Top 25 Greatest Tactical Feats

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"Don't fight a battle if you don't gain anything by winning."

-Erwin Rommel


(25) Battle of Narva

This an outstanding example of how surprise and initiative can turn the tables and overwhelm far superior numbers. The main Swedish force was assisted by around 2,500 men from within the city. The Russian army was in great numerical superiority and numbered about 37 000 troops (4 Russians to every Swede). During this time the Swedish army was ready to make its move, but just before Rehnskiöld, the Swedish commander, gave the order to attack the weather started to change. Snow started falling and the wind from the south grew in strength. This made it impossible for the Russian scouts to see what the Swedes were up to. The Swedish Army went into action at noon, and protected by the blizzard blowing the Russians in their eyes, blinding them. They broke through the Russian lines and put the entire Russian army in panic. As a blinding snowstorm raged, Charles XII of Sweden defeated a Russian army that was nearly five times his army's size -- and all within two hours. This battle provided a strong indication of the military genius of the young Charles. This battle is often portrayed as one of the greatest in Swedish military history.

Swedish Victory at Narva


(24) Battle of Dunbar

Oliver Cromwell marched into Scotland as ordered, but found the superior Scottish army under the Earl of Leven (an experienced veteran) strongly entrenched in front of Edinburgh. Outnumbered and outpositioned, Cromwell still tried to outflank the Scots, but failed and, in pouring rain, was pursued back to his base at Dunbar by the Scottish cavalry. Not daunted, he tried again a few weeks later, attempting to manoeuvre around the Scottish southern flank. However, Leven's superior numbers allowed him to counter this, and his flank was strongly guarded by bogs and hills. By now the English army was running low on food, and the situation seemed hopeless. Oliver Cromwell again fell back to Dunbar, this time planning to abandon the campaign. Sensing total victory, Leven pursued, and managed to get his troops in front of the English army, blocking the only road back to the border. Cromwell's forces were now defeated, starving, soaked by the constant rain, and surrounded deep inside enemy territory. Leven's army occupied an extremely strong defensive position, on a hill with a deep ravine and stream at its base, and all they had to do was wait for the English to surrender. Instead, Cromwell attacked.

He'd realised that the rugged terrain, while it favoured the defender, also made it difficult for them to move troops quickly from one part of the battlefield to another. Originally he'd deployed his troops along the length of the ravine, with the Scots on the other side. However, during the night he moved almost all his cavalry and half his infantry to concentrate against a single crossing-point. They forced their way over, with heavy losses - but Cromwell kept his nerve and continued to feed in his reserves to replace each regiment that lost momentum. The Scots, taken by surprise and hindered by the ground just as Cromwell anticipated, were unable to do likewise, and so their right wing eventually broke. Cromwell could now turn and roll up the rest of the Scottish forces from the flank, and they broke and ran. Cromwell soundly thrashed the Scotts forces, showing great audacity and ingenuity, excellent knowledge and shrewd usage of the terrain.

English General Oliver Cromwell

(23) The Battle of Kiev

In the Battle of Kiev, the Germans introduced a new tactic to their offensive doctrine. It involved a textbook example of the classic maneuver of double envelopment. They used keil und Kessel (wedge and caldron) tactics to effect the encirclement and destruction of the Red Army in South-Western Russia. The greatest concentration of Soviet forces lay round the Ukrainian capital of Kiev. The force was composed of 5 Russian Armies: the 5th, 13th, 21st and the 40th. Marshall Budennyy and his unwieldy mass of 1,000,000 men had orders from Stalin to defend Kiev and the Ukraine. Once Rundstedt's mobile forces had finished at Uman, they continued, veering to the south of Kiev. Kleist's First Panzer Group then swung north, joining up with Guderian's divisions (Army Group Center), whose sudden strike down from the central front took the Soviet command by surprise. After penetrating Soviet defenses, rapidly advancing German forces--their Keil spearheads formed by four independent panzer groups--enclosed the Russians within two concentric rings. The first ring would be closed by the leading panzer forces and would isolate the enemy. Following closely on the heels of the motorized elements, hard-marching infantry divisions would form a second inner ring around the trapped Soviet units. At this time Panzer groups in fierce fights beat off attempts Russian to deblock the forces from the east.

Army Group Center then formed the Northern pincer while Army Group South formed the southern pincer. These two pincers met 200 miles west of Kiev, trapping 665,000 Russian soldiers. Once a Kessel was formed, the temporary mission of both the panzer and the infantry rings was defensive: the inner (infantry) ring blocked enemy escape, while the outer (armored) one barred enemy rescue. As a result of this offensive, simultaneous impact of 6th German Army through Dniepers till both sides of Kiev, which September 19 was encircled and taken. The greatest surrender in the history of all warfare took place at Kiev, some 665,000 Russian soldiers surrendering, 50 Soviet divisions, or 5 Soviet Armies ceased to exist after the battle ended. Germans also captured 3,718 guns and 884 tanks. With characteristic German tactical virtuosity, the panzer corps managed to encircle the entire Russian army. Hitler called it " the greatest battle in world history".


(22) Battle of Sedan

The moment had arrived for the commander of XIX Panzer Korps, Heinz Guderian - his aim was to cross the Meuse at Sedan. At dawn on 10th May, 1940, an early morning call by the Luftwaffe ended the smug neutrality of the Low Countries. Ignoring intelligence warnings, General Gamelin ordered forty divisions into Belgium. Behind them, unseen, seven Panzerdivisions moved into the Ardennes - the cutting edge of the 'sickle' was about to fall on ten French infantry divisions holding a hundred mile front in the 'impassable' Ardennes. Rommel’s 7th Divison had the crucial task of crossing the Meuse and breaking through at Sedan. Their movement was slowed more by congested roadways than enemy fire. Some of the men in Major General Erwin Rommel's Seventh Panzer Division discovered a stone weird (dam) that connected both banks of the Meuse with an island in the center. After nightfall, Rommel sent a battalion of motorcyles across and they established a small bridgehead he quickly reinforced.

German wehrmarch in the Fall of France

The next morning Rommel began sending infantry aross in rubber rafts; the French fire was heavy and the losses high, but Rommel's presence in the lead raft gave his troops courage to press on with the assault. When French tanks appeared and threatened the bridgehead, Rommel did the improbable: he ordered his infantry to attack them with light machine guns. Assuming the infantry were attacking because they had panzers on the way to help, the French retreated. By the afternoon the Germans had established a large enough foothold for engineers to begin constructing bridges for the tanks that were following! His tanks now blew out, and drove westward , pouring in like a torrent, culminating to the final victory, and the fall of France herself.

The Battle of Sedan brought a significant change to Battle Tactics. Up until this point, panzer leaders though rifle and armored units should be kept distinct, and tanks would be the deciding factor. But The main force of victory at Sedan was not the Blitzkrieg, but the German infantry, coordinated with other arms and pursuing a consistent and coherent doctrine in the traditional sense. The nature of the crossing led to the formation kampfgruppen-(mixed battles groups consisting of tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft guns, assault engineers (Sturmpionieren), engineers and rifle regiments) This was a unique, highly mobile, combined arms unit, built around tanks, and capable of swift and coherent movement, which translated into impressive survivability, fire power, and tactical movement on the battlefield. The tactical qualities displayed by the men of 7th division, had been extraordinary throughout the battle of Sedan. To this reckless taking of initiatives and quality of leadership, Wehrmacht training had added great skill in all arms co-operation, and proved to be a formidable fighting force, dominating German tactical operations for the remainder of the war.


(21) Battle of the Kalka River

This was virtuoso of Mongolian tactics. While Genghis Khan was consolidating his conquests in Persia and Afghanistan, a force of 40,000 Mongol horsemen pushed through Azerbaijan and Armenia. They defeated Georgian crusaders, captured a Genoese trade-fortress in the Crimea and spent the winter along the coast of the Black Sea. As they were headed back home they met 80,000 warriors led by Prince Mstitslav of Kiev. The battle of Kalka River commenced. Staying out of range of the crude weapons of peasant infantry, and with better bows than opposing archers, they devastated the prince's standing army.

Having a decoy force to approach their opponent, and through various subterfuges, they feigned a retreat, drawing the armored cavalry forward, taking advantage of the vanity and over-confidence of the mounted aristocrats. Doing whatever is necessary to draw the enemy forces out of their prepared formations and positions, and chase the mangudai "suicide squad" until the pursuers are strung out in the chase, focused on catching the fleeing enemy. Suddenly, the Mongols attacked the pursuers from the flanks, and re-enforced the mangudai, which them turn and attack the leading elements of the pursuing force. Lighter and more mobile, they strung out and tired the pursuers and then attacked, killed and routed them, demonstrating a variety of their tactics in one single battle. Many other cultures have used a similar tactic, adapted to their times, technologies, and capabilities, but the Mongols made it a staple of their playbook for years to come.

(20)Battle of Raate Road

Holding back one of the largest armies in Europe, a few men in skies encircled an army of men equipped with tanks, planes, ect, using the “motti” or encirclement, as the basis of their tactics. On the on start of the Soviet-Finnish War, the Finnish began immediate counter-measures to regain a village position near the Raate Road against a Soviet division. Although outnumbered and poorly equipped, the Fins were able to use their Motti tactics against the well-entrenched opponents. The idea of this tactic was to cut the enemy columns or battle groups into smaller groups and then encircle them by light and mobile forces, such as ski-troops during winter. Afterwards, the smaller pockets of enemies could then dealt with individually by concentrating forces on them. These tactics meant cutting the enemy column in several places and surrounding it. Then the enemy columns were broken into small pockets. The weakest pockets were destroyed first, the stronger ones only after the cold and hunger had weakened the soldiers. The encirclement was tightened until the pocket was destroyed with a powerful attack.

This was especially effective against some of the mechanized units of the Soviet Army, as they were effectively restricted to the roads. The Finnish troops on the other hand could move quickly through the forests and strike weak points in the formations. As a result the defenders were divided into isolated groups and destroyed by the Finnish troops and the Soviets retreated in panic over the surrounding frozen lakes. In the battle of the Raate Road, the Soviet losses were about 70% of the force strength. Using their famous motti tactic, Finnish ski troops almost totally destroyed both Soviet divisions in only four days. In addition, the Finns captured considerable numbers of tanks, trucks, horses, weapons and ammunition. After this debacle, the Fins would later be referred to as "the White Death”.

 

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"May God have mercy upon my enemies, because I won't."
-George Patton



(19)Battle of Tannenberg

The Battles of Tannenberg and the Masurian Lakes halted the Russian advance into East Prussia, presented to the world one of Germany's greatest victory in the Great War. This was a major victory for German forces in the east. Paul von Hindenburg a great German general completely outwitted the Russians and their general Alexander Samsonov. Despite the fact that the Germans knew for over twenty years that they would have to conduct a delaying operation in East Prussia against numerically-superior Russian forces they never developed a proper mobile covering force or the doctrine of delaying actions. Instead, the German army of 1914 had only two tactical options: attack or defend, neither of which was well-suited for the start of the war in the East.

Tannenberg Encirclement

In the case of Tannenberg the The German field commander, Hidenburg Francois saved this bottle neck. The German Defense plan left a screening force to delay the Russian 1st Army which was approaching from the east, and set a trap for the Russian 2nd Army which was moving up from the south. Hidenburg simply intended to cut Samsonv's back off. Hidenburg apparently wanted to destroy all of Russian 2nd army all at once. His tactics to accomplish this is to take all routes for Samsonov to escape in advance. Hidenburg allowed the 2nd Army to advance, and then cut them off from their already tenuous supply route. This forced massive surrenders, and saw the almost complete destruction of the 2nd Army near Frogenau. As a result, the Germans encircled Russians with few contacts with Russians. The battle is a good example of freies Operieren in which an outnumbered force used agility to outmaneuver the enemy and win. The Principle of maneuver were extremely important in this battle, maneuverability and movement of German troops allowed a major victory over Russian troops. The opening encounter between the Russian and German Empires in World War I ended in a spectacular German tactical victory, and the Russians were to remain on the defensive for the rest of the War.


(18) Battle of Salamis

The ensuing Battle of Salamis was one of the decisive engagements of history. The Greek commander Themistocles had cleverly laid a trap to engulf the Persian battle fleet. On September 22, 480BC, the Greek fleet held a position between the north coast of the Island of Salamis and the coast of Attica to the northwest of Piraeus. The Persians had deployed facing north in a line three deep, Themistocles purposely left the channel between Salamis and Magara open and unguarded, possibly to tempt Xerxes to divide his fleet. Xerxes did exactly this, sending his Egyptian contingent around Salamis to take and seal the western channel. The Greek fleet drew up in battle formation on the shore of Attica, with the Athenians taking the left wing and the Aeginetans the right. The Greek fleet had some 300 warships at its disposal.

On the morning of the battle, the Persians deployed with their right wing held by the Phoenicians and the Ionian ships on the left. While still trying to get into position, the Persians were attacked by the Greeks, who forced the leading Persian ships back upon their comrades, causing disorder in the Persian formation as the Persian ships were already close packed in the narrow confines of the Straight. This was immediately followed by an Athenian flank attack on the Phoenician ships which were pushed back into the Persian center and onto the coast of Attica. Eventually the Greeks made an encircling movement behind the Persian center, which proved decisive, and the Ionian Greeks, with their resistance broken and scattered, retreated. Themistocles had cleverly trapped the Persians in a channel too narrow for them to bring their greater numbers to bear, and attacked them vigorously, in the end causing the loss of 200 Persian ships vs 40 Greek.

Battlefleet Formation

(17)The Fourth battle of kawanakajima

There were at least five battles at Kawanakajima between the two great daimyos Takeda Shingen and Uesugi Kenshin during the Sengoku Jidai. The battle of kawanakajima usually refers to the fourth encounter which was the most eventful between the forces of Uesugi Kenshin and Takeda Shingen. Since both Daimyo's provinces were separated by mountains, the plain was destined to become a battlefield; being the only flatland bordering the two. Since both Daimyo's provinces were separated by mountains, the plain was destined to become a battlefield; being the only flatland bordering the two.

One of Takeda's trusted generals, Yamamoto Kansuke conceived a plan called “woodpecker”. It basically divided Takeda's army into two forces in an attempt to trap the Uesugi between them. Kosaka Masanobu, Takeda's chief military advisor and lover, was to lead a force of 12 000 , climb Saijoyama and attack the Uesugi from the rear. Meanwhile, the second force of 8 000 under Takeda himself deployed in the "crane's wing" formation in front of the Uesugi army. However, Uesugi Kenshin was suspicious . Under cover of the morning fog, he set a force of 10 000 men in the "winding wheel" formation and surprised Takeda Shingen by attacking first. Uesugi's general Kakizaki Kageie led the initial attack and struck hard at the Takeda formations. Outnumbered and outmaneuvered, things looked very grim for the Takeda. Ironically, Yamamoto's plan did succeed, but not in the manner expected. Although it failed to some extend, the “woodpecker” ensued a victory in the end.

(16) The Battle of Crécy

sketch of the battle of crecy

The relatively small English force under the Black Prince, son of Edward III, was forced into a defensive battle by a series of French divisions or battles the last of which was commanded by John (Jeun) the French King. English longbow men, arranged in the usual harrow formations, made short work of the first mounted attack. With this and the memory of Crecy still fresh in the mind the heavily armoured French decided to dismount and engage the English on foot thus depriving them of the advantage afforded by the effect of arrows on horses. After a long and bloody close-quarter melee with sword mace the Dauphin's division retired leaving the exhausted English to now face the largest division - that of the French king himself. There were three options open to the English - to take flight, to defend again, or to attack the dismounted French who now had neither cavalry nor crossbow cover. The opportunity was quickly seized. The English mounted up and charged the French. The force was scattered and the French king captured. The battle ended with a clear-cut English victory, which depended upon foot archers and took advantage of the disorderly French heavy cavalry. It was an undoubted victory of disciplined infantry in an open field over the best cavalry in Europe. An "infantry revolution" had overturned the dominance of chivalric cavalry.

(15) The Battle of Nashville

In November, Confederate General John B. Hood had led the Army of Tennessee out of Alabama toward Nashville in an effort to cut off Union General William T. Sherman's supply line. Unfortunately for him, Sherman had left more than enough forces behind. Hood's forces first met Union forces at Franklin on the road to Nashville. Here, the Union General George Henry Thomas, delivered one of the most brilliantly conceived and executed battle strategies of the Civil war. Thomas struck like a sledgehammer in an attack that militarily Historians have regarded as virtually faultless. With meticulous attention to detail, careful planning, mastery of logistics and deployment, the "Sledge of Nashville" expertly coordinated infantry, artillery and cavalry to bring overwhelming force to bear on the most vulnerable point of the enemy in a series of smashing blows. Thomas' tactical plan was a masterly, co-ordinated attack.

His heavily weighted main effort drove against Hood's left flank while a secondary attack aimed simultaneously at Hood's right. Thomas provided an adequate reserve and used cavalry to screen his flank and extend the envelopment of the enemy left. Hood, on the other hand, was overextended and his thin line was concave to the enemy, denying him the advantage of interior lines. Hood's reserve was inadequate, and his cavalry was absent on a minor mission. The two-day battle proceeded according to Thomas' plan as the Federals fixed Hood's right while slashing savagely around the Confederate left flank. They broke Hood's first line on December 15, forcing the southerners to retire to a new line two miles to the rear. The Federals repeated their maneuver on the 16th, and by nightfall the three-sided battle had disintegrated into a rout of Hood's army. Broken and defeated, it streamed southward, protected from hotly pursuing Union cavalry only by the intrepid rear-guard action of Forrest's horsemen. The devastating battle of Nashville had eliminated one of the two great armies of the Confederacy off the chessboard in a “Battle of Annihilation”. The victory at Nashville was the only one in the war so complete that the defeated army practically lost its existence.


(14)Battle of Trafalgar

Up until Trafalgar, the orthodox method of naval strategy was in line ahead (hence the term line of battle), both fleets running parallel to each other, and firing broadsides at their opposing number. A few battles were fought like this, but they seldom resulted in a decisive victory for either side, although the casualties could be high, and results inconclusive. But things were to change at the Spanish Port at Trafalgar.

The allied fleet, steering north in a very irregular line known was attacked by the British in two columns, known as crossing the "E", running before the wind from the westward. This was a dangerous tactic, exposing the leading ships to the risk of heavy damage, but Nelson correctly counted on superior British training and discipline, and on the initiative of captains whom he had thoroughly imbued with his ideas. He also placed his biggest ships at the head of the columns (rather than in the center, as usual), himself leading one in the Victory, while Vice Admiral Cuthbert Collingwood led the other in the Royal Sovereign. The result was to break up the allied line and expose its center and rear to overwhelming force, bringing a crushing victory in which nineteen ships were captured. Because Nelson's deadly thoroughness in formulating his bold plan and his innovative strategy - which annihilated the French threat to British homeland, and signaled British Invincibility on the Seas for the next century.

 

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"Strategy is the art of making use of time and space. I am less concerned about the later than the former. Space we can recover, lost time never."

-Napoleon Bornaparte



(13)Battle of Brices Crossroads

Nathan B. Forrest

Brice's Crossroads was the most classic battle of the Civil War. It demonstrated the innate military genius of Confederate general Nathan Bedford Forrest, who out-maneuvered a Union force three times the size of his own. Forrest defeated superior numbers (three-to-one) of mounted Union forces by arriving first, dismounting his entire troop, leaving his horses at a safe, but prudent distance from the battlefield and entrenching. Forrest's deployment of his horse artillery was most radical. During a crucial moment at Brice's Crossroads, when the Yankee resistance was stiffening, he ordered his chief of artillery, Captain John Morton, to charge the enemy with his guns. Morton's men rode to within sixty yards of the Union line, unlimbered under heavy fire and sent shot and shell into the horrified Federals at point blank range; breaking the back of the Union resistance. After disrupting the Union advance Forrest used his mobility by mounting part of his forces and using them in pursuit, "Keeping up the skeer" as it were and not allowing the Union forces the opportunity to rally and reform after enveloping them on both flanks. The rest of Forrest's forces used the mobility of their mounts to by-pass the fighting and attack their enemy's rear capturing huge quantities of supplies.

Brice’s Crossroads was a scent of tactical ingenuity. 4,800 men, arriving piecemeal, routed a 8,300 man federal force, by first engaging 3,600 federal cavalry, who actually outnumbered Forrest at the time, pushing this force and engaging 3,600 federal infantry quickly brought up, routing the whole force. Forrest's tactical employment of his heavily armed cavalry was well in advance of his day. Always at or near the point of danger, he employed his escort as a strategic reserve to exploit successes or to reinforce units struggling to contain an enemy breakthrough. The battle duplicated Hannibal's tactics at Cannae and was considered by Rommel as a classic. Forrest's victory at Brice's Cross Roads was the subject of a class taught at the French War College by Marshal Ferdinand Foch before World War I, and his mobile campaigns were studied by the German general Erwin Rommel, who as commander of the Afrika Korps in World War II emulated his tactics on a wider scale, with tanks and trucks.

(12) The Battle of Gqokli Hill

Masterful tactics in spite of being outnumbered 2:1 won the battle for Shaka. He posted troops at the drifts where Zwide's troops, under command of Nomahlanjana, had to cross the White Umfolozi River, to delay the enemy where he had advantage. Meanwhile he laid waste to the area over the river, and placed his troops around the top of Gqokli hill, with a reserve, and all his supplies, all concealed in a depression at the top of the hill. He dispatched some troops as a decoy to herd cattle away – in order to draw off a portion of his opponent’s force. Nomahlanjana divided his forces to capture the cattle for provisions. Discipline on the part of the Zulus meant that the surrounding Ndwandwe forces threw away their assegai to little effect while getting no weapons thrown back in return. The decreasing circle of the attacking forces also caused congestion. Making little progress with a frontal attack on Shaka, Nomahlanjana decided to concentrate all his forces at one point. Shakas tactics came into play - his reserve forces ran down the hill in two lines, encircled and destroyed the column. A combination of masterful tactics, and cunning brought Shaka’s greatest victory.

(11) Battle of Cowpens

The Cowpens may be one of the most important battles ever fought on American soil from the standpoint of the tactical lessons one can learn from it. In addition, it demonstrated Morgan's unique and ingenious deployment of troops. Using a unique deployment of troops, Morgan planned a tactical masterpiece that made use of all his troops' strengths and used some of their weaknesses to his advantage. He had an uncanny understanding of the psychology of soldiers and a firm grasp of tactical principles. He possessed an acute understanding of his troops’ limitations, both physical and psychological. He had confidence in his regulars, and knew how to handle his militiamen as well, but most importantly, he predicted how the enemy would fight.

On January 17th, 1781 Daniel Morgan was in charge of the American troops, mostly militia, along with a small cavalry reserve led by Colonel William Washington (George's cousin). Facing Morgan was the aggressive Brit Banastre Tarleton, commanding a roughly equal (1,100) number of men. Tarleton had a large cavalry advantage over Morgan, and also possessed two 3-pounder 'grasshopper' artillery pieces. Morgan spent all night moving about his camp, conveying instructions and support to his troops, ensuring that they would be prepared for the approaching engagement. Tarleton woke his men up well before dawn and marched them for hours to reach the battlefield, without issuing specific orders to his subordinates. Tarleton was eager to get to the fight, and he fully expected to win. The glamorous commander was becoming somewhat overconfident of his abilities and probably viewed Morgan's rag-tag army as just one more inviting target for victory.

They were thought to be cowardly to stand up against the disciplined ranks of seasoned professionals. On finding Morgan, Tarleton ordered an immediate attack, without rest nor breakfast for his men. His men moved forward in regular formation, were momentarily checked by the militia rifles, but, continued to advance while sensing increasing victory. However, the British drove in successive lines, only to encounter another, stronger line after exerting themselves and suffering casualties. As a result, the dept of the American lines soaked up the shock of the British advance. Taking the withdrawal of the first two lines as a full blown retreat, the British broke ranks, rushing headlong into the awaiting final line of disciplined regulars. Believing that the Americans were once again in flight, the overconfident Tarleton committed his reserve to close pursuit, thus exposing one of his flanks to Col. Washington's cavalry. Another deadly point-blank American volley, coupled with a rallied militia contingent, sealed the trap and led to the British being routed with very heavy casualties. In point of tactics, this was the most brilliant battle of the Revolutionary war, and it still appears brilliant when judged by the standards that we apply to the work of the greatest masters of the military art.

 

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I would not fear a pack of lions led by a sheep, but I would always fear a flock of sheep led by a lion.
-Alexander the Great


(10) Spring and Autumn Period China

In 632 BC the armies of Jin and Chu faced each other at Chengbu before the battle of the same name. Chu sent an envoy to Jin requesting to fight a chariot duel the next day to which the Jin ruler, Duke Wen, agreed. In the morning Duke Wen climbed to the top of an observation tower and looking down on his camp's preparations said: A Young and old conduct themselves according to ritual. They are fit for use!" He then ordered his troops to cut down trees to be used as part of an unorthodox tactic. While the chariot duel was underway Duke Wen launched a sudden cavalry attack against the Chu right wing causing it to collapse in. At the same time as the right was being pushed into the main body, the Jin troops in the center feigned a reatreatm and thier raised the retreat pennants and began pulling back. As the Jin troops retreated they dragged behind them the trees they had cut down earlier that morning. This raised such a dust cloud that the Chu commanders thought the Jin were fleeing in panic and eagerly gave chase. When the main body of the Chu army was enveloped in the cloud of dust they were unable to see that the Jin forces had split into two divisions and had turned around. The Jin executed a classical pincer movement on both of the Chu flanks. The result was a resounding defeat after which the Chu general was ordered to commit suicide. Duke Wen had taken advantage of the distraction provided by the chariot duel to launch both a surprise attack, and feigned a retreat afterwards, manipulating the Chu forces into a trap.

(9) The Battle of Gazala

The Battle of Gazala has become known as Rommels finest moment in battle, and one of the most astonishing defeats of the British army during World War II. Gazala was a stroke of tactical genius on Rommels behalf to cope the doctrine mobile war, in which a feint in the North was rapidly followed by a attack in the South in an tremendous outflanking maneuver. Trapped against the British minefields, his Afrika Korps came within an ace of running out of ammunition and fuel, but his legendary luck held. He was able to repulse every ill-co-ordinated British counter-attack. When he had regrouped and re-established his supply lines Rommel prepared to unleash his counter-offensive. On May 26, 1942 Rommel unleashed his attack on the Gazala line.

The British and their allies had established a forty mile long front blocking the road to Tobruk. With the Eighth Army in a static defense position and scattered piecemeal in the form of strong-points or 'boxes' with only parts of the amour committed to their defense The southern most end of this line of strong points and mines was Bir Hacheim on the edge of the deep desert. The strong point was held by the 1st Free French Brigade (the only French ground force at the time bearing arms against the Germans). The Italian infantry division Ariete was assigned the task of taking this strong point out. This would secure the pivot proint to Rommel’s "sweeping right hook". In a daring and risky move, he drove his army around the flank of the British army and into its rear. Within days, Tobruk had fallen to Axis forces. Despite of being outnumbered both on the land and on the air, the Axis forces imposed its tactical flexibility and superior leadership to the rigidity and lethargy of the Allied command.


(8)Battle of Chancellorsville

The Battle of Chancellorsville marked the pinnacle of General Lee’s tactical fervor. It was one of the most lop-sided battles in the war, yet one of the most decisive. Union General Hooker brought an effective fighting force of 132,000 men onto the field, against Lee’s 57,000. Hooker, wanted to fight defensively to inflict casualties on Lee's army for a change. He was counting on the inherent advantage of the defense if General Lee gave battle. The fact that Hooker enjoyed a two-to-one numerical advantage, superior logistics support and the element of surprise by seizing the initiative all made this seem more likely to accomplish. Unfortunately for General Hooker, he overlooked the disadvantage of giving up the initiative. This proved to be his undoing. The demonstrated tactical aggressiveness of Generals Lee and Jackson, of which General Hooker should certainly have been aware, used General Hooker's strategy against him. From Fredericksburg Hooker sought to move his main force to the north and west of the Confederates and come upon them from behind.

Seeing what was coming Lee divided his force and rushed troops west to halt the Union advance in the Wilderness leaving just 10,000 men at Fredericksburg. Lee, of course, takes the initiative, and sends his more able subordinate “Stonewall” Jackson to start his flanking maneuver. Military writers have often held that to divide an inferior force in the face of a superior enemy was to invite certain destruction. It was indeed an act with enormous risks, unheard of in conventional wisdom. Yet it brought stunning results. Jackson, instructed to flank his opponent with 28,000, made a rapid a fourteen-mile march to carry the Union's right flank. These men were enjoying an early evening brew when deer bounded through their camp heralding the arrival of Jackson's men. Only units such the Vermont Brigade kept the defeat from becoming a complete rout, but this battle was, nevertheless, the high water mark of Confederate military success. Perhaps as much known for Lee's quip about losing his right arm (Jackson) as tactics this battle is a brilliant example of how a commander, although outnumbered and outflanked defied military convention by dividing his forces twice, took the initiative and scored a memorable victory.



(7) The Battle of Breitenfeldt

The Battle of Breitenfeld served as major endorsement of the linear tactics of Gustavus Adolphus. The Imperial forces arranged their army in squares, called tercios (Spanish). This was the traditional formation for the period, with each square having a fifty man front and a depth of thirty men. The centre comprised pikemen with supporting units of arquebusiers on each flank. The Imperial army was comprised of seventeen such formations, arranged in three large blocks with the center block placed slightly ahead of the other two. The cavalry was drawn up on each flank, Pappenheim commanding the left and Fürstenburg the right. The left flank was close by Breitenfeld; the right, by Seehausen. Tilly had no reserves except for some cavalry placed behind his infantry. Gustavus Adolphus, however, arranged his forces in two long lines. Each line was five men deep for pikemen, and six men deep for musketeers. The use of linear tactics enabled Gustavus to create a front that matched Tilly's, while still giving him troops to keep in reserve. Gustavus mixed his artillery, and some cavalry, into the main formation.

The battle began around noon with a two hour exchange of artillery fire. This exchange was ended when Count Pappenheim led a charge of the cavalry on Tilly's left. These cuirassiers advanced seven times, but each time was turned back by the Swedes. The Swedes used the tactic of mixing men armed with muskets with their cavalry, who were able to defeat the light cavalry pistol tactics used by the Imperial forces. Swedish reserve cavalry was also able to extend the Swedish line and countercharge with sabers against the Imperial cavalry. Following the defeat of his seventh assault, Pappenheim and his cavalry quit the field.

During this time, Tilly's infantry remained stationary, but the cavalry on his right charged the Saxon cavalry and routed it towards Eilenburg. Seeing an opportunity, Tilly sent the majority of his infantry against the remaining Saxon forces and they fled the field, stopping only briefly to loot the Swedish camp. Tilly thus defeated forty percent of his enemy and was poised to deliver a devastating flank attack on the remaining Protestants. As Tilly was ordering his infantry to roll up the Swedish line, however, Gustavus Adolphus was able to reorder his second line into an array at a right angle to the front. This deprived Tilly of the opportunity for an attack on the Protestant flank. Following this, a charge by the Swedish cavalry was able to drive off the rest of the Imperial cavalry. With this help, the Protestant infantry was able to gain the upper hand. Soon under fire from both the excellent Swedish guns and captured Imperial guns, the Imperial infantry was forced to retire from the field.The Swedes used the tactic of mixing men armed with muskets with their cavalry, who were able to defeat the light cavalry pistol tactics used by the Imperial forces. This Battle was Gustav's crowning point, employing mobile artillery on the battlefield, as well as a very active tactic where attack was stressed over defense and mobility more important than in the usual linear tactic.



(6)The Battle of Leuctra

This battle is of great significance in Greek history. This battle marks a revolution in military tactics, introducing the first known instance of a deliberate concentration of attack upon the vital point of the enemy’s line. A Peloponnesian army, about 10,000 strong, which had invaded Boeotia from Phocis, was here confronted by a Boeotian levy of perhaps 6000 soldiers under Epaminondas. In spite of inferior numbers and the doubtful loyalty of his Boeotian allies, Epaminondas offered battle on the plain before the town. But he had a trick up his sleeve. During phalanx, each hoplite gained protection from the shield belonging to the man on his right, so there was usually a natural tendency for a phalanx to drift sideways, as the men pack themselves under the shields of their neighbors. As a result, the right section of the line came into contact with greater force. Epaminondas prepared to use this to his advantage, by increasing the depth and the numbers of his men on the left flank.

Massing his cavalry and the 50-deep column of Theban infantry on his left wing, he sent forward this body in advance of his center and right wing. After a cavalry engagement in which the Thebans drove their enemies off the field, the decisive issue was fought out between the Theban and Spartan foot. The latter, though fighting well, could not sustain in their 12-deep formation the heavy impact of their opponents' column, and were hurled back with a loss of about 2000 men, of whom 700 were Spartan citizens, including the king Cleombrotus I. This was the first time that Epaminondas, the Theban commander, used his innovative tactics which foreshadowed the famous phalanx, later developed so successfully by Philip of Macedon and then Alexander the Great.

 

[BOTP]

"It is well that war is so terrible - otherwise we should grow too fond of it."
-Robert E. Lee


(5) Battle of Pharsalus

Caesar, and his 25,000 men, though outnumbered to Pompeus’s 50,000 managed to rbing a decisive victory. The battlefield was positioned with a river to Caesar's left, insuring that neither side would be able to move around the other army on Caesar's left. Both commanders realized that if one army was able to flank the other and force them to fight on two sides, they would probably win. As such, both commanders put a substantial amount of effort into insuring that the other would be unable to sneak around to the back. The most important part of the battle was to happen on Caesar's right. Pompey hoped to win by using his superior cavalry to mount a two-front attack on Caesar's forces. Caesar anticipated this, and positioned a strong force of infantry in echelon just behind his own cavalry.

Caesar placed his cavalry on his right, with the fourth battle line in reserve behind it. Pompeius' cavalry charged, Caesar's cavalry deliberately fell back and to either side, and Pompeius' men ran headfirst into a steady line of heavy infantry armed with spears. The front horses pulled up, the rear ones ran into them from behind, and the whole force became a disorganized mass of confusion. At that point Caesar's cavalry turned round, formed up and charged, and swept Pompeius' men from the field. Now it was the Caesarian cavalry who could attack the enemy from the rear. It was here, Ceaser’s demonstrated his skillful deployment of reserves, and his echelon formation brought stunning results. Caesar 200 lost men. Pompeus lost 20,000 and 30,000 surrendered to the Dictator, and Caesar remained the unrivaled ruler of the Mediterranean world.


(4)The Battle of Gaugamela

This battle is the Pinnacle of Alexander’s Military career, and a salient point of his genius for war. With an army of 40,000 under his command, pitting it against a ¼ million Persian, and defeating it in detail. Alexander drew up his men in the form of a “Flying Wedge” of his Companion cavalry, hypaspists, and heavy infantry to strike at a gap in the Persian line. He ordered deceptively weak attack to draw away the huge masses of Persian heavy cavalry, dangerous as they were with their new armament. This happened on Alexander's right flank at Gaugamela, where he drew them off after they had ridden wildly to the right when Alexander was moving to the right with his entire army. They were trying to negate the flanking advantages Alexander's cavalry on the right were now getting. Knowing this, and having anticipated it, Alexander had set up his cavalry in the standard formation, but with a little, and eventually very important feature. This was a feint on the wing of the Macedonian hetairoi, made up of Thracians and Thessalians, which drew off the Skythians and other Persian allied cavalry, along with the Persians themselves, luring them into a trap, where they were pounced upon by the rest of the cavalry on Alexander's right. After the shock of the impact had taken place, Alexander left the battle itself to Cleitus, the Hippiarch of the hetairoi, and then either direct the battle or support another part of the melee with another charge. So ended one of the biggest threats to Alexander's daring strategy at Gaugamela.

(3) Battle of Leuthen

Frederick's greatest contribution was what is known as the "oblique attack." This is simplified precursor to the use of separate operational axes and a refinement of the main tactic used by the Spartans to attack their enemy in flank. At Leuthen, Frederick achieved the greatest success in using this tactic. Frederick had a first-rate army of 35,000; Prince Charles of Lorraine 65,000 Austrians. Frederick, crucially, took and retained the initiative. In this battle, he also displayed his greatest military talent, the ability to improvise based on battlefield conditions. Simply put, the attack in oblique order places the smallest possible force which can accomplish its purpose in parallel order, to "fix in place" the enemy line. When ideally executed, the schwerpunkt, the crucial point of attack against the enemy's line is then assaulted by infantry battalions which have been "stacked up," concentrated to achieve the maximum effect in the shortest time.

At Leuten, Frederick's troops moved out in the darkness before dawn; but, encountering a strong force of Austrian cavalry with infantry support on some heights over which the main infantry assault was to have occurred. Benefiting from the cover of a ridge, he turned the Austrian left flank while a feint attack led the Austrians to send their reserves to bolster their right. The line was quickly wheeled, and while the Austrians were masked by cavalry and infantry, the Prussians fell upon the Saxon infantry as they were struggling to get into formation in the early dawn hours. The route of the Austro-Saxon army was total, and the entire affair was over by 9:00 a.m. Frederick developed the concept of the "oblique attack" later in his career, but never achieved the effect so totally and so successfully as at Leuthen.

(2) Battles of Austerlitz

A French force of approximately 73,000 under Napoleon decisively defeated The combined Russo-Austrian army under General Mikhail Kutuzov, with 85,000 men and 278 guns, advanced through Moravia toward Vienna. Kutuzov was accompanied by both the Austrian emperor Francis I and the Russian tsar Alexander, resulting in command conflicts that reduced the effectiveness of the combined army. A plan for an outflanking movement by the right wing was adopted despite Kutuzov's opposition. That became the gambit attempted on December 2. The Russo-Austrian forces had fallen into the trap. The Russo-Austrians were occupied with attacking Napoleon's right flank, and the Russo-Austrians began to push the French back on the right. Anticipating such a move, Napoleon massed the bulk of his army, which totaled seventy-three thousand troops and 139 guns, on the opposite flank and in his right center, and sent these forces in to attack when he judged the Russo-Austrian army had become overextended and had denuded its center, a totally unexpected maneuver.

Kutuzov's forces, who had expected French counterattacks to be flanking side maneuvers, were surprised at the frontal attack, and the center was routed after heavy fighting. The French managed to take back the Pratzen Heights, and with the center broken, the Russo-Austrian armies on the side flanks were cut off from each other. The French attack broke the allied left wing and gained key heights behind the Russo-Austrian attack force, which was then pinned against marshland. The allied army disintegrated. Thousands of fleeing troops drowned when a frozen lake split under the weight of men and guns. French losses amounted to 8000 while the Russian and Austrian emperors, present at the battle, saw more than 27,000 men killed, wounded and captured. Bonaparte also captured 180 cannon. In this sublime trap, Napoleon has proven himself a master of tactics, in particular his speed and use of inside lines when fighting his numerically superior opponents.





And last but not least....







(1) Cannae

Probably the most fascinating Battle in History; the crowning point of Hannibal's campaign in the 2nd Punic War; this battle is probably the most famous tactical battle in history. At Cannae, Hannibal annihilated a Roman Army of more than twice of his own, consisting of 80,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry. It has become been hailed since, and is a model of a perfectly fought battle that is studied in detail at military academies around the world. The engagement that followed was a masterpiece of battlefield control. For starters, Hannibal put his troops into battle formation: Hannibal has under him 40,000 foot and 10,000 horse. He placed his Spanish and Gallic Infantry in the center, the Heavy African Infantry (acting as reserves) on either side of the Spanish and Gallic Infantry, with the Celtic/Spanish Heavy Cavalry on the left wing of the infantry, and the Numidian Heavy cavalry to the right wing of the infantry. The Roman commander positioned his troops with the standard three lines in the center, and cavalry on the wings (Roman cavalry on the Roman right wing, and Latin Cavalry on the Roman left wing). The battle started off with Hannibal advancing his Spanish and Gallic infantry in the center. Next, Hannibal ordered his Heavy Cavalry to attack the Roman cavalry, and Hannibal's cavalry succeeded in driving the Roman Cavalry form the field. Hannibal's then ordered his light cavalry to engage the Romans' Latin Cavalry.

After driving the Roman cavalry from the field, the Carthaginian Heavy Cavalry crossed the rear of the Roman troops, and aided their Light Cavalry by attacking the Latin Cavalry from behind, driving all the Roman cavalry from the field. The Roman legion pushes the Hannibal's infantry back, and upon seeing this success, the Roman commander orders his reserves to rush in and aid in pushing the Carthaginian infantry into defeat. As a gap in the Carthaginian infantry forms, the Romans pack themselves in, causing the maniples to clash into one another, and simply form one huge crowd of Roman soldiers. At this point, Hannibal orders his Heavy African Infantry to turn inwards and advance against the Roman flanks. The Carthaginian cavalry now returns to attack the Romans' exposed rear, thus completely encircling the Romans, and make this an easy slaughter. By the end of the conflict the Romans had lost 47,500 infantry and 2,700 cavalry killed and a further 19,300 captured. The tactics that Hannibal utilized, what has been called a double envelopment, have been studied for the past centuries and were the basis for the German plan for the invasion of France in 1914 as well as Schwarzkopf's Desert Storm. This battle makes the number 1 spot! IMHO..Hard to argue with a battle that everyone has been trying to emulate for the past 2000 years.

 

[Sir Bugsy]

Extremely well done, well written and very inclusive covering naval and ground battles. I'd have put Chancellorsville and Salamis higher, but a very definitive list.

I would have thought a possible naval/air battle like Midway may have made the list.

 

[Reno]

Impressive list, thanks.

 

[samildanach]

Extremely well done, well written and very inclusive covering naval and ground battles. I'd have put Chancellorsville and Salamis higher, but a very definitive list.

I disagree. This is supposed to be a list of the most impressive tactical feats right? So why am I left looking for lucid descriptions of the tactics used and how and why they were so effective.

Definitive list? So you say! Who in their right mind would put Crecy on such a list and not include Agincourt? Why include Crecy anyway? It seems like the guy has just went into a history book and pulled a battle at random because he feels it is appropriate to give a nod to the 100 years war.

 

[Adler17]

Wow. Impressive list indeed.

Adler

 

[BOTP]

Definitive list? So you say! Who in their right mind would put Crecy on such a list and not include Agincourt? Why include Crecy anyway? It seems like the guy has just went into a history book and pulled a battle at random because he feels it is appropriate to give a nod to the 100 years war.

Agincourt is probably the most famous clash of the Hundred Years' War, but it was less politically significant than Poitiers and far less innovative in terms of tactics and weaponry than Crécy.

 

[samildanach]

far less innovative in terms of tactics and weaponry than Crécy.

Then explain why Crecy was tactically brilliant in your opinion. From the description you have given it just seems like a case of the same old-same old medieval hack and slash fest.

 

[BOTP]

Then explain why Crecy was tactically brilliant in your opinion. From the description you have given it just seems like a case of the same old-same old medieval hack and slash fest.

Because it Agincourt was practically a repitive of it. Besides, this battle is seen by many historians as the beginning of the end of chivalry, because during the course of the battle many of the prisoners and wounded were dispatched contrary to chivalric codes of warfare, and the illustrious noble cavalry was no longer undefeatable by infantry. This battle established the military supremacy of the English longbow over the French combination of crossbow and armoured knights.

 

[Gelion]

Very well done 10/10 for quality. However the choice of battles is VERY biased i.e not a single battle by Suvorov who always fought against the odds and never lost a battle. He was a tactician to be recognised. Alexander Nevsky's battles against the Sweeds and Germans deserve recognition. I haven't read 100% of the text, but many lack the technical description of equipment used and amrs often played great roles than numbers. I could go on for hours, but I realise it is a good job in giving general overall impressions of some of the greatest battles in history.

 

[Drakan]

Many thanks BOTP !

 

[dgfred]

Great work BOTP! Love the maps/pics .

 

[Provolution]

Honestly, I think this beats Cannae due to the intelligence and planning as well as combined arms and engineering conducted duribng this battle siege.
Cannae may well be a classic, but the Battle of Alesia is way more deep.


THE SIEGE OF ALESIA, GAUL 52 BC

Near the quiet modern-day town of Alise-Sainte Reine in France, 32 miles northwest of Dijon, Gaius Julius Caesar fought one of history's legendary battles. His opponent, Vercingetorix, an Avernian chieftain, had raised a great confederacy of Gallic tribes to hurl the Romans once and for all from their war-torn lands. Caesar's legions were outnumbered by their enemies roughly six to one. He had built a series of fortifications around the isolated fortress of Alesia which was considered breathtaking even by Roman engineering standards -not one, but two, great circumvallations totaling between 10 and 13 miles each. Atop Alesia, Vercingetorix's tribes attacked; outside the perimeter fortifications, a giant Gallic army arrived in support. Caesar was fighting the combined might of Gaul in two directions at once. Yet his victory at Alesia and the surrender of Vercingetorix was so complete that many historians view the siege as definitive in the bloody attempt to impose Roman rule on "Long-haired Gaul." Caesar's final two years in the province were, after Alesia, largely mopping-up operations. The tribal confederacy was broken at Alesia: it never recovered.

Image by kind permission of James Grout



" It was clearly impregnable except by blockade; for it stood at a high altitude on top of a hill washed by streams on the north and south, and closely surrounded by other hills as high as itself on every side except the west, where a plain extended for some three miles. The whole of the slope below the town ramparts on the east was occupied by a camp crowded with Gallic troops, who had fortified it with a trench and a six-foot wall. The siege works that the Romans were starting to make had a circumference of ten miles. Eight camps were placed in strategic positions, linked together by fortifications along which twenty-three redoubts were built. The redoubts were occupied in the daytime by pickets, to prevent a surprise attack at any point; at night strong garrisons bivouacked in them with sentries on duty."

Caesar The Gallic Wars , VII, 69

Near the quiet modern-day town of Alise-Sainte Reine in France, 32 miles northwest of Dijon, Gaius Julius Caesar fought one of history's legendary battles. His opponent, Vercingetorix, an Avernian chieftain, had raised a great confederacy of Gallic tribes to hurl the Romans once and for all from their war-torn lands. Caesar's legions were outnumbered by their enemies roughly six to one. He had built a series of fortifications around the isolated fortress of Alesia which was considered breathtaking even by Roman engineering standards -not one, but two, great circumvallations totaling between 10 and 13 miles each. Atop Alesia, Vercingetorix's tribes attacked; outside the perimeter fortifications, a giant Gallic army arrived in support. Caesar was fighting the combined might of Gaul in two directions at once. Yet his victory at Alesia and the surrender of Vercingetorix was so complete that many historians view the siege as definitive in the bloody attempt to impose Roman rule on "Long-haired Gaul." Caesar's final two years in the province were, after Alesia, largely mopping-up operations. The tribal confederacy was broken at Alesia: it never recovered.

THE PROCONSULAR COMMAND, 58 BC

Caesar had, after much political maneuvering, received both the provinces of Cisalpine Gaul (roughly, northern Italy and the Adriatic coast) and Transalpine Gaul (France) following his year as Consul in 59, BC. Southern Gaul, largely pacified, had been a Roman province for almost a century, but the far reaches of what is now part of Switzerland, northern France, and Belgium had attracted Caesar's ambitious eye. Campaigns began almost at once against the Helvetii,and in the years that followed (58-52 BC) Caesar's legions grew, as did the scale of their campaigns. Caesar defeated the Helvetii, the Sequani, the Nervii, Menapii and Teveri near the Rhine, as well as the Senones and Carnutes. Hardly a tribe in the entire region had not risen at one time or another against his troops, with the loyal exception of the Aedui. Each year's campaign appeared to have pacified the tribes; each spring seemed to bring new flare-ups from one part of Gaul to another. The instability of his Gallic conquests brought Caesar racing back from his invasions of Britain in both 55 and 54 BC to quell deterioration in his Gallic conquests. By 53, the area seemed largely pacified, but underneath the surface, for the first time, the tribes were uniting under Vercingetorix against the Roman invaders.

Map of Gaul during Caesar's campaigns, 58-50 BC

In the winter of 53-52 BC, Caesar was in Cisalpine Gaul holding the normal pattern of judicial assizes. Rome was in turmoil following the murder of Publius Clodius and the political intrigues of multiple political factions. With his political career in crisis, Caesar suddenly learned that the Carnutes, hitherto thought largely pacified, had massacred all Roman citizen traders as well as Caesar's commissariat officer in their oppidum of Cenabum (Orleans). It was the signal. Despite the fact that six legions, the bulk of the Roman army, were quartered in the lands of the Senones, a guerilla force at once formed and began seriously disrupting the army's food supply. Related maneuvers were being handled by Gallic confederates throughout the center of France against the Roman armies in winter quarters. When word came of the uprising, Caesar crossed the Alps in late-February as well as the heavy snows of the Cevennes mountains, appearing in the center of France with his usual unexpectedness. He began collecting the Roman legions in Gaul around the region of Agedincum (Sens).

To deal with the now widespread revolt, Caesar divided his legions: he himself led six legions in the direction of Gergovia, the main stronghold of the Averni, while Titus Labienus took four legions into the lands of the Senones and the Parisii, further to the north. Meanwhile, Vercingetorix, manning the strong natural fortress of Gergovia, had secured the support of the Aedui tribe and its leader, Commius, once considered one of Caesar's most dependable allies. The Aedui for some years had served in the legions as auxiliaries and were highly valued by Caesar as his cavalry. This negotiating triumph led immediately to the massacre of Roman troops by 10,000 supposedly loyal Aedui cavalry and additional murders of all Roman citizens in Cabillonum (Chalon-sur-Saone). Caesar's efforts before Gergovia led to as near a military defeat as he ever suffered in Gaul, and he was forced to withdraw. Tribal leaders formerly loyal to Caesar began deserting with their troops to Vercingetorix. It is estimated that as many as 45 tribes joined against Rome. They torched the army depot of Noviodonum, massacred its Roman merchants and Caesar's hostages, and continued attacks on Caesar's supply lines. Caesar fell back toward the Loire, although he managed to successfully reunite with the legions of Labienus and find some breathing room to replenish his cavalry with German (not Aeduan) auxiliaries. Paradoxically for a tribe in revolt, this appears to have horrified the Aedui, who viewed the German horsemen as brutal barbarians who fought with insane inspiration.

The view from Caesar's lines to the plateau

In an historic move, the tribes had elected Vercingetorix their commander in chief and, some sources claim, King of Gaul. In this anxious summer of 52, he was maintaining his leadership position with the now-swollen confederacy with some difficulty. The tribes, long used to warring against each other for territory and plunder, cooperated only with difficulty. Vercingetorix had become convinced that a "scorched earth" policy would best succeed against the legions since, as both an intelligent and perceptive leader, he knew that numbers had not in the past succeeded against legionary discipline. He pleaded with the tribal leaders to have their people destroy their grain and all foodstuffs which might support the Romans as well as themselves during the campaign. As Caesar himself quotes the great Gaul, All you have to do...is to destroy your corn crops without hesitation and burn your granaries, knowing that this sacrifice will make you free men for ever and rulers over others." This pragmatic advice was, however, directly contradictory to the Gallic warrior tradition and was seldom followed. At some point Vercingetorix was persuaded to invest the citadel of Alesia, the capital of the Mandubrii, as his base, and to attack Caesar's army (en route to the lands of the Sequani) with his vastly superior cavalry forces. Caesar's legions were, however, able to completely repulse the attack with the frightening aid of their new German cavalry: they proved not only of signal support to Caesar but were greatly feared by the Gauls themselves. This quite unexpected defeat led Vercingetorix to retire his army (allegedly 80,000 strong) to Alesia. Caesar quickly grasped the changed situation and followed, immediately beginning on his arrival that inexorable enclosure of the hilltop fortress which would isolate Vercingetorix's army from its remaining allies.

THE SIEGE, 52 BC


" Most of the people who escaped from the battle took refuge with their King in the city of Alesia. The place was regarded as impregnable because of the size and strength of the walls and the great numbers of its defenders. Caesar besieged it, however, and while doing so, was threatened from outside by a quite indescribable danger. Three hundred thousand men, the best fighting troops from every nation in Gaul, assembled together and marched to the relief of Alesia. Caesar now found himself caught between two enormous forces; he was himself besieged and was compelled to build two systems of fortification, one facing the city and one facing the relieving army, since he knew well that, if the two forces should combine, everything would be over with him. "

Plutarch, Life, 27

With Caesar's fabled focus on the arts of engineering to defeat his enemies, he proceeded to circumvallate around the entire plateau of Alesia, constructing walls, ditches, and all the concomitant structures which would lock in the Gauls. The first series of walls eventually stretched a total length of 10 miles. An 18-foot-wide ditch was backed by a second trench, filled with water from a nearby source. Then came a series of buried iron "mantraps" and carefully concealed holes in the ground, several feet deep, containing pointed stakes in the center that would easily impale. A third wall, far behind the others, was nine feet high and capped with breastworks. Square towers at regular intervals held the Romans' feared siege equipment. As Caesar expected that Gallic reinforcements would arrive to aid the besieged army, he then turned to face away from the city, constructing an entire second line of fortifications parallel to the first, between 13-15 miles long. The effect was not only to surround Alesia, but also to enclose Caesar's army between the inner and outer rings of fortifications. It was believed at the time, and remains, one of the Romans' greatest feats of wartime engineering, in a league with Masada and other structures which led the foes of Rome to simply disbelieve the evidence of their own eyes.

Sketch of the double circumvallation at Alesia

Vercingetorix was not idle as he saw the walls begin to rise below him. Ongoing cavalry battles constantly interrupted construction and Roman efforts to gather supplies. Warriors regularly issued from the great gates of Alesia to kill and seek a breakout of the tightening siege. However, the increasing waves of defensive fortifications, including mantraps, made it more and more dangerous for anyone venturing outside the walls. Finally, as Caesar wrote,


" Vercingetorix now decided to send out all his cavalry in the night, before the Roman entrenchments were completed. He bade them go every man to his own country and impress for service all the men of military age. He pointed out how much they owed him ...[and that] they ought not to abandon him to the cruel vengeance of the enemy. Moreover, if they were slack in doing their duty, they would condemn eighty thousand picked men to perish with him. He had taken stock of the corn, he said, and by strict rationing would have enough for a month - even a little longer, if the ration were reduced. "

Caesar, The Gallic Wars, 71

Escaping through a gap in the lines, the troops raced to raise reinforcements. During the next month, Vercingetorix forced all the supplies in Alesia to be brought to him and carefully doled them out. Supplies began to run low. With practical cruelty, it was decided to eject from the hilltop fortress all the townspeople - women, children, the aged and those who could not bear arms - so that their rations might go to sustain the warriors within the town. Unfortunately, these miserable people starved between the lines, neither side being willing to accept them into their ranks. Caesar posted guards to ensure that his troops, hearing their cries, would refuse the Mandubrii admission. Meanwhile, the tribes, alerted by the escaped cavalry, had met and, some quarter million strong according to Caesar, marched for Alesia. Modern scholars believe the number of tribesmen was actually between 80-100,000 warriors. Commius and the other allied leaders encamped on a hill a mile outside the Roman outer lines. Caesar with his lieutenants, including Marc Antony and Gaius Trebonius, braced themselves for a two-front battle. The watchers in the citadel cheered when they saw the Gauls arrive. The endgame of Alesia had begun.

 

[Provolution]

"As long as the Gauls were at a distance from the entrenchments, the rain of javelins which they discharged gained them some advantage. But when they came nearer they suddenly found themselves pierced by the goads or tumbled into the pits and impaled themselves, while others were killed by heavy siege spears discharged from the rampart and towers. Their losses were everywhere heavy and when dawn came they had failed to penetrate the defenses at any point...The besieged lost much time in bringing out the implements that Vercingetorix had prepared for the sortie and in filling up the first stretches of trench, and before they reached the main fortifications heard of the retreat of the relief force, so they returned into the town without effecting anything." De Bello Gallico, VII, 83.

Sketch of the multiple layers of Alesia fortifications

"It opened on the first day with a cavalry battle, which again ended in a Roman victory thanks to the impetuous valor of the Germans. After a day's rest the Roman fortifications were simultaneously attacked from inside and out, but they were nowhere pierced. Around midday on the fourth day the final storm burst; both besieged and relievers put forth their utmost efforts. On this occasion, too, after a fearful battle, the Romans came through victorious. The great relieving army scattered after the lost of 74 standards. On the next day, Vercingetorix surrendered." M. Gelzer.

On the final day of battle, the irony of the revolted Aeduii cavalry became even more clear: the Gauls lost the battle when Caesar's German cavalry attacked from the rear at the moment of Caesar's charge in front. The warriors wavered, broke, and fled in complete rout, hotly pursued by the brutal German cavalry.

"Vercingetorix gathered the tribal leaders and offered either to die at their hand or surrender, at their choice. He told them, Caesar wrote, that "I did not undertake the war...for private ends, but in the cause of national liberty." A deputation was sent to Caesar, who ordered the defeated Gauls to hand over their arms and bring all tribal chiefs to him. He seated himself at the fortification in front of his camp, and there the chiefs and Vercingetorix were brought to him. As Plutarch writes, "Vercingetorix...put on his most beautiful armor, had his horse carefully groomed, and rode out through the gates. Caesar was sitting down and Vercingetorix, after riding round him in a circle, leaped down from his horse, stripped off his armor, and sat at Caesar's feet silent and motionless until he was taken away under arrest, a prisoner reserved for the triumph." Plutarch, Caesar, 27.

The surviving Gauls on the field were divided among Caesar's soldiers as slaves, after 20,000 Aedui and Averni had been separated from them; the political importance of these tribes was such that Caesar pardoned their warriors and even granted the Aedui their former status as free allies. The Arverni were given relatively easy terms of surrender in return for hostages. This preferential treatment of the two leading tribes, as Caesar intended, secured their future loyalty at Caesar's mercy and they never again lent their support to the enemies of Rome.

The Senate awarded Caesar a 20-days' thanksgiving in Rome. In the two-year balance of his command, Caesar completed the pacification of Gaul. By the time he crossed the Rubicon in January, 49 BC, what is now France and Belgium were a province of Rome. No later rebellion shook it significantly until the Empire's last decline, four centuries later. Vercingetorix was led, an honored prisoner, into Roman captivity. He remained alive for six years while Caesar fought Pompey in the Civil War and took control of the Roman world. Then, as was customary with a hostage of such notorious valor, he marched stoically in Caesar's Gallic triumph in 46 BC. He was then strangled, again following custom, in the depths of the Mamartine Prison in Rome.

Nineteen centuries later, the Emperor Napoleon III of France, deeply suspicious of the danger of war with Germany and mindful of the tactical effect of Caesar's German cavalry on the defeat of Vercingetorix, stationed a massive statue of the great Gaul on the site of the newly-discovered ruins of the Alesia fortifications. Vercingetorix had come to symbolize the courageous valor of France against its enemies. However, his defeat at Alesia signaled the destruction of all native hopes for an independent Gaul.

 

[Gelion]

Good job Provolution! That deserves recognition!

 

[allhailIndia]

How come no mention of the Israeli victories against superior forces in the Arab-Israeli wars. Surely, at least some of them were due to the sheer brilliance of Israeli tactics and tenacity, than just Arab incompetence

 

[pawpaw]

How come no mention of the Israeli victories against superior forces in the Arab-Israeli wars. Surely, at least some of them were due to the sheer brilliance of Israeli tactics and tenacity, than just Arab incompetence

from what i've read, it's alot more of the latter