How long was Case White expected to last by Germans?

[Domen]

Does anyone know how long was the Polish Campaign expected to last by Germans before they actually invaded?

I don't know about existence of any official report which mentions how long the Case White was expected to last.

I only know about some "semi-official" statements (of Halder and Hitler, for example), which say something about 3 or "if possible even 2" weeks.

However, those "semi-official" statements could also be "semi-propaganda", used to raise spirits & self-confidence of German commanders.

Fall Weiss itself doesn't contain any exact "time schedule" of planned operations, as far as I know.

Initially Germans planned to encircle, cut off and destroy Polish army in the area west of rivers Vistula-San. This plan could not be implemented with full success in reality, due to higher than expected speed of Polish retreat and due to "interruptions" such as Polish Bzura counterattack. That's why Germans decided to extend the pincers of encirclement further eastwards. This 2nd encirclement was also not yet fully accomplished until the Soviet Invasion.

After the Soviet Invasion, Germans stopped execution of that changed version of Fall Weiss and limited themselves only to completing operations in Western and Central Poland. In Eastern Poland, on the other hand, few days after the Soviet Invasion they started to retreat behind the demarcation line (in places where they actually managed to cross it - because in some other places they didn't even get to it). Yet on 18 September they changed some of their previous plans regarding the conquest of Eastern Poland (which was apparently a "Plan B" - designed hastily in mid-September due to the fact that Soviets were constantly delaying their invasion), but general retreat behind the demarcation line started few days later. That retreat was interrupted in several places by Polish units which - after the Soviet invasion - were ordered to break through to Romania/Hungary & were trying to do so before the Soviet arrival (particularly the German 14th Army was forced to fight some very hard battles in the 2nd half of September).

Considering that Germans planned to narrow down military operations in Poland to a smaller area than area on which they were conducted in reality, they probably didn't expect the Polish campaign to last for a longer time - even if they anticipated a slower speed of operations / speed of advance, than they achieved in reality.

Another question is how the signature of the Ribbentrop-Molotov agreement changed German temporal expectations regarding the campaign. AFAIK Germans assumed that Soviet invasion would begin shortly after their own.

In reality 16 days had to pass from the start of the German invasion until the start of the Soviet attack.

During that time Germans numerous times pushed their "allies" to finally attack Poland. With no visible results (despite numerous promises to German ambassador in Moscow Schulenburg, Molotov was constantly delaying the planned date of the invasion). Finally around 14 - 16 September Germans lost much of their confidence in Soviet reliability, and started to seriously consider the situation they faced - that is, the probable necessity of conquering all of Poland on their own.

Luckily for them, the Soviet invasion finally did begin.

Had the Soviets invaded in first days of September, Poland would have probably collapsed a lot faster.

To summ up - not everyhing went according to the German plan. Apart from the partial failure of "small pincers" plan (limited to areas west of Vistula-San), another operational "setback" for the Germans was the fact that German Air Reconnaissance somehow failed to detect positions of Army "Poznan" of gen. Kutrzeba for several days. This army suddenly "disappeared" from German ordnance maps after the first few days - and did not appear on them until the overextended wing of 8. Army had been suddenly attacked by "strong, unspecified enemy" at the Bzura, on 9 September 1939. One day before the Polish Bzura "offensive turn", German High Command anticipated, that Army "Poznan" had already withdrawn to the eastern bank of the Vistula across Kampinos and Warsaw. But soon that wrong German anticipation was to be verified by reality in a quite painful & problematic way.

That operational surprise could be achieved by Poles thanks to the fact that Army "Poznan" marched only at nights, while at days it was hiding in forests, etc.. But there was also some neglect from the German side - if only they made more efforts, they certainly would be able to localize Army "Poznan" before it "localized itself".

[[[ Thread about the battle of Bzura on this forum: http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?t=62527 ]]]

Also the fact that Germans used to overestimate their initial successes in the campaign, later did not help them (maybe even harmed them). I am talking for example about the German assessment, that practically entire Army "Pomorze" had been destroyed in the Polish Corridor in the first days of September. Combats vs retreating Polish units fought by II. & III. Army Corps of 4. Army during their advance towards Warsaw along both banks of the Vistula, had been considered by OKH / OKW as combats vs just some remnants of allegedly destroyed Army "Pomorze". In reality, Army "Pomorze" lost ca. 25% of its strength in the Corridor, and later Germans had to confront this "non-existant army" - as they thought - once again, in the battle of Bzura, in which part of its forces successfully (in the 1st phase of the battle) protected the rear area of Army "Poznan" against 4. Army and another part supported counteroffensive actions of Army "Poznan" against 8. and 10. Armies.

Another issue is the siege of Warsaw - did Germans even anticipate it?

I'm not sure if Germans expected Warsaw to put up quite a long resistance or even to be defended.

It is known that - according to some German sources - when Germans were approaching the suburbs of Warsaw at the turn of the first and the second week of September, they considered Warsaw as an "open city". It is hard to explain why they considered Warsaw as such, because Poles had never declared Warsaw to be an "open city".

Maybe the entire story of Germans allegedly thinking that Warsaw had been announced an "open city" was invented only later, to justify the failure of an overconfident German attempt of seizing Warsaw by hasty attack.

On the other hand - it is true that defence of Warsaw had been organized "ad hoc" during just few days preceeding the German approach to the city. Had the Germans approached & attacked Warsaw even a few days earlier than in reality, it is possible that they would have been able to capture it by hasty attack.

So - what do you guys think - was Fall Weiss expected to last longer, shorter or for similar time as it lasted in reality?

How did the agreement with the Soviets (= expected Soviet help in defeating Poland) influence German estimations of time required to conquer Poland?

 

[Domen]

This is what I found:

Hitler 1936-1945: Nemesis. By Ian Kershaw, paper back by Penguin Books page 179

The directive for Case White was ready on April 3 and it was issued eight days later. Kershaw says that the aims of the campaign were given by Halder to other senior officers within two weeks. Halder said Poland had to be destroyed in record time “einen Record an Schnelligkeit” and that Poland formed “no serious opponent”. He ended by saying “we must be finished with Poland within three weeks”.

Kershaw’s source is a German work. Christian Hartmann and Sergej Slutsch, “Franz Halder und die Kkriegvorbereitungen im Fruhjahr 1939. Eine Ansprache des Generalstabschefs des Heeres”

I seem to recall a similar quote by Hitler about how long he expected the campaign to take but tonight I cannot remember where to find it.

And here some fragments from a pre-war report of Abwehr (German military intelligence) about the Polish army:

High-ranking officers:

"The Officer Corps of the Polish army includes many individuals which had never been professional officers before and gained their experiences from Legions. Also officers from armies of former Austrian and Russian partitioning powers belong to this Corps, and only few from the former German army of German partition."

Younger officers:

"The Corps of younger officers was created from people coming from better regions of Poland. They are capable of doing more than older officers with limited views. They are dynamic, willing to service, athletic and disciplined, but they are less-educated than German officers."

Equipment and weaponry:

"Equipment and weaponry when it comes to heavy artillery, AT and AA artillery, armored vehicles, aircrafts and bombs do not correspond to modern requirements. The command is unsteady and schematic. The effect of enemy firepower is neglected. Own abilities are in every respect overestimated. However, these weaknesses will be partially compensated by fanatism of the Officer Corps and by fortitude and sacrifice of soldiers."

Motorization and transport:

"Motorization of the army coincides with motorization of the country. It is in the phase of development. Only after 2-3 years conditions for overall motorization of the country will be created. On 1 January 1939 the total number of motor vehicles in Poland was expected to exceed 54 thousands. Despite this Poland is still statistically almost at the end of Europe - one motor vehicle for 600 inhabitants. Regarding the army, a small number of trucks is noticeable. In February of 1939 the Polish minister of war said that due to this fact Poland will be passing on horses as main traction yet for the next few years."

About cavalry - the elite of Polish army as concluded by Abwehr:

"Officer cadre, cadets and soldiers and horses are the best from all types of formations of the Polish army. Except for shortcomings in combat service, the Officer Corps of cavalry constitutes of young generation of hardened, commited, nationalistic officer cadre."

Overall summing-up conclusion of the report says:

"Due to mediocre command abilities and insufficient weaponry the Polish army is not capable of major military operations against a modern enemy."

And such a fragment of "Military-Geographical Description of Poland" (finished on 1 July 1939 by Department 9 of the Ober-Kommando des Heeres):

"V. Population:

(...) Poles: character - sanguine, full of temperament, enthusiasts, very hospitable, but sometimes highly reckless and unsteady. Under good commander a Pole is a brave soldier. He is daring, undemanding, eager, tough and resistant in march. Better in attack than in defence. (...)"

From subsequent Hitler's propaganda speech:

"(...) Poles fought valiantly in many places. Their lowest command level was making desperate efforts, but their medium command level was not intelligent enough and their high command was bad, below all criticism. Their organization was - Polish! (...) I must also say that apart from courage demonstrated by many Polish soldiers, many Polish bands commited sordid acts. (...)"

BTW - today's the anniversary.

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Interesting article (written by Andrzej Witkowski) - below I post English translation of Part 1 of this article.

It is about the causes of Polish defeat, apart from those numerical, material and technological ones.

PART I - THE GENERAL MATTERS:

Typically, as the main cause of the Polish defeat people mention lack of armament combined with vast technological superiority of the enemy (for example, they compare the number of Polish and German tanks), errors of military doctrine and the foundations of the plan to defend all the borders. Thinking about these reasons as a remedy for all the bad things, forum members are trying to point out possible alternative ways of creating the armored units for the pre-war Polish army and expansion of aviation at the expense of, for example, Navy. As a remedy for failure, they sometimes see other defensive positions of the Polish army (behind the line of the Vistula River), the reorganization of tactical units. This reasoning usually suffers from the desire of putting the entire blame for the defeat just on economic weakness of the state, stressing the material and numerical superiority of the enemy.

Gentlemen: this is not the whole truth.

Well the main reason for the Polish defeat in 1939, unfortunately, was lying in the poor organization of command at the strategic level and operational level. The blame for the size of the failure should be put predominantly on Marschall Rydz-Smigly. Many mistakes were commited:

1. Mistake of the principle of single command:

Single command is obviously the only solution on the lower and middle tactical levels of command - there's no time for consultation and lengthy thinking. Decisions on the level of platoon, company or battalion must be taken immediately in response to changes on the battlefield. Thinking about command at these levels we have to settle for possible theoretical mistakes of command in order to achieve the necessary speed of decision making - it is better to make a wrong decision immediately, than even the best but too late (so for example after 10 minutes). The higher, however, we proceed in the hierarchy of command, the slower situation (on the map) changes (in terms of general impression) and command errors (incompatibility of decision making with the rules of war) start to result in larger and farther-reaching and sometimes irreversible consequences.

When we reach the level of the army, army group or defending the country in general we should yet use the "war council" supported by a good general staff (active, searching for solutions for the commander in chief). Commander (of course) should always have the right to issue orders, but should at every step TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION opinions of his subordinates and his staff. His generals should be well-versed before the battle abouy what he intends, thus they would be able to point out his errors in advance, to support the plan of the battle with some good idea and during its course to be fully aware of their own role in the entire plan. In the Polish army of 1939 all of this WAS NOT PRESENT. Before the war Rydz-Śmigły did not brag in detail to anyone about his idea on defense. Army commanders did not know what role was designated for them by the Supreme Commander (NW). It was so called "Pilsudski's school" - generals get to know about the battle intentions only if the Supreme Commander decides to inform them. NW was not dealing with leadership and command also because he did not have time to independently analyze of situation correctly and take the approproate decisions (it is related to point 2). So he sometimes happened to "forget" about the less important directions of defense, to make decisions with reprehensible delay, to "not think" about some certain fact, etc.

2. Erroneus organization of the army on strategic level:

This point is partly related to the above and the below (the link between points 2 and 3 will be in point 4). The Polish army lacked the level of a Corps or (and) the level of an Army Group. The effect was, that the Supreme Commander was overloaded by decision making and command duties, because commanders of 11 operational compounds were subordinated to him, and he could not keep up with issuing orders for all of them (as the result NW instead of dealing with strategy, had to constantly crack the operational details). And for the same reason army commanders were severely desiderating the lack of Corps level (instead of dealing with command on operational level, they were involved in dealing with tactical level in divisions and brigades). At the strategic level communication was failing, because firstly it was not modern and secondly it had to cope with sending messages to relatively low level of command (let's remember that the lower level of command, the more frequently and faster commanders have to command) and to many tactical compounds. The result... dramatic. Furthermore we have to note frequent lack of cooperation on wings of neighbouring compounds, resulting from lack of informations from "above" (here - communication, discussed practice of single command so a habit of not informing about own intentions as well as the strategic "fragmentation" of the Polish army generating such situations from its nature).

3. Defensive plan. Lack of DETAILED plan:

It is just scandal! Here again (probably) "Pilsudski's school" did not let the Supreme Commander to reforge his intentions into a detailed defensive plan, therefore to inform his subordinates commanders and his staff about own intentions and predictions concerning enemy movements. Furthermore the Supreme Commander extracted 3 phases of combats (1. the battle for the border, 2. withdrawal, 3. defense of the line of rivers). While there should be at most two phases because the army should smoothly move from defense to withdrawal and the withdrawal itself should be a minutely planned part of the first phase of war. Commanders of individual armies should in advance know the exact criterion of making the decision to withdraw as well as the method of conducting this withdrawal (for example counterattack and nocturnal dodge), in such situation commander of an army defense of which is breaking would properly recognize the critical moment and inform the staff about it, then the staff would approve the exact hour of starting the withdrawal and transmit it to other army commanders together with other necessary information. Unfortunately in reality army commanders did not have this independence, just like they didn't know tasks of neighbours and reserves. They didn't know the overall situation on the frontline. Thus decision was being taken by the Supreme Commander himself and for various reasons he took it around 2 days too late - the result? - disastrous.

The theoretical division of the defense for three phases by NW is connected with another of his mistakes. NW was apparently assuming, that he could predict only the course of the first days of war, while later it improvisation would become necessary. Most probably that's why he emerged the first phase of combats along the border and seperated the withdrawal from this phase, as this moment of combats the development of which is by no means predictable. Instead of this way of thinking, plans of several different variants of operations should have been developed. Unfortunately, instead of this a "great improvisation" took place, which for various reasons (described above and below) quickly turned into chaos in command.

In the same paragraph I have to discuss also the fact, that NW, self-confident in his command abilities, did not play with his commanders before the war any single so called "war game" to werify his visions of the imminent war. Such a game would clearly reveal the weakest points of own side and the strongest points of the enemy. After such a game maybe NW would avoid commiting many mistakes in the real war, which cost the lives of many Polish soldiers. From such a game NW would learn, that his conception of linear withdrawal has no chance success in the face of 15 German armoured-motorized divisions and the crushing air superiority of Luftwaffe.

4. PLAN, or rather a general concept existing mainly inside the brain of Marschall Rydz-Smigly, assumed the LINEAR WITHDRAWAL. Polish command (staff and the non-existant war council) should realize about the fact, that enemy forces had large superiority of maneuver and mobility (it resulted from information of the Polish intelligence, department of analysis and it would also result from lessons of war games, which however in reality did not take place). Due to this fact the only correct solution was to withdraw in large groups, capable of defending from the forehead against the mass of German infantry and to break through the emerging on their flanks and on their rears German armoured-motorized fast units. Thus the solution were stronger armies with more numerous tactical compounds (8 - 12 divisions and brigades), grouped into Corps-size units with 2 - 4 divisions and brigades each. The additional advantage of this solution was the reduction of number of operational compounds, which was also an advantage in the Polish conditions of 1939. The reduction of number of operational commanders subordinated directly to NW from 11 to 3 - 4, maybe 5, would result in joint responsibility of these people - equal to that of NW - for the fate of Poland and they would create together with NW and hist staff some kind of a decision-making body capable of working out, even in the most critical moments, good command decisions for a certain part of the frontline as well as for the defence of entire country in general.

5. Mistakes of under-information, lack of information, which included:

First of all - mistakes in reconnoitring on strategic level. The Supreme Commander simply did not have an idea what was hiding behind the very first line of enemy forces. He did not leave for his disposition any reconnaissance aviation and he did not oblige his subordinate commanders to conduct reconnoitring of enemy grouping to strategic and operational depth. Correct reconnoitring of German divisions was not being "followed" by adding to them their "partner divisions" from the same Corps. Simply speaking only general Szylling gave himself a trouble of identyfing enemy Corps, not just divisions, and to provide to the Supreme Commander a fuller and more complete picture of enemy forces attacking units of his army. When after the first few days of combats many of the enemy tactical units were not recognized - especially several of the most dangerous fast units - it became necessary to find out at all cost where exactly those units were (by analysis or intensive air reconnaissance) - after all they were not needles in a haystack. It is impossible to command well while neglecting so fundamental matters!

Secondly - the Supreme Commander was many times cheated by his subordinate commanders (Rómmel, Dąb-Biernacki) [regarding situation along their parts of the frontline - Domen]. It wouldn't happen if the Polish army did not stubbornly cling on the "chain of command" (which again probably originated from the rule described in 1.). Simply speaking NW should have some trusted liaison officers in HQs of each army. On this occasion I should raise the issue of gen. Dąb-Biernacki who was exactly hushing up his own mistakes by sending reports about the demoralization of his units to NW (is such a man even suitable at all for being a commander?)

On this occasion (commanders) it can be also considered, why an experienced, characterized by high commanding values gen. Piskor remained on 01.09.1939 without any forces under his command, while such a gen. Dąb-Biernacki had its own forces??? - once again mistake of the Supreme Commander (this time probably intentional - I don't know).

6. Dozens of minor and major operational mistakes of NW and Army and Independent Operational Group commanders - they largely resulted from all issues mentioned in previous points, as well as for example from such a prosaic matter, like the way of presenting information about the battlefields to NW (drawings for NW). Lack of detailed maps enabling efficient artillery fire. Lack of enough artillery ammunition supplies forcing Polish artillery guns to stay silent.

Part 2 is "THE CONCRETE ISSUES".

 

[Domen]

And here several fragments from Part IV ("Conclusions") of the book "The Defence of Poland, September 1939" written by Polish general - Lt. Gen. M. Norwid Neugebauer -, translated by Peter Jordan, translation first published in March 1942, M. I. Kolin Publishers Ltd., London, England. Originally published in Polish, "Kampania Wrzesniowa w Polsce", 1941, London.

Note that this book (or rather report) was written in 1940 yet before France was invaded:

(...)

1. General Observations

In estimating the military results of the campaign, it is generally stressed that the Polish army carried out an important task by engaging the major part of the German forces and thus allowing the Western Allies of Poland ample time for a leisurely mobilisation and preparations.

Apart from that somewhat passive task and the inflicting of heavy losses on the enemy, the resistance of Poland achieved another important object by revealing the operational methods of the German High Command and the fighting value of the different branches of the German forces.

Most of the views which have been so far expressed on the subject of the Polish defence plan and general development of forces contain a criticism of the weakness of flanks, of the insufficiency of reserves, and of the choice of a defence line (it is stated that it should have been placed behind the Narew, the Bug, the Vistula, and the San).

The consideration of the topography of the country, of the military possibilities, and of the plans and preparations of the Polish High Command throws some light on the subject and permits a sound estimate of the facts.

(...)

The German plan provided for three simultaneous blows, aimed at the centre and the two flanks. The first stage of the campaign was to consist in the cutting off of Pomorze and the preparation for the surrounding of the Polish western armies within the loop of the Vistula. In the second stage it was planned to carry out a wider encirclement beyond the Bug and the San.

Poland decided to resist and yield ground fighting; after taking up positions behind the defence line it was expected that the well-known and undisputable superiority of the enemy forces would be counteracted.

Such were the leading principles of the operations. Germany had a great ease of manoeuvre thanks to her mastery of the air. The original surprise attack gave her the initiative, which she could keep in her hands throughout the campaign owing to the superior speed of her armoured and motorised divisions, as well as to the mastery of the air possessed by the Luftwaffe.

Poland could not carry any planned manoeuvre to its conclusion, owing to the slow rate of movement due to the inferiority of her technical resources, which weighed heavily on every attempt at concentration or counter-action.

The sources which are accessible to-day provide a clear picture of the actual development of events, but they give little ground for a critical appreciation of the operations.

The first "Blitzkrieg" on a major scale provided, however, a great wealth of experience and data, permitting a valuation of the part played by new weapons and the method of their tactical use. The one-month campaign fought by the Polish army deserves to be studied especially from that point of view.

The ancient elements of warfare, such as leadership, morale, physical superiority, surprise, etc., have remained unchanged. In the sphere of manoeuvre, however, the present war brought about a complete revision of the relative importance of different means of transport. Motor transport leapt to the first place, together with the aeroplane, leaving the railways far behind.

Infantry marches can be used as a means of manoeuvre only within a limited tactical scope and on small distances.

The increased speed of action and speed of movement emphasises the element of foresight, planning, and efficient organisation of the disposable means on a certain territory. The calculation of time has to be set now to quite different limits than those of yesterday.

The principle of a most careful selection of the technical executors of the commanders' orders has been confirmed again by the Polish campaign. A still greater amount of experience and knowledge is to be expected of a staff officer.

2. New Weapons

The First World War brought new tactical methods, resulting from the use of fire concentrations both in defence and offence (the fire manoeuvre). The fire power, provided by guns, was limited in range and destructive effect, owing to technical reasons.

In the present war fire concentrations became more destructive and their range was increased to several hundred kilometres thanks to the use of waves of bombers following each other.

The last war gave only the first inkling of the power of the new weapons: the aeroplane and the tank. Their apptitude for mass grouping, their speed, and their range suggested new possibilities of breaking-through and of destruction.

The subsequent period of peace was used by engineers for improving the performance of both aeroplanes and tanks, while military experts worked out new methods for their use.

Thanks to careful observation, theoretical conceptions were confirmed and new practical data were collected in the course of various minor wars, especially during the last five years.

Germany, actively rebuilding her military power, was leading in all the fields, either openly or in secrecy. Examples are provided by the period of collaboration with Russia after Rapallo or the participation in the Spanish civil war. After 1933 no expense was spared on tests and experiments (some of them unsuccessful) carried out in the course of manoeuvres and training. Bloodless campaigns (the occupation of Austria, of the Sudeten, and of Czechoslovakia), although they were not free from failings, served to formulate definite principles, which were embodied in military publications and provisory regulations, known as "Merkblatter."

In Poland, as well as in some other countries, it was usual first to wait for the results of promising disarmament conversations and then to recoil from the spending of fantastic sums involved in the introduction of new weapons or defences against them.

But the price which we paid for the experience of 1939 was infinitely greater than any possible expense.

Although the Soviet intervention was directly responsible for the conclusion of the campaign, its issue was actually decided by air power and armoured divisions. This is a basic truth which should be ever present in the minds of those responsible for the security of any country.

Observations on the activity of those two fighting services form the centre of interest, as the others played only a subsidiary part; that is why I have dispensed in the present work with a study of the purely tactical aspect of the campaign and the conclusions to which it might lead. The available data and facts remain a subject for a separate study undertaken from a tactical point of view.

3. The Air Force and its Use

The air force acted as a separate arm, carrying out its own individual tasks, which included mastery of the air and the destruction of the whole country. Those two aims were achieved thanks to the inadequate strength of the Polish air force and anti-aircraft defences, as well as the small depth of the Polish territory. In view of the encirclement of Poland from the north and the south by territories under German control, no air operations had to be undertaken within a greater range than 400 kilometres.

The autonomous activity of the Luftwaffe suggests the following conclusions:
(1) The air attacks were carried out by surprise. In consequence everything that was not ready for action on the first day was immediately disorganised and thrown out of gear.
(2) The mass of bombers used by the enemy was so great as to cover the whole front and the whole country at the same time. The destruction was too widespread to make repairs possible and many services could not be restored.
(3) The continuity and the uninterrupted character of action caused the exhaustion of the resources of the defence and made even temporary reconstruction impossible.
(4) The long duration of certain actions, even if they were not particularly effective, tied up the defence and gave the impression that the attacking force was stronger than was actually the case.
(5) The mastery of the air was used for effecting landings, in order to promote sabotage and treachery behind the front lines, to spread panic or to carry out definite actions. In some cases larger detachments landed from the air attacked army headquarters or security units behind the front.

Every action was carried out by at least one squadron, generally flying at medium altitude. After 12th September there were also actions by smaller groups, probably designed to cover simultaneously the largest possible area. There is documentary evidence of over 420 group flights carried out by the enemy; 862 localities bombed, while Warsaw suffered 26 air attacks. These figures take no account of actions against troops, even when they involved the bombing of inhabited areas and towns. The number of air raids on non-military objectives gives the measure of the Luftwaffe in Poland.

As far as Poland was concerned, this action had the following results:
(1) It confused and postponed mobilisation, although it failed to prevent it completely.
(2) It paralysed the transports already on the third day, making it impossible to complete the concentration. It also rendered impossible any manoeuvre or re-grouping on a large operational scale.
(3) It threw out of gear the administrative machinery - as a consequence most orders either reached their destination too late or could not be carried out.
(4) It destroyed means of liaison and thus either diminished or supressed facilities for commanding.
(5) It made any movement of troops extremely difficult, reducing it to night alone.

The air force also collaborated with the army in respect of reconnaissance and directing of fire.

It was notable that the aerial reconnaissance was used almost exclusively in favour of armoured formations, or for the purpose of tracking the Polish air force.

Reconnaissance was generally carried out not as a separate task, but in the course of bombing or ground strafing flights. Advanced aircraft of a fighting formation sought out targets and informed about them their ground headquarters.

The collaboration with the army was aimed at superseding artillery, mainly heavy and long-range artillery. Such attacks were directed at first at the rear positions, gun positions and stores of the enemy, then turning towards the front line. Sometimes both the rear and the front were attacked simultaneously by two waves of bombers.

It is known, however, that the destruction of permanent buildings was thorough and effective. The losses suffered by trained, disciplined, and properly disposed troops on march were relatively slight. At any rate ground strafing caused more casualties than bombing.

The proportion of non-exploded bombs was fairly high - 30-50 per cent.

The moral effect and the confusion produced by the explosions of a large number of bombs were always so strong that some time was needed to restore the men to normal. The same moral effect was noted in the course of night fighting, when tracer, flare, and incendiary missiles were used. The sound effects used by the enemy (screaming bombs, powerful sirens with a high-pitched shriek, etc.) also required a certain nervous effort of self-control on the part of the soldiers.

The inadequate Polish anti-aircraft artillery helped to keep the enemy aircraft at a certain altitude, but it was not particularly effective when attacks on large targets were concerned.

The fighters proved to be a really effective and reliable means of defence, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy, dispersing the bomber formations, and sometimes even forcing them to abandon their mission. But the fighters could be effective only if they were available in large numbers and kept in constant technical and fighting readiness. In Poland, where neither of those conditions were realised, the German bombers and dive-bombers generally carried out their attacks without the protection of ther own fighters.

Generally speaking, the Luftwaffe, secure in its mastery of the air and impunity in view of the inadequate ground defence, carried out in its actions against the army and the whole country the task which is generally imposed on the air force by the modern theory of war. It paralysed the work of the country, immobilised or destroyed material, and foiled the efforts of the defence.

4. The Armoured-Motorised Formations as an Instrument of Lightning War

Armoured-motorised units were used on a big scale for the realisation of the operational plans of the High Command. They were its principle instrument of action, responsible for the execution of the whole plan.

Every armoured-motorised unit was composed of several elements charged with three tactical duties respectively: reconnaissance; the capture of certain objectives; and the preparation of advance by overtaking.

An analysis of the battles reveals that most of the mobile fighting was done with the fire of armoured machine-guns or artillery. Wherever there was some stabilisation of the front, or a technically prepared territory was encountered, the enemy reverted to the old tactical methods, consisting of reconnoitring a position, preparing an attack with fire and then attempting a break-through, eventually followed by a deeper consolidation of the advantage thus obtained.

The operational use of armoured forces was based on the typical features of that arm: the concentration action of armoured fire and the speed of the tanks.

A few general principles may be formulated:
(1) A division advanced some light elements in order to seek out the enemy front, establish contact, and form flanks. If there was no possibility of an encircling action through the point of least resistance, a frontal attack was carried out and then the speed of the armoured forces was used for penetrating as far as possible and thus preparing the way for the next wave.
(2) A complete armoured-motorised division was used in each of the proposed directions of attack. If the task in hand required it, they were coupled with other fast divisions, making use of the gaps which might be discovered, or of the breach made by the tanks.
(3) After a successful break-through the front line, the motorised divisions penetrated very deep behind the front, in order to escape the counter-action and prevent the re-organisation of defence on the same line. If they encountered serious resistance, reinforcements of light motorised forces, or infantry brought in lorries, were immediately sent up.
(4) In the main direction of action, in the group of General Reichenau (the 10th Army), a group of six armoured-motorised divisions was specially formed. Their action consisted of the following stages: first, the resistance of the front line positions was broken and a deep penetration into the defence system was effected, while the next wave of attack was endeavouring to engage the flanks of the breach. In the next stage, an attempt was made to roll up the wings of the defence by a vigorous action, while a further movement was effected at the maximum depth of penetration in the main direction of advance by means of reconnaissance and the capturing of certain points in the region concerned. In the third stage, light fast divisions were inserted into the breach and they spread fanwise into the country, while the continued pressure on the flanks of the original front on both sides of the breach caused a concentration of Polish forces at those points, where they were engaged by infantry.

Such was the general outline of the operation north of Czestochowa, designed for a break-through towards the Vistula, Warsaw and Sandomierz. At the same time the flanks of the Lodz Army were engaged, the resistance of the reserve army was broken down with a side movement, and the positions of the Kielce group were passed by after the destruction of the 7th infantry division. The same method was used by the action of the concentrated two armoured divisions south of the line Chojnice-Tuchola-Swiecie, with a by-passing of the defence at Czersk. A similar action was carried out from Jordanow towards Rzeszow-Lwow and from Krosno through Chyrow towards Lwow, and after the break-through at Wizna towards Brzesc and Kaluszyn. In the last two cases the development of the battle was somewhat different, as there was a counter-action of the Polish troops and they did carry out a centrifugal manoeuvre.

In the course of all those actions there was a close collaboration with bombers and attack squadrons of the Luftwaffe. They attacked the country far beyond the front line, destroying railway and road junctions, all means of transport and larger towns, and reporting at the same time the disposition of the defences, as well as carrying out the functions of long-range artillery.

The break-through battles were fought in strict accordance with the regulations and instructions. The armoured forces accompanying infantry established contact, and after making an attempt at breaking through with their sheer weight, which generally failed, they formed a curtain of fire in front of the Polish defence lines. Lighter elements moved in search of the flanks. The remaining forces of the column launched immediately a frontal attack, using all their available weapons, unless a flank or weak point was previously discovered by the light elements. Each of the successive stages of the battle followed by short intervals of about two or three hours, during which the tanks, the infantry, and the artillery carried on their concerted action. The attacking troops were often brought up to the line by motorised transport within sight of the defending forces.

It is to be observed that there was not a single action of advanced elements which was not supported by artillery fire. Combined groups were always used: motor-cycles with machine-guns, light tanks and motorised artillery on caterpillars.

Every attack was prepared by artillery fire concentrated on the point selected for a break-through and repeated after a few hours`interval in case of failure.

Such a method of action of armoured divisions completely changed the character of mobile fighting. It also changed the method of using the reserves at the disposal of the senior commander. In both cases it was a matter of first overtaking the speed of motorised weapons and then breaking the armour. The local defence had to anticipate the blow and the counter-attack. An excellent example is provided by the action of the 58th infantry regiment at Emiljanow, where a wave of tanks surprised the attack of the 14th infantry division in the course of its preparation and was arrested by the defence on the positions of the reserve regiment.

The Polish idea of organising motorised anti-armour units for every division was therefore correct. They consisted of a battery of anti-tank guns with machine-guns for their protection. They were organised in autonomous motorised brigades, known as O.M., designed to use their speed for forming a barrier behind the front of the army, or on its flank.

The use of divisional reserves, or reserve armies, for the purpose of protection by traditional counter-attack, proved entirely ineffective, for it is necessary to stop the wave of tanks before engaging in a battle in which their armour may be destroyed.

A decision of retreat at the moment of a break-through by armoured forces tended to favour the plans of the enemy. On the contrary, an army should stay on and endeavour to cut off the armoured divisions which penetrate behind its front, for the purpose of subsequently destroying them.

As the financial limitations imposed on the Polish army did not permit the establishment of sufficiently strong armoured forces, the cheaper solution was adopted in the form of providing the troops with effective anti-tank weapons. The gradation of the means of defence and their organisation depended on the tasks imposed on each type of command. The means used by a smaller unit are bound to be different from those reserved for an army. No unit, however, should be without anti-tank weapons.

The arrangement of reserves in depth was not sufficient if they were not provided with mobile anti-tank weapons. It was also not sufficient for an army front to have several successive lines of defence, with anti-tank obstacles and human reserves, if it had no means for overtaking the fast enemy units, piercing their armour, and cutting off their fuel supply. It is to be observed that the German regulations ordered every division to carry four days' supply and that it provided for ten hours of action per day. Those facts indicate the possible lines for counter-action.

The Polish army was equipped with anti-tank ammunition, grenades, and land mines, but their supply was small and calculated for short actions. There were special anti-tank rifles in every infantry platoon and anti-tank guns in battalions. They were very effective in action, but insufficient in numbers. Unfortunately the regiments and divisions were without special anti-tank units, while the 75 mm. field guns could be used for that purpose only to a limited extent, since they had to carry out other important duties. Besides, there were too few of them to go around. In consequence, every action was more or less confined to resistance on the line, as it was impossible to produce a barrage of anti-armour fire deeper than 800 metres, which could have dealt with mass and wave attacks. There were too few motorised brigades to be used operationally as movable barriers (the value of such units was well illustrated by the activity of the motorised brigade in the Cracow Army during its sixteen days of fighting).

The method of night attacks against the headquarters and parks of armoured divisions, used on several occasions by Polish infantry, gave excellent results. The enemy was compelled to provide his tanks and armoured cars with powerful searchlights, which blinded the attacking force and, when used in accordance with a definite plan, assisted defence fire at night. Finally the method of bombing motorised columns on march, and especially at their stopping-places, proved effective in delaying their progress. Several captured enemy reports confirm the fact that serious losses were inflicted by the Polish bombers. The method of cutting off motorised divisions from their fuel supply and thus paralysing their movements was not tried out. It could have become a practical plan only after 10th September as a consequence of the depth of the enemy penetration up to that date, and of the fact that the enemy was operating on territory previously ravaged by his own bombers.

The enemy tactics consisted of the use of 100-150 tanks on a front of one kilometre.

There were three waves, each with its own definite task: (1) Engaging with fire and destroying the sources of defence fire, especially of anti-armour weapons; (2) Penetrating deep into the defences, for the purpose of overpowering the artillery and reserves; (3) Consolidating the gain.

It was possible to include in the principles of defence outlined by the Polish Regulations of 1939 some instructions for dealing with such attacks and to state the complement of anti-armour weapons and units required by a division. The defence principles were, however, not fully applied.

5. The Equipment of Commands

The activity of the fast armoured-motorised divisions and of the air force increased the depth of the battle zone to such an extent that it covered practically the whole country. This fact rendered necessary a revision of the equipment and organisation of the higher commands. There were in Poland many cases of a disruption of liaison between higher commands, resulting in individual fighting on various sectors, which favoured the enemy. The wire communications failed frequently. There were not enough underground-cable connections for war purposes. The car proved to be too slow as a means of liaison, while the use of aeroplanes was difficult in view of the mastery of the air possessed by the enemy. Landing difficulties made aerial communication available only for the higher commands.

6. The Other Arms

The other arms served as the auxiliaries of the armoured and air forces which brought vitory to the Reich in its lightning war.

Artillery.- Germany devoted considerable attention to artillery, providing it liberally to divisions, though not nearly in quantities usual in the war of 1914-1918. There was a predominance of heavy, powerful weapons, mostly howitzers. The tactics of fire were based on concentrated hammerings and rapid support in action. Those were the points emphasised in the training and the instructions about the collaboration of different arms.

Infantry.- The role of [German] infantry was reduced to defence, taking over captured ground and fighting in collaboration with armoured units. There were a few battles of the old type, but they were generally concluded by bringing up the tanks and the air force. Up to that moment, however, they developed in a manner similar to that observed in previous wars. The intensity of machine-gun fire was carried to its highest pitch, in order to be used as an unfailing method of pinning the enemy down to the ground and paralysing his movements. The present organisation of infantry requires large quantities of special equipment, adapted to different conditions of the ground, various offensive weapons and methods of warfare. As this equipment has to be made reasonably secure against fire of normal intensity, it is to be feared that infantry must lose much of its former mobility. It is threatened with becoming simply an auxiliary service of various specialised arms. The Polish infantry frequently carried out bayonet attacks, displaying a moral and physical resistance and marching ability superior to that of the German infantry. Those assets should not be disregarded, and it is to be expected that infantry may be reorganised and adapted to the purposes of position warfare on the one hand, and of mobile fighting on the other. This would involve a different organisation of divisions.

Cavalry. - Although the Polish cavalry upheld its splendid tradition, and carried out faithfully its orders, it proved to be an expensive army, disappointing some of the hopes which were placed in its fighting value. Its speed sometimes proved very useful, but it was still too slow, and its fire power was inadequate for the carrying out of the duties which used to fall to its share under the old conditions. When technical equipment is insufficient, it still remains the fast arm.

Supplies and Transport. - The Polish campaign proved again what huge quantities of material have to be carried over large distances in a relatively short time under modern war conditions. Horse traction is out of the question under such circumstances. The numerous examples of the paralysing of the movement of divisions in the course of concentration and the technical difficulties occasioned by the handling of immensely long columns of traffic rule out the horse as a means of transport from the regiment upwards. The destruction of railway lines and the dangerous positions of junctions limit to some extent the efficiency of railway transport.

The present war requires motor transport capable of dealing with work under normal cross-country conditions.

(...)

 

[Agent327]

You seem to have answered your own question... and rather thoroughly.

 

[Laurwin]

very nice read, I just wanted to ask, how obsolete were the Polish forces at the start of WW2, in context of the limited resources available? Was domestic armaments production able to remedy the situation? Did the Polish forces have any "old but still effective" weaponry against German blitzkrieg?

I was thinking about the modernity of weapons available since it's usually something that gets brought up, as in "if we had prepared better..." I also read this one book about Finnish fighter pilots in WW2, where there was a barrage of criticism against government unpreparedness.

Of course it was impossible to really predict what kind of weapons you would really need for WW2 and when it would indeed start, back in the day, and how it would play it's course. Over the course of the war it would of course be difficult for small countries to buy any modern weapons due to several problems.

Actual transport of bought war equipment from the seller to the buyer could be a big problem, or simply the fact that even great powers like Britain were materially quite unprepared and needed every ounce of modern weapons for domestic defense. Then there's the fact that when the world political crisis starts, even before actual war, the panic spreads like at the Stock Market, all armaments prices skyrocket, and most market available war equipmet would be second hand quality because the best war equipment was generally speaking developed by the great powers and used it for domestic defense (at least initially)

Particularly in aeroplane development the rate of advancement was quite huge, and was more or less performed almost solely by the great powers of the time, even though there were surprisingly effective and advanced civilian designs. So even though some particular aircraft technologies were of course state secrets, many civilian planes were superiour in performance to many service models of state airforces. In the sense of having a better prepared air force, there was great potential to be seen and exploited. Tank development went in similar lines but not really with any civilian models

Tried and trusted small arms and heavy artillery could, and indeed did prove effective against many modern weapon systems

But in many smaller countries' airforces, there seems to have been a noticable lack of strategic perception, negligence of technical details and technology, co-operation with other branches of armed forces, with governments, with procurement, objectives and mission tasks.

Finnish airforce for example had relatively modern bomber aircraft by the time of winter war (blenheim) but fighter procurement had been delayed in part due to high hopes of producing domestically licensed Fokker-planes in the State Aircraft Factory and possible domestically researched and produced VL Myrsky- fighter. In the end the VL Myrsky was quite the failure, and was delayed well into the 1943, and in performance was about equal to me-109. Winter war of course included the German blockade of armaments to Finland in the spirit of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, so even the procurement of Italian Fiat G50s failed.

Finnish airforce seemed to still clinge on to the interwar agenda of having an independant airforce with mainly recon and naval planes, since at least the budget would allow for that type of thing. With the procurement of land based planes and bombers Finnish airforce seemed to have some kind of striking power. But even so, the safe guess about Finland's position as the Soviet Union's neighbour apparently eluded the top brass from considering that advanced fighter planes for interception purposes were actually the real necessity. Interception (as well as recon) proved eventually to be the cornerstones of Finnish airforce operations during much of WW2.

 

[REDY]

You have some good points. For example Czechoslovakia had excellent armaments industry, but it was exporting to other countries instead modernising own army. They even refusing buy foreign airplanes and just producing obselete domestic ones. After occupation its factories realy boosted Germany.

About Polish situation I dont know. They were producing some own armaments (for example light tanks) comparable with european standards. Polish tanks and planes did quite well in 1:1 - but were completely outnumbered and had obselete tactics. So first what was needed was change of organisation and produce more.

 

[Domen]

Von Rundstedt yet in May of 1939 tried to predict what defensive actions would the Poles undertake:

He considered several variants of Polish actions:

1st Variant most favourable for the Germans according to von Rundstedt:

"If the Poles are to make the same mistake as the Czechs made in the Autumn of 1938, namely if they since the very beginning want to defend all of their borders (...) it will be easy to pierce such defence with concentrated forces in over a dozen points."

2nd Variant most reasonable and thus most probable according to him:

"This is why it should be presumed, that the Poles will seek to defend their vast borders only with weaker forces, while maintaining the main part of their army as mobile reserve force. In the region of Poznan Polish forces shall not be too strong.
Behind the Warthe line, the resistance will grow stronger. Polish mobile units will be located probably (a) in the region of Jaroslaw & Przemysl (b) in the region of Deblin (c) in the region of Warsaw and (d) at the Narew."

3rd Variant most unfavourable for the Germans in his opinion:

"If the Poles could count on fast and sure help of other powers, they would put up resistance with the main bulk of their forces to the east of Vistula, defending fiercely and withdrawing behind the line San - Vistula - Narew. (...) For us this means a problem of concentrating all units on the western and southern banks of these rivers, without dispersing forces in the eastern direction."

Polish defensive Plan "West" was most similar to 1st Variant, with only some limited elements of 2nd Variant (reserve Army "Prusy").

=========================

As for Laurwin's questions - I will try to answer them soon.