WWTVICTOR said:
Singhasari should be a main rival of Majapahit as the latter established in 1292.
Ehhhhhhhhhhh that's wrong. The two weren't contemporaneous. Singhasari came to an effective end in early-1292, when Kertangara was killed. Jayakatwang, Kertangara's killer, didn't crown himself Raja of Singhasari however but used his own claims to the defunct throne of Kediri as a basis for his new regime. The title of Raja of Singhasari as a consequence fell into abeyance. Kertarajasa/Raden Wijaya a son-in-law of Kertangara however survived the coup and managed through to good offices of Arya Wiraraja to win the favour of the hegemon Jayakatwang. This favour took the form of forgiveness and a grant of land, the kraton/settlement which he founded on it was called Majapahit. This was late in 1292. Unfortunately for Jayakatwang, his attempts to hold onto his pre-eminent position foundered on the Mongol intervention of 1293 which Kertarajase harnessed for his own purposes; using the Mongols to defeat his erstwhile master, before turning on his Mongol allies. Having defeated his domestic and foreign foes, Kertarajasa founded the Kingdom of Majapahit in 1293. Though the change in name was
really just that; following Javanese tradition Kertarajasa abandoned a name he seems to have thought ill-fated and in doing so established his right to rule independent of his affiliation with his father-in-law, even if he was keen to play the the legitimate succession card when it suited him. Continuity aside, Singhasari ceased to be in 1292 while Majapahit was founded in 1293.
WWTVICTOR said:
Don't forget Srivijava as she was very important in the layout of the Southeast Asia in the 13th century, she still ruled Sumatra, Malay peninsula, and Sunda.
No, it wasn't and it never 'ruled' those territories. But I'll deal with the 1200s issue first. The best evidence we have of Malayu-Jambi's relative weakness is the slew of vassals who slipped the leash. This included ports like Kampe which slipped the leash in the 1220s. Kedah also seems to have followed in that direction sending ships to India, even if we don't know it's precise status - it could have been a vassal but even if it was it seems more nominal that actual at this point. Furthermore, in the 1200s we get an upsurge in references to pirates at the eastern end of the straits, an unambiguous demonstration of just how weak Malayu had become. It would seem that Malayu had lost control of its own home-waters and had probably lost control of some significant proportion of the Orang Laut. This slipping of central authority was almost certainly mirrored in the rise of ports like Pasai, Barus and Lamuri/Aceh as entrepôt polities in their own right. The most obvious result of this weakness in the Malay Negara was Singhasari's conquest of Malayu in 1288...
The second claim about the extent of Srivijayan rule also needs to be examined critically. What is almost certain is that even at its height under Srivijaya never ruled Sumatra, the Malay Peninsula or Sunda. The best claim to Javanese rule that Srivijaya seems to have been able to advance was a claim to ruling Central Java under a Saliendra claimant to both thrones. It isn't even clear what the precise relationship was between the two thrones or what this relationship meant in tangible terms; what evidence we have is to fragmentary to provide a clear answer.
As to Sumatra, Srivijaya at best exercised a loose mutually beneficial hegemony between over the port polities of Sumatra. From what we know this 'rule' was exercised through marriages, the gifting of titles, the mutual exchange of gifts, a sophisticated court culture and some rather strange religious practices - most notably the placing of sacred rocks with curses written over them. The further one got away from the core in Palembang, the weaker the influence - sacral power - of the ruler got. Thus Barus, on the other side of the island, effectively the furtherest point from Palembang could get away with offering minimal or no tribute. While Jambi just up the coast couldn't.
In terms of influence outside the ports, there's a strong body of evidence that Srivijaya used much the same tricks to keep the hinterland trading with it. We know that this influence was sufficient to give it some degree of pre-eminence in the inland gold trade even if the distances were likely longer. This obviously didn't extend into the whole of Sumatra or into the Malay Peninsula at all. What we do know of the Malay Peninsula, seems to suggest that the polities there slipped the noose on a regular basis. This gives Srivijayan rule something of a Siamese hue, down to the annual punitive military actions.
