Good post in general joyce10. Especially about the "Spanish school" of warfare.
A number of comments though. Most of them due to what I know of the army of Gustavus Adolphus (the Swedish intervention 1630-1648).
joycem10 said:
horse, as the most expensive, was always the smallest component, and became smaller as the century wore on.
Actually as the 30 years war dragged on in the German theater, armies tended to get smaller but much more reliant on horses. When the Swedish king landed on Rügen in 1630, he commanded an infantry army of something like 30.000+ troops, and a much smaller cavalry. A few years later Johan Banér had a string of Swedish vicrories rarely commanding more than 8-9000 troops, but most of these were mounted; not cavalry for the most part, they didn't fight on horseback.
joycem10 said:
Among the infantry, the proportions of pike to shot changed over the years as well. How to integrate firearms with pikes was one of the technical issues of the day, with firearms becoming a more and more prominent component over time. By the seventeenth century, two-thirds of the infantry would be firearms.
The big Dutch invention in the late 16th c. was the volley fire (possibly independantly invented in Japan, battle of Nagashino 1576). This started the increase in the musketeer to pikeman ratio and the development of battlefield infantry tactis reliant on superior fire-power. Accuracy wasn't the aim, but speed. Drill was designed to decrease reloading time to increase the rate of fire. During the 18th c. muskets were shortened in the race to reduce reloading time.
The Swedes learned all they could from the Dutch and the refined it, making the Swedish army the first to try to win battle through fire-power. (Smaller units, a huge increase in the number of musketeers with only a thin screen of pikemen to protect them while reloading. The idea was to blast the opponent to pieces.)
But the real break through for them was probabaly the artillery, like JohnMacleod has pointed out. The Swedish artillery was the real high-tech, innovative branch of the army. Tactically what they aimed for was having lots and lots of light field artillery pieces. The "leather gun" was an early attempt. This was a metal tube sourrounded by layer upon layer of cured leather. It was light and manouverable, but not very durable or accurate it seems. In the end Sweden settled for light cast iron guns, usually three-pounders. It had been a dream for gunmakers to be able to cast guns out of cheap iron instead of expensive bronze. Problem was, most iron contained so many impurities it made the metal to brittle to be useful in a gun. They would crack, often killing their crew. Here Sweden was helped by providence, being the only nation in Europe in posession of mines full of pure, high-grade iron ore. (The other known place at the time was India.)
So Sweden produced huge numbers of these guns (unintentionally almost discovering standardisation, not by design, but as a product of the scale of the manufacture). They were distributed through the army, each regiment was supplied with its own pieces (another first). Usually they would fire shrapnel, and they were light enough to be moved around by two horses, and redirected by a few men. Most artillery of the other armies at the time were few, huge and heavy made out of bronze. These were lugged into place before the battle. You wouldn't want to get in their line of fire, but once in position, they stayed there and often they couldn't even be redirected if their fire power was needed elsewhere.
The Swedish artillery tactics were a huge success, and so was the manufacture of artillery pieces, making Sweden the worlds largest exporter of artillery in the 17th century. (Sweden even sold artillery to the Indians in North America from the colony of New Sweden, what is today Delaware.)
joycem10 said:
Cavalry had mutated from the armored knight to the model of the german cuirasser. Although some still armed themselves with lances, the typical horseman carried multiple single shot weapons and edged weapons. The usual tactic was a charge, fire and wheel manuever called a "caracole". This is performed by a squadron of many ranks. The first rank comes up to the enemy, fires, then wheels off to reload and reform. Cavalry were used on battlefield but also were used as skirmishers, scouts and raiders.
Yes, but the "caracol" was also the cavalry tactic that was replaced by a reliance on "bare steel" and speed. The caracol wasn't a charge, it was usually done at a canter. Later, 18th-19th centuries, cavalry wasn't caracolling anymore, but relied on the charge, edged weapons out (or lances), knee to knee, at full tilt (if the horsemen had the skill. British cavalry during the Napoleonic wars were contemptous of the French cav. that often attacked at a canter because their rideing skills were too bad to handle anything else.)
Again, this kind of cavalry tactics were pioneered by the Swedish army. (The Finnish cavalry was particularily renowned.) Partly because because Sweden couldn't afford to arm their horsemen with eleaborate armour (you would get a stiff coat of moose leather) and the expensive pistols (you got a sword, and if someone shot at you, hope he'd miss, charge and put the sword in him). This meant lighter horsemen, less protected, on smaller and cheaper horses, attacking at higher speeds. When fighting armoured heavy cavalry head on they were at a disadvantage, but in a flank attack, and especially if they were set upon retreating infantry, they were deadly.
But once massive fire power became available, cavalry was reduced to the classical role of later wars: scouting, skirmishing and protecting the flanks. It was infantry and artillery that would win the battles.
joycem10 said:
The Spanish were considered the greatest army of the time and thier tactics were considered the model. During that period, the Hapsburgs were seeking to establish hegemony over Europe, and thier armies were in play throughout the continent.
Absolutely, which also meant that their defeat by Dutch, Swedes etc. was a bit of a shock. The Imperial armies didn't stick to what was known as the "Spanish school" but reformed and in the end resembled their adversaries.
joycem10 said:
The Spanish "Tercio" was a combination pikes and arqubuses. The pikemen formed the heart of the formation with arquebusiers arrayed on the flanks. The arquebusiers' principal duty was to fend off pistol-wielding cavalry and match volleys with enemy gunmen. Thier main goal was to keep the pikes intact until their final charge, which would decide the battle.
Which worked fine, until faced with an enemy that wouldn't get into that kind of "shoving contest", but was content to massacre them from a distance with musket and artillery fire. (Breitenfeld 1632) The Dutch and the Swedes (and later Cromwells New Model Army if I've understood correctly) inversed the roles of pike and musket. In these armies it was the pikemens job to protect the musketeers from other pikemen, cavalry etc. The musketeers would then blow everything sent against them to Kingdom Come. This was the way of the future. Towards the end of the 17th c. the pike was replaced by the new invention the bayonet, making the musketeers their own pikemen.
joycem10 said:
Most of the armies of the time were mercenary armies. The costs associated with fielding these armies soon made finance vitally important. Also, along with mercenary armies came the problems of sack and plunder. Victorious battles could be lost after the fact when an army disbanded due to pay in arrears.
Exactly. Another important factor was supply. In a place like Germany were the war had raged for a while, operations were often decided on the basis of where the army could be supplied through plunder, usually the only means to do so. Failure to plan ahead destroyed more armies than the fighting. The Imperial general Gallas was nicknamed "der Heerzerstörer", "the Destroyer of Armies", at the court in Vienna. Of course, he never destroyed any of the enemies armies, only his own, and usually by marching them of into some place where they couldn't be supplied. He was a bit simple, but unflinchingly loyal to the Emperor so he remained in command. More clever an ambitious generals (Wallenstein, Piccolmini) were distrusted, and it seems with reason. (Too keen on setting themselves up as rulers of something.)
joycem10 said:
The combat of the time was dominated more by seige warfare than by actual field battles. Strategy was considered an art of manuever and supply.
Commanders at the time would talk about "hazarding a battle", i.e. the thought of the battles not as the best means of destroying the enemy, but as a gamble. Once started, commanders never really could control events, and there was always the risk that it would end in disaster. Consequnelty, the good generals only fought pitched battles when they were out of options. It was much better to harass the enemy, reduce his strong points and try to manouver him into a place were he couldn't feed his men.
It could also be added that the way armies fought varied considerably across Europe. In eastern Europe an almosy medieval reliance on cavalry remained into the second half of the 17th century. The noblemen that made up the Polish cavalry were extremely successful fighting Russians, Turks etc. Their attitude towards infantry continued to be that of speed bumps to be ridden over. It's been said that the last charge of the medieval knight was made by the Hungarian "haiduks" at the three day battle of Warsaw against the Swedish infantry/artillery based army in the 1650's.
