America is investing in Ukrainian failure
To great fanfare, President Biden signed the
$95 billion foreign aid package late last month
claiming it was “going to make America safer. It’s going to make the world safer.” While many Ukraine supporters have celebrated the bill’s passage, a closer examination of relevant facts should temper any excitement; while this cash may enable the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) to continue fighting, it isn’t likely to change the ultimate outcome.
By the numbers, Ukraine will never win the war and retake all its lost territory. If Kyiv doesn’t quickly seek a negotiated settlement on the best terms available, Ukraine may ultimately suffer an outright defeat.
You would be forgiven for thinking that after the
horrendous strategic disaster that was our two-full-decades-in-the-making defeat in Afghanistan, we wouldn’t be in a rush to repeat our flaws. But you would be mistaken. As a colleague recently quipped to me, American foreign policy seems stuck in the “
double down” mode, whereby instead of acknowledging errors — and then correcting them — we simply ignore the mistakes and double down on the same policy elements that led to failure in the first place.
That unhealthy penchant is on full display in Ukraine. The reality is that this war could have been averted with sober and mature diplomacy by the United States. Though European capitals and Ukrainian leaders have agency and are not free from guilt, Washington unquestionably drives the train on matters related to war and peace vis-à-vis Russia and Ukraine.
We could have insisted that Ukraine and Europe did whatever it took to implement the terms of the
Minsk Agreements. While Russia certainly dragged its heels on implementing its obligations, the West,
as admitted by former German Chancellor Angela Merkel, apparently never intended for Ukraine to abide by the terms, only using the agreement as cover for Kyiv to build up and train its military forces.
We could have worked with both Kyiv and Moscow in December 2021 to find enough common ground to come to an agreement to prevent a Russian invasion and keep dialogue alive.
Vladimir Putin’s opening demands were clearly beyond what anyone in the West would have accepted, but that’s what any negotiations are about: each side starting with its optimal position and then negotiating down to a mutually acceptable compromise. Putin’s offer wasn’t even entertained.
Russia’s oft-stated non-negotiable was Ukraine joining NATO, which would bring the military alliance to Moscow’s doorstep. One month after Putin’s public offer of negotiations, NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg delivered a clear repudiation
when he said the alliance stands by its 2008 declaration
to admit Ukraine, and that he would continue to “help Ukraine to move towards a NATO membership.”
A negotiated settlement was also possible barely six weeks into the war when Turkey hosted talks between Ukraine and Russia. Heading into that meeting, Volodymyr Zelensky
stated publicly he would consider meeting Putin’s main requirement: neutrality. On March 29, it appeared both sides were near a deal to end the war. But for reasons that
remain murky, Zelensky sharply reversed course days later and the deal died. In October 2022, Zelensky signed a bill
prohibiting negotiations with Russia so long as Putin remains president. There haven’t been any serious discussions since.
Many Ukraine supporters claim that the new U.S. aid package will provide some relief from
severe ammunition shortages, but remain deathly silent on how this infusion of cash and ammunition will reverse the
huge advantages Russia has on the battlefield. For Ukraine to even have a shot at military victory (defined as driving Russia out of occupied territory back to the 1991 — or even 2022 — borders), advocates must show, tangibly, how this aid will reverse Putin’s advantages in air power, air defense, artillery ammunition production, missiles, drones, electronic warfare, military industrial capacity and, above all, manpower.
But no one can chart such a course, because neither the United States nor our allies are willing to part with major portions of their own national defense stocks and funds to provide enough to reverse the imbalance, and it will take too many years to try and grow the required volume of kit by expanding capacity.
Zelensky will no doubt soon ask for more U.S. funding, as this current package might get them through this year, but no more. That’s not something Ukraine should count on. It took
six long months of political wrangling in Washington to get this deal out the door; it is unclear there will even be one more funding bill, much less sustained cash infusions for years into the future.
What we should do is tell Zelensky and NATO allies the truth: we’re not going to keep backing a policy that can’t succeed. If we are wise and truly value the lives of Ukrainians, we should offer to supply enough weapons and ammo to try to hold the line — as long as Kyiv actively and publicly seeks a negotiated settlement with Moscow. The point should be to recognize reality, stop the killing, the destruction of Ukrainian cities, and the loss of more territory, and give the survivors a legitimate chance at a future.
If the West and Kyiv continue to ignore reality and cling to the fiction that with enough time and money they can win the war, the chances rise to dangerous highs that Ukraine will eventually be presented with terms of surrender.
