James Stuart
King
I am in full agreement with this.
The situation in Mali was very similar; jihadist groups that were fighting unsuccessfully on one front (Libya) crossed the border and formed an alliance with a long-standing rebellious minority group (the Tuareg rebels). They gained stunning and swift success due to a combination of their new target being weaker than their previous target, the sheer unpreparedness of their enemy to face the new threat, an initially friendly or apathetic populace, and problems in the government of their target state (Mali's head-of-state had just been overthrown in a surprise coup, and there was the distinct possibility of civil war between opposing army units). With success apparently imminent, the jihadists turned on their less-radical allies, wiping them out. This gave the Malinese government enough time, with outside pressure, to get its act together, and a broad-front assault, backed by a major Western power (France) cleared out the jihadists, leaving Mali in a better position than it had been before the invasion. The jihadist/ rebel alliance there even declared themselves an independent state, just like ISIL.
One can only hope the situation in Iraq works out as favourably - though preferably with less bloodshed - but I unfortunately don't see the US acting either as decisively or as effectively as France in this matter. Barack Obama is not the calibre of leader as Francois Hollande, and America's Middle East policy has never been as conherent as francafrique. I also would not be slightly surprised if some of the same jihadist actors who escaped Mali are now involved in ISIL. The resemblances are too uncanny to be simple coincidence, in my opinion. This of course, raises the possibility that any survivors of Mali will be too smart to turn on the Baathists early, which would simplify matters greatly.
