Exhera
Unorthodox Unicorn
Me has thinked!
Motherland be free land, full recognized, even by evil communist China!
(Taiwan)
Motherland be free land, full recognized, even by evil communist China!
(Taiwan)
Possible effects by 2025: Open DPRK rapidly developing with aid from China, Russia and ROK. ROK no longer under US sphere of influence. Japanese military formally reinstated. US possibly taking efforts to strengthen ties with SEA states/India to 'contain' China?
2. Tied to Sone's bit: With Syrian, Yemeni, Palestinian and Iraqi infrastructure still ravaged from conflict, and millions of refugees in none-to-pleasant conditions in neighbouring states, the agricultural disaster of the 2020's hits the region hard, reigniting many waning conflicts. Refugee populations, already grating under conditions that grew increasingly oppressive throughout the 2010's, become more and more unstable as food rations slow. Competition among regional powers (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran) and global powers (US, Russia) further fan the flames.
Possible effects by 2025: Instability, or outright conflict growing in mid-east states (Lebanon, Jordan, maybe Turkey?), reigniting or intensifying of conflicts already present in the 2010's (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine (Kurdistan?)). Regional powers growing increasingly antagonistic to one another, as well as reliant on global powers (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran forming closer ties with US or Russia - maybe Israel and Saudi Arabia becoming ever closer thanks to the US as their mutual ally, and Iran as mutual antagonist).
Other possible ideas are 1) a proper Mexican civil war. 2) collapse or contraction of the EU. 3) strengthening of AU as African economies grow, and domestic conflicts continue to grow to regional conflicts (influence of China?).
Me has thinked!
Motherland be free land, full recognized, even by evil communist China!
(Taiwan)
I doubt China would ever intervene in Southeast Asia. Most of its potential targets are US allies, e.g. Thailand and the Philippines, strong enough to resist, e.g. Indonesia or Vietnam, and/or would cause other powers to freak, e.g. India with Burma. This is quite apart from the fact that outside of a limited conflict over some coral islands, there's no reason to intervene. Keeping in mind that the present coral island thing is causing a major regional realignment to the US.
This is something the United States is already doing through bilateral security agreements with various countries in the region, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
I think direct conflict between the major powers in the region would be unlikely. The powers involved would likely wage war on one another through their proxies in Syria, Yemen, and other destabilized countries. There are a couple of wild cards in my opinion that could push into a more general Middle Eastern conflict such as a Third (or Fourth by 2025) Intifada or another conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Southern Lebanon.
1. I don't know enough about Mexico to guess what the factions in a Mexican Civil War would actually be. I don't feel at this moment that Mexico is veering toward civil war, and with the United States right next door, I believe that there would be humanitarian intervention to alleviate the food crisis in Mexico before it spiraled into something nastier.
3. When you say strengthening, do you mean increasing the strength of the institutions and the integration of its members of just increased general clout because of Africa's growing economy? I can see both as well as regional economic and political blocs forming such as the East African Federation.
I think there is zero chance that Taiwan will ever become an independent country by 2050. As time goes on, the United States' ability to intervene positively to save Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack to thwart a Taiwanese declaration of independence is just going to keep decreasing. The United States will likely continue pressing Taiwanese leaders to not declare independence or take steps toward independence because the United States knows that that would be a red line for China. I believe Taiwan will remain in a perpetual limbo of de facto statehood without actually ever receiving the full benefits of full independence.
Of course, but with the loss of the ROK as an ally, the US could push for more direct security agreements with SEA states (possibly permanent bases, or larger bases) that feel threatened by Chinese claims (Philippines, most notably). Also largely depends on how SEA states swing with a weakened US presence, ie Vietnam and Indonesia. There's also the possibility that the US could simply reverse its 'pivot' if events in the mid-east/mexico/europe take too much of its attention.
Good idea, as violence fueled by the drug war continues, confidence in the mexican gov't continues to drop, resulting in many local and state groups taking up arms to defend themselves. Seeing Mexico on the brink of a full on collapse, The US (and maybe Canada/neighbouring states/UN PKO?) intervene.
I guess the other issue is that any Chinese intervention is going to be viewed so negatively... that it would hurt China more than help it. You might gain a client... and lose the region completely.
@thomas
I don't that's really possible given the timeframe.
Oh, 100 years for 80 meters is the estimate.
Re: Chinese agricultural investment in Africa.
A few points:
1. Agriculture is declining as a share of African economic output and only accounts for between 12 to 15 per cent of total now. Going forward it will continue to decline in economic significance with a consequent reduction in its usefulness as a lever.
2. European and North American investment still accounts for half of FDI into Africa. The whole of the Asia-Pacific region is 20 per cent and has remained more or less flat for the last decade. China could grow its FDI inflows a lot but in will lag far behind European and North America levels of investment.
3. Agricultural investment is not that important. The top three sectors were tech, media and telecoms and accounted for 50% of FDI in 2013. Agriculture might grow but that will be from a low base.
4. There’s a host of issues with investing in green-fields African agriculture e.g. non-existent supply chains and enabling infrastructure. It’s for this reason that South Africa and Egypt account for something like half of all FDI in agriculture.
5. I have no idea why mining and energy (the latter in particular) are not considered given that it’s possible for one or two projects to have an outsized impact on state revenue/economic performance.
Sources: EY & UNCTAD
Ideas I have bouncing around but need to actually do some proper research on later:
1. Softish collapse of North Korea: A relatively non-violent coup results in deescalation between the DPRK and ROK. While full reunification is not yet realised (by 2025) due to the amount of effort the ROK would need to exert to develop the north properly, the DPRK is much more integrated into the regional economy, and has much stronger ties with the PRC, ROK and Russia. With the DPRK no longer a threat, the US loses influence in the region as the ROK does not renew its alliance with the US, instead forming closer ties with China and Russia, and keen to become its own independent power in the region. With US support, Japan fully re-militarizes, further antagonizing Korea and China.
Possible effects by 2025: Open DPRK rapidly developing with aid from China, Russia and ROK. ROK no longer under US sphere of influence. Japanese military formally reinstated. US possibly taking efforts to strengthen ties with SEA states/India to 'contain' China?
This is something the United States is already doing through bilateral security agreements with various countries in the region, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership.
Of course, but with the loss of the ROK as an ally, the US could push for more direct security agreements with SEA states (possibly permanent bases, or larger bases) that feel threatened by Chinese claims (Philippines, most notably). Also largely depends on how SEA states swing with a weakened US presence, ie Vietnam and Indonesia. There's also the possibility that the US could simply reverse its 'pivot' if events in the mid-east/mexico/europe take too much of its attention.
I think Mexico would have to absolutely collapse in order to derail the US pivot, but fair point. Besides the United States pushing for increased security arrangements, the countries in the region themselves likely would begin relying on one another if the US is distracted elsewhere.
2. Tied to Sone's bit: With Syrian, Yemeni, Palestinian and Iraqi infrastructure still ravaged from conflict, and millions of refugees in none-to-pleasant conditions in neighbouring states, the agricultural disaster of the 2020's hits the region hard, reigniting many waning conflicts. Refugee populations, already grating under conditions that grew increasingly oppressive throughout the 2010's, become more and more unstable as food rations slow. Competition among regional powers (Israel, Saudi Arabia, Iran) and global powers (US, Russia) further fan the flames.
That makes perfect sense. Besides the mentioned countries, countries that have "fended off" the worst of the Arab Winter, such as Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Bahrain, may find themselves embroiled in widespread unrest once again. Especially since in the case of Egypt, it isn't likely that development will have reached a satisfactorily level under the current military regime.
Possible effects by 2025: Instability, or outright conflict growing in mid-east states (Lebanon, Jordan, maybe Turkey?), reigniting or intensifying of conflicts already present in the 2010's (Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Palestine (Kurdistan?)). Regional powers growing increasingly antagonistic to one another, as well as reliant on global powers (Israel, Saudi Arabia and Iran forming closer ties with US or Russia - maybe Israel and Saudi Arabia becoming ever closer thanks to the US as their mutual ally, and Iran as mutual antagonist).
I think direct conflict between the major powers in the region would be unlikely. The powers involved would likely wage war on one another through their proxies in Syria, Yemen, and other destabilized countries. There are a couple of wild cards in my opinion that could push into a more general Middle Eastern conflict such as a Third (or Fourth by 2025) Intifada or another conflict between Hezbollah and Israel in Southern Lebanon.
Not a direct conflict between Russia and the US, of course, but increased tensions (possibly setting up for something in following terms, or setting the stage for the game proper) as they try to set up friendly regimes in the collapsing states.
Other possible ideas are 1) a proper Mexican civil war. 2) collapse or contraction of the EU. 3) strengthening of AU as African economies grow, and domestic conflicts continue to grow to regional conflicts (influence of China?).
I'll make proper events once I do a bit more reading and other people weigh in.
1. I don't know enough about Mexico to guess what the factions in a Mexican Civil War would actually be. I don't feel at this moment that Mexico is veering toward civil war, and with the United States right next door, I believe that there would be humanitarian intervention to alleviate the food crisis in Mexico before it spiraled into something nastier.
Good idea, as violence fueled by the drug war continues, confidence in the mexican gov't continues to drop, resulting in many local and state groups taking up arms to defend themselves. Seeing Mexico on the brink of a full on collapse, The US (and maybe Canada/neighboring states/UN PKO?) intervene.
I can see that, but I don't feel that it would get that far in the first place.
Other possible ideas are 1) a proper Mexican civil war. 2) collapse or contraction of the EU. 3) strengthening of AU as African economies grow, and domestic conflicts continue to grow to regional conflicts (influence of China?).
I'll make proper events once I do a bit more reading and other people weigh in.
2. Wild card.
Other possible ideas are 1) a proper Mexican civil war. 2) collapse or contraction of the EU. 3) strengthening of AU as African economies grow, and domestic conflicts continue to grow to regional conflicts (influence of China?).
I'll make proper events once I do a bit more reading and other people weigh in.
3. When you say strengthening, do you mean increasing the strength of the institutions and the integration of its members of just increased general clout because of Africa's growing economy? I can see both as well as regional economic and political blocs forming such as the East African Federation.
3. I would imagine there are a few countries in Southeast Asia that China may intervene in the 2020s should instability rise too high.
Possibly both, though it would make more sense for regional political/security blocs to form rather than something analogous to the EU, given how intensely African nations tend support sovereignty and non-intervention (in their own affairs). Along with an East African Bloc mostly made up of the states involved in Somalia (Ehtiopia, Kenya, Burundi, Uganda, etc), as well as possibly a West Africa Bloc, forming around the conflict against Boko Haram and its ilk (Nigeria, Cameroon, Niger, Chad). The agricultural crisis could force African states to cooperate more closely together (or drive them apart, who knows), as well as into Chinese influence (or American/South African/who ever else).
Me has thinked!
Motherland be free land, full recognized, even by evil communist China!
(Taiwan)
I think there is zero chance that Taiwan will ever become an independent country by 2050. As time goes on, the United States' ability to intervene positively to save Taiwan in the event of a Chinese attack to thwart a Taiwanese declaration of independence is just going to keep falling. For starters, the United States is careful about what weapons it sends Taiwan, and how many, because sending too many weapons or certain weapon systems would trigger a crisis. Furthermore, China's air force and navy are undergoing substantial modernization which will shift the air force from being just a tool of the army to a strategically powerful tool in its own right. [1] The United States will likely continue pressing Taiwanese leaders to not declare independence or take steps toward independence because the United States knows that that would be a red line for China. I believe Taiwan will remain in a perpetual limbo of de facto statehood without actually ever receiving the full benefits of full independence.
[1] http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/01402390.2015.1068165
Agreed. China, Taiwan and the US don't have much to gain from changing the status quo. If anything, economic ties between Taiwan and China keep getting tighter as they are now, making it nearly impossible for Taiwan to risk cutting them.
I can't think of a state that's sitting on that kind of demographic volcano. Burma is the exception... but it's been blowing up regularly since 1949 and not even the Tatmadaw shelling across the border into China during an attack against the ethnic Han Kokang, despite warnings from the PRC not to attack their one-time/likely still clients, got them to say much and that was this year. There's just no reason to do it really. Burma is weak and ineffective enough to make it hard to impose a government nevermind there being absolutely no reason to want to get involved. I guess the other issue is that any Chinese intervention is going to be viewed so negatively... that it would hurt China more than help it. You might gain a client... and lose the region completely.
In that case, is there any chance China would concede some of its claims in the South China Sea in order to build ties and political support for planned projects like the Maritime Silk Road? Or is the government facing too many internal and domestic pressure to change course on the issues?