Commandos during WWII. Worth it?

[storealex]

I've heard a lot of claims that the British Commandos and Special Forces during WWII was an waste of effort. That it was an expensive undertaking which drained the best men from the regular units. And that the resources spent on it would have been better used on ordinary warfare.

The arguments against this are many. Commandos boosted British morale in a time when Britain stood alone. They forced the Germans to spread out their forces all over Europe to defend every little Island and coastline against possible raids, and in this way they diverted German troops which might otherwise have been used in Russia. They also helped tricking the Germans into believing that the Allied landings would come in other places than where they actually did. They damaged German infrastructure, plants, ships and aircraft and finally they provided elite forces which by pure combat helped the war effort.

Im inclined to argue that it was worth it, but Im no expert and would like to hear from people who actually are:
Was the use of British Commandos and Special Forces worth it, or would the resources spent on them have helped the war effort more in other ways?

 

[Silurian]

Well the use of special forces has increased since WW2.

 

[Terrance888]

I understand but don't know the scale of the impact of talent concentration. Special forces like Commandos, Stormtroopers or Seals "Skim the Cream" off other services. So... exactly how worse off are the other services, and how does this concentration of talent help overall? (other than the obvious best people for hardest tasks thing)

Just posing another question for them experts.

 

[Flying Pig]

There is the other argument that such forces increase the level of talent in the field army, because there are vastly more soldiers training and aspiring to join the SAS than will ever be able to join it, meaning that they are driven to much higher standards than they would be with nothing else to aim for.

 

[Terrance888]

That also makes sense. Everyone wants to be special, and qualifying for the special services certainly count.

 

[innonimatu]

The way I see it they were essentially giving extra training to some units. That is cheap on resources, you can't just trade that for extra materiel for equipping more army units, especially if you're dealing with raw materials shortages.

Man-hours for training time wouldn't have been better used elsewhere, probably. I'm guessing that a limiting factor would be the willingness/inclination of the soldiers to actually absorb extra training beyond some level, and that it made sense to pick a few that seemed more inclined or better qualified (whatever the criteria) for that extra training.
But Flying Pig is probably the only person here who can comment on that.

 

[Flying Pig]

Slim notably was concerned that special forces training was in fact taking skills away from the rest of the army - he complained that it was like 'creating a Royal Corps of Tree Climbers and declaring that no soldier who did not wear the oak-leaf cluster would be allowed to climb a tree'. Bear in mind that special forces aren't just trained to be better line infantry; their role is altogether other, and indeed, as Arnhem showed, they're not necessarily cut out to fight in 'conventional' battles unsupported.

 

[storealex]

There is the other argument that such forces increase the level of talent in the field army, because there are vastly more soldiers training and aspiring to join the SAS than will ever be able to join it, meaning that they are driven to much higher standards than they would be with nothing else to aim for.

I think thats more true during peacetime, but during WWII when every soldier knew he might very well have to fight for his life, I think most soldiers in most units would have plenty of motivation to increase their standard. Im not saying it was not a factor, I just don't think it was such a big deal.

Bear in mind that special forces aren't just trained to be better line infantry; their role is altogether other, and indeed, as Arnhem showed, they're not necessarily cut out to fight in 'conventional' battles unsupported.

I wouldn't characterize the Paras as Special Forces though. More like a branch of the Army. The were infantry trained for a specific purpose, but often used as regular infantry as well.
By Special Forces in this context I mean smaller specialized units, such as SAS, SBS, Long Range Desert Group, Commandos etc. (Im aware that the Commandos actually had Brigades and also fought as a "Marine" type of infantry, but Im mainly interested in discussing the usefulness of their "SOF" type missions.

 

[Flying Pig]

I think thats more true during peacetime, but during WWII when every soldier knew he might very well have to fight for his life, I think most soldiers in most units would have plenty of motivation to increase their standard. Im not saying it was not a factor, I just don't think it was such a big deal.

I am talking in general terms rather than specifically to the Second World War, but I disagree with that; we don't observe nowadays, for instance, that battalions about to go to Afghanistan raise their standards to be equal with airborne or commando battalions. Of course, soldiers who are concerned about their fitness go for a few extra runs, but there's not the sort of dedication to training that you see in men with their eyes on the SAS (I can't speak for those seeking a transfer to the airborne, for obvious reasons) - most soldiers spend the weeks before deployment getting extremely drunk and spending an awful lot of money!

I wouldn't characterize the Paras as Special Forces though. More like a branch of the Army. The were infantry trained for a specific purpose, but often used as regular infantry as well.

By Special Forces in this context I mean smaller specialized units, such as SAS, SBS, Long Range Desert Group, Commandos etc. (Im aware that the Commandos actually had Brigades and also fought as a "Marine" type of infantry, but Im mainly interested in discussing the usefulness of their "SOF" type missions.

This is true; the reason I used them as an example was that during the Second World War, they were composed of volunteers from other regiments chosen on merit: my point is that the Army didn't take the best soldiers and put them in a regiment that would be better than the rest of the Army at conventional tasks; they created one which actually wasn't all that good at what the rest of the Army did. Yes, they were heroic, and very good at light infantry duties, but their nature made them very much unsuited to the 'hold' part of a take-and-hold mission - which Montgomery and Browning knew, and they had never intended for them to be used in that way. The Commandos encountered similar problems making head-on assaults on German strongpoints in Normandy, although they usually carried the day, albiet with heavy losses - not least because Lord Lovat ordered his regiment to charge Pegasus Bridge in their green berets!

 

[Dachs]

This is true; the reason I used them as an example was that during the Second World War, they were composed of volunteers from other regiments chosen on merit: my point is that the Army didn't take the best soldiers and put them in a regiment that would be better than the rest of the Army at conventional tasks; they created one which actually wasn't all that good at what the rest of the Army did. Yes, they were heroic, and very good at light infantry duties, but their nature made them very much unsuited to the 'hold' part of a take-and-hold mission - which Montgomery and Browning knew, and they had never intended for them to be used in that way.

Perhaps they should've trained like American paratroopers instead - you know, which could do what the rest of the Army did, but better, in addition to their unconventional job.

 

[Flying Pig]

Witty, but missing the point - a paratrooper better at soldiering than an infanteer, an airborne battalion is better at everything than a line battalion , but an airborne division, lacking the heavy support available to a line division - big guns and armour, critically - is unsuited for certain tasks for which a line division is normally used. Training has nothing to do with it; it's simply a constraint imposed by what can and cannot be taken into the air, thrown out of an aircraft, and used again when it hits the ground.

 

[Dachs]

Witty, but missing the point - a paratrooper better at soldiering than an infanteer, an airborne battalion is better at everything than a line battalion , but an airborne division, lacking the heavy support available to a line division - big guns and armour, critically - is unsuited for certain tasks for which a line division is normally used. Training has nothing to do with it; it's simply a constraint imposed by what can and cannot be taken into the air, thrown out of an aircraft, and used again when it hits the ground.

Infantry divisions didn't have overly large supplies of armor, either, and the problem of acquiring field artillery capable of air glider transport was solved - at least by the Americans - long before MARKET GARDEN. Look at the way the Americans used the XVII Airborne Corps - the 82nd and 101st were put into the line several times and either performed up to par or outperformed regular line infantry units. How was standing up to German armor at Bastogne and St.-Vith a fundamentally different task from holding it off in Arnhem?

Now, I don't think that the problem the British faced in Arnhem was one of training, but of tactics, which isn't necessarily an institutional problem (although contemporary American officers like Jim Gavin thought that it was). Given the piss-poor plan that was devised for them - both the operational plan and the plan specifically for the Arnhem landing - it would probably have been asking too much of any division, in any army, to carry it off. And I don't know enough about the First Airborne Division to be able to say whether it had serious deficiencies in training and equipment compared to the American airborne divisions. But the fact is that those American divisions were regularly able to accomplish tasks outside the supposed remit of an airborne division, and accomplish them extremely ably. In their cases, there is no reason to believe that specialization implied a concomitant loss of ability in other facets of warmaking.

 

[Flying Pig]

Infantry divisions didn't have overly large supplies of armor, either, and the problem of acquiring field artillery capable of air glider transport was solved - at least by the Americans - long before MARKET GARDEN. Look at the way the Americans used the XVII Airborne Corps - the 82nd and 101st were put into the line several times and either performed up to par or outperformed regular line infantry units.

Airborne brigades have light guns, yes, but not heavy ones, and infantry divisions nowadays are mechanised: you can't drop a battalion's worth of Warriors out of the sky without somebody noticing. Even then, under normal circumstances an infantry battalion, even in the Second World War, would be supported by armour - each infantry brigade contains an armoured regiment, which gives each infantry division the core of an armoured brigade spread about its elements.

How was standing up to German armor at Bastogne and St.-Vith a fundamentally different task from holding it off in Arnhem?

Quantity and preparation - the American divisions were able to fight as formed units, while very few of the airborne battalions at Arnhem were able to work together for most of the battle. This is an unfortunate side-effect of being dropped in rather badly, miles from where you want to end up, without communications, and hideously outnumbered.

Now, I don't think that the problem the British faced in Arnhem was one of training, but of tactics, which isn't necessarily an institutional problem (although contemporary American officers like Jim Gavin thought that it was). Given the piss-poor plan that was devised for them - both the operational plan and the plan specifically for the Arnhem landing - it would probably have been asking too much of any division, in any army, to carry it off.

I think you're right - as did most of the 1st's officers; Urquhart had originally wanted to drop right on top of Arnhem, but the RAF wouldn't fly the mission - especially given the inaccurate estimates of enemy strength. On paper, Arnhem was defended by only a small number of second-class troops, rather than two SS divisions.

And I don't know enough about the First Airborne Division to be able to say whether it had serious deficiencies in training and equipment compared to the American airborne divisions. But the fact is that those American divisions were regularly able to accomplish tasks outside the supposed remit of an airborne division, and accomplish them extremely ably. In their cases, there is no reason to believe that specialization implied a concomitant loss of ability in other facets of warmaking.

If nothing else, airborne status means a reduction in speed moving over terrain. When not jumping out of an aircraft, paratroopers move and fight on foot; most infantry use APCs to get around faster and provide some level of heavy firepower in contact. Airborne divisions also don't have heavy gun batteries, as discussed above - I don't know enough about history to say whether that ever made a difference during the war, and my intuitive guess would be that their commanders knew these weaknesses and so avoided giving them missions which depended on having the things that they didn't have. The point with Arnhem is that, despite the ridiculous plan, the 1st would have had a far greater chance of success had they had something more effective than the PIAT to engage enemy armour, and something better than Jeeps to move quickly in a coup-de-main.

 

[storealex]

But the fact is that those American divisions were regularly able to accomplish tasks outside the supposed remit of an airborne division, and accomplish them extremely ably. In their cases, there is no reason to believe that specialization implied a concomitant loss of ability in other facets of warmaking.

Well the 82nd didn't take their bridge in Nijmegen before the arrival of British tanks from XXX Corps.

 

[storealex]

I am talking in general terms rather than specifically to the Second World War, but I disagree with that; we don't observe nowadays, for instance, that battalions about to go to Afghanistan raise their standards to be equal with airborne or commando battalions. Of course, soldiers who are concerned about their fitness go for a few extra runs, but there's not the sort of dedication to training that you see in men with their eyes on the SAS (I can't speak for those seeking a transfer to the airborne, for obvious reasons) - most soldiers spend the weeks before deployment getting extremely drunk and spending an awful lot of money!

Well you could hardly expect standard infantry to raise their standards to commando levels and that is certainly not a point Im trying to make. But I would argue that battalions going to Afghanistan do take their mission and and training seriously, and therefore reach a high a decent level before deployment. Some wild partying dosn't make them bad soldiers. Indeed, SAS and SBS soldiers were pretty good drinkers in WWII too, even though being elite and taking their job seriously.

 

[Flying Pig]

Oh yes, absolutely, I'm not disagreeing with any of that - but I am saying that even in wartime, introducing highly selective units and inviting men to apply to join them will lead some of them to train even harder, even though they already have 'plenty of motivation to increase their standards'.

 

[Dachs]

Airborne brigades have light guns, yes, but not heavy ones, and infantry divisions nowadays are mechanised: you can't drop a battalion's worth of Warriors out of the sky without somebody noticing. Even then, under normal circumstances an infantry battalion, even in the Second World War, would be supported by armour - each infantry brigade contains an armoured regiment, which gives each infantry division the core of an armoured brigade spread about its elements.



Quantity and preparation - the American divisions were able to fight as formed units, while very few of the airborne battalions at Arnhem were able to work together for most of the battle. This is an unfortunate side-effect of being dropped in rather badly, miles from where you want to end up, without communications, and hideously outnumbered.



I think you're right - as did most of the 1st's officers; Urquhart had originally wanted to drop right on top of Arnhem, but the RAF wouldn't fly the mission - especially given the inaccurate estimates of enemy strength. On paper, Arnhem was defended by only a small number of second-class troops, rather than two SS divisions.



If nothing else, airborne status means a reduction in speed moving over terrain. When not jumping out of an aircraft, paratroopers move and fight on foot; most infantry use APCs to get around faster and provide some level of heavy firepower in contact. Airborne divisions also don't have heavy gun batteries, as discussed above - I don't know enough about history to say whether that ever made a difference during the war, and my intuitive guess would be that their commanders knew these weaknesses and so avoided giving them missions which depended on having the things that they didn't have. The point with Arnhem is that, despite the ridiculous plan, the 1st would have had a far greater chance of success had they had something more effective than the PIAT to engage enemy armour, and something better than Jeeps to move quickly in a coup-de-main.

While these are in general interesting comments, I honestly think that their value is diminished by the apparent confusion in the time period about which we are talking. We can't really discuss the effectiveness of airborne infantry vis-a-vis the legs in the Second World War while mentioning, for instance, APCs or main battle tanks. (And if we're on the question of mobility, surely an APC is less mobile than, say, a Chinook or Blackhawk.)

Well the 82nd didn't take their bridge in Nijmegen before the arrival of British tanks from XXX Corps.

Yes, but those tanks were immaterial to the actual seizure of the bridge; it was a question of time and of repelling the attacks out of the Reichswald and around Wyler first in order to free up enough troops to make the attack. Reuben Tucker's men didn't get much help from the tanks when they rowed across the river.

 

[Flying Pig]

While these are in general interesting comments, I honestly think that their value is diminished by the apparent confusion in the time period about which we are talking. We can't really discuss the effectiveness of airborne infantry vis-a-vis the legs in the Second World War while mentioning, for instance, APCs or main battle tanks. (And if we're on the question of mobility, surely an APC is less mobile than, say, a Chinook or Blackhawk.)

I know; I'm being a bit naughty and talking in general terms, which I know quite a lot about, rather than specifically about 1940s formations. At any rate, the comment about heavy guns and armour support still holds.

Yes, a Chinook is more mobile, but it's not there a lot of the time - you don't have one of those following you around the battlefield! A Chinook is a taxi; it drops you off and you foot it; with an APC, you dismount to fight, and then get back in it.

 

[storealex]

Yes, but those tanks were immaterial to the actual seizure of the bridge; it was a question of time and of repelling the attacks out of the Reichswald and around Wyler first in order to free up enough troops to make the attack. Reuben Tucker's men didn't get much help from the tanks when they rowed across the river.

Well Im sure the 1st Airborne would have fared better taking their bridge, had they had XXX Corps around like the 82nd had. The 1st only had Frosts Battalion around the bridge. The rest of the Division was busy fighting Germans on the way to the bridge and unlike their American counterparts, they had no armor to keep those occupied in order to shift main effort.

 

[Dachs]

Well Im sure the 1st Airborne would have fared better taking their bridge, had they had XXX Corps around like the 82nd had. The 1st only had Frosts Battalion around the bridge. The rest of the Division was busy fighting Germans on the way to the bridge and unlike their American counterparts, they had no armor to keep those occupied in order to shift main effort.

Yeah, but that didn't actually happen. XXX Corps halted when its leading elements reached Nijmegen on 19-20 September. The overwhelming majority of British armor did not participate in the engagement on 20 September that ended up with the 504th Parachute Infantry securing the Waal bridge and with successful 82nd counterattacks on all fronts. A battalion each of Coldstream Guards and Grenadier Guards were detached to the division, but the former remained in division reserve, while the latter had problems getting their tanks through the streets of Nijmegen and were of limited utility. Undoubtedly the presence of Commonwealth troops at Nijmegen was a useful morale boost to the Americans, and they did provide limited material assistance, but they were hardly a prerequisite for American victory.

Now, had XXX Corps managed to somehow link up with the 1st Airborne, then yes, obviously the British would have stood an excellent chance of victory at Arnhem - but if that had happened, then the 1st Airborne probably would've had to have captured both ends of the bridge already anyway, and therefore the whole operation would probably have been carried out differently. Which kind of brings us back to my argument, no?