Moderator Action: the minimally comprehensible and the completely obscure, taking in the occasional absurdity along the way... Imagine what reading your sentences is like for someone who isn't you.
Now at least someone tried to engage with what r16 wrote rather than express bafflement. Please, if anyone can't manage to do likewise, refrain from posting.
well , my style does really baffle , ı guess . There is no problem from my side on how people react to my style , as this list of dozen thousand says. Let me add , just as a note of my thick skull and skin , when ı was working at a museum and my collegues , as a practical joke , declined to give new uniforms to me and the management with some encouragement from my collegues decided it would be beneficial to mark me as somewhat below mental standarts to stress their handicapped awareness to increase their chances in a competition , first ı did not notice , second ı did work until the day ı was fired . And ı did return my uniform that was practically in tatters . And no they didn't win .
and will try answering , though about 3 or 4 days late . As ı said ı don't have web connection at home .
the exact paragraph ( W.Heinemann in Armoured Warfare , [edited by J.P.Harris and F.H.Toase ] , Batsford 1990 p.68 ) :
To the casual observer the most obvious thing about the campaign was the German use of large masses of tanks . This seemed to justify those who had made the boldest claims for the tank in Britain . But the Panzer divisions were not simply tank masses . Had they been so they would have been almost totally ineffective . They could not have got across the Meuse without the help of the infantry divisions and this would have so delayed the assault crossing operation that the outcome of the whole campaign might have been different . Much of the decisive fighting on the Meuse was actually done by the German combat engineers and Schuetzen
(infantry integral to the panzer divisions ) with the support of the Luftwaffe . Though tanks did play a role in silencing French pill-boxes and putting French defenders to flight , their role in achieving the breakthrough was secondary .The German tanks also played a considerable part in destroying what French armour was belatedly and disjointly thrust in their path . But one historian summarizes the matter felicitiously where he writes ' The real strenght of armour lay not in battle but in the pre-emption of battle' . The concentration of German tanks sweeping to the Channel after the breakout on the Meuse , supported by mechanised infantry and artillery , was able to brush aside light opposition with ease . The sheer speed of their spearheads allowed the Germans to win by decisive manoeuvre rather than by attritional fighting .
the quotation is from P.Griffith , Forward into Battle , Bird , 1981, p. 89.
the Gandhi episode in September 1934 is as follows ( C.Messenger , The Art of Blitzkrieg , Ian Allan , 1991, p.75.) :
"... The picture painted for the exercise was that the Mobile Force, starting from near Gloucester , was to make a raid on a series of objectives near Amesbury on Salisbury Plain . Unfortunately every obstacle was placed in the way of Lindsay and Hobart [ commanders of the said force ]. "
The tanks are given strict timetables and orders to preserve their strength , imagine a Mongolian raid that aims to draw out recalcitrant defenders out of the holes they are hiding . The tanks drive around a bit and hide for the final battle on the third day . Then the final phase of the exercise is called off and the tanks are told to get out , I guess, the way they came :
"...with the knowledge that the opposing commander had slipped motorised infantry in behind them to man road-blocks and set up mine fields . At this stage the proceedings took on the attitude of a farce . As one young tank officer described it :
' The infantry were allowed by the umpires to surround the area and lie on the road like the members of the Gandhi's 'disobeidance campaign' in İndia . They were guided by officers' wives who had arrived by car earlier . As we closed in on them they would not move , and others attempted to climb on to the tanks , while the artillery were allowed to bring up their field guns and block the roads at point blank range in full view.'
...The exercise turned out to be no more than an effort to boost the morale of the infantry , and did much to prevent the the setting up of British armoured divisions for the next three years "
de Gaulle in the 1920s "
always held Petain up as the shining example of how military affairs should be conducted . He did this to an extent that many regarded him as Petain's mouthpiece " (Messenger p.57 .) There has been posts in Civfanatics about how de Gaulle was thought to be under Petain's orders to continue the fight under Free French banner while the Marshall was limiting damage to France proper . His reputation as a protaganist of armour , taking the dates , names and qoutes from Messenger ( ibid , page 89 and more ) , was the publishing of his book named the Army of the Future in 1933 where he discusses the advantages of a proffessional army for France . A smaller in numbers but stronger in armour force to stop any surprise attack to allow time for already accepted French views on warfare , bring on the big guns and pulverize the enemy . Page 90 quotes Liddell Hart as "
So far as can be deuced from his hazy outline , the division he picturerd [ exactly , a misprint in my copy ]
would have been a clumsy monstrosity , impossible to manoeuvre ..." as the division had 900+ artillery pieces ; compared to hard hitting , generally winning Soviet equivalent of December 1944 that had 234 guns / mortars. "
He hardly mentioned the use of aircraft . He did at one point suggest that they might be useful laying smokescreens to cover the advancing tanks , but otherwise he passed them by . It was only later , after his bitter experiences in May 1940 , that he published a new edition giving them a more positive role in his scheme ." De Gaulle has no contribution to Blitzkrieg at all ; though he has provided a counter to deep battle , in recognizing the agressor might have all the 109s in the world but the agressor still can't shoot down 155 mm shells in flight . Where the theory lets De Gaulle down is that all the 109s in the world might have been covering for all the Ju-87s in the world and that becomes a whole new ball game . De Gaulle's arguments for armoured warfare are just a cover for his political working up . Compared to de Gaulle , Patton and Eisenhower more concentrated on rising in the military itself , meaning they returned to their parent branches and shut up , in the case of Ike when threatened with court martial over championing of the armour in the drastic retrenchment period after the Great War .
but then only to contradict myself and support myself at the same time , de Gaulle wrote to a friend that after assigned to a tank regiment in 1937 , he was finding his theories sound , Germans were listening to him so unlike his own countrymen , "
Artillery keeps its relative value but from now on it is in support of tanks it must be used before all else .It remains to recognise these facts and to organize the French Army accordingly , making it an instrument of manouevre and shock attack based on tanks , that is to say an armoured corps. Moreover this corps , given its relative importance and the cost of the material devoted to it , can only be formed for the moment out of specialists like the navy and aviation." ( p.115) . Not only he develops the theory , but also advises reshaping the armed forces giving priority to armour where he is bound to benefit as he is the apostatle , prophet , whatever . And other smart guys who invent new theories should be considered . As the French aviation chiefs would oppose his ascendancy through the tanks given priority they must be denied importance . Only because the enemy , Germans are organizing panzer divisions . Because nobody can challenge the German reputation in military affairs . Gamelin , the loser that lost May 1940 , was presiding a meeting in October 1936 when he said :
"
One must have the instruments to implement the technique . The Germans have invented the Panzer division , which is the tool of a sudden attack followed by exploitaiton in depth ... We don't have the the instrument of attack ... necessary for attack or counter-attack in force ... We need an instrument stronger than the Panzer division ." Hardly the Maginotist that loves becoming potatoes underground . The quote is on the page before the de Gaulle letter .
because of the career enchanging aspects of the mechanised theory , the prospects were not throughly examined , politics were more important than the military aspect , all over the world . The world is unfortunate that the Germans did not follow the British lead in armoured theory . What makes Germans so special is that they were already keen supporters of balanced approach to battle , the devastating success of Panzers early in the war is derived from the Sturmtruppen infantry of WW1 who kept momentum in the attack by attacking the weakly held sections to break the cohesion of defence When the Allies got themselves properly armed and there were no more weak sections left , well, the vaunted Panzers didn't get Germans that far .
returning to staff officers breathing the same air , it is seriously true . Sedan was the scene of a humiliating defeat for the French in 1870 , the area is named as a traditional invasion route into France and nobody , especially the French , ignored it , the threat of attack from the Ardennes . The premise is so simple . Germans attack , French delay , Germans advance all the way to the Meuse , then they have to cross it , which in due course they will , only to meet French reserves that will attack and destroy the Germans on the "West" side of the river . WW1 experience suggests the assembly of sufficient forces to cross the river will take 9 days , both German and French staffs have calculated so . Because the road network of Ardennes is limited , Germans can not mass in time , their logistic train open to aerial attack on congested roads . And the choice of French cavalry for the holding of the area is of course perfect , horses to move on the hostile territory that will block mechanized advance, animals can be supported locally and they will be fast enough to retreat in the face of German onslaught . A 20th Century attack from the Ardennes can not achieve anything , apart from a lost opportunity for Germans . While a repeat of Schliffen Plan can give them the Low Countries useful as a barrier and bargaining chip . Since the name of the game is to wait until Bolshies and Natsies are each other's throats it is then perfectly acceptable for the Allies to drive their best forces into Belgium and Netherlands . Holding those lands means they can keep on their phony war , slightly heated but still meaning no immediate harm to Germans . Who then will have to attack the ever increasing hordes of the Red Menace before Stalin stabs them in the back , while the miserable failure in the West that achieved nothing , which fell short of the monastries and even the nuns were not captured , well , this assures Adolf Hitler can not even dare to think about a piece deal . Either he fights Stalin or he swings . This is the mainstream feeling .
german operation is not at attempt to reach to the sea , a bluff to distract . Which ı hope will gain me a hundred LOLs and a thousand Whats . ( But hey , ı did that in Hitler's worst mistake thread already .) And the Germans were extremely surprised to find that the Allies had not thought much about tank speed .
a cursory glance suggests the Bf-109s and the even deadlier German flak put paid to the hopes of aerial interdiction , Luftwaffe and its much derided tactical orientation was much better in close air support and interdiction of its own , the Panzers contained far too much offensive power to be delayed gaining a day or two on the schedule - antitank guns are sure deadly to tanks but they have to present in the field , right ? - the French should and could put up a harder fight at the river line and de Gaulle should have thought a bit more ; he would have become a saint by flanking the German attack across the river if he had had tank speed , for he had a French Panzer division . In the end he merely became a president .
liddell Hart saw what was coming . He was much into politics of the armoured theory , he was advising the defence minister on whom should be assigned to where , meaning just naturally British generals would not listen to him and worse were incapable of fine balance in the indirect approach , horrible thing as Liddell Hart and his coterie of slow movers were pushed into sidelines due to the golden age being just around the corner , Britain and France rushed into a war just like schoolkids who slept all week until the last night before the exam . He did his best though , he argued for using armour against Panzers and fighters in his last book in the summer of 1939 . He would have become an unrecognized saint if he had argued against Munich
in private .
the whole idea of Ardennes being thought unpassable is just an excuse for the many failings of the Allied politicians and commanders . Had not Americans put up such a defence even in their severely surprised condition , not even the man deep snow of December 1944 would have stopped the Panzers , but then the weather cleared and 3000 bombers attacked . This is a difference .
yeah , ı am one of those who solve any problem after reading just one book . One of the kind that produces a smokescreen of words and sentences to cover the nakedness , the emptyness of one's own premise . And , yes , the Allies were so surprised in the German success that they were more surprised than the Germans themselves , they became immediate converts to the tank with the exemplary strength of faith the newly converted and the road took them from Belgrade to Pearl .
all this proves is ı have at least three books .
the world is unfortunate that the Germans did not follow the British lead in armoured theory .
what did careerism aspect in the armour debate can be examined with a few examples and some sweeping generalizations . A British tank regiment in the desert found out that "
if the 2pdr tank guns were sighted according to the Tank Gunnery textbook , then a shot fired at at a target 1,000 yards away would fall 300 yards short .This crucial piece of information was passed on to higher headquarters but seems to have been disseminated to very few other units .The rest ' were no doubt responsible for the legend that the effective range of the 2-pounder was no more than 600 yards ...' " (J.Ellis , Brute Force , Andre Deutsch Limited , 1990 , p.244 ) A small mistake that shall be covered up because those responsible are now at high rank , the boat is not to be rocked , say by instructions to put hand written notes at the relevant page until corrected books are issued . So what this little thing does ? Germans are always in all arms mood . Rommel's divisions are outnumbered in tanks anyhow , so the long ranging 88s follow the lead Panzers from a safe distance of , say , a 1000 yards . The British tankers are waiting for the Panzers to come into range , closer to say 600 to 700 yards . Germans do advance slowly and when in range the 88s open up , as they can reach another 1, 000 yards from their compatriots under armour . Those British tanks not damaged do retreat , but not many, as British courage is never questioned and the tankers took as much as they could . It is time for Allied anti tank guns to speak . The British have not thought much about all arms approach . Tankers especially have always claimed the priority ; as the queen of battlefield they would attack and the pawn of the battlefield infantry would hold , so all the tanks are out of the fight for now . London having slept so long before Munich the British AT gun is the same 2 pounder which is an effective weapon , and proven , especially against any Panzer that was within range . Germans are always in all arms mood ever since 1870 where far better French rifles took a toll on the Prussians until they started to support attacks with heavy concentrations of artillery fire . So the Germans start heavy bombardment to knock out the guns . Since PzKw IV was specifically ordered as a support vehicle sporting a HE-only gun , any available on the day also join the fun , firing out to 3 ,000 yards . Heavy fire does much of the work , British infantry is in crisis and help is sought . From a yet unengaged tank unit . Since eventual Allied victory has never been doubted , and post war advances depend on war time successes , commanders do prefer to do their own thing . The tanks rush in , charging to save the day . Panzers are the target , but all arms minded Germans have also low profile 50 mm PAKs . As British tankers are aiming the enemy tanks they don't care for the enemy guns and besides they can't do anything about them anyhow as the 2-pdr has no HE capability , says most of the history . In fact there were British 40 mm HE rounds but never issued ; one presumes to clear the way for the 6 pounder , a magnificient weapon ready in 1940 but not produced in time , one presumes to make more of 2 pounder production . ı believe from both guns were from the same firm . The results of the duel are , though , all too much repetition of history , the British counter attack fails totally . There is much soul searching that night , tank was always hailed as the supreme weapon by its proponents , German panzers are ruining anything that opposes them . Soul searching goes on for a long time ; it is on record that "
Until 5 June [1942] Commonwealth activity was limited to endless inconclusive conferences , with Eight Army not even intervening when Rommel began mopping up a nearby infantry box , manned by 150 Brigade , an operation which took two full days ." (Ellis, p 273 ) So the Panzers must be superior beasts . A counter might be using larger caliber guns , opening the way for some glory for the artillery officers "
with 25-pounder field guns firing AP shot in the direct -fire role . This expedient , however , was effective only at a relatively short range , and it led to an unfortunate diversion of the 25-pounders away from their primary role as indirect-fire artillery . It diverted them, indeed, from their optimum role a neutralizers of enemy antitank guns " (Armoured warfare , p.75 ) Because tank was always hailed as the supreme and events appeared to prove that , nobody did much thinking on what was going on .
"... the Germans were fully concious of the limitations ( including numerically) of their tanks and were therefore anxious to use anti-tank guns as a protective screen . This profound imbalance in perception and in practice between the two sides made for combats in which the British tended to rush forward into a fray while the Germans sheltered behind or between the fires of their concealed , low lying anti-tank guns . This was not a 'tank battle' at all but a shooting gallery in which the Germans held the guns , while the British , without even HE shells for their two -pounders , were almost completely powerless to reply .." ( the Armoured Warfare , p. 78.)
a short return to June 5 ,1942 : "
The diversionary attack , made against strong positions on Sidra ridge , was the fiasco all such isolated forays had hitherto been . An almost apologetic German officer wrote :
For some reason this attack was supported by only twelve guns , and it was brought to a halt with loss of fifty tanks out of seventy ..." (Ellis , p.274) The attack ends in a mine field and it somehow works as it draws some attention to it . The main infantry attack fails because the guns supporting it fired short ; lack of reconnaisance about German positions . Do the Brits give up , hell no ! It is 1942 and British tankers are still charging onto anti-guns without proper support , at least some of them do , as out of the two armoured brigades set aside for exploitation one was ordered around and around so the honour falls on one . Facing Italians who are still underequipped , it goes in succesfully for a bit and finds the 88 line . Another 60 tanks gone . Thus begins Rommel's dash to the Alexanderia .
where in the end he would face Monty who was terribly in the Great War frame of mind . Germans in the Kaiserschlacht once achieved a daily advance of 12 miles . The British break in at Al Alamein took 12 days to achieve 10 miles . Montogomery , playing it from a different angle, ended up the NATO commander .
careerism cut short far too many careers and , alas , lives .
apart from saving the honour of the pundits who defended the anti-tank gun and therefore are blamed for the fall of France in 1940 , what we have achieved ? Nothing , but a glimmer of the faith in victory as British armour was sent to Balkans , to wave the red cape in front the bull who had done the mountains the year before . Come on guys , how could the Allies fail ?
americans at least have the British to blame about the way their armor was build up ...
absurd ? Why not ...
awesome. keep it coming 
yes any clarity would help
