If you think my tactics are about mindlessly throwing wave after wave of troops at the enemy, then you obviously have me confused with France and the USSA. I would also bring up Belgium, but they don't exactly have enough troops for one wave right now, let alone multiple.
Blackened Skies
- Thread starter Nuka-sama
- Start date
Zappericus
Euro scumbag
We're closing in on nukes, so reinforce your jimmies people.
Zappericus
Euro scumbag
So basically a little less than a decade until christos crashes the game in atomic fire and the GMs reshapes Blackened Skies into Botwawki.
Crezth
i knew you were a real man of the left
Announcement: This speculation does not belong in this thread. Take it to the other thread. We will cross the bridge of WMDs when we come to it.
1. The United States requires that all merchant vessels operating in the seas near and/or surrounding Japan and the Philippines must submit themselves to inspection for contraband or be fired upon.
2. The United States declares a free fire zone in respect of certain declared zones in the Philippines and Japan.
3. British flagged vessels will afforded the same privileges as in the Brazilian case.
4. The United States declares as contraband all such materials as the United States sees fit to so declare.
5. The United States asks both Chinese parties to respect the lives and property of United States citizens.
2. The United States declares a free fire zone in respect of certain declared zones in the Philippines and Japan.
3. British flagged vessels will afforded the same privileges as in the Brazilian case.
4. The United States declares as contraband all such materials as the United States sees fit to so declare.
5. The United States asks both Chinese parties to respect the lives and property of United States citizens.
The Great Zhao would like the United States to better define its claimed sea zones, as one could construe the seas surrounding Japan and the Philippines as the entire coastline of China - not to mention the waterways Russia uses for fleet actions and trade.
christos200
Never tell me the odds
Prince Augustus
In a highly dramatic and elaborate public ceremony Lord-Regent Gerlach Trautmann has been given the title "Prince Augustus". An Imperial Edict issued three days ago by the Regency Council in the name of the child Tsar conveyed the Tsar's gratitude towards Gerlach for "saving the Empire, preserving my reign and punishing the traitors who killed my father Tsar Peter IV" as well for "crushing the enemies of the Empire in Eastern Europe and China and bringing the light of Russia's civilization across Asia and Europe". The edict declared that Gerlach was to be given the title of "Prince Augustus" in a public ceremony.
The Military Parade
The Orthodox Battalions and more than 20,000 Russian soldiers paraded in the streets of St. Petersburg. The men of the Orthodox Battalions carried torches and flags of Russia. Along with the Orthodox Battalions and the soldiers, tens of tanks paraded in the streets of the city and military aircraft flew above the imperial capital. "Not since the days of the Roman Caesars had such show of strength been shown", a high ranking official is said to have remarked.
Crowning by the Patriarch
The Patriarch of Russia attended in person the ceremony and crowned Gerlach with a golden crown as "Prince Augustus and Protector of the Tsar" and blessed him as "Defender of Christendom" and "Savior of Christianity". As soon as Gerlach was crowned, the army and the Orthodox Battalions, as per the Regency Council's instructions, saluted the new Augustus by raising their hands as per the Roman salute and shouted "Hail Augustus, Savior of the Empire, Protector of the Tsar, Conqueror of China".
Second Alexander
The poet, Minister of Foreign Affairs and close friend of Gerlach Dimitrios Gounaris then gave a dramatic speech in which he compared the Augustus with the ancient Caesars and Alexander the Great. "Like a second Alexander, with his army he crushed the numerous armies of the East, thus conquering the vast area of Sinkiang and bringing eternal glory to the Russian nation", he said. "Even the Roman Emperors, the all powerful ancient Caesars, ruled an Empire far smaller than the Russian one. All Under God bow before the Tsar and his Protector, the Prince Augustus".
Gifts from all Nations
Representatives of all of the Empire's nationalities then proceeded to bow before the Prince Augustus and present him with gifts: Polish, Hungarians, Germans, Romanians, Greeks, Kazakhs, Ukrainians, Turkic peoples, Mongols, Tartars, Chinese, Manchu and countless other nationalities. Never since the times of the ancient Romans had so many people paid tribute to a single man.
jackelgull
An aberration of nature
So we're really hammering in on the "Russia third Rome" thingie here aren't we?
The German Federalist Alliance: Strategic Military Review - 1937
Recent fighting record: Araguina Offensive (May-July 1932, Brazilian Civil War, low-scale Sudamerika Volunteer Corps action), Operation “Graf von Spree” (Fall 1933, police action in Bohemia), Operation “Boiorix” (March-May 1934, Trieste Pact War, failed ambitious offensive in Slovenia), Operation “Teutobod” (August-September 1934, Trieste Pact War, successful invasion of Croatia and Bosnia), Battle of Genoa (April-June, September-November 1935, , Trieste Pact War, unsuccessful part of Operation “Alaric”
, Treviso-Padua Offensive (May-September 1935, Trieste Pact War, limitedly successful part of Operation “Alaric”, Trento Pocket (July-early September 1936, Trieste Pact War, early success of Operation “Theodoric”, Genoa-Milan Encirclement (October 1936, Trieste Pact War, mop-up action within Operation “Theodoric”, Storm of Firenze (November-early December 1936, Trieste Pact War, final stage of Operation “Theodoric”, Arezzo-Perugia Offensive (April-June 1937, Trieste Pact War, opening breakthrough of Operation “Theodemir”, Battle of Central Apennines (May-June 1937, Trieste Pact War, support action of Operation “Theodemir”, Battle of Rome (July-August 1937, Trieste Pact War, key part of Operation “Odoacer”, Bremen Counter-Offensive (October 1937, SocIntern-British Commonwealth War, defense of Bremen).
Historical reference: The GFA’s Bundezmacht is considered by many to be the core of contemporary East-German statehood. Even despite most recent attempts to delegate many responsibilities to civil branches of the government and increasing influence of Fortschrittist intellectual elite in Federalist politics, the military has retained its grasp on the key issues of the state, and is acting at least as a gatekeeper and a warden of existing East-German regime. This military-centric model of government defined the development of Bundezmacht in the late 1920s-early 1930s. While not being able to compare with the Ruhr and other members of the Socialist Internationale in economic power, the GFA did its best to preserve its superiority in military quality, viewing its state-of-the-art land forces and ever-developing military aviation as invaluable assets of diplomatic projection. Chairman-General Reyher’s desire to preserve historic continuity of military command forced the Federalist regime to keep talented old regime officers off limits of socialist purist advocates. Perhaps, unintentionally, this, in turn, created a dynamic, meritocratic environment in which political, ideological, and, eventually, intellectual mavericks were allowed to hold their position and push the military forward to new advances in theory and applied practice of modern warfare.
First attempts in experimentation with modern theory of combined arms combat came, surprisingly, not as a government-driven effort, but as a quasi-private initiative. The Sudamerika Volunteer Corps was a shadow paramilitary force, sponsored by East-German industrialists and socialist enthusiasts and deployed tacitly to fight for the Democratic Republic of Brazil in local Civil War. It was Sudamerikakorps’ offensive operations in Para that effectively ended Imperial Brazilian hopes to control the countryside. Despite the rag-tag quality of equipment, the Sudamerikakorps action in Brazil gave the first real-life feedback on modern applications of combined arms warfare, and majority of the most prominent theoreticians of Vernichtungsschlacht doctrine were ex-members of that short-living volunteer mission. Subsequent reforms of the air force and its support infrastructure (expanded air fields, radio towers, improved hangars, expanded flying schools), combined with establishment of token synthetic oil and rubber industry, signaled gradual preparation of the GFA industry to support a new type of military force; a force that wouldn’t see combat against an equal, modern military opponent until the beginning of the Trieste Pact War following the “Pacification” of Austria-Bohemia. However, as it often happens in such ambitious enterprises, the first try turned into a fluke: East-German swing offensive through Slovenia managed to achieve only limited, short-term objectives and failed to penetrate into Italy. Subsequent two years of bloody fighting, however, were beneficial for Bundezmacht grasp on their revolutionary theory of mechanized war of maneuver. The Italians turned out to be great “sparring partners,” fielding a modern, diverse, well-put-together force that could teach East-Germans a lesson or two in air and tank battles. Summer campaigns of 1936-1937, however, finalized the adoption of the “battle of annihilation” doctrine by the GFA military. Utilizing keen exploitation of breakthroughs and pincer movements, the East Germans proved once and again that their strategic and operational concept was as good in theory as it was in practice. Now, that the GFA is mobilizing its fighting capacity for a war with a dangerous foe – the Black&Tan Britain, - its doctrinal concepts are once again required to pass a test against a much more formidable opponent. There’s no doubt, more lessons are waiting to be learned in that struggle.
Overview as of winter 1937: One unquestionable parameter that defines Bundezmacht as a unique fighting force is its unprecedented maneuverability. In the time when evolution of war machines has taken the majority of standing armies toward higher lethality of weapons, the paradigm of the Vernichtungschlacht doctrine forced the East-German military to evolve their mechanized units toward greater mobility. That was achieved, of course, not as much through mechanical improvements (after all, there are objective limitations to how fast a 20-ton war machine can move on a modern chassis), but rather through a complete overhaul of hierarchy of command and order of battle. First of all, East-Germans completely abandoned the concept of an infantry-support tank with its short-barrel ordnance cannon. Instead of supporting slowly-moving infantry in its assaults, tank units were formed into separate, tighter formations, combined with self-propelled artillery and large numbers of trucks, tractors, and other support vehicles. Each of these formations had at least a regiment of motorized infantry assigned to it, but tactical roles of infantry and armor were changed: now the tanks were acting as key goal-achievers, and infantry was acting merely in support. Classic field infantry divisions didn’t disappear from the battlefield altogether, of course, but they now were required to advance after the spearheading armored and mechanized divisions, pinning down encircled pockets of enemy forces and gradually “digesting” them. In order to keep the pace of advance, they, too, were provided with plenty of logistical support; while not every division was fully motorized, trucks have become standard units of logistical support, and tractor-driven field artillery became a norm.
Roles of combat aviation also changed: no longer concentrated on pummeling enemy strongpoints with bombs, close air support planes and multi-role fighters were concentrated on tactical tasks of removing obstacles from the panzers’ avenues of advance. That coordination between armor, infantry, artillery, and air force required a qualitatively different approach to command integration. Combined arms detachments became key operational drivers, and coordination of inter-branch service was brought down from the HQ level to the level of divisions. To achieve this, wide use of radio-equipment, encryption, and other modern electronic tools was introduced into practice, with every other tank and airplane being upgraded with a radio transmitter-receiver by the end of 1937. These measures, however, proved to be limited compared to the excellent level of inter-branch coordination achieved by the Royal British Force, and while East-German generals tend to dismiss operational élan of British generals, they have to currently admit they have been humbled by the perfect tactical support British land forces enjoy from their aviation and navy.
Lack of specialized support units of pioneers and fortress assault detachments also seems to be a gap in the current East-German doctrine. While recognizing the importance of mobile engineers in operational and tactical success, Federalist command failed to organize enough of effective pioneer units to meet the demands of its sizable military. More than once advancing East German infantry and even armor have been unable to effectively cross rivers under fire or penetrate well-entrenched or fortified positions of the enemy. It is argued that German air superiority in Italian campaigns is to blame for that, since a lot of such tactical challenges were simply resolved by calling in dive bombers. It is to be seen how the East German military will deal with this shortcoming.
Combat mentality of the Federalist troops seems to be another point of concern among the higher command. In the early days of testing and trying the Vernichtungsschlacht doctrine (1934-1936), extreme independence of local tactical command was a cornerstone to effective operational execution. With radios being not always available, and with quick, intuitive decision-making being critical for exploitation of any sort of tactical success, East-German officers were given unparalleled freedom of command. It could be pointed out that such notion was a natural result of ideological and intellectual plurality that existed in the Federalist high command, which in the end trickled down even to the NCO level. However, as the latest campaign against the British army pointed out, such freedom of command had its side effects. More often than not, East-German officers were known to disengage from combat when they considered that continuous bloodshed could be too costly for their units with little tactical gain to show for it. As wise as such choices could at times look on the tactical level, they were often proven to be detrimental on the operational level, not always obvious for lower-ranking officers. If anything, the North-European campaign of fall-winter 1937 has exposed morale inferiority of the East-German military compared to the extreme resolve displayed both by the British and the Ruhr fighting forces (the latter fact especially humbling, since these were the GFA officers that supervised the officer reform in the Ruhr in 1936). While still a disciplined, well-organized standing army, the Bundezmacht is yet to find a resolution for the conflict of command paradigms it is suffering from.
Recent fighting record: Araguina Offensive (May-July 1932, Brazilian Civil War, low-scale Sudamerika Volunteer Corps action), Operation “Graf von Spree” (Fall 1933, police action in Bohemia), Operation “Boiorix” (March-May 1934, Trieste Pact War, failed ambitious offensive in Slovenia), Operation “Teutobod” (August-September 1934, Trieste Pact War, successful invasion of Croatia and Bosnia), Battle of Genoa (April-June, September-November 1935, , Trieste Pact War, unsuccessful part of Operation “Alaric”
, Treviso-Padua Offensive (May-September 1935, Trieste Pact War, limitedly successful part of Operation “Alaric”, Trento Pocket (July-early September 1936, Trieste Pact War, early success of Operation “Theodoric”, Genoa-Milan Encirclement (October 1936, Trieste Pact War, mop-up action within Operation “Theodoric”, Storm of Firenze (November-early December 1936, Trieste Pact War, final stage of Operation “Theodoric”, Arezzo-Perugia Offensive (April-June 1937, Trieste Pact War, opening breakthrough of Operation “Theodemir”, Battle of Central Apennines (May-June 1937, Trieste Pact War, support action of Operation “Theodemir”, Battle of Rome (July-August 1937, Trieste Pact War, key part of Operation “Odoacer”, Bremen Counter-Offensive (October 1937, SocIntern-British Commonwealth War, defense of Bremen).Historical reference: The GFA’s Bundezmacht is considered by many to be the core of contemporary East-German statehood. Even despite most recent attempts to delegate many responsibilities to civil branches of the government and increasing influence of Fortschrittist intellectual elite in Federalist politics, the military has retained its grasp on the key issues of the state, and is acting at least as a gatekeeper and a warden of existing East-German regime. This military-centric model of government defined the development of Bundezmacht in the late 1920s-early 1930s. While not being able to compare with the Ruhr and other members of the Socialist Internationale in economic power, the GFA did its best to preserve its superiority in military quality, viewing its state-of-the-art land forces and ever-developing military aviation as invaluable assets of diplomatic projection. Chairman-General Reyher’s desire to preserve historic continuity of military command forced the Federalist regime to keep talented old regime officers off limits of socialist purist advocates. Perhaps, unintentionally, this, in turn, created a dynamic, meritocratic environment in which political, ideological, and, eventually, intellectual mavericks were allowed to hold their position and push the military forward to new advances in theory and applied practice of modern warfare.
First attempts in experimentation with modern theory of combined arms combat came, surprisingly, not as a government-driven effort, but as a quasi-private initiative. The Sudamerika Volunteer Corps was a shadow paramilitary force, sponsored by East-German industrialists and socialist enthusiasts and deployed tacitly to fight for the Democratic Republic of Brazil in local Civil War. It was Sudamerikakorps’ offensive operations in Para that effectively ended Imperial Brazilian hopes to control the countryside. Despite the rag-tag quality of equipment, the Sudamerikakorps action in Brazil gave the first real-life feedback on modern applications of combined arms warfare, and majority of the most prominent theoreticians of Vernichtungsschlacht doctrine were ex-members of that short-living volunteer mission. Subsequent reforms of the air force and its support infrastructure (expanded air fields, radio towers, improved hangars, expanded flying schools), combined with establishment of token synthetic oil and rubber industry, signaled gradual preparation of the GFA industry to support a new type of military force; a force that wouldn’t see combat against an equal, modern military opponent until the beginning of the Trieste Pact War following the “Pacification” of Austria-Bohemia. However, as it often happens in such ambitious enterprises, the first try turned into a fluke: East-German swing offensive through Slovenia managed to achieve only limited, short-term objectives and failed to penetrate into Italy. Subsequent two years of bloody fighting, however, were beneficial for Bundezmacht grasp on their revolutionary theory of mechanized war of maneuver. The Italians turned out to be great “sparring partners,” fielding a modern, diverse, well-put-together force that could teach East-Germans a lesson or two in air and tank battles. Summer campaigns of 1936-1937, however, finalized the adoption of the “battle of annihilation” doctrine by the GFA military. Utilizing keen exploitation of breakthroughs and pincer movements, the East Germans proved once and again that their strategic and operational concept was as good in theory as it was in practice. Now, that the GFA is mobilizing its fighting capacity for a war with a dangerous foe – the Black&Tan Britain, - its doctrinal concepts are once again required to pass a test against a much more formidable opponent. There’s no doubt, more lessons are waiting to be learned in that struggle.
Overview as of winter 1937: One unquestionable parameter that defines Bundezmacht as a unique fighting force is its unprecedented maneuverability. In the time when evolution of war machines has taken the majority of standing armies toward higher lethality of weapons, the paradigm of the Vernichtungschlacht doctrine forced the East-German military to evolve their mechanized units toward greater mobility. That was achieved, of course, not as much through mechanical improvements (after all, there are objective limitations to how fast a 20-ton war machine can move on a modern chassis), but rather through a complete overhaul of hierarchy of command and order of battle. First of all, East-Germans completely abandoned the concept of an infantry-support tank with its short-barrel ordnance cannon. Instead of supporting slowly-moving infantry in its assaults, tank units were formed into separate, tighter formations, combined with self-propelled artillery and large numbers of trucks, tractors, and other support vehicles. Each of these formations had at least a regiment of motorized infantry assigned to it, but tactical roles of infantry and armor were changed: now the tanks were acting as key goal-achievers, and infantry was acting merely in support. Classic field infantry divisions didn’t disappear from the battlefield altogether, of course, but they now were required to advance after the spearheading armored and mechanized divisions, pinning down encircled pockets of enemy forces and gradually “digesting” them. In order to keep the pace of advance, they, too, were provided with plenty of logistical support; while not every division was fully motorized, trucks have become standard units of logistical support, and tractor-driven field artillery became a norm.
Roles of combat aviation also changed: no longer concentrated on pummeling enemy strongpoints with bombs, close air support planes and multi-role fighters were concentrated on tactical tasks of removing obstacles from the panzers’ avenues of advance. That coordination between armor, infantry, artillery, and air force required a qualitatively different approach to command integration. Combined arms detachments became key operational drivers, and coordination of inter-branch service was brought down from the HQ level to the level of divisions. To achieve this, wide use of radio-equipment, encryption, and other modern electronic tools was introduced into practice, with every other tank and airplane being upgraded with a radio transmitter-receiver by the end of 1937. These measures, however, proved to be limited compared to the excellent level of inter-branch coordination achieved by the Royal British Force, and while East-German generals tend to dismiss operational élan of British generals, they have to currently admit they have been humbled by the perfect tactical support British land forces enjoy from their aviation and navy.
Lack of specialized support units of pioneers and fortress assault detachments also seems to be a gap in the current East-German doctrine. While recognizing the importance of mobile engineers in operational and tactical success, Federalist command failed to organize enough of effective pioneer units to meet the demands of its sizable military. More than once advancing East German infantry and even armor have been unable to effectively cross rivers under fire or penetrate well-entrenched or fortified positions of the enemy. It is argued that German air superiority in Italian campaigns is to blame for that, since a lot of such tactical challenges were simply resolved by calling in dive bombers. It is to be seen how the East German military will deal with this shortcoming.
Combat mentality of the Federalist troops seems to be another point of concern among the higher command. In the early days of testing and trying the Vernichtungsschlacht doctrine (1934-1936), extreme independence of local tactical command was a cornerstone to effective operational execution. With radios being not always available, and with quick, intuitive decision-making being critical for exploitation of any sort of tactical success, East-German officers were given unparalleled freedom of command. It could be pointed out that such notion was a natural result of ideological and intellectual plurality that existed in the Federalist high command, which in the end trickled down even to the NCO level. However, as the latest campaign against the British army pointed out, such freedom of command had its side effects. More often than not, East-German officers were known to disengage from combat when they considered that continuous bloodshed could be too costly for their units with little tactical gain to show for it. As wise as such choices could at times look on the tactical level, they were often proven to be detrimental on the operational level, not always obvious for lower-ranking officers. If anything, the North-European campaign of fall-winter 1937 has exposed morale inferiority of the East-German military compared to the extreme resolve displayed both by the British and the Ruhr fighting forces (the latter fact especially humbling, since these were the GFA officers that supervised the officer reform in the Ruhr in 1936). While still a disciplined, well-organized standing army, the Bundezmacht is yet to find a resolution for the conflict of command paradigms it is suffering from.
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