thinking. I would see Ceasar as greater on one critical point, and that was that Ceasar was very concerned with Luck, and he knew as a general rule, that luck will come to you if you do like - like emperor Tiberius put it "A good shepherd cut the wool of the sheps, but he doesn't skin them". Clearly said: Alexander didn't know when it was time to stop, and therefore, he will count along the long row of other conquerors who in some way had to face a defeat of some kind. Alexanders defeat was when he entered India - a very vast way from home, not just with the Ancient measuring - and when not even this was enough for him, he wanted to go furthr to China, but then his soldiers refused to follow him, and he was forced to return home. ---- Caesar then, was one of the few conquerors of world history who never was defeted. The reason is exactly that Ceasar, who cried under Alexanders statue, and lived out all his emotions with a intense charisma as result, always has his common sence in judgements still there - he always could calmly calculate the risks of a conquest, and oppress his longing for eternal life. When Ceasar had conquered Gaul, he didn't continue into Germanic soil as such a conquest couldn't be estimated to occupy him for a certain time, he didn't attack Brittannia as the exact size of that continent wasn't known and that also would include a too large element of unsecurity and risk. On the other hand, he knew that he could conquer Gaul, adn he know he would win fame and a good strategic position from it, he didn't enter into Asia Minor as he knew the slumbering strength of the Persian Empire.... It seems that Ceasar always had the ability to choose the road to go that he had the best probabilities to be victorious, and above all the sharpness of mind to execute these conqests as smart as possible. Seemingly he only twice took on projects that were very risky. The first was when he crossed Rubicon and started the Civil War. He could at that point likely count with being victorious in the closest time, but the political and military consequences on a longer perspective must have been very hard to predict. The other case when he had practically won the Civil War, and he attacked Hispania to hunt down his antagonists last bastion. The leader of the republican forces in Hispania was a very intelligent man and a general with much experiance (the name escapes me and I don't have the sources at hand), and Caesar knew he could as likely win as loose. He still took on this campaign as he argued from Hispania a future threat against the Monarchy he tried to etablish could be raised, an he wished to complete his task on that point. Ceasar wrote in "De bello civil" that had he lost this battle he had sought his own death on the battlefield. ----An other difference between Ceasar and Alexander was also bound in temperament, and that was that Alexander acted mainly on impulse, as whole his nature and personality was impulsive, while Ceasar on the other hand planned everything he did like a perfectionist. Ceasar suffered from epilepsy, and at the day for one battle in Gaul, Ceasar was not able to lead his troops in the battle due to an epilepsyattack, still his plans which he had given to his officers were so exact that they could lead the army in his absence, and the fight went like a clockwork after his plans. ----
When one rates a military leader - of any time - two main things have to be considered: his ability as tactican and his ability as strategian. In short the difference is that strategy means taking overlaying desicions which causes the campaign as whole to turn out well, while a good tactican is good at simply concrete execute the plans. Like the strategian moves on the map, but the tactician moves on the battlefield. Hannibal is an example on a general who was a great tactican, but a poor strateg. He brilliantly understood the strengthness of his own armys discipline and the weakness of the enemy armys psyche, and therefore he could totaly destroy a Roman army with the highly original tactic in the battle of Cannae, but in his Italian campaign, he didn't realize that he could easily have won the war with attacking Rome at an early stage, instead he wasted his resources on a lot of messing around. His opponent OTOH, Fabius Maximus, knew exactly from the beginning that he could defeat Hannibal with fooling him to do exactly as he came to do. Fabius avoided to meet Hannibal in a big battle, and fooled him to waste his resources and time on attacking fortified cities, therefore Fabius was a good strateg (another insight F. had was that he wasn't as good tactican as Hannibal and would likely loose if their armies confronted openly). That Fabius maximus has to bear the nickname "Cunctator" (="the slow sausage"), is unfair.
Alexander made some very wise strategical desicions, like when he conquered the Palestine coast and Egypt before striking into Babylonia to prevent the Persians from attacking Greece in his back with fleets, but Alexander was also to much extent in a position where he could trust that his technically supreme infantry units - the phalanxes - would do the hard work. Many times he didn't need to plan extensively at all, it was just to drive over the enemy with this armoured beast, the phalanx, and the fight was won. Much also thanks to he had psychological overtake with countrymen who were very determined to win, meeting an yet bigger enemy force but consisting of soldiers from many coutries, many not very eager to fight for the Persians, and many who would even welcome a Greek victory for other reasons (mainly economical). Ceasar then had after anno 58 at least an enemy who was as determined as him to fight until last chance was outdone, adn he had to take many very good desicions strategically as well as tactically. Ceasar managed to do this, but so he was also an incredibly intelligent human being, and in my opinion more provenly a greater general then Alexander. The reasons I have explained above.
Mats Norrman
mats.norrman@home.se
Quite true - in fact by mentioning Ceasar and Herodotus you picked the exact two sources I'd have brought up to discuss the exaggerated numbers of armies.
But! Not all ancient writers were so prone to exaggerate and there are some estimates of numbers which are, so far as we know, very accurate.
Diodorus and his run down of the strength of Alexander for example or Polybius and his estimates for the battle of Cannae.
But just because someone like Polybius gets it right for one battle it doesn't mean you should trust him for all battles. There are a number of instances where he gets it wrong. Likewise there are times when Ceasar gets it spot on.
Sometimes the author only gets it half right. Arrian gives very acurate estimates for Alexander's army, but his estimates for Persian numbers are probably vastly exaggerated.
You have to apply a lot of care when studying ancient sources...
Mats Norrman
Chieftain
Several have remarked that the Ancient historians frequently exaggerated the size of armies. I would like to point out that they did not necessarily do so, but because they counted different than how we count today, for several reasons, many of which will seem so obvious so we miss them today.
First of all, historians of the Ancient did not count the actual number of soldiers when they told about an army size. The counted all people that were moving with the army, including all people that were needed to serve the soldiers and have the army function as an organization on move.
An illuminating example from later date is when Wallenstein marched his army through Germany in the 30 years war, he had an army of about 35'000 soldiers. To that adds the tross which was rather large, and included in the tross were about 30'000 prostitutes. So if say Herodotus had been the historian in charge to write about the event, he had likely approximated Wallensteins army to the size of 80'000-90'000 - perhaps more.
By the way - I believe that the army for very long time - at least in Western Europe after Medieval times had monopole on prostitution. A woman is now a good hook on a soldier, and if they had not this lock in the armys neighbourhood, they would likely desert and settle down where and when they liked as soon as they got tired of hanging around in war. This would support the theory that the burning of 'witches' in this time was a lesser nice way to fight private prostitution.
Mats Norrman
mats.norrman@home.se
First of all, historians of the Ancient did not count the actual number of soldiers when they told about an army size. The counted all people that were moving with the army, including all people that were needed to serve the soldiers and have the army function as an organization on move.
An illuminating example from later date is when Wallenstein marched his army through Germany in the 30 years war, he had an army of about 35'000 soldiers. To that adds the tross which was rather large, and included in the tross were about 30'000 prostitutes. So if say Herodotus had been the historian in charge to write about the event, he had likely approximated Wallensteins army to the size of 80'000-90'000 - perhaps more.
By the way - I believe that the army for very long time - at least in Western Europe after Medieval times had monopole on prostitution. A woman is now a good hook on a soldier, and if they had not this lock in the armys neighbourhood, they would likely desert and settle down where and when they liked as soon as they got tired of hanging around in war. This would support the theory that the burning of 'witches' in this time was a lesser nice way to fight private prostitution.
Mats Norrman
mats.norrman@home.se
