Eastern Europe, what's next?

[joycem10]

Originally posted by Tycho Brahe
It´s true. EU is behind in R&B .. erh... and hate it.

The EU must close the R&B gap!

I propose John Lee Hooker and BB King be traded to the EU immediately, preferably for some authentic german beer ( none of that import crap). Only then will levels of Rythem and Blues be equal worldwide.

 

[Vrylakas]

The EU must close the R&B gap!

I propose John Lee Hooker and BB King be traded to the EU immediately, preferably for some authentic german beer ( none of that import crap). Only then will levels of Rythem and Blues be equal worldwide.

OK, that was pretty funny. I'm a little miffed because you beat me to it.

A large part of Eastern Europe is part of the EU for almost two hours by now. Based on Eastern Europe's history, what do you think, is this the end of the road for those who joined? Or being in the EU will be just another curve in the historic detour of Eastern Europe?

I had a lot of work to do at home last night so I didn't get a chance to write down the lyrics of a song I used to love back in the early 1990s, and although I can see it listed on webpages devoted to this guy its lyrics are never included. Cseh Tamás put out a great song on his U'j dalok album called simply Keleteurópa ("Eastern Europe"). I wish I could re-produce the lyrics here in full but my memory is a bit creaky. There is in particular one line, "Táncolj, mért éppen most szabad!" ("Dance [now], because now you can!"; I suck at translations.) that I think best typifies the situation Eastern Europe now finds itself in. Dammit! This song is full of great lines that really express a lot of the usual conundrum Eastern Europe finds itself in nowadays, lines like, "Hol a bal, hol a jobb, nincs itt irány"; ("Where's the left, where's the right; There are no directions here": A political analogy.) If I get some time and think of it this weekend I'll sit down and transcribe this song.

The collapse of the Soviet empire and the subsequent expansion of NATO and the EU into the region bring great possibilities and opportunities, but nothing is guaranteed; nothing is written in stone. I don't believe in Fukayama-style absolutes in history; history is not a machine like Marx envisioned. Still, the NATO and EU ascensions are probably the most positive thing to happen to Eastern Europe for the past 4 centuries, even perhaps more important than the (re-)founding of independent states in 1918, given the dangerous and politically untenable environment they existed in until the inevitable Second World War. For those not familiar with Eastern Europe, think about that for a minute; it's been 4 long centuries since most of us collectively got unconditional, unqualified good news, and some of us have to go still farther back than that.

That said, many dangers lurk. For once at least the general atmosphere in Europe favors peaceful development and growth in Eastern Europe, but Western Europe still hasn't fully digested the full impact of its actions in expanding the EU eastward. Don't get me wrong; I'm glad they didn't think about it too much and chose to make a historical, if somewhat sentimental, decision rather than get too buried in the ledger balances of "Re-"unification. However, there is still the danger of a bureaucratic or tax-payer backlash in Western Europe once the euphoria of "Lisbon to Vilnius" wears off. Thank the gods for us that Western Europe didn't learn a thing from the 1990 German re-unification.

Just a few years ago I wouldn't have given a second thought to American relations having any impact on an EU expansion but as recent events showed (i.e., Iraq) there are some significant differences between Eastern and Western Europe. I wouldn't even go as far as to say Eastern Europe is pro-American, but rather to say that the region is far more security-focused than Western Europe and the region sees real European security being achieved only with significant ties and aid from the U.S. It's a long historical story that I've talked about on many times so I won't re-hash it out here but essentially Eastern Europe, while very eager to embrace Western European democracy, stability and prosperity, does not trust Western Europe to be able to provide an effective security environment for the continent. Eastern Europeans therefore just about collapse with apoplexy attacks when nationalists in Washington, Paris and Brussels seemingly endanger or disregard their alliance and historical ties over modern trivial issues or ideologies. We want a strong and prosperous EU, but we also want that EU to have a strong alliance and relationship with the U.S. We want to know that a Russian threat against Poland would be brunted by the potential intervention of U.S. Marines.

OK, wandering back to the main question, I think that Eastern Europe has grabbed a HUGE opportunity in joining the EU, but a danger is that the EU itself hasn't quite figured out what it wants to be and how to get there when it does decide. This week Chirac referred to the EU as "a confederation of sovereign nation-states". Is it a confederation? Is it a "United States of Europe"? What balance will EU laws have jurisdictionally compared to local laws? Will this balance be universal, or will each country adopt their own balance (i.e., a British approach that emphasizes national sovereignty compared to a Belgian approach that emphasizes EU supremacy)? There are so many questions for and about the EU that need to be worked out, which makes an EU expansion to Eastern Europe far more precarious than the EU's induction of Spain and Portugal. Through all of this Eastern Europeans are worried (as Laci mentioned) about finding themselves relegated to a second-class status within the EU, that for instance their economies will not be developed independently but rather developed as service sops to the Western European more developed economies.

The EU is the greatest achievment of European history, and from the moment in 1952 that French foreign minister Robert Schuman proposed the coal-sharing agreement with Germany Europe has marched towards the goal of a united, peaceful and prosperous Europe. Eastern Europe historically deserves to be members of the EU, and despite the up-front costs has much to offer the Union. The final unification of much of the European Continent - still more to go - is a revolution in modern concepts of sovereignty and statehood. The EU and Eastern Europe have a lot of work ahead of them to make this work (and the jury is still out on whether it will work) but opportunities for Eastern Europe do not come any more pregnant than this.

 

[Tycho Brahe]

Great post, Vrylakas

The part about the song I didn´t catch, though

 

[klazlo]

I agree with Vrylakas that this is a great opportunity for Eastern Europe, regardless of the imagined or true fears in both camps. I'm sceptical with regards to many aspects of the EU, but putting this into a historical context there was simply no other outcome. There are some important benefits for EE, like more restrictive environmental regulations, or better opportunities (i.e. more money) for improving transportation and telecommunication infrastructure. And when the EE higher education should compete with WE colleges and universities, it might break the fossil-like structure of EE academia.

Also, this step is a great opportunity for Western Europe. Buying significant market, incorporating EE into a more peaceful (though sometimes completely inefficient) political arena, making social mobility better within Europe and refreshing the Western European societies with Eastern European immigrants/workers/intellectuals will help them too (maybe I shouldn't make the distinction between "them" and "us" )

A Slovak farmer said once: "it is better to be a poor cousin than being only poor and not cousin at all".
Eastern Europe had no choice but join. Western Europe had no choice but incorporate. Too bad, it took so long.

 

[Vrylakas]

Here is a relevant article from RFE highlighting some of the "challenges" the EU will have to collectively face. This means in effect that parts of Europe - i.e., Russia - will reject European unity and the benefits of economic and political cooperation, opting instead for strengthening national sovereignty. The article:

Analysis: Russia And The EU -- A Problematic Future

By Victor Yasmann

The 1 May expansion of the EU to include 10 new members -- eight of which are either former Soviet republics or former Soviet satellite states -- opens a new era in Russia's relations with the rest of greater Europe. Naturally, Russians do not share the Euro-enthusiasm of the Central and Eastern Europeans, both those who have already become citizens of a united Europe and those that aspire to do so.

This represents something of a shift in Russian attitudes. Back in the 1990s, when Russia first signed its Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU, the general implication was that Russia would slowly but steadily move toward greater integration with Europe. Now, both the public and the Russian political elite seem to have changed their minds about Europe. A national ROMIR-Monitoring poll of 1,600 Russians conducted last month found that 43 percent of respondents said they do not care about EU expansion, even about the fact that the Baltic states were scheduled to become EU members, RIA-Novosti reported on 29 April. Twenty-nine percent of respondents said they viewed EU expansion negatively, while 24 percent viewed it positively. By comparison, about 60 percent of those surveyed had a negative view of NATO expansion.

The Russian political elite has even more definite views about the EU, clearly feeling that eventual Russian membership of the organization is neither possible nor desirable. "The consensus is that the present political course of [President] Vladimir Putin, which is supported by a majority of the population, excludes the possibility of integration into the EU, because Russia is not prepared to sacrifice part of its sovereignty, adopt European legislation, or make human rights a priority," "Russia In Global Policy" Editor in Chief Fedor Lukyanov told "Izvestiya" on 27 April.

Both Moscow and Brussels feel that the model of relations between Russia and the EU that emerged a decade ago must be re-envisioned.Both Moscow and Brussels feel that the model of relations between Russia and the EU that emerged a decade ago must be re-envisioned. "Now it is obvious that the two sides represent two different political and economic systems, and the vector of Russia's development is not the one that was expected at the dawn of Russian democracy," Lukyanov said.

Lukyanov outlines at least two areas of potential conflict that could emerge as a result of EU enlargement. First, Lukyanov noted that the EU takes seriously concepts such as the rule of law, human rights, and social justice and, therefore, it cannot help but react negatively to some antidemocratic developments in Russia's emerging "authoritarian modernization." Even if EU officials were willing to turn a blind eye to such things as Chechnya and various espionage and oligarch trials, European public opinion and legislatures would not allow them to do so for long. The EU membership of the Baltic states and the former Soviet satellites -- which are still particularly sensitive to Russia's behavior -- would only make it more difficult for the organization to ignore such issues.

The second area of potential conflict, according to Lukyanov, is the increased interest of the enlarged EU in such countries as Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova, which the EU has begun calling its "new neighbors." Moscow has more or less openly stated its intention of restoring its dominance of the territory of the former Soviet Union, excluding the Baltic states. One such conflict already emerged last November, when Russia unilaterally proposed a settlement of the Transdniester conflict in Moldova, to which the EU objected. Further conflicts seem inevitable as Russia turns its attention to Ukraine's November presidential election (see http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2004/5/A3CC5AF6-FDE5-4032-AF08-A8D6AF4B6381.html) and as the Kremlin proceeds with the implementation of the Single Economic Space.

Lukyanov also emphasized that the problems associated with the EU's absorption of the new members and other issues will prevent the organization from concentrating on its relations with Russia. Moreover, as Moscow Center for Political Studies analyst Dmitrii Yevstafev noted, Moscow and the EU do not have any shared experience resolving serious conflicts, such as Russia and the United States developed over the decades of the Cold War and during the post-Soviet period, "Ekspert," No. 17, reported. Moscow and Washington, he argued, managed to develop a unique political culture that was generally even tempered and restrained.

Moscow and Brussels have no such culture. "Today, even American Russophobes do not say about Russia even 10 percent [of the negative remarks] made by European moderates," Yevstafev said. "The problem is that we are responding in kind and saying the same things about Europe."

In addition to the bilateral issues mentioned above, it cannot be forgotten that there is a vast economic disparity between Russia and the EU. The union is now the largest free market in the world, while Russia's unstable economy remains heavily dependent on oil exports and other external factors. Before enlargement, trade with the EU accounted for 46 percent of Russia's foreign-trade turnover, "Izvestiya" reported on 24 February. After enlargement, that figure will be 54 percent. By comparison, Russia's share of the EU's total trade volume -- excluding energy -- is just 4 percent. In political terms, this disproportion gives the EU considerable leverage in its dealings with Moscow.

Perhaps as a means of compensating for its weak position vis a vis Brussels, the Kremlin has been cultivating its bilateral ties with the key countries of "old Europe" in recent years. Putin enjoys "special personal relations" with Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, and French President Jacques Chirac.

Russia's relationships with European countries are usually more pragmatic than ideological. In the run-up to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in March, Moscow sided with Berlin and Paris in opposing military action. However, this came precisely when Moscow needed German and French support in its long negotiations with the EU over the status of the Russian exclave of Kaliningrad Oblast, and the United States rightly recognized this factor and did not unnecessarily antagonize Moscow over Iraq.

Russia's various flirtations with old Europe irritate the European Commission, which is concerned with the unity of the EU. Lukyanov referred to the words of Frits Bolkenstein, EU commissioner for Internal Markets, Taxation, and Customs Union issues, who criticized Berlusconi for "promising Putin EU membership on his own initiative." "This is shortsighted," Bolkenstein said. "We should not be shy about saying that there are borders to the EU and that we should not encourage hopes that we can never meet." On 3 May, European Commission President Romano Prodi said virtually the same thing, stressing that although the EU wants to cooperate with Russia and other CIS members, they will never become EU members, Russian and Western media reported.

Yevstafev also raised another point regarding Russia's relations with the EU. The union's joint projects and plans with Russia were all developed when Russia was economically weak and politically diminished. At that time, Russia was viewed -- at best -- as a market for agricultural goods. Now, the EU is struggling to come to terms with a politically ambitious and economically recovering Russia because the union simply has nothing of interest to offer Moscow, Yevstafev said.

It is remarkable that Yevstafev's commentary was published by "Ekspert," an upscale weekly that maintains a somewhat liberal, but ultimately Kremlin-friendly editorial line. The weekly is part of the financial-industrial empire of Interros holding company CEO Vladimir Potanin, who is a Putin loyalist. Yevstafiev's views are more in line with those of the nationalist-statist camp, which once had the dream of forming a pan-European bloc embracing Russia and old Europe to counterbalance the United States. Author Maksim Kalashnikov is a representative of the so-called national-revanche school who is known as "the Russian Tom Clancy" and who has long advocated the restoration of Russia's military might.

 

[Vrylakas]

Part II: (continued)

In his best-selling 2003 book, "The Wrath of Ork," Kalashnikov wrote that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the purveyors of Eurasianism -- particularly Eurasia party leader Aleksandr Dugin (see http://www.rferl.org/specials/russianelection/bio/dugin.asp) -- believed that it would be possible to manipulate rising anti-American sentiment in Europe, particularly in Germany. They argued that Russia and Europe could form a transcontinental bloc to counter the naval power of the United States and the United Kingdom.

Under this scenario, Europe should actively invest in Russia in order to unite its technological advantages and capital with Russia's natural resources, its remaining military-industrial complex, and its space technology. But now these dreams seem almost quaint. "Europe simply does not need Russia as it is now," Kalashnikov wrote. Even investment in Russia's energy sector is much less attractive than opportunities in Kazakhstan, Libya, Iraq, or Vietnam, he added. In addition, Europe -- mainly Germany -- gave huge state and commercial loans to the modernize the Soviet economy, but that money was largely wasted, and now Russia owes Germany billions of dollars. Obviously, all the earlier illusions are gone.

Taking into consideration Russia's enormous size and the difficulties that have been encountered in Germany's incorporation of the former East Germany, German politicians and bankers are convinced that Russia could bankrupt the country. "They don't give a damn about Eurasianism and continental brotherhood," Kalashnikov wrote.

"Previously, Europe saw Russia as a terrible bear, whose existence enabled Europe to get some benefits from the United States. Now that bear is feeble, but it still wants to eat and that poses a serious problem for Europe," he concluded.

The actual situation is not as dramatic as Kalashnikov depicts it. However, the new cohabitation of Russia and the EU has so far produced more questions than answers, and the future seems problematic.

 

[klazlo]

This article is really interesting. I don't know if the EU will ever want to include those former SU member countries such as Belarus or Ukraine, but I'd say that Russia will most likely never be a full member of the EU (actually Russia may not qualify as Eastern Europe, I think it's a separate category in itself). Neither side would gain anything from this deal and both in Moscow and Brussles they are aware of that.

 

[Mîtiu Ioan]

The West is Anti-American, while the East fallen in love with America.

This will not last for much time ...
Americans seems unable to fulfill their promises for an economical/ investitional help in this countries, even us give them full suport for war in Irak.
In fact - it's almost opposite situation - some US officials made "blackmails" to governements in our countries to accept very disavantageous contracts ( in public works or weapons aquisitions ).

For example Romanian governement give ~2.5 bilions dollars to US firm Bechtel to build one highway in west of the country. This sum is ~double of value of american investements in Romania in the last decade and also ... >20% bigger then the sum requested by an european firm.

My opinion of course.

Regards,

P.S. : Excuse me my bad english

 

[Verbose]

Russia in EU would be wonderful! No more a potential threat to Finns, Poles etc. Part of the problem seems to be that Russia thinks of itself (or rather enough Russians think of it) as an entity on equal footing with the US and the EU. Joining would perhaps require a reshaping (downsizing) of most Russians concept of what Russia should be?

Actually, I think the EU expanding southwards and into the Middle East might happen sooner. Such a scenario would also be interesting as part of the struggle to deal with fundamentalist terrorists etc. Getting the arab world out of the rutt of failed modernization (economic and political) is a priority to do this. If bringing them into the EU can help make this part of the world stable, democratic, economically booming and throughly modern (secular) I'm all for it. (Though it remains to be seen if that would actually work.) It will have to start with Turkey though...