wierd postwar situations

[Loki130]

so I've been reading about the occupied countries in ww2 lately, and I've been wondering: what happened to these places just after the war, when the occupation melted away and the locals were left to their own devices? I know I've heard about some mini-state in a gap of occupation in germany just following WW1, so I'm wondering if there have been other situations like that.

so the question, which applies to all of history: What kind of wierd situations have sprung up immediately following a war, or some collapse of government?

 

[vogtmurr]

There were a host of short lived independent states in the wake of WWI and the Bolshevik Revolution, and they all issued their own stamps

• Far Eastern Republic (Bolshevik) 1920-22, buffer state against the Japanese assisted White Army in the east.
• Ukraine: several short lived states between 1917-21. Among them the nationalist Ukrainian People's Republic,
• the Hetmanate cossack state supported by the central powers, the Directorate in opposition to this, the Western Ukrainian People's Republic overrun by Poland, the anarchist 'black army' of red army deserters led by Nestor Makhno, and the pro-Bolshevik Soviet Republic that eventually came out on top. What is interesting about the Russian civil war conflicts is even though WWI was over, the defeated central powers participated sometimes with or against the allies.
  
• Transcaucasian Federated Republics 1917-18, before squabbling amongst themselves and dissolution in to the 3 separate Caucasus republics below. The recent history of this region is a telling commentary on the degree of ethnic diversity and the current strife in this region. After heavy involvement with the red army in the Civil War and against the Ottomans, it re-emerged as a Soviet Federated State but continued to issue it's own stamps 1922-1936.

• Democratic Republic of Georgia 1918-21, bordering the short-lived Mountainous Republic of Northern Caucasus, and Kuban People's Republic.
• Democratic Republic of Armenia 1918-21, this fragment of the Armenian homeland on the Russian side of the border became the modern republic in 1991.
• Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan 1918-21. Ethnically, the dominant nationalism was Zoroastrian Persian.

The Tuvans were allowed a satellite independent state 1921-44 (Tannu Tuva)bordering modern Mongolia, and this is only a sample of the variety within the Soviet Union.

The breakdown and regional states of inter-war China between the Nationalist revolution and the victory of the PLA is even more intricate and confusing, but few of them were drawn along ethnic lines.

Then there's the short lived territories eventually decided by pelbiscite or arbitration in Europe:

Eastern Rumelia, between Ottoman Thrace and Bulgaria, majority to Bulgaria by 1908 before the last Balkan wars

• Karelia, Finns failed to overthrow the Bolshevists, absorbed in Russia by 1923.
• Eastern Silesia 1918-20, between Poland and Czechoslovakia before the latter occupied it.
• Central Lithuania 1920-22, in the Vilnius region, eventually went to Poland.
• Bessarabia, declared independence 1918, joined kingdom of Romania 3 months later. Reoccupied by Russia 1944, became state of Moldavia 1991.
• Plus the three short lived republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, independent from 1921-1941, and then again in 1991.

Pieces of the former Central Powers, some oif which reverted to their former control before the Franco-Prussian War.

• Schleswig-Holstein rejoined Denmark by referendum 1920.
• Eupen, Malmedy, annexed to Belgium 1925.
• Fiume free state 1919-24, occupied by Italy, reverted to Yugoslav control post WWII.
• Saarland was a haven for anti-Nazi sympathizers until the referendum of 1935 brought it under German control.
• The Free State of Danzig 1920-39 actually remained that way and was one of the casus belli of WWII.

Then there's the various Greek fragments from the same era:
Crete 1900-13.
Epirus 1914-16
Thrace various pieces 1913, and 1919-22.

Not to mention the colonial enclaves around the world that changed hands, and the various provisional governments of the Spanish Civil War that issued their own stamps,

 

[BananaLee]

When the Japanese left Malaya, the MPAJA (essentially a communist resistance group) took over the government for three days before the Brits returned and establied the BMA.

 

[Masada]

Post-war Indonesia was an absolute basket-case. You had Japanese trained Javanese militia groups, Japanese trained Sumatran militia groups, Nationalist leaders who assisted the Japanese to varying degrees, Islamist groups, Communists cadres, Socialists cadres, various separatist groups, and the Japanese themselves desperately trying to keep the peace.

In short order you then had the British turn up and fight a series of running battles with the aforementioned Japanese trained Javanese militias which killed around 20,000 people mostly civilians, you then had a series of skirmishes in Sumatra before the British effectively gave up trying to secure the entirety of the big islands. They then waited for the Dutch to rebuild their military, while the various Indonesian groups fought each other, the Dutch then arrived and launched a series of 'police actions' against the Nationalist Republic of Indonesia who then melted away into the hills of Central Java.

The Dutch then setup a puppet United States of Indonesia which incorporated at its height almost none of Sumatra and only about half of Java but the rest of the outer islands. They then tried to get the thing recognized, failed, and were forced out by diplomatic pressure led by America. The United States of Indonesia promptly fell apart with all its constituent parts joining the Republic of Indonesia. The Republic was then forced to quell a series of Islamist rebellions, rather bloodily, and was then forced to turn on the Socialist Party when it attempted to overthrow the government, which effectively destroyed them as a viable entity. It just keeps going on at this point for about another decade as successive groups rise and are crushed by the Republic.

 

[Arwon]

It seems like a near miracle that Indonesia stayed a single entity.

 

[Masada]

It's significantly more complex than that, that was merely the external struggle by the Republic the internal struggles were just as bloody. The Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian Armed Forces) during the early years of the Republic was composed of two major groups, Japanese trained militia's who made up the majority and operated at varying levels of competence, and the Dutch trained troops of the now-defunct colonial army who were consummate professionals. The early years of the war against the Dutch were chaotic but most Indonesians were resigned to getting rid of the Dutch. As the Dutch began to fold the various elements of the military itself began to fall-out with each other, the Dutch trained officers of the army wanted to form a proper Western style military whilst the Japanese trained officers wanted to form an army of national struggle which would essentially operate as a largely autonomous national guard with guerrilla pretensions.

Neither side could agree. Nevertheless the fiscal meltdown of the Republic at the end of the war preempted both groups, as the government was forced to order the demobilization of a couple of hundred thousand soldiers, mostly from the militias. Predictably they were not happy about losing their livelihood and most promptly deserted, the Republic was thus left with a large number of battle-hardened militias spread all over the country especially in areas it had little real control over - Sumatra, Central and Eastern Java and the outer islands especially the Moluccas and Sulawesi. Alongside regionally focused forces were arrayed primarily Socialist Parties cadres (the Indonesian Communist Party hadn't quite recovered from a crack-down by Dutch officials some years earlier) and a whole host of other politically motivated forces.

This led to about a decade of instability and constant fight between the Republican government and forces looking to do away with it -- in short order forces in Sumatra were crushed, an abortive socialist uprising was quelled bloodily, separatists in Sulawesi were dealt with and the list keeps going on

It seems like a near miracle that Indonesia stayed a single entity.

It nearly fell apart a number of times -- and it did fall apart a number of times as well.

 

[Tee Kay]

The Warlord Era in early Republican China is highly entertaining.

Mongolia became independent around this time. Right after the collapse of Qing, Mongolia declared its independence as a Tibet-esque quasi-theocracy under Bogd Khan. This was not recognized by the Republic of China (which still claims Outer Mongolia to this day). In 1919 the Chinese somehow managed to have enough cohesion to attack Mongolia and drive out the Khan. Right after this retreating White Russian general Baron Ungern von Sternburg drove out the Chinese and ruled Mongolia as de facto dictator (though the country officially remained a theocracy with Bogd Khan at the helm), dreaming of the restoration of the Russian Empire while organizing pogroms against any Jews who happened to be around for him to prosecute. The Bolsheviks help raised a communist Mongolian army (around this time Mongolia is almost entirely comprised of nomads) who overthrew the Baron and impose a communist government with the lama Bogd Khan as Head of State. Mongolia became a "People's Republic" (read: Stalinist dictatorship) in 1924.

 

[vogtmurr]

The bloody white baron - that's pretty messed up.

 

[BananaLee]

It seems like a near miracle that Indonesia stayed a single entity.

Even more so that the concept of modern Indonesia as a single entity was a construct imagined up by nationalists.
Javanese, Sumatran and Sulawesians were at one point and are still are to some extent pretty damned distinct cultures with separate interests.

 

[Camikaze]

[...]Indonesia[...]

To talk of weird postwar situations, I would say that the fact that Japan was still occupying Indonesia after the war (for the Allies), and even after Sukarno's tacitly allowed Indonesian declaration of independence under that occupation, makes for an odd situation.

 

[Yeekim]

[*]Plus the three short lived republics of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, independent from 1921-1941, and then again in 1991.

Just a minor nitpick; Estonia declared independence in 1918 and was first recognized de jure by Tartu Peace Treaty, signed in February 1920 with Russian SFSR.

 

[Tee Kay]

Speaking of post-WWI Baltic states, the United Baltic Duchy was pretty messed up.

 

[Masada]

To talk of weird postwar situations, I would say that the fact that Japan was still occupying Indonesia after the war (for the Allies), and even after Sukarno's tacitly allowed Indonesian declaration of independence under that occupation, makes for an odd situation.

I don't think approval, even tacit approval, is correct; the opinions of the Japanese occupying authorities – especially within army, navy and colonial office – varied considerably on the question. I’ll discuss the events leading up to August 17 – the day of proclamation itself – in some detail, since to me it exemplifies the differing attitudes of the former-conquers to Indonesian independence. The Japanese occupation was initially welcomed, somewhat hesitantly, by some, if not most, Indonesian nationalists including Sukarno, with the most notable hold-out being Mohamed Hatta. It soon became apparent that the Japanese occupying authorities were not at all interested in Indonesian independence. For instance the military commander of Java wouldn’t even consider the matter until the end of the war – in-line with policy promulgated in 1941. In 1942 when a major newspaper published a piece which claimed that the Japanese were intent on setting a civilian government, an army controlled newspaper stated that the article was untrue.

This effectively continued on till 1944 when the Japanese war effort began to collapse, and the threat of an allied invasion of Indonesia became a distinct possibility, concessions promptly followed. It was however only on 24 August 1945 that the military commander of South-East Asia, Marshall Terauchi, gave approval for independence, with a date sometime in the near future. This loose schedule was interrupted by destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the subsequent surrender of Japan, which took Sukarno and Hatta by surprise. All the Japanese were willing to give officially was an in-principle support for independence with no date attached, whether or not they intended to honour it is a totally different thing and going by their previous actions, I highly doubt they would have.

On 15 August, Sukarno and Hatta twice rejected overtures by Japanese trained nationalist militiamen, to issue a Declaration of Independence. They were kidnapped that same night by those they had refused. This refusal was vindicated somewhat when the nationalist militias who were supposed to rise early that next morning didn’t rise. The situation got even more confusing when another nationalist leader realizing that Sukarno and Hatta had gone missing contacted the Japanese Navy, on the assumption that the two had been arrested by the Army. The admiral in charge, Mayeda, was horrified and immediately tried to contact army headquarters, fearing for the two’s safety. The two were discovered short afterwards and in order to secure their release Mayeda promised that the Navy was willing to back Indonesian independence.

Sukarno and Hatta then went to see the commander of the Army, General Yamomoto, who refused outright to receive them. They then went to his subordinate, General Nishimura, who refused them in person, forcefully. Even with the army’s apparent displeasure, Sukarno and Hatta decided to declare independence anyway, counting on Mayeda’s word. The wording of the proclamation itself caused serious problems; some held that it should be aimed at the Japanese, which was rejected, others held that only those who had not been part of Japanese sponsored bodies should sign; this was rejected in favour of having just Sukarno and Hatta sign. The presence of Japanese troops on the street, on the morning of the proclamation August 17, necessitated that the proclamation be read out quickly in front of only a handful of people. Japan hadn't surrendered, Mayeda didn't have the authority to approve anything and he had even go so as to hide Sukarno and Hatta in his own home in the night leading up to the event. The 'Japanese' did not offer tantrum approval and judging by later events were quite willing to kill people to maintain order.

 

[Camikaze]

I don't think approval, even tacit approval, is correct;

I was just meaning allowance, rather than approval, but I'll play along.

the opinions of the Japanese occupying authorities – especially within army, navy and colonial office – varied considerably on the question. I’ll discuss the events leading up to August 17 – the day of proclamation itself – in some detail, since to me it exemplifies the differing attitudes of the former-conquers to Indonesian independence. The Japanese occupation was initially welcomed, somewhat hesitantly, by some, if not most, Indonesian nationalists including Sukarno, with the most notable hold-out being Mohamed Hatta. It soon became apparent that the Japanese occupying authorities were not at all interested in Indonesian independence. For instance the military commander of Java wouldn’t even consider the matter until the end of the war – in-line with policy promulgated in 1941. In 1942 when a major newspaper published a piece which claimed that the Japanese were intent on setting a civilian government, an army controlled newspaper stated that the article was untrue.

Similarly, I wouldn't say that the Japanese occupation was welcomed so much as tolerated. Sure, it allowed for a situation that was beneficial to nationalist ambitions, and eventually conducive to independence, but at the same time, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin did not particularly want the Japanese occupation anymore than they wanted the Dutch occupation. Hatta particularly so, IIRC. They were smart enough not to believe a word of the Co-Prosperity Sphere. They knew that they would still have to work to gain concessions and eventual independence from a merely substituted imperial foe. It wasn't a matter of ever believing that the Japanese were truly intent on Indonesian independence, purely for the sake of Indonesian independence. That's why Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin organised resistance, with the agreement of Sukarno and Hatta, who would only show tacit and minimal support for the Japanese, so long as it worked towards their ends.

Question: Wasn't Java the freest of the administrative zones, particularly for nationalist organisations?

This effectively continued on till 1944 when the Japanese war effort began to collapse, and the threat of an allied invasion of Indonesia became a distinct possibility, concessions promptly followed. It was however only on 24 August 1945 that the military commander of South-East Asia, Marshall Terauchi, gave approval for independence, with a date sometime in the near future.

Concessions were made before 1944, and independence was mooted and in the works before August. Notably the March independence convention at which Sukarno's independence model was accepted.

This loose schedule was interrupted by destruction of Nagasaki and Hiroshima and the subsequent surrender of Japan, which took Sukarno and Hatta by surprise. All the Japanese were willing to give officially was an in-principle support for independence with no date attached, whether or not they intended to honour it is a totally different thing and going by their previous actions, I highly doubt they would have.

I would say that the Japanese put themselves in a position where it would be impossible not to grant independence, even if in a puppet-like fashion. Precedent can be seen in Burma. Japan didn't see the need to occupy the East Indies, so much as control its resources. They would rather allow a friendly independence, under the guise of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (which probably would have inevitably brought fuller Indonesian independence), under which they could still control resources, than risk civil conflict within Indonesia, losing the resources along the way.

Now, procrastination on the Japanese part probably came a lot due to the fact that it just wasn't possible, in the later years of the war, for Japan to evacuate its troops orderly, and maintain the resources. The only way to have the resources was to occupy Indonesia albeit in a self-sufficient manner. Even if an independent Indonesia could be achieved, with the agreement that all resources would be shipped to Japan, the Allied control of the sea would have assured that the resources never arrived at their destination. It just wasn't possible to maintain those supply/trade routes. Japan could either occupy Indonesia and use some of the resources locally, with the rest pretty much all being sunk or wasted in some other way, or they could attempt a messy withdrawal, and lose all the resources. That would be in no way beneficial to them, seeing as the only place they could feasibly withdraw to would be Indochina, where they would be of no use, and only compound supply and food problems.

On 15 August, Sukarno and Hatta twice rejected overtures by Japanese trained nationalist militiamen, to issue a Declaration of Independence. They were kidnapped that same night by those they had refused. This refusal was vindicated somewhat when the nationalist militias who were supposed to rise early that next morning didn’t rise. The situation got even more confusing when another nationalist leader realizing that Sukarno and Hatta had gone missing contacted the Japanese Navy, on the assumption that the two had been arrested by the Army. The admiral in charge, Mayeda, was horrified and immediately tried to contact army headquarters, fearing for the two’s safety. The two were discovered short afterwards and in order to secure their release Mayeda promised that the Navy was willing to back Indonesian independence.

And this doesn't count as approval, even if diminished to tacit?

Sukarno and Hatta then went to see the commander of the Army, General Yamomoto, who refused outright to receive them. They then went to his subordinate, General Nishimura, who refused them in person, forcefully. Even with the army’s apparent displeasure, Sukarno and Hatta decided to declare independence anyway, counting on Mayeda’s word. The wording of the proclamation itself caused serious problems; some held that it should be aimed at the Japanese, which was rejected, others held that only those who had not been part of Japanese sponsored bodies should sign; this was rejected in favour of having just Sukarno and Hatta sign. The presence of Japanese troops on the street, on the morning of the proclamation August 17, necessitated that the proclamation be read out quickly in front of only a handful of people. Japan hadn't surrendered, Mayeda didn't have the authority to approve anything and he had even go so as to hide Sukarno and Hatta in his own home in the night leading up to the event. The 'Japanese' did not offer tantrum approval and judging by later events were quite willing to kill people to maintain order.

My statement that it was tacitly allowed came from the fact that Sukarno was not prevented from declaring independence at a public meeting, despite the presence of Japanese troops. They army administration may not have approved it, but they allowed it.

Also, by this stage, Japan had surrendered. They were an Allied occupation force, under orders to maintain order and the status quo until the Dutch arrived back. They obviously weren't particularly fond of their new masters, and therefore their orders, and were willing, to a degree, to be fairly lenient, without compromising their charge. By the stage of independence, the final decision of allowance was not in the hands of the Japanese, but the Allies. The Japanese were slightly apathetic, enough so to allow Indonesian independence.

 

[Masada]

Sure, it allowed for a situation that was beneficial to nationalist ambitions, and eventually conducive to independence, but at the same time, Sukarno, Hatta, Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin did not particularly want the Japanese occupation anymore than they wanted the Dutch occupation. Hatta particularly so, IIRC.

The Japanese before the war and during the lead-up to the invasion of the Dutch East Indies had been quite content to lead Indonesians on about their intentions, it was quite effective, when they landed they were generally welcomed as liberators. In Java especially just before and during the invasion they made a special effort to win the population over, invoking the Djojobojo prophecies in leaflets dropped from airplanes. In the early days they also allowed the Indonesian flag to flown and the national anthem to be sung, moves which were seen as a prelude to independence by most in the independence movement: it was after-all sufficient to win over the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia as well as some Gerwindo members. Even the events of 14 March 1942 when Kan Po the army paper I've already referenced ruled out the notion wasn't enough to dissuade many. It wasn't until 17 March 1942 that Japanese headquarters said that political speculation had to stop and it wasn't until further restrictions were passed on 20 March which banned the right of assembly and the use of the flag and anthem that it became clear. Even then many still believed that some sort of compromise was possible, and this was enhanced by the promotion of Indonesians to key positions in the government, which they held till the end of the year in most cases, only then were they replaced by Japanese. Hopes were again raised with the formation of the Three A Movement and were again dashed.

Sukarno only returned in July 1942 and nobody is quite sure what he thought at the time (his memoirs at that stage are not even close to reliable), but given his later actions it was probably positive, he was always behind the eight-ball in that respect. Also according to his memoirs the Japanese begged to have him help them, allowed him to work towards independence of the Japanese and Dutch and he managed to elicit a promise that the Japanese governor would not interfere in this, which is all a lie, the Japanese had left him in Sumatra for a year without bothering to see him, and were not at all interested in his services, they even made fun of him in communiques and frankly that he seemed rather happy to help. There isn't any indication that he arrived at that conclusion until much later. Hatta and Sjahrir you are correct about, they did oppose Japanese. Sjarifuddin wasn't a nationalist in the sense of Hatta or Sukarno, he was a Marxist-Nationalist and doesn't come under the nationalist in the political sense banner - later events would bear that out.

They knew that they would still have to work to gain concessions and eventual independence from a merely substituted imperial foe. It wasn't a matter of ever believing that the Japanese were truly intent on Indonesian independence, purely for the sake of Indonesian independence. That's why Sjahrir and Sjarifuddin organised resistance, with the agreement of Sukarno and Hatta, who would only show tacit and minimal support for the Japanese, so long as it worked towards their ends.

I've shown that Sukarno probably didn't arrive at that conclusion till quite late in the game - ridiculously late in reality - and that fits in with his political character, he did exactly the same thing when Suharto came to power. Sukarno's position wasn't clear-cut, it wasn't only the Dutch and the Allies who accused him of being a collaborator, the insult was a perennial favorite of many Indonesians as well, something he hated. His actions can be contrasted with the actions of others, many didn't collaborate, he did. In any case, he had written considerable amounts about Asian brotherhood and the like, and came to the conclusion that dominance by an Asian power was preferable to dominance by a European power; this included the form of government, he didn't like western democracy and even from his earliest days preferred an Asian democracy somewhat similar in design to Japan but without the tone if you will. The most interesting facet at least in my opinion was how he changed in political tone, you can read his earlier speeches and see that during the war what he said changed markedly. You can never be sure with Sukarno, and most scholars are not in the least sure how he really felt or thought.

I guess the simple point I'm trying to make is that Sukarno and indeed the wider nationalist movement - and the majority were happy to collaborate - effectively accepted Japanese control, most did nothing to oppose it, and were quite content to sit, the notion that Japan could lose and thus free Indonesia was frankly inconceivable till quite late, remembering of course that the Japanese deliberately obscured how badly the war had turned against them. It is true that Sukarno and Hatta in 45' were not just surprised but gobsmacked when Japan surrendered, there had been little suggestion until a few months before that the Japanese were losing the war. Indeed I find the whole notion of sitting and waiting it out to be unlikely for that reason. In any case Sjarifuddin was going to do what he wanted to with our without anyone's approval.

Question: Wasn't Java the freest of the administrative zones, particularly for nationalist organisations?

No, it wasn't.

Concessions were made before 1944, and independence was mooted and in the works before August. Notably the March independence convention at which Sukarno's independence model was accepted.

The substantive reach of the concessions was minimal and the Independence Conference wasn't a promise of anything substantive either. They were token gestures, and the last was no guarantee of anything.

I would say that the Japanese put themselves in a position where it would be impossible not to grant independence, even if in a puppet-like fashion. Precedent can be seen in Burma. Japan didn't see the need to occupy the East Indies, so much as control its resources. They would rather allow a friendly independence, under the guise of the Co-Prosperity Sphere (which probably would have inevitably brought fuller Indonesian independence), under which they could still control resources, than risk civil conflict within Indonesia, losing the resources along the way.

That was discussed but the prevailing opinion seemed to be that the East Indies could be controlled with a minimum of force; and that independence was not necessary. They hadn't even been invited to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Conference (which was in 44' from memory) and Tojo had made it expressly clear that Indonesia was not going to get independence.

Now, procrastination on the Japanese part probably came a lot due to the fact that it just wasn't possible, in the later years of the war, for Japan to evacuate its troops orderly, and maintain the resources. The only way to have the resources was to occupy Indonesia albeit in a self-sufficient manner. Even if an independent Indonesia could be achieved, with the agreement that all resources would be shipped to Japan, the Allied control of the sea would have assured that the resources never arrived at their destination. It just wasn't possible to maintain those supply/trade routes. Japan could either occupy Indonesia and use some of the resources locally, with the rest pretty much all being sunk or wasted in some other way, or they could attempt a messy withdrawal, and lose all the resources. That would be in no way beneficial to them, seeing as the only place they could feasibly withdraw to would be Indochina, where they would be of no use, and only compound supply and food problems.

That wasn't the case. The best it could hope for was a semi-partition, with Java being given some semblance of freedom and the rest being rolled into a colony.

And this doesn't count as approval, even if diminished to tacit?

No. Mayeda didn't have the authority to do what he did. It wasn't "Japanese" approval by any stretch of the imagination.

My statement that it was tacitly allowed came from the fact that Sukarno was not prevented from declaring independence at a public meeting, despite the presence of Japanese troops. They army administration may not have approved it, but they allowed it.

They didn't know, it was done in secret, wasn't announce and was done in front of whoever was in the square. All Sukarno and Hatta did was read out the proclamation, raised the flag and played the national anthem then they hid:

PROCLAMATION

WE THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA HEREBY DECLARE THE INDEPENDENCE OF
INDONESIA. MATTERS WHICH CONCERN THE TRANSFER OF POWER AND
OTHER THINGS WILL BE EXECUTED BY CAREFUL MEANS AND IN THE
SHORTEST POSSIBLE TIME.

DJAKARTA, 17 AUGUST 1945

IN THE NAME OF THE PEOPLE OF INDONESIA
SOEKARNO—HATTA

The subsequent actions of the Japanese army are easy to verify, they were not inclined to support independence or anything that entailed. They realized the half a million consequences they had trained and only partially armed! The timely arrival of Sukarno on 19 September defused Ikada Square and destroyed the aspirations of Tan Malakka in that regard. Nevertheless there were Japanese casualties between the proclamation and their withdrawal, and if Ikada had gone off it would have been significantly more.

Also, by this stage, Japan had surrendered. They were an Allied occupation force, under orders to maintain order and the status quo until the Dutch arrived back. They obviously weren't particularly fond of their new masters, and therefore their orders, and were willing, to a degree, to be fairly lenient, without compromising their charge. By the stage of independence, the final decision of allowance was not in the hands of the Japanese, but the Allies. The Japanese were slightly apathetic, enough so to allow Indonesian independence.

No they hadn't! The proclamation was read on the 17th and the Japanese didn't officially surrender till the 28th. Between the announcement on the 15th and the signing of the 28th the army wasn't quite sure what to do. They were not apathetic, the refusal by the commander of the army to meet Sukarno and the outright refusal face to face of the second in command to countenance independence shows that.

 

[vogtmurr]

Just a minor nitpick; Estonia declared independence in 1918 and was first recognized de jure by Tartu Peace Treaty, signed in February 1920 with Russian SFSR.

Thanks Yeekim, figured you'd be on top of this.

 

[Phrossack]

The story of Baron Ungern von Sternberg is the most bizarre tale I have ever heard.

 

[Camikaze]

@Masada- assuming what you say is true (which I am), the source I have on hand is quite misleading, and differs from what you've said in certain aspects.

The Japanese before the war and during the lead-up to the invasion of the Dutch East Indies had been quite content to lead Indonesians on about their intentions, it was quite effective, when they landed they were generally welcomed as liberators.

Which is why 100 000 volunteered to fight for the Dutch?

In Java especially just before and during the invasion they made a special effort to win the population over...

You seem to take a rather cynical view of Sukarno. Couldn't you say that instead of the Japanese deciding to grant concessions, Sukarno forced concessions?

No, it wasn't.

To quote my on hand source:

Zone I comprised Java and Madura, and was controlled by the army. Later, it was seen that the army was prepared to allow considerable latitude to nationalists, both in freedom of movement and in the opportunities for propaganda and organisation.

The substantive reach of the concessions was minimal and the Independence Conference wasn't a promise of anything substantive either. They were token gestures, and the last was no guarantee of anything.

That was discussed but the prevailing opinion seemed to be that the East Indies could be controlled with a minimum of force; and that independence was not necessary. They hadn't even been invited to the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Conference (which was in 44' from memory) and Tojo had made it expressly clear that Indonesia was not going to get independence.

My source again:

Japan's Prime Minister announced that Indonesia would be given independence 'in the very near future'.

That seems to me to be a clear expression of an acceptance of eventual Indonesian independence. Expressly increasing the optimism of Indonesian nationalists, if that is all that it was, would not have been a smart move. And the concessions given were more than minimal. An Indonesian army? Bahasa as the language taught in schools? The formation of Indonesian youth movements?

No they hadn't! The proclamation was read on the 17th and the Japanese didn't officially surrender till the 28th. Between the announcement on the 15th and the signing of the 28th the army wasn't quite sure what to do. They were not apathetic, the refusal by the commander of the army to meet Sukarno and the outright refusal face to face of the second in command to countenance independence shows that.

I'm coming back to it again:

Between 15 August and 29 September, there was no occupation of Indonesia by the Allies. In fact the islands were part of South-East Asia Command...[who had] to land its 'commando units' as close to various Japanese headquarters with the purpose of taking over from the Japanese who were ordered to remain as a police force under Allied command until actual occupation- a course followed in the colonial areas at the insistence of the former colonial powers. However, the United States High Command blocked this operation and refused to release ships from the Pacific Transport Pool to take an occupation force to Indonesia.

This shows that the Japanese had surrendered, but had merely not been replaced as the occupiers of Indonesia. They were de facto Allied troops. This is what I was initially referring to. However, they obviously would have been reasonably apathetic in this task, and therefore apathetic in the orders that they received. There was no possibility of preserving Indonesia for the Japanese, and so the Japanese were nonchalant enough to not really go out of their way to stop the declaration of independence.

 

[Masada]

@Masada- assuming what you say is true (which I am), the source I have on hand is quite misleading, and differs from what you've said in certain aspects.

I would suggest that it isn't misleading but is simply to brief to cover the events in any great detail. The conclusions are those I would expect from that.

Which is why 100 000 volunteered to fight for the Dutch?

How many joined PUTERA alone?

You seem to take a rather cynical view of Sukarno. Couldn't you say that instead of the Japanese deciding to grant concessions, Sukarno forced concessions?

Because he did no such thing.

Zone I comprised Java and Madura, and was controlled by the army. Later, it was seen that the army was prepared to allow considerable latitude to nationalists, both in freedom of movement and in the opportunities for propaganda and organisation.

That is true. However, it was not the case in the beginning as I've elucidated upon, and only became the case later on in the war. By contrast Sumatra which was under the navy's control allowed all of those things from the get-go and was also supportive of nationalist efforts.

Japan's Prime Minister announced that Indonesia would be given independence 'in the very near future'.

It conveniently does not mention the first failed attempt or the next ones...

Premier Tojo, who unexpectedly visited Java in July 1943, was not taken in by Sukarno's welcoming speech in which the Indonesian attempted to elicit a promise for independence. Tojo mad it clear that he had traveled to a colony and he did not use the term Indonesia or Indonesians but indigenous, making it obvious that he expected the people to expend all their strength in supporting the Japanese cause [...] A further setback for Sukarno in 1943 was the omission of Indonesia from the Greater Asia conference held in Tokyo between 5 and 8 November at which China, the Philippines, Burma, Manchuria and Thailand were represented. [...] the Japanese military administration in Java convinced Tokyo of the need to award Sukarno.. a consolation prize and present them with a trip to Japan... the Indonesian arrived in Tokyo on 13 November... There was a visit to Tojo during which the question of independence was bought up but with very little result and the Indonesian leaders had to return home empty-handed

These attempts continued right until the end, and only when Japan was on the ropes did it even countenance granting independence, and even then all the concessions were part of a policy of gradual concessions designed to ensure that the Japanese could 'guide popular enthusiasm that had been engendered by the Koiso promise into channels that were more productive for the Japanese war effort' all of which is laid out in the "7 September Communique" between Tokyo and Army Headquarters.

This shows that the Japanese had surrendered, but had merely not been replaced as the occupiers of Indonesia. They were de facto Allied troops. This is what I was initially referring to. However, they obviously would have been reasonably apathetic in this task, and therefore apathetic in the orders that they received. There was no possibility of preserving Indonesia for the Japanese, and so the Japanese were nonchalant enough to not really go out of their way to stop the declaration of independence.

Not quite. In the gap between surrender and the signing of the treaty nobody had bothered to communicate in any detail to the Japanese troops in Indonesia what was happening. I also don't think you quite get how precarious the Japanese position was. They had trained and armed huge numbers of Indonesians in nationalist militias and had also allowed the formation of even more independent para-military forces like the Army of Allah. They had already had one PETA unit revolt in February 1945 and were aware of the consequences of further risings - their own lives and acted to save them. They were also committed to stopping a Declaration of Independence, for what other reason would the nationalists have been afraid that Sukarno and Hatta had been arrested by the Japanese army?

 

[Yeekim]

The story of Baron Ungern von Sternberg is the most bizarre tale I have ever heard.

http://forums.civfanatics.com/showpost.php?p=7326961&postcount=689

Yes, I've been quite fascinated with him for quite a long time, partly because he spent significant part of his life in Estonia. Not that I am proud of the depraved bastard - but he IS the only person from around here who has gotten away with being officially declared a deity (by Dalai Lama) - in XXth century no less.