Battle of Midway

[Richard III]

Bla bla bla. Wandered here because of insomnia, and then I find this bizarre thread, full of posts of the cheerful history-in-hindsight that passes for real history these days.

1. The Japanese Army, undersupplied and underequipped, almost broke into India in 1944 against what both British and American observers thought later to be one of the toughest armies on the planet at the time, the British XIVth , which had spent an entire year retraining veteran troops and probing the Japanese to improve their effectiveness, yet was barely able to hold them back in fixed positions on the border. The Japanese Army was able to inflict nasty casualties on crack US units as late as 1945 when they were desperate, at a moment in time when choosing to fight at all meant certain death. That's how they did when morale was LOW. Can you imagine fighting those same armies in Hawaii, against green US doughboys still wearing their WW1 tin hats and learning drill, in late '42, with naval supremacy to blockade the islands and pretty Kate Beckinsale clones living in Honolulu to worry about? When every Japanese soldier was grinning from ear to ear with pride at how his country was beating the crap out of the Western world? Would it really be THAT easy to stop them?

2. In 1942, Allied morale sucked because the Japanese had an unbroken string of victories across a quarter of the globe. Unbroken. Coral Sea pissed them off because someone actually fought back, but it was an anomaly at best. New Guinea was a problem, not a victory, at that stage.

Now imagine trying to hold, or retake New Guinea without a viable supply line because the US Pacific Fleet doesn't exist anymore. Imagine the Americans trying to defend a supply line - especially at Guadalcanal - without carriers.

3. So, one of you will refer to the magic pile of carriers the Americans were producing in time for 1943. Has anyone bothered to consider what makes carriers valuable yet? Not the planes (replaceable). Not the cheap unarmored deck (replaceable). Not the sailors; any fool can steer the helm of a carrier. No, what mattered at Midway was the PILOTS. Wipe out the US pilots in mid-'42, and keep all the Japanese pilots and carriers for Guadalcanal later in 'the season,' and those fresh US carriers, even if produced in time, would likely have the crap beaten out of them by veteran pilots with the same odds of success that veteran US pilots had at the Marianas Turkey Shoot under reversed circumstances. It's not like Midway was a failure of Japanese airmanship, given how quickly they smoked up the Yorktown even with three of their carriers burning beside them on the launch. Keep those planes, pilots and carriers around in a victory scenario and Hawaii is no longer America's only problem; the supply line to Australia, the supply line to China...

4. And before we've gotten through all that, imagine the political consequences of a Midway victory, let alone a landing on any of the Hawaiian islands. Let's say Japan is on the brink of invading Hawaii. People were scared enough in '41 when such a landing would have taken place without the defeats in the SW Pacific to make things scarier.

So, in late '42 or early '43, successful or not, the mere threat of a landing would be so dire that FDR would have had a very tough time sticking to his Germany First policy, let alone keeping landing craft set aside for Europe, let alone keeping such a high level of production focused on shipping materiel to European enemies. So, even if Japan "still loses" as you all suggest so breezily, at the end of a six year war instead of a four-ish year war, there's still a huge potential impact on history in Europe tht few of you have apparently considered simply because of the necessary shift in resources and political-military attention, an impact which, in turn, could have had consequences for the Pacific as well. War is not Axis and Allies, guys. There are variables.

But it's not quite as cool to say all that as it is to say "America, **** yeah, certain victory, semper fi," is it?

* * *

That AP textbook is, to be tactful, pretty glib. But then, so are all the posts I just read, which are pretty dismissive of a situation which sure didn't look pretty to the participants.

Yes, a Japanese invasion of Hawaii would have been as much of a gamble as the entire Japanese war plan was. But then, they'd been doing pretty well with their gambles at that point so far, so it's a bit rich to presume a bad result. And as for capabilities, well, any country capable of invading the Phillippines against a navy with four American carriers and a large land force is sure capable of invading Hawaii against no carriers, a smaller land force, and a lot less favorable terrain.

There's something sad about armchair history these days, with so many folks feeling it was all as linear as a CIV game, complete with obvious results that were strangely not so obvious to the participants at the time.

 

[rilnator]

Point taken. A desperate America might be more than willing to take out Tokyo, in much the same way Moshe Dayan was considering nuking Cairo during the Yom Kippur War.

Tokyo had already been seriously fire bombed. Just as effective as an N bomb.

 

[Sharwood]

Tokyo had already been seriously fire bombed. Just as effective as an N bomb.

At causing damage to industry, not the immense psychological damage of having your enemy using atomic weapons. Plus, the firebombing was intentionally kept away from the Imperial palace. That would be harder to do with a nuke.

 

[rilnator]

Yes, a Japanese invasion of Hawaii would have been as much of a gamble as the entire Japanese war plan was. But then, they'd been doing pretty well with their gambles at that point so far, so it's a bit rich to presume a bad result. And as for capabilities, well, any country capable of invading the Phillippines against a navy with four American carriers and a large land force is sure capable of invading Hawaii against no carriers, a smaller land force, and a lot less favorable terrain.

There's something sad about armchair history these days, with so many folks feeling it was all as linear as a CIV game, complete with obvious results that were strangely not so obvious to the participants at the time.

The master has spoken! Than you for gracing this thread with your presence.

The 'amazing string of sucesses' the Japanes had lasted all but 6 months. The IJN could have taken out as many US carriers as they wanted but they still didn't have an answer for the American submariners. One of the most unsung factors of WW2.

 

[Sharwood]

Bla bla bla. Wandered here because of insomnia, and then I find this bizarre thread, full of posts of the cheerful history-in-hindsight that passes for real history these days.

Wow, you are one bitter SOB Dick. May I call you Dick? I think it might be better for all of us if you did get some sleep, because you seem a little cranky.

1. The Japanese Army, undersupplied and underequipped, almost broke into India in 1944 against what both British and American observers thought later to be one of the toughest armies on the planet at the time, the British XIVth , which had spent an entire year retraining veteran troops and probing the Japanese to improve their effectiveness, yet was barely able to hold them back in fixed positions on the border. The Japanese Army was able to inflict nasty casualties on crack US units as late as 1945 when they were desperate, at a moment in time when choosing to fight at all meant certain death. That's how they did when morale was LOW. Can you imagine fighting those same armies in Hawaii, against green US doughboys still wearing their WW1 tin hats and learning drill, in late '42, with naval supremacy to blockade the islands and pretty Kate Beckinsale clones living in Honolulu to worry about? When every Japanese soldier was grinning from ear to ear with pride at how his country was beating the crap out of the Western world? Would it really be THAT easy to stop them?

The Japanese Army was always undersupplied and underequipped. They made up for that with their total disregard for their own survival, and their emphasis on men and frontal attacks over machines and manouevering. They broke the line of many a better trained and equipped military force through their sheer will to fight. Not to mention that in 1944, those Japanese troops had spent just as long being refined through fending off British sorties as the British had launching them. It is far easier for a good defensive soldier to successfully attack than for a good offensive soldier to successfully defend.

Of course they inflicted heavy casualties in 1945. They were fighting for their nations survival at this time. One need only look at what happened in Okinawa. History's full of examples of an apparently defeated power fighting desperately to survive, in some cases pulling it off. You also seem to think that the Japanese military in high spirits was as effective as when it was desperate. It wasn't. The Japanese lost Midway in part due to their cockiness. The infamous "resurrecting ships" planning session comes to mind.

A desperate America, having lost one of it's states to Japan, would be quite happy to use overwhelming force against them. Of course they'd lose a massive amount of soldiers fighting a dug in and well trained Japanese force in Japan. Doesn't mean they would have lost. They wouldn't have. The US was destined to win this war based on sheer industrial might - something Japan simply could not compete against. Japan's only real chance of victory was that Hitler would win in Europe, which again was virtually impossible, even with the German's impressive technological superiority.

2. In 1942, Allied morale sucked because the Japanese had an unbroken string of victories across a quarter of the globe. Unbroken. Coral Sea pissed them off because someone actually fought back, but it was an anomaly at best. New Guinea was a problem, not a victory, at that stage.

Now imagine trying to hold, or retake New Guinea without a viable supply line because the US Pacific Fleet doesn't exist anymore. Imagine the Americans trying to defend a supply line - especially at Guadalcanal - without carriers.

Here's where I mention that magical pile of carriers. What you don't understand is that America could churn these suckers out by the bucketload.

3. So, one of you will refer to the magic pile of carriers the Americans were producing in time for 1943. Has anyone bothered to consider what makes carriers valuable yet? Not the planes (replaceable). Not the cheap unarmored deck (replaceable). Not the sailors; any fool can steer the helm of a carrier. No, what mattered at Midway was the PILOTS. Wipe out the US pilots in mid-'42, and keep all the Japanese pilots and carriers for Guadalcanal later in 'the season,' and those fresh US carriers, even if produced in time, would likely have the crap beaten out of them by veteran pilots with the same odds of success that veteran US pilots had at the Marianas Turkey Shoot under reversed circumstances. It's not like Midway was a failure of Japanese airmanship, given how quickly they smoked up the Yorktown even with three of their carriers burning beside them on the launch. Keep those planes, pilots and carriers around in a victory scenario and Hawaii is no longer America's only problem; the supply line to Australia, the supply line to China...

America would simply train new ones. Have you noticed that all of us have stated that japanese success at Midway would have prolonged the war? Of course a triumphant Japan could have cut supply lines, built defences, and even launched assaults on US industry near the Pacific coast. It could not win. It was simply outmatched. Its army was at its limit, which is why it balked at the suggestion to invade Australia. It would have balked even if Australia was left to its own devices, or signed a treaty out of fear. It did the same to a plan to advance through India and Iran to converge with German troops in the Caucasus. And America would have had no qualms about abandoning Australia and China.

Besides, a major reason America gained the advantage in aerial warfare had nothing to do with pilots, but everything to do with the superior designs of their planes. At the start of the war, Japan's planes were superior in every way, but America very quickly copied the design of the Zero, and improved on it, while the Japanese were slower to improve on their design.

4. And before we've gotten through all that, imagine the political consequences of a Midway victory, let alone a landing on any of the Hawaiian islands. Let's say Japan is on the brink of invading Hawaii. People were scared enough in '41 when such a landing would have taken place without the defeats in the SW Pacific to make things scarier.

So, in late '42 or early '43, successful or not, the mere threat of a landing would be so dire that FDR would have had a very tough time sticking to his Germany First policy, let alone keeping landing craft set aside for Europe, let alone keeping such a high level of production focused on shipping materiel to European enemies. So, even if Japan "still loses" as you all suggest so breezily, at the end of a six year war instead of a four-ish year war, there's still a huge potential impact on history in Europe tht few of you have apparently considered simply because of the necessary shift in resources and political-military attention, an impact which, in turn, could have had consequences for the Pacific as well. War is not Axis and Allies, guys. There are variables.

But it's not quite as cool to say all that as it is to say "America, **** yeah, certain victory, semper fi," is it?

Have any of us said a damn thing about what would have happened in the future? No. The reason for that is simple; this thread has nothing at all to do with what would happen after the war. This thread is solely about the war. Period. Of course if Japan could last longer, so could Germany. But short of a German victory, which was highly unlikely, they were both still going down.

That AP textbook is, to be tactful, pretty glib. But then, so are all the posts I just read, which are pretty dismissive of a situation which sure didn't look pretty to the participants.

Yes, a Japanese invasion of Hawaii would have been as much of a gamble as the entire Japanese war plan was. But then, they'd been doing pretty well with their gambles at that point so far, so it's a bit rich to presume a bad result. And as for capabilities, well, any country capable of invading the Phillippines against a navy with four American carriers and a large land force is sure capable of invading Hawaii against no carriers, a smaller land force, and a lot less favorable terrain.

There's something sad about armchair history these days, with so many folks feeling it was all as linear as a CIV game, complete with obvious results that were strangely not so obvious to the participants at the time.

As for this condescending conclusion, you don't add anything new, and it's not worth a proper response.

 

[rilnator]

At causing damage to industry, not the immense psychological damage of having your enemy using atomic weapons. Plus, the firebombing was intentionally kept away from the Imperial palace. That would be harder to do with a nuke.

It was more luck than planning that the Imperial palace didn't get hit. If you look at some of the figures from the air war in Europe its pretty evident that bombing accuracy still had a long way to go.

Apparently the emperor toured Tokyo after one of the big raids and decided that the war had to end.

 

[MilesGregarius]

1. The Japanese Army, undersupplied and underequipped, almost broke into India...

No argument that the Japanese consistently produced near miracles considering their meagre material resources, but I still think occupying the Hawai'ian Islands was probably beyond their strategic reach.

A more likely target would have been Samoa which, like Hawai'i was vital to resupplying Australia and MacArthur's Southwest Pacific command. A Japanese victory at Midway followed up by an invasion of Samoa probably achieves the same while being more operationally feasible. Also, being farther from US shores, it would be harder for the US to mount a counteroffensive.

Although, if invading Hawai'i means islands full of Kate Beckinsale clones...

2. In 1942, Allied morale sucked because the Japanese had an unbroken string of victories across a quarter of the globe. Unbroken.

However low US morale was, Pearl Harbor had awakened a bloodlust that would have demanded continued action against Japan. As you mention in #4, this probably results in an end to the unified Anglo-American "Germany First" policy.

Now imagine trying to hold, or retake New Guinea without a viable supply line because the US Pacific Fleet doesn't exist anymore. Imagine the Americans trying to defend a supply line - especially at Guadalcanal - without carriers.

Agreed, though I'd expect Samoa rather than Hawai'i to be where the supply line is cut.

3...what mattered at Midway was the PILOTS. Wipe out the US pilots in mid-'42, and keep all the Japanese pilots and carriers for Guadalcanal later in 'the season,' and those fresh US carriers, even if produced in time, would likely have the crap beaten out of them by veteran pilots with the same odds of success that veteran US pilots had at the Marianas Turkey Shoot under reversed circumstances...

If I remember correctly, even the Marianas Turkey Shoot wasn't entirely a failure of Japanese pilot quality as much as it was the Japanese Army's refusal to release fuel supplies to Japan's carriers, causing them to withdraw thereby leaving their pilots hanging out to dry.

The US had learned that its pilots needed more training before entering combat than they had early in the war, so while the loss of veterans at Midway would have hurt, when later US carriers came on line, their aircrews would probably have been reasonably competent. Afterall, the US did have plenty of safe airspace and fuel to train replacements, unlike Japan.

4. And before we've gotten through all that, imagine the political consequences of a Midway victory, let alone a landing on any of the Hawaiian islands...

If a Japanese victory at Midway resulted in a "Japan-First" policy it might actually have SHORTENED the war against Japan while significantly lengthening the war against Germany: no Torch in 1942; Italy still in the fight until God-knows-when; no Second Front until 1945; a potential Soviet collapse in 1942 or a see-sawing stalemate on the Eastern Front or Soviet troops on the Rhine when Germany does fall.

...their emphasis on men and frontal attacks over machines and manouevering.

The Japanese army actually emphasized manouever as much as any other military, and infiltration far more than any other. The frontal banzai attack was a last, not a first, recourse.

A desperate America, having lost one of it's states to Japan...

Hawai'i didn't become a state until 1959, though that's irrelevant; the US public was baying for blood from Pearl Harbor on.

...Besides, a major reason America gained the advantage in aerial warfare had nothing to do with pilots, but everything to do with the superior designs of their planes. At the start of the war, Japan's planes were superior in every way, but America very quickly copied the design of the Zero, and improved on it, while the Japanese were slower to improve on their design.

The Zero may have outclassed the Hurricanes, Buffaloes, and P-36s used in SE Asia, but didn't outclass the early war Wildcats and P-40s used by the USN and USAAF so much as they were the superior dogfighters. Once Allied pilots learned not to turn with the Zero but to pass-and-blast, the Zero didn't provide much of an edge.

Japan had a number of improved designs that could have matched later US ones but loss of resources to US submarine action and industrial capacity to US strategic bombing prevented these designs from getting into significant production.

More important than aircraft design was the fact that Japan lost the ability to adequately train her pilots due to the lack of aviation gas caused by the aforementioned US submarine offensive. Early war Japanese pilots owned the skies because they had far more flying-hours under their belts than the Allies did initially. Once the first crop of Japanese pilots fell, at the Coral Sea, at Midway, in particular at the Marianas Turkey Shoot, Japan lacked the ability to give her replacements enough flying time to learn the intricacies of air-to-air combat. Allied pilots, meanwhile, were getting far more flying time prior to being committed to action than they did early in the war.

 

[Evie]

With all due respect, Richard (wow, haven,t seen you posting in forever), I disagree with several of your points.

First is your point regarding whether Japan could have taken Hawaii or not. I don't disagree with you that the Japanese troops were some fierce fighters (indeed, see the thread about American casualties in the Pacific where I've been defending them). My contention has more to do with logistical and strategical considerations.

1)Oahu (which, when we say "Hawaii", is what we pretty much mean, since that's where everything of any value is) had a very high troops/size ratio - two full army divisions (51 000 men, NOT counting any other military personnel that may have been drafted to assist defense) to defend 596 square miles, ie, about 86 men per square mile.

Comparatively, the ratio in Malaya was something in the order of 2 men per square miles to be defended.

Considering the favorite Japanese strategies (ie, landing to the rear of the enemy, outflanking, etc), such a high troop concentration is nowhere near being in their favor.

2)As a result of the above, the Japanese odds of making an unchallenged landing were pretty low.

And, their performance at opposed landings in the war are nothing to speak of. The best known Japanesse attempt at landing straight onto a defended beach (and when I say defended I mean five hundred men, a single shore battery and four fighters), was a debacle that cost Japan two destroyers. (the first landing on Wake, for the record).

3)Not only Japan would have to somehow land troops on Oahu (which, given their limited transport capacities, is incredibly unlikely), but they would have to somehow find a way to maintain at least some form of supplies - it's one (quite true) thing to say Japanese troops fought well even on limited supplies, but men don't fight on inexistent supplies - they die.

This would mean maintaining air superiority over the island at least while the convoy is coming in; keeping the ships in Pearl Harbor from coming out to mess with the convoy while the carriers are busy trying to keep the planes based at Pearl from interfering, and, finding some location where they can efficiently offload the ship without stretching the carriers' stay in the region. All this while the Saratoga and Wasp are roaming the Pacific, and with the US getting more and more expert at reading Japanese naval codes.

Given the size and airpower of the bases on Hawaii (we're dealing with something order of magnitudes stronger than Henderson here), this is a tall order.

Particularly given that the nearest Japanese base of any consequent size (ie, able to give basic repairing and resupplying to the carriers and supply ships) is something in the order of three thousand, four hundred miles away (Truk), as opposed to two thousands, six hundred for the USA (San Diego).

IF the japanese had managed to land sufficient forces in front of a likely opposed landing, and IF they had managed to set up some form of semi-valid supply line, and IF they had managed to keep the US from holding air superiority, the US would have been in trouble.

But circumstances made it direly unlikely they would manage all of that.

There are other points to raise (particularly regarding pilots training, as you mentioned), but these will have to wait for later

 

[mrpwn3r]

So you most of you guys have reached a consensus that, Japan would have fallen no matter what?

From what I'm seeing, most of you guys are assuming that it is the Japanese and the Americans fighting one on one. (Of course, I am tired and I'm not reading very clearly...)

But don't forget Germany also declared war on the United States several days after the US declaration of war on Japan.

Let us assume it is 1942, Japan launches an invasion of Hawaii simultaneous with Germany domination over Europe. Wouldn't FDR sue for peace rather than fight a war with both powers?

 

[innonimatu]

Of course not! With the US having just been attacked, he would finally get all the public support he needed (and had wanted for two years) to join the war. As he did.

The (unlikely) fall of Hawaii would not change the odds of victory.

 

[mrpwn3r]

Of course not! With the US having just been attacked, he would finally get all the public support he needed (and had wanted for two years) to join the war. As he did.

The (unlikely) fall of Hawaii would not change the odds of victory.

Yes but would the United States stand a chance against the combined powers of the Japanese Empire and the Nazis alone without the British and the Soviets?

 

[Cutlass]

So you most of you guys have reached a consensus that, Japan would have fallen no matter what?

From what I'm seeing, most of you guys are assuming that it is the Japanese and the Americans fighting one on one. (Of course, I am tired and I'm not reading very clearly...)

But don't forget Germany also declared war on the United States several days after the US declaration of war on Japan.

Let us assume it is 1942, Japan launches an invasion of Hawaii simultaneous with Germany domination over Europe. Wouldn't FDR sue for peace rather than fight a war with both powers?

Japan had no chance. If Japan had brought the force that invaded the Philippines with the Pearl attack force, and sent maybe 2 of their smaller carriers to take out the Panama Canal, then they could have taken Hawaii and held it for maybe a year, possible a year and a half. And that would have been the end of that.

The US built 10 battleships between 1939 and 1944. Japan built 2. And all other military production was at least that lopsided.

It's true that the US was short on trained soldiers in 1941, and that our soldiers for the next couple of years had too quick training. But it was generally better than Japanese replacement troops had. And we had vastly more of them.

In short, Japan had about what it had for the whole war already in 1941, and we produced most of what we used in the war after 1941.

Had the Japanese been right and the US could have been convinced to negotiate a peace, then Japan had enough. But in no sense did they have enough to beat us at war. Yamamoto knew that. The Army commanders might not have, but the Navy did. The Japanese government was insane to start a war with us.

 

[Evie]

And the answer to that remain, I don't think so.

It's possible - as Richard outlined - that Roosvelt would have had to abandon Germany first (though I doubt to the extent Richard suggest : IE, I think Roosevelt would have at least tried to keep supplying the Allies to the best of his capacity). Which would probably still have been a disaster for Europe : Nazi in powers for a few more years, or Warsaw pact stretching to France, take your pick.

It is exceedingly unlikely (as I outlined above) that Japan would have managed to invade the Hawaii. Heck, it's unlikely Japan would even have *tried* to invade the Hawaii. The Japanese military leaders may have made severe mistakes in the war, but even they knew their forces had *some* limits ; Hawaii was much too far from their bases to defend effectively EVEN if they managed to take it.

And honestly, I just don't see Roosevelt suing for peace with either enemy.
--------------------

Now, back to Richard's post, and specifically the issue of pilots.

There were two critical differences in pilot policy between the United States and Japan that makes me say you are mistaken.

The first is pilot rotation. That is to say, unlike Japan, which liked to keep its good pilots on the front as long as they lived (at least in the early stages of the war), America often rotated pilots around, between active duty on the carriers, and training more pilots back stateside.

The second is oil. Japan was stretched thin for it; America had it. Since oil is necessary both for military operations and for giving pilots flight training hours, this was a major issue for Japan.

The end result being, the average "green" Japanese pilot during the war had perhaps two hundred hours of flight experience and limited veteran training. The average US green pilot, however, had 600 hours of flight experience, and training with veterans.

Not to mention, of course, that pilot rotation means America would not have lost all her best pilots EVEN if all the pilots at Midway had died, since some of the top ones would have been back stateside training more pilots.

There are three more points to be made. First, killing all the pilots at Midway is NOT likely ; Japan's pilots losses at Midway have always been exaggerated. Pilots didn't die with their carrier ; those who were in the air ditched in the water and efforts were made to recover them, and those who were on the carriers themselves were, by and large, evacuated to other ships before the carriers sank. (The real murder on Japan's pilots corp was the Solomons campaign, particularly Guadalcanal).

Second, the US pilots at Midway were already rather "green" themselves - oh, they had a few years of carrier operations behind them, but their experience in combat was limited (at best) to the Coral Sea or one or two morale-bolstering raids against lightly defended islands.

Third, even assuming point one and two are not valid, there remains the fact that the United States had figured out around Coral Sea and Midway how to counter the Zero, even the Zero flown by experienced pilot (the Thach weave); that knowledge wouldn't have died at Midway.

Bottom line is, while I agree with you that a defeat at Midway may have seriously hampered America's ability to help in Europe, I think you overstate the situation.

-----------------------

There is ONE move - one that would have been a logistical and technological nightmare to pull of, but not much more so than invading Hawaii - I could see Japan attempting as the follow up to a victory at Midway, that would have dramatically shifted the situation in the Pacific. Probably not enough to ensure their victory, but enough to buy Japan some precious time.

Hit Panama with all the carrier strength they can muster, and try to cripple the Canal.

 

[Richard III]

With all due respect, Richard (wow, haven,t seen you posting in forever), I disagree with several of your points.

...which is precisely why I was so over the top in my post; to give you some ammo to work with. And to at least shake things up so the argument - like the war with Japan - won't seem so much like an inevitable Allied walkover.

And, hey, btw.

You and others have made several good points; I agree sort of on pilots, still disagree on carrier production, Japanese logistics to Hawaii, the impact of Germany First, and especially disagree on how a land battle in late '42 on the Islands would have gone. Whoever said the supply lines would be cut at Samoa is pretty smart, and whoever said that American subs would do the trick regardless is forgetting how much of a difference to patrols it would make to lose Midway and Hawaii as potential refuelling stops.

More in four hours after I've had a few drinks. :lol

 

[Evie]

American subs wouldn't have made a difference in 1942 anyway ; they were sea-going trash cans (due to defective torpedoes). At best.

As for a land invasion of Hawaii, I keep coming back to the same known facts - the troop concentration on Hawaii (Oahu) dwarfed anything Japan could work with, the airbases on Hawaii and the distance involved would make moving the invasion fleet, landing it and keeping it minimally supplied it a nightmare, etc.

In addition, there is one consideration I didn't bring up last time around - oil. Which, as we know, Japan was always stretched to the breaking point on.

How much oil would it have taken to get an invasion fleet to Hawaii? To then keep the invasion force supplied, via running convoys? To keep carrier presence close enough to Hawaii to present a serious challenge to American air superiority (if that was at all possible). Possibly, to send in the big gun ships for naval support once in a while?

If Japan couldn't afford to send the Yamato down to Guadalcanal (and Imperial Headquarter overruled Yamamoto at least once on this sort of plans because they felt they hadn't the oil for it), they certainly couldn't afford to transport, supply and support an entire invasion force to Hawaii, a lot further from Truk than Guadalcanal.

And yet another note - with the air bases on Hawaii being as they are (ie, tons of plane, and not so easy to take out outside of a Pearl-style sneak attack), there may be enough concentrated air cover around the island to allow the US to launch battleships raids against the Japanese convoys when they reached the island.

The carrier production, incidentally, isn't magical. The numbers I gave are based on the commissioning date of the ships America did build. In 1943, America commissioned 6 Essex-class carriers (plus one in december 1942), 9 Independence-class ones, and I don't know how many escort carriers.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Here's what I keep wondering about this thread as I read all these posts.

Why would Japan, NEED to invade Hawaii?

They just got a shiney new naval base on Midway Island, and strategic naval superiority. They can blockade the Hawaiin Islands, or, in a few attacks, render it useless as a naval facility. Destroy the fuel depot (like they should have done Dec. 7th. That was the big miss for the Japanese, not the carriers), and most of the Harbors equipment, and you've basically rendered it useless to the Allies. They wont be able to resupply and repair their forces, and you can let Hawaii die on the vine.

The real target the Japanese should have looked to, and probably would have, after Midway is the Panama Canal Zone. While America might be able to outproduce Japan, they would not be able to put together a fleet in time to save the Canal, and without that, they now have two separate Navies, unable to aid each other.

As for the Submarines, it should be remembered that for all they did in the war effort (and it was quite a great deal), their use was Contingent on the success of the Marines to provide naval bases to operate from. Keep in mind that with the loss of Midway, the nearest base capable of refueling Subs outside of Pearl Harbor was probably New Zealand, though possibly American Somoa. Not exactly within range of the Major Arteries of the Japanese Merchant Marine. Subs did wonders for the Americans in the Pacific. They also were a weapon that hinged upon the success of America in other fields.

 

[Evie]

Midway would be crap as a naval base, though.

However, even PAnama would not have been a miracle blow, although it would have been a great help in the situation.. It would have slowed down forces movements, but the US would just have moved ships through the Cape Horn.

 

[Cutlass]

Here's what I keep wondering about this thread as I read all these posts.

Why would Japan, NEED to invade Hawaii?

They just got a shiney new naval base on Midway Island, and strategic naval superiority.

Doesn't look like it would make a very good naval base to me

But the real answer is that the reason to take Pearl Harbor was to deny our use of it. The next closest US naval base was San Diego California. And that is a very great distance away to run a war from.

 

[ParkCungHee]

Doesn't look like it would make a very good naval base to me

Hm, I thought Midway had naval facilities as well. I stand corrected.

But the real answer is that the reason to take Pearl Harbor was to deny our use of it. The next closest US naval base was San Diego California. And that is a very great distance away to run a war from.

But what I'm saying is they could have denied us the Base without a ground invasion, the same way the Allies did with Rabaul. If the IJN began operating between California and Hawaii, denying it resupply, and launching a series of raids on the depot and port equipment, it would effectively deny the allies use of Pearl Harbor until they regained Naval Superiority.

 

[Cutlass]

Hm, I thought Midway had naval facilities as well. I stand corrected.


But what I'm saying is they could have denied us the Base without a ground invasion, the same way the Allies did with Rabaul. If the IJN began operating between California and Hawaii, denying it resupply, and launching a series of raids on the depot and port equipment, it would effectively deny the allies use of Pearl Harbor until they regained Naval Superiority.

No they couldn't have. Because we had B-17s and they had short range bombers and a tiny airfield to work with. There is no way a force on Midway can control a force in Hawaii. They are a long way apart, and you can fit 100s of times more force on Hawaii. They wanted Midway for a stepping stone to work on taking Hawaii, not as the final goal.