On math being between sensory-based and more abstract levels of human thought

Kyriakos

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For lack of a better thread title... this is a brief synopsis of the views on what Math is, in the levels of less to more abstract thinking, as presented mostly by Plato in a couple of his dialogues (eg Parmenides and The Republic).
The topic for discussion in the thread is to theorise on where math is to be placed, in regards to a scale of more abstract to less abstract human thinking subjects. You can type your own view, and i hope there can be some discussion...
The reason for this little presentation is that (as usual) it is part of my seminars, so i thought it would be good to practise it here a bit, given that if i can (decently??) present it in English, it follows it will be far more flowing in my superior native language :)

First some background on math of that era:

The two first math theorems were that of Thales (about a right-angled triangle inscribed in a semi-circle), and Pythagoras (the famous hypothenuse of a right-angled triangle one). Plato's time was around 2 centuries after Pythagoras, and almost 3 after Thales. In his Academy (a school for philosophy) Plato focused mostly on geometry as a means of examining how correctly and intricately a student could think. But in his dialogues (eg in the Cave Allegory in the 7nth book of the Republic) he names Math as only the lowest level of the higher (less sensory-bound, more abstract) calculations one can work with, and places it below all pure Ideas/Archetypes, and of course also below the edge of his system, which is some over-Idea that shines over them like a Sun, allowing humans to examine them all..
At the time of Socrates math had already moved massively to calculations of irrational numbers (the so-called Spiral of Theodoros is one of the main subjects of the Socratic Dialogue titled Theaetetos or On Science), primes and symmetries, and of course just 80 years after Plato we have the likes of Eukleid and Archimedes and many other towering mathematicians.

An overview of the argument about Math being less abstract than pure Ideas

1)Math has the unique element in all human studies that it features forms which are the same for any human observer. Eg if i tell you i see a (perfect) circle, and you know what a circle is, there is no way that you will imagine some other form apart from the circle. On the other hand if i told you that i am watching a tree, a chair, a human etc, you could never imagine the exact same, cause those are not set in oneness of form, but are multitudes which all have the same overall name/category.
2)Math, also, is something which developed from axioms. An axiom literaly means something which seems 'self-evident' and thus can aspire to be held as true without any proof given. Eg if one says that a human is One human, and not Two, that can be taken as axiomatically and evidently true. If one claimed they have 5 pens in their pocket... that would not have to be true and we would need proof.
Given humans can sense evidently some sums as integers, the progression of integer numbers is in many ways the basis of math, not just because the first positive number (1) is also a Meter of all numbers, but moreover due to properties studies in this progression (for example primes, fibonacci numbers, etc). The basic progression is 1, 1+1, 1+1+1,... This already sets the tone for math in regards to crucial notions such as the primes, cause they too are formed by examining if there are perfect divisors of a number.

3) Math has set basic forms and notions, which rest on axioms, and thus is very different from purely abstract ideas such as terms which signify not a specific and unigue image/being/subject, but anything which is partly or crucially defined by them as well. A leg is a term which signifies a moving limb used to sustain something while it touches the surface of movement. But the term itself does not provide us with set info on a particular instance of this. It can be anything from a human leg to the scales of some arthopod. Which brings us to the main argument against math being the highest abstraction:

4) Plato/Socrates noted that we cannot actually define "Knowledge" (The Theaetetos dialogue), cause for that to be possible we would need to set our definition on a final, atomic, non-breaking into more subcategories, stable substrate of the object we claim to have knowledge of (either a mental or material object, btw). Contrary to that we can have math terms which remain eternally the same, and can be examined without much difficulty by a student, cause there we already set the end of that substrate, through our axioms.
Plato ultimately is of the view that math is like a ladder which can help up to some point, but ultimately itself is not of the same type as the highest orders of thought. Chaos is a ladder too, but anyway, i think i will end this OP here since i suppose already almost no one will try to read it... :)
 
Two points:

1) Math as it existed in this period was incredibly primitive had a very limited scope with little abstraction.

2) Math is not itself a "thing" math is a system for describing and studying abstract notions. I would argue that anything deeper or more abstract than math is ipso facto meaningless. Perhaps that is too harsh, but if it can't be described or studied, how can we say it exists?
 
Two points:

1) Math as it existed in this period was incredibly primitive had a very limited scope with little abstraction.

2) Math is not itself a "thing" math is a system for describing and studying abstract notions. I would argue that anything deeper or more abstract than math is ipso facto meaningless. Perhaps that is too harsh, but if it can't be described or studied, how can we say it exists?

1) Given the epicenter of the topic is math's inherent flow through set axioms, do you claim that "more advanced" math stops being based ultimately again on (the same, or tied to them) axioms? Cause if it still does, i do not see what itself being 'more advanced' (if true) has to do with the original argument against it being more abstract? ;) In a way (but this is not a pure parallel: ) it seems to be similar to claiming that while cave-paintings by prehistoric people were 'art', future art (eg in 2014) is not really tied to creativity cause it is not 'primitive'. But it seems to me to be a fault of viewing the crucial parameters here. Current math is not independent of classical/hellenistic era math. Most of it is even directly tied to those (eg Gauss' work on infinite series and Eratosthenes, or my afforementioned allusion to proto-calculus by Archimedes, or examinations of hellenistic plane geometry by Fermat (tried to reproduce the entire hellenistic text of De Locis Planis), etc). :)

2) That may* be so, but there is the issue that anything one can theorise about can be termed an 'idea', and thus something existing mentally as much as any other thing. In that way a perfect circle exists mentally as much as the notion of "a leg" or "chaos" or "infinite" or any other complex or 'simpler' idea. The topic is whether some ideas are more abstract than others, and more specifically that archetypical ideas (eg any un-tied to specific objects, quality, such as 'greatness', 'lightness', 'very old' etc to name some of the myriads of such easy examples of ideas) are even less bound by actual sensory input as math is, due to math's axioms evidently being a result of basic sensory input like our ability to see sizes and space and extension and integers and so on).

*i typed it in italics cause in my view your phrasing makes it very dependent on point of view. Math is one thing if seen as a tool for science or for math itself, but another thing/things if examined as a human ability without any set goal.
 
2) Math is not itself a "thing" math is a system for describing and studying abstract notions. I would argue that anything deeper or more abstract than math is ipso facto meaningless. Perhaps that is too harsh, but if it can't be described or studied, how can we say it exists?

Formal logic is more "pure" than math. I think.. maybe I have the wrong discipline name..

Either way, I took a course once that was very pure and abstract logic. I'd bet that a lot of people would call it math though.
 
Eg if i tell you i see a (perfect) circle, and you know what a circle is, there is no way that you will imagine some other form apart from the circle. On the other hand if i told you that i am watching a tree, a chair, a human etc, you could never imagine the exact same, cause those are not set in oneness of form, but are multitudes which all have the same overall name/category.

Your circle:
Ski_trail_rating_symbol_red_circle.png


My circle:
500px-Circle_-_black_simple.svg.png
 
Your circle:
Ski_trail_rating_symbol_red_circle.png


My circle:
500px-Circle_-_black_simple.svg.png

Eh, first, those are technically discoi, not circles, but far more importantly:

The Idea is meant as one not breaking to more equally defined bits. Eg not if you have a red discus or a white discus, nor if you have a discus of 2cm or 20 cm etc ;)

Contrast that to the idea of 'largeness', or 'human face' and see if you can get it to any atomic level that is defined and not an abstract category by itself :mischief:

In the case of circle you can, cause a circle by set definition is the periphery which is at equal distance in all its points to a point termed as 'center' of the circle. A discus is the surface bound by that periphery, a sphere is the related volume, etc, all utterly set and defined ideas. On the contrary you can never get to a set/defined/entirely specific Idea of notions such as "human face", no matter if you use a vast number of steps to try to define an entirely particular example/form of those. This is due to them not following from axioms in a manner as math fundamental forms/notions do.
 
Eh, first, those are technically discoi, not circles, but far more importantly:
Can you actually "see" a circle that isn't a discoi even in your minds eye?

The Idea is meant as one not breaking to more equally defined bits. Eg not if you have a red discus or a white discus, nor if you have a discus of 2cm or 20 cm etc ;)

Contrast that to the idea of 'largeness', or 'human face' and see if you can get it to any atomic level that is defined and not an abstract category by itself :mischief:

In the case of circle you can, cause a circle by set definition is the periphery which is at equal distance in all its points to a point termed as 'center' of the circle. A discus is the surface bound by that periphery, a sphere is the related volume, etc, all utterly set and defined ideas.
I wouldn't be so confident on that. Your given definition of (the periphery which is at equal distance in all its points to a point termed as 'center' of the circle") doesn't seem to differentiate between notions like sphere, or a circle on a hyperbolic surface. It doesn't state the radius of the circle, etc. How do you rigorously define a circle so there is no wiggle room for different conceptions? Perhaps an infinite number of axioms are needed.

On the contrary you can never get to a set/defined/entirely specific Idea of notions such as "human face", no matter if you use a vast number of steps to try to define an entirely particular example/form of those. This is due to them not following from axioms in a manner as math fundamental forms/notions do.
I wouldn't be so sure about that. Perhaps we could mathematically define something where it describes all physical aspects of it. Could we not have a perfect model of say an electron or a hydrogen atom? If so then I wouldn't say a perfect definition of a human face would be impossible in principle, even if no real human mind could store all the needed data.
 
For the enlightenment of the ignorant, can someone (read that as Perfection) please explain what discoi are? I gather they are circle-like things, and the name looks like a reference to discs, but I am unfamiliar with the term so please help me. Also, it doesn't exist in Wiki, so I am dubious as to the existence of them to begin with as Wiki has the total sum of human knowledge available.
 
Discus= the bounded area by a circular periphery, ie those shapes Perfe ( ;) ) posted ;)
Circle is just the actual periphery, ie a closed sum of points all formed as equally distant from a set position (the center of the circle).

As for Perfe's comments:

Perfe, a circle as an idea is not something already placed in space, no no old chap, so it is not part of any shape of any dimension, thus it doesn't need a discus or a sphere nor to define where those surfaces or volumes are formed on. A circle is just the set shape as an Idea, which is what we are discussing: which Ideas are closer to sensory input (even in the form of backing for math axioms) and which are more abstract. :)

As for your second point, it is again not correct, cause the Idea "human face" is not bound by a set math progression itself even if that math progression could give you (eg in some computer 3d modeller you fed that info into) the 'same' image of that human face you had in mind. For the Idea is of a human face, and even if you add there some math model for a specific face you now brought the burden of having to set its atomic parts as well, otherwise you bound us to just one field of examination of the phenomenon (as you would if you examined the sum of info on some bit of matter as an 'atom', and not include sub-parts of that).

So the Idea is more abstract if (as i already noted) you need something like an infinite number of additions to it so as to get to something nearing the specific example of one such manifestation of the quality the Idea names (eg "Human Face", and... i don't know... Dr Phil? :) ).
 
Mathematics, geometry and logic are systems of abstract representation. They are learned empirically from observing the way things actually interact in our reality - Diophantine mathematics is taught for example by showing young children how numbers can refer to actual things and how various mathematical operations apply consistently to certain operations on those things. Euclidean Geometry operated similarly through written/drawn 'proofs'. Formal Logic works by systematising e.g. the argument forms that can be shown to be repeatably effective in the real world.

None of these things are absolutes. We know that we can use various forms of spatial representation to show that Euclidean geometry is a special case and we can model space is various alternative ways so that e.g. the angles in a triangle do not add up to 180 degrees, such theories have real world applications as well. There are alternative numerical systems - complex numbers for example, which again have real world applications and other systems of 'non-diophantine' arithmetic (which I would encourage people to look up for themselves for a nice paradigm shift in their thinking, it is actually trivial to go out and find real world examples where 1+1 does not =2). Lastly there are forms of logic that go beyond the traditional True/False dichotomy - fuzzy and quantum logic for example.
 
So the Idea is more abstract if (as i already noted) you need something like an infinite number of additions to it so as to get to something nearing the specific example of one such manifestation of the quality the Idea names (eg "Human Face", and... i don't know... Dr Phil? :) ).
How does that make it more abstract and not merely more complicated? Is a hexagon more abstract then a triangle?

The other thing you're running into is you're talking about the idea of a circle and the mathematical definition of the circle as if they were the same thing. When I say "circle" you don't immediately think the mathematical definition, you think of some roundish thing that looks kinda like a tire.
 
How does that make it more abstract and not merely more complicated? Is a hexagon more abstract then a triangle?

There is a difference between inherent (ie perpetual by definition) abstraction, and complication, since the latter can (potentially) end at some point (eg if you can reach an atomic part of that which you aim to present/describe/define). In the case of 'abstract ideas' the argument is that there is no atomic end to an attempt to define a specific manifestation of them, so the idea itself is entirely abstract. The dialogue "Parmenides, or on Ideas" focused on the apparent inability to "know" something in the realm of the notionally but not axiomatically defined (ie that which you set as a subject to examine without itself following from axioms), due to the endless sub-parts one finds and thus cannot have a fully defined basis to stand on.

The other thing you're running into is you're talking about the idea of a circle and the mathematical definition of the circle as if they were the same thing. When I say "circle" you don't immediately think the mathematical definition, you think of some roundish thing that looks kinda like a tire.

Nice comment, but it is again due to a misunderstanding on your part (but a crucial one, so i will now hopefully elaborate on that: )

-An "Idea" is not having to be an actual depiction of something. You seem to argue that the idea of a circle is in tautology with a visual imagining of a perfect circle. While some may try to have such a thing (itself quite problematic; are you really imagining something that factors an irrational number so as to form as an image in your imagination?), the idea of a math form following from axioms and a stable definition (as in the case of circle, square, cube, line, point, etc) can be taken as being there by virtue of the set method you have in mind, cause you can communicate it fully and already have the atomic parts of it defined as well (in juxtaposition to what i noted at in my reply to the first part of your comment in this post :) ).
-An Idea is in essence a category or type. In fact the original Platonic term is not "Idea", but "Eidos", which means "type" or "kind"/category. The ideas are any separate category/type you can think of. That pretty much includes any notion we have for anything, including all notions we have for examining notions we have, and so on, to endless iterations ;)

The argument by Plato/Socrates on Ideas boils down to the view (which i find correct, at least for the math i am familiar with and they talk about, but i already asked if any more modern math can be said to not flow from axioms as those older math did-- which i doubt is true) that math notions/ideas are formed in clearer and closer dependence on human sensory input, eg geometric notions seem to follow from humans having the ability to move in space, to observe things as integers, etc, while at the same time core math elements are abstractions that create antithesis in the overall system (eg Democritos, the one who theorised on 'atomic' final parts, had noted that the notion of 'single point' creates issues in geometry, since it functions as a sort of atom there but in a system which is not part of nature anyway. There is one paradox left by him, or rather a question, about whether a cone sectioned by a plane will have in two immediate outer points in that section an just above or below it, the same lenght or less/more, and it would follow that if it has less the cone is in reality step-by-step created in its atomic parts, while if it has the same length it would follow that it would remain the same even if we multiply that infinitesimal part, thus we would now have a cylinder instead of a cone).

Basically some notions in math are more tied to sensory or somatic input, others are more on the purely mental side of things (like the notion of Infinity, which the Eleatic philosophers (Parmenides, Zeno, etc) were so fond of using to argue that the senses and human perception in general is only a source of illusion and errror).
 
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