Smullyan's Paradox

[Souron]

Under the eyes of the law, only the successful person is guilty of murder, while the other is guilty of attempted homicide. This is ultimately due to the limitations of the law -- it can't be proven beyond the shadow of doubt that person A had as much intention as person B to kill person C, and would have been successful had person B not intervened.

But ethically, there is no such limitation. If we know that both actors were attempting murder, then their crime is the same. And since the law is intended be ethical, in the narrow circumstance presented, the law should treat both A and B the same.

Whether A would have been successful is immaterial; attempted murder is attempted murder, even if you're bad at at. The standard of proof needed is always beyond reasonable doubt, but as stated, the facts of case are not in contention.

What could be material is if B denied A the chance to recant. If A had noticed the hole in C's canteen, then he knew his murder attempt would fail, and telling C his canteen is poisoned is unnecessary. Whereas if A had not noticed the hole, or there was no hole, he could have at any point try to run up to C and tell him his canteen is poisoned and offered his own.

 

[GhostWriter16]

But ethically, there is no such limitation. If we know that both actors were attempting murder, then their crime is the same. And since the law is intended be ethical, in the narrow circumstance presented, the law should treat both A and B the same.

No it isn't. I feel that this is a critical error.

It is not ethical to drive by the homeless person on the road who is begging for money without giving him something, particularly if you are not suffering from poverty yourself, but it is perfectly legal.

It is ethical to give money to starving children in Africa, but to do so is not a crime.

Its unethical to use so much tobacco that you end up dying young from lung cancer, leaving your young children without a parent, but to do so is not a crime (I'd argue that it's unethical to use it at all but I'm using the most extreme case that everyone would agree on.)

Attempted murder, unlike these things, should still be a crime. Attempted aggression is still wrong. But its worse if you actually succeed. If you fail, the person isn't dead.

 

[timtofly]

If neither A nor B gave C any water, they both are still liable for negligent homicide.

 

[Borachio]

But C was negligent in going into the desert with two very untrustworthy companions, too.

And who's to say C's nature wasn't deplorable?

How would you feel if C was Osama bin Laden? It doesn't change matters for me. But I have a feeling I'm in a minority.

 

[Souron]

No it isn't. I feel that this is a critical error.

It is not ethical to drive by the homeless person on the road who is begging for money without giving him something, particularly if you are not suffering from poverty yourself, but it is perfectly legal.

It is ethical to give money to starving children in Africa, but to do so is not a crime.

Its unethical to use so much tobacco that you end up dying young from lung cancer, leaving your young children without a parent, but to do so is not a crime (I'd argue that it's unethical to use it at all but I'm using the most extreme case that everyone would agree on.)

Attempted murder, unlike these things, should still be a crime. Attempted aggression is still wrong. But its worse if you actually succeed. If you fail, the person isn't dead.

I agree that there are two standards of ethics: what you should do, and what you should be expected to do. Criminal law applies the second standard, but it is not the only thing to do so. So I stand by the claim that criminal law should follow ethics, though it is a lower standard of ethics than I might apply in giving people awards, for example.

As for the difference between attempted aggression, and successful aggression, I don't think that it's less of a crime when you fail. It is easier to pay someone back for an act if you don't actually do any damage, of course, but the motivations and circumstances that bring about the crime are the same, and the penalty must act in the same way to prevent future crimes.

 

[Souron]

If neither A nor B gave C any water, they both are still liable for negligent homicide.

I imagine all three left the oasis in different directions, so A and B were not around to stop C from dying. This should really be spelled out in the premise.

 

[GhostWriter16]

I agree that there are two standards of ethics: what you should do, and what you should be expected to do. Criminal law applies the second standard, but it is not the only thing to do so. So I stand by the claim that criminal law should follow ethics, though it is a lower standard of ethics than I might apply in giving people awards, for example.

To me its more than just "A lower standard" its a matter of whether aggression was done or not. If I steal a dollar from you, yes that's a minor crime, and maybe able to be justified if I were starving, but its still a crime and deserves a (Albeit minor) punishment.

Alternatively, if you are starving and you ask me for a dollar to buy food and I refuse, I'm acting VERY unethically, certainly moreso than stealing a dollar to feed my family, but its still rightfully not a crime to refuse.

Crime has very little to do with ethics for me, it should be based on the first use of force.

As for the difference between attempted aggression, and successful aggression, I don't think that it's less of a crime when you fail. It is easier to pay someone back for an act if you don't actually do any damage, of course, but the motivations and circumstances that bring about the crime are the same, and the penalty must act in the same way to prevent future crimes.

I agree that attempting to do something else is a pretty serious aggravating factor, but still not quite equivalent to actually doing it. Frankly, I'd rather someone swing an axe at my head and miss than to swing an axe at my head and hit me. That I fell off a cliff and died later is missing the point.

 

[Souron]

To me its more than just "A lower standard" its a matter of whether aggression was done or not. If I steal a dollar from you, yes that's a minor crime, and maybe able to be justified if I were starving, but its still a crime and deserves a (Albeit minor) punishment.

Alternatively, if you are starving and you ask me for a dollar to buy food and I refuse, I'm acting VERY unethically, certainly moreso than stealing a dollar to feed my family, but its still rightfully not a crime to refuse.

Crime has very little to do with ethics for me, it should be based on the first use of force.

I disagree that aggression is what distinguishes crime. Violent crime should be treated specially, because it has different causes, not because it is worse than other wrong doing. Attempting to harm someone is just as bad regardless of the involvement of physical violence.

I think in the particular example is a conflict between two things the state should ensure. The state should ensure that nobody starves, and that people are secure in their possessions. So I don't think it's generally right for a state to punish starving people for stealing food.

In my view criminal law is society's method of enforcing it's agreed upon system of ethics on itself.

I agree that attempting to do something else is a pretty serious aggravating factor, but still not quite equivalent to actually doing it. Frankly, I'd rather someone swing an axe at my head and miss than to swing an axe at my head and hit me. That I fell off a cliff and died later is missing the point.

I'd say it's equivalent for the purposes of guilt. For the purposes of punishment, it should mitigate retributive and restorative punishment, but not punishment when the goal is deterrence, rehabilitation, or societal protection.

 

[GhostWriter16]

I disagree that aggression is what distinguishes crime. Violent crime should be treated specially, because it has different causes, not because it is worse than other wrong doing. Attempting to harm someone is just as bad regardless of the involvement of physical violence.

I didn't say violence, I said aggression. Maybe I wasn't clear, but aggression is broader than violence. Aggression means any use of force against another person or their property without permission. So if I steal your wallet, maybe that isn't "Violent" but it is aggressive.

I think in the particular example is a conflict between two things the state should ensure. The state should ensure that nobody starves, and that people are secure in their possessions. So I don't think it's generally right for a state to punish starving people for stealing food.

While I'd agree with you that society should ensure that nobody starves, it should not use a coercive method (Forceful redistribution of property) to acheive a morally upright end (The lack of starvation.) Instead, voluntary charities, food banks, churches, exc. should help ensure that nobody starves. If this doesn't happen in absence of a state providing welfare, than almost everyone is a massive hypocrite.

In my view criminal law is society's method of enforcing it's agreed upon system of ethics on itself.

This isn't an acceptable reasoning for legislation. I believe it is ethically wrong to engage in homosexual sex, prostitution, drugs, or drunkenness, but I don't think any of those things should be forcefully punished by the state. Luckily, society has enough respect for individual rights not to force ALL of its morality on other people, but democracy is fundamentally two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Its not really an acceptable way of doing anything. I tend to agree that it is the least of possible evils (As I've stated, with as many checks and balances as possible) but I would try to persuade everyone that they should oppose coercion even if they believe that certain activities are unethical and would like to use force against the practioneers.

I'd say it's equivalent for the purposes of guilt.

Ethically, but not legally.

For the purposes of punishment, it should mitigate retributive and restorative punishment, but not punishment when the goal is deterrence, rehabilitation, or societal protection.

I really only consider two of those goals to be inherently justifiable, protecting society (Only in extreme cases) and restitution to the victim (Always.) Rehabilition is an incorrect reason to punish crime, and deterrence is not a per say valid reasoning, although it could naturally occur (If we just imposed a draconian kill anyone who commits any crime, it would deter a heck of a lot more crime than it does now, but its still immoral.) Rehabilition, on the other hand, is for the criminal's benefit and so is his own responsibility to pursue if he needs it. Criminal punishment should be to restitute the victim, and, in the case of serious violent crimes (This time I actually meant "Violent"), to protect the public.

 

[Gori the Grey]

Guys, I think it's intended as a logical paradox, not a case in legal/ethical reasoning.

 

[Souron]

I didn't say violence, I said aggression. Maybe I wasn't clear, but aggression is broader than violence. Aggression means any use of force against another person or their property without permission. So if I steal your wallet, maybe that isn't "Violent" but it is aggressive.

This would suggest negligence is never a crime. I disagree. Sometimes people are held to positions of responsibility in society. When people intentionally forgo those responsibilities, that can be criminal. But I don't want to sidetrack into categorizing crime. But I do stand by my claims on the relation between crime and a ethics.

Now one thing that crimes should share is that they have a victim.

While I'd agree with you that society should ensure that nobody starves, it should not use a coercive method (Forceful redistribution of property) to acheive a morally upright end (The lack of starvation.) Instead, voluntary charities, food banks, churches, exc. should help ensure that nobody starves. If this doesn't happen in absence of a state providing welfare, than almost everyone is a massive hypocrite.

Firstly, I did not say the state must provide for the public welfare directly, merely that it's not right to punish starving people for doing what they can to get food.

Secondly, I completely disagree with the system you describe. Voluntary charities are not the best mechanisms for ensuring nobody starves or other need are provided, though as long as they get tax breaks and subsidies, it's still state action that ensures and encourages their effect. But properly, if society collectively thinks nobody should starve, then it should have a stable and universal system for doing so, instead of the piecemeal support that having large numbers of disconnected charities can do. It should be everywhere where people could otherwise starve, though perhaps the details of how could vary. However this is tangential.

This isn't an acceptable reasoning for legislation. I believe it is ethically wrong to engage in homosexual sex, prostitution, drugs, or drunkenness, but I don't think any of those things should be forcefully punished by the state. Luckily, society has enough respect for individual rights not to force ALL of its morality on other people, but democracy is fundamentally two wolves and a sheep voting on what to have for dinner. Its not really an acceptable way of doing anything. I tend to agree that it is the least of possible evils (As I've stated, with as many checks and balances as possible) but I would try to persuade everyone that they should oppose coercion even if they believe that certain activities are unethical and would like to use force against the practioneers.

I believe in minority rights too, but for a different reason: It's a protection against the fallibility of society to make ethical laws. This includes doubt in my own understanding of ethics; I might be wrong about what's right and wrong. Ideally, all laws would have consensus among the populous. But that's impractical. So instead for most things only a majority is needed, but individuals get special protection.

I really only consider two of those goals to be inherently justifiable, protecting society (Only in extreme cases) and restitution to the victim (Always.) Rehabilition is an incorrect reason to punish crime, and deterrence is not a per say valid reasoning, although it could naturally occur (If we just imposed a draconian kill anyone who commits any crime, it would deter a heck of a lot more crime than it does now, but its still immoral.) Rehabilition, on the other hand, is for the criminal's benefit and so is his own responsibility to pursue if he needs it. Criminal punishment should be to restitute the victim, and, in the case of serious violent crimes (This time I actually meant "Violent"), to protect the public.

For completeness I should mention that it is also possible, for a punishment to be a public denunciation of a crime by society.

If punishment is for restitution and protecting society only, then it would be wrong to issue jail sentences than aren't for life. Except for the deterrent and rehabilitation effect of prison (if any), A criminal who is released from jail is not less likely to commit a crime when released if he is released right away or after a few years. If he didn't like prison, and therefore is compelled not to break the law again, that's deterrence.

Also, rehabilitation is not just for the criminal. It's for society to have less criminals. In many ways that's more important to make the streets safer by rehabilitating criminals and thereby preventing many future victims, than to provide restoration for the single crime committed. When we don't kill criminals or lock them up for life, rehabilitation can be the top ethical priority.

 

[Neomega]

A and B survived.

1) Either they did not share water, or 2) they were more hardy to the effects of the desert.

If

1) A is guilty of attempted murder for poisoning the water, and B is possibly guilty of a lesser crime for not sharing water.

if
2) A is guilty of attempted murder, and B is innocent, as he tried to save the life of C.

 

[GhostWriter16]

This would suggest negligence is never a crime. I disagree. Sometimes people are held to positions of responsibility in society. When people intentionally forgo those responsibilities, that can be criminal. But I don't want to sidetrack into categorizing crime. But I do stand by my claims on the relation between crime and a ethics.

I only believe negligence should be a crime if there is a contract (Which can be implicit) requiring action. As I said, this can be implicit. If you are a parent who hasn't given up his child for adoption, this is an implicit acceptance of the duty to feed, clothe, and shelter that child, even if you didn't physically sign a contract. You are not, however, guilty of (At least not legal, the moral question is much more difficult and probably damns us all) negligence if a child starves in Africa, because you have no (Again, I'm restricting this to legal, not moral) responsibility for that child.

Yes, this even applies to the "Able to throw a lifeboat and don't" situation, unless you have a contractual obligation to do so (Such as being employed as a lifeguard, or some other similar situation) you shouldn't be able to legally prosecute someone for not throwing the lifeboat. I admit that this really sucks, and I don't really like it either, but a legal system has to be consistent.

That said, an ethical system does not necessarily need to be consistent like a legal system does, and in the kind of free society I would like to see, you don't have to associate with people that you don't want to. While sometimes this usage of freedom of association will be ethically wrong, and likely killed by the market (Such as a storeowner who doesn't sell to black people, gay people, exc.) I would consider a refusal to associate with the guy who refuses to throw the life preserver an ethical GOOD. And some people likely won't associate with such a despicable person.

I wouldn't.

So there is likely a pretty harsh backlash against the guy who refuses to provide this very minimal kind of aid, even if he doesn't go to jail for it. It would also be completely legal to print such a person's name in the newspapers and advise people not to associate with him/sell him anything/whatever.

Now one thing that crimes should share is that they have a victim.

I've been definitely dabbling in theory here, trying to refine my consistency, exc. but when it comes to the real world, this is 95% of my problem with the legal status quo. That is, if "Victim" is correctly defined. I've seen people oppose the principle of victimless crime, and then go by a line of reasoning that makes something that definitely does not have a victim actually having a victim.

One poster (I'm attacking an idea here, not the poster, which is why I'm not naming him) even compared a refusal to give someone service on religious grounds to be comparable to swinging your fist and hitting someone in the face... Sorry but no.

One could also argue that drugs have "Negative social affects" but there's still no (Intrinsic) victim, so it shouldn't be a crime.

Firstly, I did not say the state must provide for the public welfare directly, merely that it's not right to punish starving people for doing what they can to get food.

I wouldn't volunteer to be on that jury (To prosecute such a person) and I think you are basically a jerk if you are anywhere near well to do and won't give a starving person that's right in front of you a bit of food. This probably goes back to my whole freedom to associate comments I made above. Still, the starving person did steal, and if someone wants to press charges for that, they have a (Legal, not moral) right to do so.

Secondly, I completely disagree with the system you describe. Voluntary charities are not the best mechanisms for ensuring nobody starves or other need are provided, though as long as they get tax breaks and subsidies, it's still state action that ensures and encourages their effect. But properly, if society collectively thinks nobody should starve, then it should have a stable and universal system for doing so, instead of the piecemeal support that having large numbers of disconnected charities can do. It should be everywhere where people could otherwise starve, though perhaps the details of how could vary. However this is tangential.

I actually think I lied. I said that nobody should starve. I lied. If someone is completely unwilling, even though able, to work, I have no ethical problem with allowing them to starve. That category is pretty narrow, and "Person who wants to work, but is disabled or can't find a job" is probably broader. In most cases I have little desire to help people who won't take jobs that are "Beneath them." There are still a lot of people, of course, that do not fit this category.

Ignoring those cases (Which government can probably deal with as well as charity can, if perhaps less efficiently) my issue is the forcible redistribution of wealth that government welfare provides. I know I've stated this a thousand times, and unlike a lot of these other issues, I've defended this position on welfare about a thousand times against the rest of this forum. Everyone knows what my position is, and why. I'd prefer to drop this particular point, since I've discussed it particularly often and I don't want to bore everyone again.

I believe in minority rights too, but for a different reason: It's a protection against the fallibility of society to make ethical laws. This includes doubt in my own understanding of ethics; I might be wrong about what's right and wrong. Ideally, all laws would have consensus among the populous. But that's impractical. So instead for most things only a majority is needed, but individuals get special protection.

Religious faith makes me a bit more confident of my ethics, although this doesn't really help me when trying to translate ethics to politics, such as with the NAP and defining terms like "Victim", so I have a similar skepticism of my own logic. That said, even if my ethical system could be demonstrated beyond an absolute doubt, I still believe it would be immoral to impose it at the point of a gun. Morality through immoral means is still immoral. Also known as "Part truth and part lie is all lie" or "A little bit of yeast spreads to the whole loaf" or whatever other analogy you find appropriate.

For completeness I should mention that it is also possible, for a punishment to be a public denunciation of a crime by society.

I did mention this before. I find it unlikely that ALL of the public would agree even that murder is wrong, let alone lesser evils like we're discussing in this thread. That said, the MAJORITY of people would find certain forms of "Criminal" neglect, such as refusing to throw a lifeboat, reprehensible. As far as I'm concerned, they have every right to "Discriminate" against such a person and refuse to associate or do business with him. (I also think you have a right to discriminate for less noble reasons, but I also think the market would be more likely to naturally weed these out in the long run.)

If punishment is for restitution and protecting society only, then it would be wrong to issue jail sentences than aren't for life. Except for the deterrent and rehabilitation effect of prison (if any), A criminal who is released from jail is not less likely to commit a crime when released if he is released right away or after a few years. If he didn't like prison, and therefore is compelled not to break the law again, that's deterrence.

I don't usually like prison as a punishment for anything, although I do make exceptions for a few things in the name of public safety. Even still, during your stay you should be made to do labor (I'm not talking about brutality or torture, but you should have to work) to pay back your victim for the wrong you did to him.

Also, rehabilitation is not just for the criminal. It's for society to have less criminals. In many ways that's more important to make the streets safer by rehabilitating criminals and thereby preventing many future victims, than to provide restoration for the single crime committed. When we don't kill criminals or lock them up for life, rehabilitation can be the top ethical priority.

I think compensating the victim for harm done is much, much more immediately important.

 

[timtofly]

I imagine all three left the oasis in different directions, so A and B were not around to stop C from dying. This should really be spelled out in the premise.

If they all were going in different directions, there is no paradox. There was no reason to conspire in the first place. For all the imagining, why would you conspire at all if there was no common goal, which is the splitting up of the group any ways?

If C died and the other two survived, the conspiracy was to get rid of C, even if negligence just happened to be the final resulting factor.

 

[Souron]

@GhostWriter16
I made my reply in a separate thread cause this discussion is a bit of a derail here.

http://forums.civfanatics.com/showthread.php?p=12156726

 

[Souron]

If they all were going in different directions, there is no paradox. There was no reason to conspire in the first place. For all the imagining, why would you conspire at all if there was no common goal, which is the splitting up of the group any ways?

If C died and the other two survived, the conspiracy was to get rid of C, even if negligence just happened to be the final resulting factor.

Maybe they conspired because C is Osama bin Laden.

It's possible that A and B attempted murder to take C's stuff or something, but generally there would motive for killing a comrade in the desert. So the motive isn't necessarily tied to that, and so could be just as applicable if they went in separate direction as if they went of together.

 

[Leoreth]

Guys, I think it's intended as a logical paradox, not a case in legal/ethical reasoning.

So where is the logical contradiction then?

I only believe negligence should be a crime if there is a contract (Which can be implicit) requiring action. As I said, this can be implicit. If you are a parent who hasn't given up his child for adoption, this is an implicit acceptance of the duty to feed, clothe, and shelter that child, even if you didn't physically sign a contract. You are not, however, guilty of (At least not legal, the moral question is much more difficult and probably damns us all) negligence if a child starves in Africa, because you have no (Again, I'm restricting this to legal, not moral) responsibility for that child.

The problem with that is that it's completely arbitrary to decide where an implicit contract exists and where it doesn't. You simply state that the obligation of parents to care for their children is such an explicit contract, I suppose because you obviously don't want to accept the situation that parents are not obliged to care for their children and want to avoid relying on the negligence concept.

But there are really no criteria to identify where else such an implicit contract exists. Does living in a society with other people entail the implicit contract to help them when they have an accident or a disease? You've spent many posts on this board trying to argue against the liberal concept of a social contract which is essentially the same kind of implicit contract you're putting forth here.

How can you decide that an implicit contract of a parent to care for their children exists, but the broader social contract doesn't? It boils down to what you personally consider to be true or desirable, but that's hardly a useful basis for a consistent moral system.

Not to mention that the whole idea of implicit contracts seems to run counter to how libertarianism understands the idea of a contract and what it means in society, i.e. that a society based entirely only on voluntary contracts is more free because people can choose whether they enter a contract or not. Implicit contracts completely ruin this idea, which is why libertarians naturally disagree with other implicit contracts such as the social contract or environmental contracts etc.

 

[Gori the Grey]

So where is the logical contradiction then?

Although there is a dead man, both of his killers can legitimately claim to be innocent of having caused his death. How could such a thing be?

I'm not sure what answer this Sullyan fellow wanted. Perhaps the point of the brain teaser is to get you to think that something you'd just taken as an inert dimension of the hypothetical--setting in a desert--is actually a third "murderer," so it's a think-outside-the-box puzzle. Or maybe he just wanted you to marvel at his cleverness in concocting a situation in which two murderers are both innocent of killing their victim.

I don't know the symbols for formal logic, but the puzzle reduces to: if x can only be true by either n or m being true, and x is true but neither n or m is true, how can that be? If that's the right way to frame it up, then maybe the answer here is to observe that the situation changes in the course of its development so that one of the original actions, while superficially the same action, has actually changed in its impact. Initially C can die by being poisoned or by dying of thirst from having his canteen drained. But once A has poisoned C's canteen, B's draining it is no longer really the same action that it would have been back in the initial state; he now faces two deaths, poisoning or thirst, and B's saving him from one consigns him to the other.

 

[Borachio]

Is the order of the events important?

What would be the effect if B had drained C's canteen first, without A's knowledge? And then A had poisoned the, unknown to him, empty canteen?

 

[Gori the Grey]

Is the order of the events important?

I think that discerning that the order of events makes one of the events a different event than it would be in a purely abstract, non-sequential circumstance is the logic challenge that the brain teaser poses.