Rate Napoleons Marshalls
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privatehudson
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Their rapid rise though in itself reflects a problem suffered in the revolutionary army. The rapid expansion of the forces followed with the loss of officers meant that many commanders by the time of Napoleon in Italy owed their current rank more to politics than to ability. Whilst it permitted men like Ney to rise to senior command, there was of course many who rose to senior command who blatantly didn't suit it. The system afterwards also fell prey to Napoleon's whims, frequently better commanders were turned away in favour of those who offered strict loyalty.
BTW, I think Macdonald was only 1/2 Scottish.
BTW, I think Macdonald was only 1/2 Scottish.
privatehudson
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I'm thinking also of his choices for various roles and commands, for example turning down Murat in 1815, Leaving Davout in Germany in 1813-14 and so on. His issues about loyalty go beyond merely who he appointed to the Marshalate.
privatehudson
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In a word? Overated.
No doubt that will bring pleanty of criticism, so let me explain that a little. I am not saying he was a terrible commander, but that the reputation he enjoys with the general public has a tendency to concentrate on the good parts of his career rather than take it as a whole.
I tend to view his career in two distinct seperate periods. Up until 1805 he was tactically and strategically a genius as demonstrated by his brilliant campaigns in Italy and Austria for example. After that date his record takes something of a nosedive tactically. From crossing a river in the face of the enemy army without reconaissance (Aspern Essling), to the bloody frontal assaults at Borodino, Waterloo and Wagram it is clear to me that Napoleon had "lost his touch" so to speak on the field of battle. Strategically in that period I still hold him in regard, after all the opening of the Waterloo campaign for example was brilliant. I'm afraid though that with exceptions like 1814 and possibly 1806 (Where Davout stole the show
) were he performed well again on the field, the last 9 years of campaigning were a long series of costly victories or bloody defeats.
Crucially Napoleon had a series of inbuilt personality flaws that cost him as much as his military decisions. As a political animal who owed his power to victories and the army, he suffered from being something of a control-freak and being unable to trust many around him. This manifested itself in his habit of trying to control campaigns from afar (notably Spain) and as I mentioned his tendency not to forgive easily those who slighted him like Murat. There was also a sense that he fostered competition amongst the marshals for his favour which leant much to their inability to assist eachother. Petty rivalries between marshals cost the French more than one battle.
Don't have time for more right now sorry.
No doubt that will bring pleanty of criticism, so let me explain that a little. I am not saying he was a terrible commander, but that the reputation he enjoys with the general public has a tendency to concentrate on the good parts of his career rather than take it as a whole.
I tend to view his career in two distinct seperate periods. Up until 1805 he was tactically and strategically a genius as demonstrated by his brilliant campaigns in Italy and Austria for example. After that date his record takes something of a nosedive tactically. From crossing a river in the face of the enemy army without reconaissance (Aspern Essling), to the bloody frontal assaults at Borodino, Waterloo and Wagram it is clear to me that Napoleon had "lost his touch" so to speak on the field of battle. Strategically in that period I still hold him in regard, after all the opening of the Waterloo campaign for example was brilliant. I'm afraid though that with exceptions like 1814 and possibly 1806 (Where Davout stole the show
) were he performed well again on the field, the last 9 years of campaigning were a long series of costly victories or bloody defeats.Crucially Napoleon had a series of inbuilt personality flaws that cost him as much as his military decisions. As a political animal who owed his power to victories and the army, he suffered from being something of a control-freak and being unable to trust many around him. This manifested itself in his habit of trying to control campaigns from afar (notably Spain) and as I mentioned his tendency not to forgive easily those who slighted him like Murat. There was also a sense that he fostered competition amongst the marshals for his favour which leant much to their inability to assist eachother. Petty rivalries between marshals cost the French more than one battle.
Don't have time for more right now sorry.
P.H., I think some of it is because of his opponents--the performance of the Austrian army at Wagram ( 1809 ) and in the Italians campagians ( 1800 ) is miles apart. After having their butts whoopped a half dozen times his enemies began to copy the french.
privatehudson
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Exactly. It's also easy to argue that had Charles rather than Mack been in command at Ulm, the Austerlitz campaign would have been a damn site harder because Charles wouldn't have sat still whilst Napoleon ran rings round him then surrendered without a fight. As you say the Austrian army had also improved, Charles had reformed it and their was a certain degree of nationalism sweeping Austria in 1809 which made the war more popular. At the same time Charles made a number of errors in the campaign also, for example he was very cautious at Aspern-Essling when his entire army where handed the chance to destroy at least 2 French corps but failed to do so.
To a degree generals must be judged on the quality of their opponents, and when faced with good commanders and reformed armies later in his career Napoleon's sucess rate dropped sharply. By the same token when judging Wellington we should do so on his level of sucess against competent marshals like Massena, Soult, Marmont and to a degree Ney and not against Jourdan.
To a degree generals must be judged on the quality of their opponents, and when faced with good commanders and reformed armies later in his career Napoleon's sucess rate dropped sharply. By the same token when judging Wellington we should do so on his level of sucess against competent marshals like Massena, Soult, Marmont and to a degree Ney and not against Jourdan.
Akka
Moody old mage.
Sadly. He was probably the closest friend of Napoléon (he was, after all, tutoying the emperor), had his complete trust, and was one of the few able to bend his opinion, which would have perhaps spared many mistakes later.pawpaw said:
privatehudson
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pawpaw said:
He certainly was, but Charles didn't use all his available forces, nor co-ordinate his attacks very well, so he made Lannes' job a little easier.
Thank you for your reply Hudson.
I don't think he is overrated so much. Sure, he was not so good in the end, but he personally led his troops into battle 60 times! Im sure Wellington would have made tons of mistakes, had he fought some 60 plus battles.
I don't think he is overrated so much. Sure, he was not so good in the end, but he personally led his troops into battle 60 times! Im sure Wellington would have made tons of mistakes, had he fought some 60 plus battles.
privatehudson
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I'm pretty sure he fought in at least 1/2 that many battles if you count small engagements also, and he didn't loose any of them. He did though make mistakes, especially early in his career, and during 1815, but he made up for them and made sure they didn't happen again.
Napoleon didn't just make understandable mistakes though, he made what even he himself earlier in his career would have considered unforgiveable ones. He once said something like "I can forgive a general who looses battles, but not one that looses time". His dawdling for no reason after Ligny cost him the 1815 campaign. Much more than simple mistakes, the battles in his latter career seem to form a pattern, and he wasn't learning from the mistakes but repeating them. His opponents got better and he did not have an answer in battle for this.
It has been argued that Napoleon's poor showing at Waterloo was partially due to his hemorrhoids, which made it extremely painful to sit on a horse. Therefore, during the battle, Napoleon stayed in one place and was unable to properly observe and supervise his army.
Sickman
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I applaud to this thread.
This is the real good stuff the juicy one I mean.
I could also join the party if it wouldn't be so many years since I read about Napoleonic wars. Even though reading pawpaws message about marshalls brought back some information from the hidden caches of my brain but I don't really want to make fool about myself.
I remember once I argued about Davout and Lannes with friends and I have now and then absolutely just horrondous name-memory so I mixed these two gentleman together and made complete @ss out of myself.
Privatehudson seems to be in right track what comes to Napoleon. I could quote other well known military commander and revisit his words:
"One who tries to (control) everything, (controls) nothing"
I think that Napoleon's natural talents in overall were out of this world and simply like grandmaster chess player he thought that everything could be controlled from the first move to a checkmate. But war isn't like that and you have to learn from it. Natural talent isn't enough, you need also discipline (and Napoleon surely did have both) but you need also learn that there are moments when discipline and control becomes a vice instead of being a virtue which it usually is for military commander.
Another good quote which would fit Napoleon regarding how he handled his staff would be:
"If you keep your dogs in short leech, they cannot hunt"
In overall I would say Napoleon was almost exact mirror in certain ways compared example to Robert E. Lee. Napoleon gave too little room to work while Lee gave too much. This meant that while Napoleon had numerous talented commanders to give orders they never had "real" chance to prove their talents and Lee gave too much freedom especially after he had lost his most experienced officers which gave too much freedom to the inexperienced.
Strategically Napoleon had goals that were far-fetched while Lee seemed to have none.
It's always about balance how much you as commander of your army give room to invidual officers to make their own choices.
This can be also seen as one of major concepts of Eastern Front in WW2.
What comes in overall rating of different army commanders I would say it's very hard close to impossible to compare them because they always have different troops under their command, different types of scenarios they must handle, different types of goals they must reach, different types of challenges of circumstances to meet...which leads to butterfly effect that one small mistake/accomplishment can turn the tables in a way or another for the whole battle or for whole campaign or even for the whole war.
Well, this was just a message full of gibberish theory in order to make myself feel little better and think that I once probably knew something about military history and strategic thinking in warfare.
Looking back I'm not so sure anymore.
This is the real good stuff the juicy one I mean.
I could also join the party if it wouldn't be so many years since I read about Napoleonic wars. Even though reading pawpaws message about marshalls brought back some information from the hidden caches of my brain but I don't really want to make fool about myself.
I remember once I argued about Davout and Lannes with friends and I have now and then absolutely just horrondous name-memory so I mixed these two gentleman together and made complete @ss out of myself.
Privatehudson seems to be in right track what comes to Napoleon. I could quote other well known military commander and revisit his words:
"One who tries to (control) everything, (controls) nothing"
I think that Napoleon's natural talents in overall were out of this world and simply like grandmaster chess player he thought that everything could be controlled from the first move to a checkmate. But war isn't like that and you have to learn from it. Natural talent isn't enough, you need also discipline (and Napoleon surely did have both) but you need also learn that there are moments when discipline and control becomes a vice instead of being a virtue which it usually is for military commander.
Another good quote which would fit Napoleon regarding how he handled his staff would be:
"If you keep your dogs in short leech, they cannot hunt"
In overall I would say Napoleon was almost exact mirror in certain ways compared example to Robert E. Lee. Napoleon gave too little room to work while Lee gave too much. This meant that while Napoleon had numerous talented commanders to give orders they never had "real" chance to prove their talents and Lee gave too much freedom especially after he had lost his most experienced officers which gave too much freedom to the inexperienced.
Strategically Napoleon had goals that were far-fetched while Lee seemed to have none.
It's always about balance how much you as commander of your army give room to invidual officers to make their own choices.
This can be also seen as one of major concepts of Eastern Front in WW2.
What comes in overall rating of different army commanders I would say it's very hard close to impossible to compare them because they always have different troops under their command, different types of scenarios they must handle, different types of goals they must reach, different types of challenges of circumstances to meet...which leads to butterfly effect that one small mistake/accomplishment can turn the tables in a way or another for the whole battle or for whole campaign or even for the whole war.
Well, this was just a message full of gibberish theory in order to make myself feel little better and think that I once probably knew something about military history and strategic thinking in warfare.
Looking back I'm not so sure anymore.
privatehudson
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Yes I've seen the list of excuses before
Sickman makes a good point which I was touching on earlier when I talked about Napoleon attempting to control Spain from afar. It also links to the above in that Napoleon could have handed control of the battle to a competent Marshal like Davout or Suchet had he brought them with him. Instead he was left with Ney partly in charge of the battle, though he refused to allow him total control over all the decisions. Ney wasn't the best choice for that role, and was also hampered by not being given the freedom to run the battle that any commander needs.
I think he was just burned out. If you look at he early Napoleon, his energy is amazing. He is everywhere, from the staff meeting to the lowest private etc. That's why he could control everything him self in the beginning, he had the energy to to so.
Later, he was old and tired, but tried to do as he always did. And failed. Kinda sad really... Like when an old man tries to do a sport he was good at when he was young, but ends up in the Hospital.
Later, he was old and tired, but tried to do as he always did. And failed. Kinda sad really... Like when an old man tries to do a sport he was good at when he was young, but ends up in the Hospital.
you may or may not know this but here is an earlier story of one Emmanuel Grouchy.
in 1796 an irish man named Wolfe Tone managed (after a hell of alot of cajoling) to convince the then french directory that an invasion of the island of ireland was a worthwhile venture. It should be noted it was planned after one Bonaparte's success in Italy and he apparently had first refusal on leading an armada mainly from the port of Brest numbering around the 40,000 landing forces with the target of Bantry Bay in the south, an inlet of county Kerry, should the winds not be favourable a landing on either the galway coast or indeed further north around sligo was proposed as plans b and c. The express intention was that of injuring Brittish pride by challenging and ousting it from Ireland something that had been argued by the United Irishman (a forerunner of the IRB, the grandfather of the IRA) as eminently possible. Tone and his main rival Napper Tandy (who hated each other as both wanted their own names immortalised as the liberators and had different views on how to achieve it) over played the "nation is ripe for revolt" card. [I[/I]
in 1796 an irish man named Wolfe Tone managed (after a hell of alot of cajoling) to convince the then french directory that an invasion of the island of ireland was a worthwhile venture. It should be noted it was planned after one Bonaparte's success in Italy and he apparently had first refusal on leading an armada mainly from the port of Brest numbering around the 40,000 landing forces with the target of Bantry Bay in the south, an inlet of county Kerry, should the winds not be favourable a landing on either the galway coast or indeed further north around sligo was proposed as plans b and c. The express intention was that of injuring Brittish pride by challenging and ousting it from Ireland something that had been argued by the United Irishman (a forerunner of the IRB, the grandfather of the IRA) as eminently possible. Tone and his main rival Napper Tandy (who hated each other as both wanted their own names immortalised as the liberators and had different views on how to achieve it) over played the "nation is ripe for revolt" card. [I[/I]
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