You're talking as though the IR - a concept that in itself is getting a lot of criticism in terms of historiography in the last few decades - was a fundamental change that somebody, somewhere "got" and from there it spread to other people in other countries. That's...not really the way it worked, though. The old understanding of the IR as something that involved a dramatic "takeoff" is deeply flawed in terms of its lack of relation to the actual data. Take the (United) Kingdom of Great Britain (and Ireland), which so inconveniently underwent a name change in this period. The usual story is that the IR "started" with the Brits in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and was characterized by rapid increases in growth rates, frequently shown in terms of estimated GDP, but back in the eighties cliometric economic historians started revising many of those estimates downward and talking in terms of a more long-term sustained increase in standards of living. That does not mean that the IR was not a "revolution", or that every IR trope from before the 1980s is wrong - the fact that living standards were increasing despite population growth is a dramatic break with the implications of Malthus, for instance.
It's also highly debatable as to what extent the earlier periods of the IR - you know, the ones in which the Brits figure the most prominently - were even a case of wildfire technological growth. Even in the context of the revisionist argument, it's clear that British industrial metrics (not the economy as a whole) experienced an uptick beginning in the 1810s and 1820s - profitability went up, employment as a percentage of the workforce went up, and so forth. Are these plausibly explained by things like the Enlightenment or by specific technologies that already existed and were beginning to see use in the eighteenth century, like varieties of water and steam power, or by contingent factors like the end of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, a major decline in transport costs attendant in large part on the power and ubiquity of the Royal Navy, and the political-military collapse of protection in markets in South America and China? This is a problem, after all - the growth numbers don't match the dates for the introduction of certain technologies, or the "decline" of the aristocracy (didn't happen in the UK until the early 20th century, in Germany until the aftermath of the First World War, in Russia until 1917...), or the introduction of banking, or even all of those pieces coming together.
Side note: the view of landowning aristocracy being a barrier to "modernization" due to its supposed control of the means of production and attendant political-military power is a frustrating one. :3
