A case for free choice

[betazed]

heh, we have been thru this one in endless circles before (posts from Gothmog and Mark1031 and others come to mind). Let me add my 2 cents (again)!

What do we need to have a free will (such a loosely defined concept - hopefully we will harden it later). Seems to me that we need an actor which acts out the free will and a free will machine (for want of a better name, still pretty apt though) which implements the axiom of choice in the precise mathematical sense. Now it should be obvious that the actor only plays a passive part in this play. take out the machine from a actor + machine combine and put it on another actor and we should reasonable say that the new actor now has free will. So for all our future discussion we will ignore the actor and concentrate on the machine.

So what are the key characteristics of this machine. I can think of the following :-

1. Unpredicatbility - that this should be a key characteristic can be proved easily by reductio ab absurdum. Assume that the machine is predictable. So let us create another machine - call it the free-will predictor - that can predict this machine. If such is the case then we can say it is really the predictor machine which is acting out the free will and our original free will machine is really an actor. if the predictor machine is also predictable we can follow the chain of logic till we find a unpredictable machine. We will call this machine the free will machine by definition.

2. partially Non-random - While individual responses from the free will machine is random, statistically there still should be a pattern which should show and underlying rhyme and reason (free will or no free will given a choice between taking $1000 and and $10000 most individuals will always take $10000).

3. Impossible to simulate exactly in functionality by anything other than a free-will machine - because if it can be simulated by anything then whatever that is simulating it becomes a free will machine and this machine stops becoming a free will machine.

4. Assignment of responsibility - this actually follows from 3 above but i wanted to state it separately. Once an action has been taken it should be possible to state that the sole cause of the action was the free-will machine. Because if it was not then something else was simulating it and that which was simulating it is the actual free will machine.

I cannot think of any other requirement. can anyone else?

Given these requirements it should be trivial to build a free will machine don't you think? and if it is trivial then the statement that free-will exists is also trivially true (it exists because we can create it). Of course whether humans are a free-will machine is another question altogether.

 

[Aphex_Twin]

@Betazed

3. Impossible to simulate exactly in functionality by anything other than a free-will machine - because if it can be simulated by anything then whatever that is simulating it becomes a free will machine and this machine stops becoming a free will machine.

I'm not sure even a "free will machine" can simulate another. Or you can read the minds of women

 

[insurgent]

insurgent wrote: Eh? Why would this imply that you can’t hold someone responsible for their actions? Judging a person by his actions has nothing to do with free will. Nor does it imply that an accident is equivalent to a premeditated crime.

If the actions of a person is predetermined and he does not possess a free will, he could not have chosen a different path of action in any given situation. Therefore he cannot be held responsible.

But as you say this is beside the point.

Roughly speaking I agree with your example wrt determinism. I would add though that the uncertainty principle does give us a bit of flexibility in applying this example to ‘free will’. For example, the timing of a specific radioactive decay in our brain that may or may not cause an additional neuron to fire and somehow affected the decision made. As far as we can tell the timing of a specific radioactive decay is indeterminate. It may also be that the collective behavior of our mental system has a measure of indeterminism due to its chaotic nature and the fact that its initial conditions may have an indeterminate component due to the uncertainty principle (given a certain interpretation of the uncertainty principle). I don’t know how you would connect that to ‘free will’ though, unless you are saying that we have a ‘soul’ that is able to affect that collective behavior at a quantum level (and perhaps affect the timing of radioactive decay as well?). Or a ‘soul’ that need not obey such physical laws?

True, a naturalist determinism does not mean that there is no such thing as random factors that might determine the outcome. So, even this test would not really solve the problem of defining the difference in views. I've considered the idea of another hypothetical situation. If a person is told what he is predetermined to do (because of science or whatever), would he then be able to choose not to? But then again, this means that he is given a stimulus which might just predetermine him to do something else.
Defining the basic discord between determinism and indeterminism in understandable terms is quite hard.
I think the lesson here is that if there is a such thing as free will, it cannot be established scientifically, simply because we do not know of any scientific explanation that would fully account for it.

So it seems you associate thinking about something with the application of free will? I am not seeing that connection. Are you saying that you do not base your thoughts on what you have learned in the past? That your decisions do not originate from your experiences? If not experience then perhaps some intrinsic character that you possess? These are the possibilities I already mentioned and you have not offered another. Maybe your decisions are totally random? It’s the old saying attributed to Schopenhauer ‘man can do what he wills but he cannot will what he wills.

I see your point, and I understand it. I see how determinists might attribute such rational decisions to various determining factors. But I believe consciousness is the keyword here. It's what defines humans and moves our psyche beyond the boundaries of exact science. I might illustrate this with a common example:
A smoker might, being preoccupied with something different, talking, eating or whatever, out of habit and dependence reach out for his packet of cigarettes. He might light it and smoke it and not think about what he does. In other words, he is not conscious of his decision.
But if something interrupts him. If he stops and thinks about what he does, he might decide to skip the smoke because it isn't healthy. He might have chosen at some point not to smoke more than five cigarettes a day or something along those lines. If he stops and considers what he should do, he makes a conscious decision. And whether or not he gives in to his urge and smokes a cigarette or he decides not to, he will have made a choice which is an expression of his free will.
This is a dead end when it comes to discussing whether or not there is a free will, because the determinist argument will be that the smoker was predetermined to stop, think, and his decision could, given that the necessary information is available, be predicted accurately. Simply because this entire process was also the result of stimuli and other determining factors.
But it clarifies my view.

As I said I enjoy feeling engaged. Why should I stop? I also enjoy the illusion that I have some ability to affect my future. I don’t care if it is false or not, it certainly feels real. If there were a choice of ‘the red pill or the blue pill’ I would take the red pill, but there is no such choice to be made here.

Well, my point is that you do have a choice and the ability to determine your own future. I find it hard to imagine that any person can truly deny himself that ability.

The point about being engaged is really irrelevant. I just don't believe in the idea of engaging oneself out of the basic absurdité de la vie. Sooner or later, you will realise that you are merely trying to escape the hard facts of reality, and you will be faced with the choice of accepting the pointlessness of life (and whatever you feel engaged with) or simply seeking an empty feeling of purpose and happiness which can never gain permanence. But that's my anti-Sartre existentialism talking, it is not crucial to my point.

IMO the pleasing illusion of free will comes from the interaction between nature and nurture. I take full responsibility for my actions and try to make the best decisions I can based on the information I have available to me. This is not free will, this is me (nature) responding to the environment in which I have lived (nurture). If I had free will I could just as easily decide to not take responsibility for my actions.

Sure you could, and if you truly believe that your fate is predetermined by nature and nurture, you have decided to relieve yourself of responsibility for your own actions. It seems your free will just snuck in through your backdoor.

 

[punkbass2000]

If the actions of a person is predetermined and he does not possess a free will, he could not have chosen a different path of action in any given situation. Therefore he cannot be held responsible.

Your "therefore" fired a bit early. He can be held responsible. Many have been held responsible for crimes they didn't commit. In fact, the US and Canadian court systems perfectly allow for it. OJ Simpson, for example, was not successfully prosecuted in Criminal Court, yet was still held responsible for damages in Civil Court.

True, a naturalist determinism does not mean that there is no such thing as random factors that might determine the outcome. So, even this test would not really solve the problem of defining the difference in views. I've considered the idea of another hypothetical situation. If a person is told what he is predetermined to do (because of science or whatever), would he then be able to choose not to? But then again, this means that he is given a stimulus which might just predetermine him to do something else.
Defining the basic discord between determinism and indeterminism in understandable terms is quite hard.
I think the lesson here is that if there is a such thing as free will, it cannot be established scientifically, simply because we do not know of any scientific explanation that would fully account for it.

And here is the crux of the issue. You cannot prove free will. How would one know when free will had been demonstrated? Either you must accept that every decision made by anyone or anything anywhere is demonstration of free will, or else any possibility of free will must be thrown into question.

I see your point, and I understand it. I see how determinists might attribute such rational decisions to various determining factors. But I believe consciousness is the keyword here. It's what defines humans and moves our psyche beyond the boundaries of exact science. I might illustrate this with a common example:

But the problem is consciousness is hardly definable. I'm sure your familiar with the Chinese box paradox, for example. If you're going to presume consciousness gives free will a priori, then you've simply shifted the argument laterally.

The point about being engaged is really irrelevant. I just don't believe in the idea of engaging oneself out of the basic absurdité de la vie. Sooner or later, you will realise that you are merely trying to escape the hard facts of reality, and you will be faced with the choice of accepting the pointlessness of life (and whatever you feel engaged with) or simply seeking an empty feeling of purpose and happiness which can never gain permanence. But that's my anti-Sartre existentialism talking, it is not crucial to my point.

What are the "hard facts of reality", as you say, and what makes you think you know what they are and that those you disagree are simply trying to escape reality? And, do you have any sort of "solution" to the problem as you propose it?

Sure you could, and if you truly believe that your fate is predetermined by nature and nurture, you have decided to relieve yourself of responsibility for your own actions. It seems your free will just snuck in through your backdoor.

You make your owh argument. Sure, if you believe that your fate is predetermined, etc., you have made a decision which suggests free will. But then, taking it beyond that, if you decide anything, you are inherently presuming free will. The difficulty is determining whether or not you have made a decision in the first place. Whether you believe in free will or not is immaterial, as you could arguable have been predetermined to have that belief.

 

[insurgent]

I meant no harm or insult. I sometimes discuss things like this because I think it's more interesting, not because I think it's a better way of "teaching" you. And since it doesn't matter to me, I'll ellaborate on my point right here and right now.

Thank you.

Again, the question is, does this apply to children?

No.

I imagine you think that at a certain point, a person is too young to make his or her own decisions. And the reason is of course that these youngsters have not developed the cognitive abilities to be able to think as intelligently as you (or me in some cases, even though I'm still considered a minor), plus they have not yet acquired the education necessary to make certain decisions responsibly.

I don't think it is a matter of intelligence or knowledge. It's a question of level of consciousness.

But does this apply to all kids, and zero adults? Quite obviously not. If it did, I'd have to ask you what the magic age is, at which point a kid is instantly endowed with all the wisdom in the world. Nah, there certainly isn't a clear, black and white division between kids and adults.

You're right, there is no clear black and white division between them. It happens gradually. Defining when a person becomes ready to decide for himself is hard, and I can't see how it can be done by anybody uninvolved.

Now another question: How do we know that kids are generally more stupid than adults? No, it's not by scanning their brains with complex neurological equipment; that's meaningless in and of itself. What really gives us an idea of the intellectual capabilities of people are just plain old observations that have been noted since the dawn of time (and these are the background against which more complex observations by neurologists are made). Oh, so little Johnny can't complete the analogy cat:kitten::dog:_____? Well, no surprise there! Would you expect any different from a kid who still puts his toes in his mouth?

Now what if Johnny's father also can't complete that analogy? Would it make a whole lot of sense to trust him with making good decisions much more than Johnny? No, they're both stupid. If we're so willing to guide stupid children, is it so crazy to look at adults in the same way in some cases (the last three words being key here)?

You are right that we can find some people stupid. We might even think that they are unworthy of the rights that we enjoy. But we cannot do that.

Once we start defining who can and who can't define his own life, we start defining who amongst us is human and who isn't. The principle must be that human dignity is inalienable and belongs to humans because we are, not because we have to qualify in some respect.

You're ignoring that there are sometimes third parties. In such cases the free market usually leaves something to be desired, sometimes failing completely.

Deals between two parties are the business of the two parties solely. If the third party wants to be involved, he will have to offer something and voluntarily be included. If that doesn't happen, whether or not he dislikes the deal is irrelevant. But all this is an entirely different discussion. It is rooted in the discussion that we are having above, and I'd prefer to stick with that.

If what you're saying is true (which isn't that hard to imagine), wouldn't you say it's possible that a person may want the government to direct them more than they already do because they appreciate the direction? If governmental intervention is necessarily such an evil thing, why do the victims keep begging for more?

Now, perhaps even though they want it, it's still bad for them. But wait, I thought we all know what's best for us?

I do not believe that there is an objective definition of what is good or bad. If there is one, then the good thing is the one that is derived from a free choice, and the bad thing is the one that results from compulsion. I think you will disagree here, and so even that principle must be subjective.
So, saying that each person knows what is best for us means to me that since each person knows his preferences best, he will know better which decision to make than anybody else.
A particular individual may in a specific situation want somebody else to make his decisions for him. What I want him to do is to make a conscious decision and voluntarily transfer this responsibility to somebody else, if that is what he wants. In that case, the responsibility for that decision is individual. The keyword is consciousness here.
A person who thinks like a slave is not conscious.

 

[WillJ]

I don't think it is a matter of intelligence or knowledge. It's a question of level of consciousness.

A fine addition; I think it's a matter of all three.

No. [This choice thing does not apply to children.]

----AND------

You are right that we can find some people stupid. We might even think that they are unworthy of the rights that we enjoy. But we cannot do that.

Once we start defining who can and who can't define his own life, we start defining who amongst us is human and who isn't. The principle must be that human dignity is inalienable and belongs to humans because we are, not because we have to qualify in some respect.

Aren't these two responses contradictory? You say that children don't deserve the freedom of choice, yet it's immoral to restrict the freedom of choice.

I certainly agree that what I advocate is a slipperly slope. For example, when Hitler decreed that Jews aren't human, that was not a very nice thing to do.

But you have to recognize that the desirability of individual choice is not universal to all situations, and thus draw the line somewhere. You yourself recognize this with regards to children.

Deals between two parties are the business of the two parties solely. If the third party wants to be involved, he will have to offer something and voluntarily be included. If that doesn't happen, whether or not he dislikes the deal is irrelevant. But all this is an entirely different discussion. It is rooted in the discussion that we are having above, and I'd prefer to stick with that.

All right, we don't have to discuss it if you don't want to. If you're curious, though, my response to what you said would be that sometimes third parties HAVE to be involved. For example, if you want to establish a military to protect one American citizen, you're pretty much going to HAVE to protect nearby Americans.

I do not believe that there is an objective definition of what is good or bad. If there is one, then the good thing is the one that is derived from a free choice, and the bad thing is the one that results from compulsion. I think you will disagree here, and so even that principle must be subjective.

You're right, I disagree with you. I actually also agree with you saying that because I disagree, what you're saying must be subjective. It's possible that what you're saying is objectively true, but I still disagree with it, and thus am a moron. (Of course, I myself don't think this is the case. )

So, saying that each person knows what is best for us means to me that since each person knows his preferences best, he will know better which decision to make than anybody else.

Except that people don't always know their own preferences best. This is assuming that by "preferences" you mean people's REAL self-interest, not what they think is their self-interest. (Obviously we all do indeed know what we think best, and if that's what you're saying I agree, but I don't think it's significant.)

An example of people not knowing their own preferences would be drug addicts. It was never in their best interests to begin using drugs, even though they thought so when they began. Another is buyer's remorse, for example when you buy a video game only to find out it sucks, realizing that you should have researched the game more before buying it.

And I admit that wouldn't matter if there weren't anyone else who actually knew better, although I'm sure in some cases there is.

A particular individual may in a specific situation want somebody else to make his decisions for him. What I want him to do is to make a conscious decision and voluntarily transfer this responsibility to somebody else, if that is what he wants. In that case, the responsibility for that decision is individual. The keyword is consciousness here.
A person who thinks like a slave is not conscious.

Why wouldn't you say this is what is done when the government is asked to do something? We don't make conscious decisions when we vote, etc.?

 

[Paalikles]

I ve assumed that people behave more or less rationally in every economic model I have presented in papers I write @ the university. It is a simplification, and I know it reduces the scope of the model....

But in any case, if people were in fact perfectly rational, I would say they have free will
But with imperfections in rational thinking, I can see arguments go either way...

However, I am a believer - in free choice/will

 

[Ayatollah So]

You're ignoring that there are sometimes third parties. In such cases the free market usually leaves something to be desired, sometimes failing completely.

Well said. Somehow this excellent point got lost in the shuffle.

That's also what I was trying to get at with my little dig about governmental figures just being individuals acting by the lights of their own values. The problem in both cases is fundamentally the same - other people are affected by the deal, but get no say. When George Bush and Congressional Republicans agree to the PATRIOT act, that has unwanted effects on many people who didn't agree to the deal. When you and your auto dealer agree on the sale of a gas guzzling CO2 factory, and the earth gets a smidgeon hotter, that also has unwanted effects on many who didn't have a say.

 

[Ayatollah So]

1. Unpredicatbility - that this should be a key characteristic can be proved easily by reductio ab absurdum. Assume that the machine is predictable. So let us create another machine - call it the free-will predictor - that can predict this machine. If such is the case then we can say it is really the predictor machine which is acting out the free will and our original free will machine is really an actor.

Non sequitur, sir. You imply without argument, that free will is somehow exclusionary: the freedom of the predictor excludes the freedom of the predicted. Why? Why does a prediction undercut anyone's free will? After all, we're talking about predicting what some does, not forcing them to do it.

I go downtown to meet my friend, but construction and traffic delay me, and the first event we had planned to share is over. We had no further plan, having expected to meet there and plan the rest of the day together at that point. What to do? I go to my usual hangout and hang out. My friend correctly predicts my action. We meet up and enjoy the rest of the day together.

Where, oh where, is the threat to my free will?

 

[insurgent]

Your "therefore" fired a bit early. He can be held responsible. Many have been held responsible for crimes they didn't commit. In fact, the US and Canadian court systems perfectly allow for it. OJ Simpson, for example, was not successfully prosecuted in Criminal Court, yet was still held responsible for damages in Civil Court.

How the courts handle this is irrelevant to me. If they believe that people can be punished for things that are not their fault, then they are wrong.
But since I believe there is a free will and that everybody is responsible for their own actions, this is a somewhat theoretical discussion to me. It will suffice to say that there can be no responsibility without freedom.

And here is the crux of the issue. You cannot prove free will. How would one know when free will had been demonstrated? Either you must accept that every decision made by anyone or anything anywhere is demonstration of free will, or else any possibility of free will must be thrown into question.

True, it cannot be proven. But I firmly and strongly believe that I can choose consciously and that I can control my thought process consciously. But I disagree with you that you have to attribute all decisions to free will, but the rights that are associated with free will have to be attributed to all decisions, yes.

But the problem is consciousness is hardly definable. I'm sure your familiar with the Chinese box paradox, for example. If you're going to presume consciousness gives free will a priori, then you've simply shifted the argument laterally.

True.

What are the "hard facts of reality", as you say, and what makes you think you know what they are and that those you disagree are simply trying to escape reality? And, do you have any sort of "solution" to the problem as you propose it?

I see the subjectivity of my point. I don't intend to debate this to great lengths here. Start an existentialism thread if you want to discuss this with me. Read Camus if you want to understand me.

You make your owh argument. Sure, if you believe that your fate is predetermined, etc., you have made a decision which suggests free will. But then, taking it beyond that, if you decide anything, you are inherently presuming free will. The difficulty is determining whether or not you have made a decision in the first place. Whether you believe in free will or not is immaterial, as you could arguable have been predetermined to have that belief.

I know. I was just trying to be funny, proving that exact point. It is pointless to discuss this simply because I will tend to attribute decisions to free will and consider them results of this and determinists will consider the decisions predetermined results of whatever predetermines them. Decisions as well as thoughts and beliefs.

 

[insurgent]

Aren't these two responses contradictory? You say that children don't deserve the freedom of choice, yet it's immoral to restrict the freedom of choice.

They seem to be. The only, and admittedly somewhat shaky, solution to this paradox has to be that children are not indefinitely without that right. They are all equal with adults in that the adults have also had to wait for this right.

But you have to recognize that the desirability of individual choice is not universal to all situations, and thus draw the line somewhere. You yourself recognize this with regards to children.

I agree that in some situations I may think that I or someone else knows better than an individual. But since I cannot possibly have an objective opinion about this, I need to resort to the right of the individual to decide. I have to say, what does the individual want?

All right, we don't have to discuss it if you don't want to. If you're curious, though, my response to what you said would be that sometimes third parties HAVE to be involved. For example, if you want to establish a military to protect one American citizen, you're pretty much going to HAVE to protect nearby Americans.

I know the argument. It's commonly used against anarcho-capitalists.

You're right, I disagree with you. I actually also agree with you saying that because I disagree, what you're saying must be subjective. It's possible that what you're saying is objectively true, but I still disagree with it, and thus am a moron. (Of course, I myself don't think this is the case. )

Right. I believe that it is objectively true, but until I have convinced every single person on this planet, this principle is subjective. I don't think I have convinced a single person, so I've got to get moving, I guess...

Except that people don't always know their own preferences best. This is assuming that by "preferences" you mean people's REAL self-interest, not what they think is their self-interest. (Obviously we all do indeed know what we think best, and if that's what you're saying I agree, but I don't think it's significant.)

I don't distinguish between what people think is the best for them and what actually is. Nobody can afford to do this, as the consequences of present decisions and choices are always unknown. Defining what is objectively best for an individual is therefore impossible.

An example of people not knowing their own preferences would be drug addicts. It was never in their best interests to begin using drugs, even though they thought so when they began. Another is buyer's remorse, for example when you buy a video game only to find out it sucks, realizing that you should have researched the game more before buying it.

Those are no excuses, frankly. I'm sorry, but that's what I think.

Why wouldn't you say this is what is done when the government is asked to do something? We don't make conscious decisions when we vote, etc.?

Well, the point of much of my first answer to you was to outline how man turns into a slave when he is relieved of responsibility for his own life.
But also there is the fundamental problem that the state does not work by consensus or by voluntary means. It enforces and compels its decisions and a minority always suffer. Just because there is a majority for something, it doesn't mean that the rights of individuals can be removed.

 

[insurgent]

However, I do enjoy the illusion that I control my own destiny. It helps me feel engaged.

May I just add that I find this sad.

I find it hard to have any personal respect for a human being who says that he does not believe that he has free will.

It's like saying that you shouldn't get credit or responsibility for your own choices. You waive your freedom, you waive your human dignity, and you waive your life and call yourself a product of something else. You call yourself an unwilling product of others and of chemistry and nature. You go through life without the belief that you could have done anything better or do anything better, without incentive or hope for improvement.
You take away all that is great and human in yourself, and you make yourself nothing more than an animal guided by its instincts or a rock forcibly held down by gravity or involuntarily kicked around by forces greater than yourself.

How can you live with that? I know I couldn't.

 

[Gothmog]

First let me say that I agree with Mise. I cannot think of how the existence or non-existence of free will would change our actions. Except in so far as the pondering of its philosophical implications is an experience we can have and thus affects our character.

@betazed – your ‘machine’ set up does separate some of the complications from this discussion (especially the fact that we all feel like we have free will), but I’m still at a loss to explain what exactly people mean by free will. With the exception of people who think God gave it to us, or who assume the existence of some spiritual type ‘soul’.

I mean it seems obvious to me that I am my physical body, plus the sum of all my experiences; nothing more, nothing less. In that context what does free will mean? My decisions are made based on my experiences and my intrinsic character (and their non-linear interaction), it may also include some element of randomness. So where does free will originate and what does it mean? It has always seemed a bit of a logical fallacy to me.

So in your #2, partially non-random – what does that mean? Even a chaotic system is predictable, just very sensitive to initial conditions. A non-determinant part must be built into the system if it is to exist and in the physical world all the non-determinant agents are seemingly random (actually a tough word to define). Like radioactive decay, it follows a pattern en-masse but each event is random. Statistically describable, but not individually predictable.

@insurgent – sorry I still am not seeing at all why you cannot hold someone responsible for his actions based on a philosophical discussion of weather free will exists. You ignored my comment about the justice system, but it is central. A stable working society requires a system of justice, we all accept that there are mitigating circumstances (my brother dying in a car accident is different from being murdered during a crime) – but again this has nothing to do with free will. We are all accountable for our actions in the context of society, what does this have to do with theoretically being able, or not, to chose a different path of action?

I think the lesson here is that if there is a such thing as free will, it cannot be established scientifically, simply because we do not know of any scientific explanation that would fully account for it.

Yes, basically what I say above to betazed – a belief in free will is much like a belief in God. It may be true, but no one has true knowledge of it (or if they do they have no way of knowing it); and indeed it has no measurable impact on the physical world other than through human psychology – there is no need for that hypothesis. Weather God created man or man created God, it amounts to the same thing. To paraphrase: how can something feel like pain and not be pain?

There is lots of interesting evidence from neuroscience that actions often precede our awareness of intention. That is, you move to scratch an itch before you ‘decide’ to lift your left hand and scratch your nose.

In a more complicated situation, our decision is made – then we justify it within our conception of self. This has been looked at in studies of people with damage, or external stimulation, to their medial frontal cortex. Sorry I don’t have any references handy.

Even so, free will may not lie in our neurons (as I eluded to already). Seemingly it does not because, as you describe it, it is more than our intrinsic properties coupled with our experiences.

The point about being engaged is really irrelevant…

Heh, hard facts of reality… amusing. IME, life is only pointless if you feel that people are worthless. Otherwise, love gives meaning, love and service. Again, if it feels like meaning how can it not be meaning?

if you truly believe that your fate is predetermined by nature and nurture, you have decided to relieve yourself of responsibility for your own actions. It seems your free will just snuck in through your backdoor.

I guess you are not following what I am saying. I believe both that free will is a pleasing illusion, and that I am fully responsible for my actions. Who else will take responsibility for them after all? I insist that others do the same because historically speaking a functioning society requires that. We are all accountable, if not responsible on some philosophical grounds.

Also, I was talking about decisions that I make, my ‘fate’ has more to do with decisions that other people make and the specific historical/societal context of my life.

In your response to punkbass you say that there can be no responsibility without freedom. I think you are mixing concepts here. There is the freedom to make your own decisions (i.e. not have your actions dictated by other humans), and then there is the separate question of ‘free will’ (i.e. if you have a ‘free will’ beyond your intrinsic properties and your experiences).

So where do you think that free will originates?

 

[Ayatollah So]

In your response to punkbass you say that there can be no responsibility without freedom. I think you are mixing concepts here. There is the freedom to make your own decisions (i.e. not have your actions dictated by other humans), and then there is the separate question of ‘free will’ (i.e. if you have a ‘free will’ beyond your intrinsic properties and your experiences).

So where do you think that free will originates?

In the human brain.

I realize your comments aren't directed at me, but I feel compelled to respond anyway. I want to interject a third view, different from both insurgent and many of his critics.

As you say, there is the freedom from oppression by other humans, and then there is free will - but I don't agree with insurgent's equation of free will with "beyond your intrinsic properties and your experiences." Instead, free will is that quality which makes oppression of humans by other humans a bad thing, in a way that imprisoning a paramecium is not a bad thing. That difference relates to the intelligent, flexible, conscious decision-making of human beings. Which is also what makes us (and not paramecia) morally responsible for our actions.

IMHO, the influence of our experiences on our decisions is not a problem for free will, but vital to free will. It is not a disproof but evidence in favor. Free will is all about evaluating courses of action in the light of experience! That's what choice is.

The whole determinism bugaboo is beside the point. It doesn't matter if determinism is true or not. (Actually it does matter a little bit, but only because a certain approximation to determinism is required for free will - not an obstacle to free will.) What matters is whether you are a conscious being capable of thinking and acting rationally (enough).

 

[Gothmog]

Ayatollah, I think we are in basic agreement.

I think you are saying that humans have a right to act according to who they are and what they have experienced.

While I agree to some extent, I also think society has a right to punish people who violate its laws. That is I think it is proper and necessary that society limit individual human freedoms to some extent. You obviously agree that a person does not have the right to oppress another. You feel it is an intrinsic right, I think it is a function of society. Also, you take your argument a bit too far wrt morallity (which I see as an intrinsic evolutionary property of humans again modified by experience). I agree with your ideas, but don't see them as possessing some sort of objective truth.

Still, it seems you are saying that ones decisions are the result of ones intrinsic character coupled with ones experiences. That is exactly my position and the one insurgent has been arguing against, and went so far as to describe as 'sad'. Of course he also said it makes me nothing more than an animal, which indeed is exactly how I think of myself though not in the derogatory way that he implied.

I agree that determinism is beside the point, we have no way to test it in any case as time only flows in one direction, but obviously insurgent differs.

 

[betazed]

Non sequitur, sir. You imply without argument, that free will is somehow exclusionary: the freedom of the predictor excludes the freedom of the predicted. Why? Why does a prediction undercut anyone's free will? After all, we're talking about predicting what some does, not forcing them to do it.

I go downtown to meet my friend, but construction and traffic delay me, and the first event we had planned to share is over. We had no further plan, having expected to meet there and plan the rest of the day together at that point. What to do? I go to my usual hangout and hang out. My friend correctly predicts my action. We meet up and enjoy the rest of the day together.

Where, oh where, is the threat to my free will?

I think you are making a subtle error. Predictability does not mean that a random event is predicted but rather all events are consistently predicted correctly. In the example above your friend predicted one random event of yours. But that does not mean he can predict you. To predict you he has to consistently predict every future action of yours. In the case that he can actually do that it can be said that you do not have a free will. Your friend is the free-will machine and you are just the actor.

<snip> but I’m still at a loss to explain what exactly people mean by free will.

IMHO, most of the confusion is because of this lack of explanation of the exact meaning of free will. That is the reason I defined it as a machine which implements the axiom of choice and having the characteristics i mentioned. I think that is a reasonable definition of free-will. Can't think of any reason why it should not be.

I mean it seems obvious to me that I am my physical body, plus the sum of all my experiences; nothing more, nothing less. In that context what does free will mean?

Answering that question is easy if you use the above definition/explanation of free-will; the question is are you a free-will machine? I think that question cannot be answered very easily without understanding the implementation of the machine (in this case the human brain). It is possible that it is a free-will machine. OTOH, there is a slight possibility that it is not and that it can actually be entirely simulated in a computer and completely predicted (the strong AI hypothesis).

So in your #2, partially non-random – what does that mean? Even a chaotic system is predictable, just very sensitive to initial conditions. A non-determinant part must be built into the system if it is to exist and in the physical world all the non-determinant agents are seemingly random (actually a tough word to define). Like radioactive decay, it follows a pattern en-masse but each event is random. Statistically describable, but not individually predictable.

Ok. Here is a tentative design of a free-will machine. Whenever faced with a decision where it has to select 1 out of N choices the machine shoots Upperbound(log[2]N) electrons in arbitrary spin states into a magnetic field. It measures the spins of each electrons getting a bit of information out of each electron (say 'up' for 1 and 'down' for 0). Upperbound(log[2]N) bits should enable it to choose 1 out of N choices. This makes its choices completely random and unpredictable. However, we also build into it some rules. Some example rules are (a) it will never take a choice that will knowingly destroy itself, (b) There is a function F that it will try to maximize if there are even number of 0 bits

Now the machine is completely unpredictable but will produce partially non-random results (because there are certain inputs for which you can always predict the answers and there are certain inputs for which you can always predict correctly a statistically non-trivial probability).

Yes, basically what I say above to betazed – a belief in free will is much like a belief in God.

I will agree with you on this one with the caveat that it is so only because we do not understand the engineering of the brain. If we do understand the engineering in detail then it should be possible to provide an unambiguous answer of whether we possess free-will.

 

[Mark1031]

I will agree with you on this one with the caveat that it is so only because we do not understand the engineering of the brain. If we do understand the engineering in detail then it should be possible to provide an unambiguous answer of whether we possess free-will.

We do understand the engineering of the brain in great detail at the cellular and gross anatomical level. We simply cannot describe the action of the trillions of synapses in real time however we can describe gross brain activity in real time and the precise activity of individual neurons in real time. In any case we have enough knowledge IMO to know that there is not free will which I would define as the control of our thoughts and behaviors independent of environmental stimuli. We all just process information and act based on current and previous stimuli and what they did to our brains, that and genetic and developmental factors along with stochastic variation (at the level of individual neurons/synapses) thrown into the mix.

 

[betazed]

<snbip> that there is not free will which I would define as the control of our thoughts and behaviors independent of environmental stimuli. We all just process information and act based on current and previous stimuli and what they did to our brains, that and genetic and developmental factors along with stochastic variation (at the level of individual neurons/synapses) thrown into the mix.

But mark, that is a very strict and unreasonable definition. No process in this universe is independent of stimuli from the external environment. of course we process information and of course we are a result of our design factors. How does that preclude us from having free-will?

 

[Mark1031]

Well what is your definition (I didn't really understant your machine above)? I realize mine is so strict as to be almost nonsensical. However, what is the alternative; what is the will and what is it doing. Mine is still totally deterministic.

 

[betazed]

Well what is your definition (I didn't really understant your machine above)?

Anything that is said to have free-will must possess the following characteristics .

(a) It can make a choice. i.e. given any number of options to choose from it can always pick one out of all the available options. It does this is such a way that it is
(b) Unpredicatable (hence impossible to simulate even in principle), yet
(c) Partially non-random
(d) and thus can be assigned as the responsible entity for making the choice.