On Wittgenstein's account, language provides a way of coping with, what one might call, "everyday purposes," and it works well within that context. But when everyday language attempts to explain something beyond what it is able, problems arise. At root, this is what is known as the say/show distinction: that which can be said can also be shown, but there is that which can only be shown, not said. In other words, that which can only be shown "we must pass over in silence." To illustrate this point, consider the difference between sense and nonsense. If someone says, for instance, "There is a difference between sense and nonsense," one readily understands what this means. However, if someone did not understand the difference, it would certainly be impossible to explain it. Hence, the difference between sense and nonsense can be shown in statements, but this showing cannot be said (explained) in any meaningful way and therefore remains in silence. Put another way, the say/show distinction shows that while we can meaningfully discuss our experience, we cannot meaningfully discuss those things upon which our experience of the world depends. Thus, if someone on the street were to ask another "What time is it?" there can be a straightforward and meaningful answer. However, if the same person goes on to ask, "Well then what is time?" the situation would be quite different (for how could you meaningfully explain time without appealing to the very concept?). Thus, questions such as "What is time?" and "What is the difference between sense and nonsense?" are nonsensical questions for Wittgenstein. This does not mean that they should not be asked or that they are bad questions, but that their answers can only be shown. These answers, then, will be descriptive rather than explicatory.
Wittgenstein's new philosophical methodology involved continually reminding his readers of certain aspects of linguistic usage that had been forgotten in the search for metaphysical truths. In general, the point is that if it is left alone, language functions unproblematically; it does not stand in need of correction by philosophers. In this manner, he aimed to demonstrate that the great questions posed by philosophers had arisen because they were operating on a mistaken view of language and its relation to reality. Philosophers in the Western tradition were not "wiser" than anyone else, as had been assumed — they were simply more likely to get caught up in linguistic confusion by taking language beyond the context it was meant to deal with. For Wittgenstein, the philosopher's proper task is therefore to "show the fly out of the fly bottle": to show that the problems with which philosophers torment themselves are not really problems at all, but rather examples of "language gone on holiday" (as he put it). The philosopher is to clear up confusion, but not by crafting philosophical theses.
