Free Will

[Souron]

That's not correct. I think that you're misapplying a third-person perspective to a first-person context. When you describe someone else, you may be able to rule out certain future actions on scientific grounds. When a person describes himself, and in particular his own actions, the only way he can rationally rule an action out is if he's already decided against it. Even if he has in hand a complete description of the early universe and the (suppose for the sake of argument) deterministic laws of nature, he's still not rationally compelled to conclude on scientific grounds, "I will do A". He's not, because he knows darn well that if he concludes on practical grounds "I will do B", he will do B. Because either conclusion would be self-fulfilling, neither one is rationally forced. More details of this subtle point here, along with a reference to David Velleman's original paper on the subject.

I'm not talking about people's perception of the truth, I'm talking about the actual truth. The clone will behave like the original. That's a fact. It not true because the copy thinks or doesn't think it's true. It's simply true because the world is deterministic. A set of given conditions will result in a set outcome in a deterministic world. No ifs and buts about it.

You and the paper seem to be talking about the paradox of predicting your own actions, but that's not what I'm talking about. The clone has no knowledge of the original (otherwise it my have the desire to be different, which will violate the identical environments premise).

The wording (and, I suspect, the intended meaning) is wrong. You are entitled to say:
There is no possibility that there is a difference in behavior between you and the copy

But your first sentence above doesn't follow from that. "The copy has no possibility ..." illegitimately distributes the impossibility, moving it from the relationship between us onto one (or each) of us considered individually. It's the modal scope fallacy deja vu all over again.

And here you go talking about modal fallacies again. . .

All the following are equal (assuming that like means identically):
There is no possible difference in behavior between you and the copy
You and the copy behave identically.
You behave identically to the copy.
The copy behaves identically to you.

to put it in math terms:
if X is equal to Y
then Y is equal to X
and Y and X are equal

Obviously if something is true, then it has a 100% chance of being true.

 

[Souron]

The problem is with the word "possible". You can have as many possible options or choices as you want, but there will always be one outcome, and this is true regardless of whether or not you have free will.

Bozo resurrected a post of his, which asked Atlas14 whether he could make a different choice. Regardless of whether free will exists objectively or not, given that Atlas made that choice, he could not have made any other choice. Determinism says the exact same thing, except it projects the scenario onto the future: given that Atlas will make <this> choice, Atlas will not make any other choice. And, similarly, this is regardless of whether or not free will exists objectively.

That's circular. You are saying Atlas chooses to do something, therefore (intermediate clause), therefore Atlas made a choice.

If free will does not exist, then Atlas14 did not choose to post.
If Atlas could not have made a different choice, it is because he has no free will, not because it already happened.

Atlas's logic "I posted, therefore I choose to post" does not follow.

 

[Souron]

Ayatollah So, As I understand, you argument centers around this idea: If something happens, that does not imply that that thing has to happen.

But to me that seems like a definition of an indeterministic world. One set of events happen, but not every event is the mechanical cause of something. Some things could have happened differently.

So what is the difference between a deterministic world and an indeterministic world?

 

[Mise]

That's circular. You are saying Atlas chooses to do something, therefore (intermediate clause), therefore Atlas made a choice.

I didn't say that at all. I said that "Atlas choose to do something, therefore Atlas could not have chosen to do anything else" does not follow. I then said that "Atlas will choose to do <this>, therefore Atlas cannot choose to do anything else" equally does not follow.

 

[Ayatollah So]

All the following are equal (assuming that like means identically):
There is no possible difference in behavior between you and the copy
You and the copy behave identically.
You behave identically to the copy.
The copy behaves identically to you.

Actually the first statement is stronger than the others. But they're all true, I don't dispute any of those. The last 3 are totally innocent since they make no mention of necessity or impossibility.

Ayatollah So, As I understand, you argument centers around this idea: If something happens, that does not imply that that thing has to happen.

But to me that seems like a definition of an indeterministic world. [...] So what is the difference between a deterministic world and an indeterministic world?

In the deterministic world, there is a relational impossibility that does not hold in the indeterministic world. In the indeterministic world the combination {first event happens, second event doesn't} is possible. In the deterministic world it's not.

 

[Souron]

Actually the first statement is stronger than the others. But they're all true, I don't dispute any of those. The last 3 are totally innocent since they make no mention of necessity or impossibility.

I disagree. If a statement is conditionally true, and it's premises are true, then it is impossible for it to be false. (In other words it is necessairily true) And any statement asserts its own truth. So the three statements imply the following:
5)It is impossible for you and the copy not to behave identically.
6)It is impossible for you not to behave identically to the copy.
7)It is impossible for the copy not to behaves identically to you.
From 7 follows:
The copy has no possibility of behaving non-identically to you.
And from that:
The copy has no possibility of behaving any differently than the way you behave.(my original statement)

Edit: I've looked at that wikki some more, and I see where your comming from.
I still hold that you are misapplying modal logic.
I've modified this post to accordingly.
Note: I sense a posibility for ambiguity in the definition of "necessairily true", so I suggest avoiding the term. "Analitically true" is a less ambigious word meaning true following from the defintion, without conditional premises.

In the deterministic world, there is a relational impossibility that does not hold in the indeterministic world. In the indeterministic world the combination {first event happens, second event doesn't} is possible. In the deterministic world it's not.

So in a deterministic world, if the first event happend, then it is impossible for the second event not to happen. Is that correct?

 

[Souron]

I didn't say that at all. I said that "Atlas choose to do something, therefore Atlas could not have chosen to do anything else" does not follow. I then said that "Atlas will choose to do <this>, therefore Atlas cannot choose to do anything else" equally does not follow.

First of all, Do we agree that besides that apparent falacy, warpus's and mine arguemnts hold water? Lets put forth all points of contention for debate.

Seccond:
Atlas will choose to do <this>, therefore Atlas cannot choose to do anything else

Are you saying that that statement is analitically false? (that there is no way that statement could be true)
If you are then I would agree. *
I would also say if Atlas could choose to do something else, then his choice is non-deterministic.

Are you saying that that statement may be true, but is not necessairily true, even in a deterministic world?
If you are, then I would assert that the statement is necessairily true in a deterministic world.*
Reasoning:
1) In a deterministic world the each set of events leading up to a choice, can result in exactly one desition. (Premise: follows from/is definition of determinism)
2) At any time, there is only one sent of events that happen. (Premise: related to definition of world)
3) Atlas makes disition to post ("desition A") at time t (Feb 14, 2007, 10:34 AM) (Premise)
4) At time t, there was exactly one set of events leading up to it. (form 2)
5) At time t, Atlas's choice could result in exactly 1 desition. (from 1 and 3)
6) At time t, Atlas's choice resulted in desition A (from 3)
7) At time t, Atlas's choice could not have resulted in any desition except A (from 5 and 6)


Also, Mise, if you haven't already, please read post #323. That should put you on the same page as Ayatollah So.

*It may seem like I am argueing that the statement is true and false at the same time. This is because of the ambiguous definition of choose. If you define choose one way, then the statement is necessairily false. If you define choose another way, then the statement is necessairily true. Either way it is central to the contradiciton between determanism and free will.

 

[Ayatollah So]

I disagree. If a statement is conditionally true, and it's premises are true, then it is impossible for it to be false. (In other words it is necessairily true) And any statement asserts its own truth. So the three statements imply the following:
5)It is impossible for you and the copy not to behave identically.
6)It is impossible for you not to behave identically to the copy.
7)It is impossible for the copy not to behaves identically to you.

5 is OK, but 6 and 7 are ambiguous. Take 7 for example. On one reading it means "it is impossible for the copy not to behave like that", where with "like that" one points to the way you just behaved. That would be false (or so I argue). At any rate, it doesn't follow from 5.

So in a deterministic world, if the first event happend, then it is impossible for the second event not to happen. Is that correct?

No, that illegitimately changes the scope of "it is impossible for...". What determinism says is that it is impossible for both the first event to happen and the second event not to happen. If you have as another premise that the first event actually happens, you can't deduce a conclusion that narrows the scope of the "impossible" down to the second conjunct.

Pseudo-formally that inference looks like this, where I{proposition} means "it is not possible for <proposition> to be true":

I{first event happens and second event doesn't}
first event happens
Therefore, I{second event doesn't}

As a very loose analogy, consider G{proposition} which means that "George W Bush believes that <proposition> is true". Suppose I argue as follows:

G{if Iraq is a hopeless mission, then American troops should not be there}
Iraq is a hopeless mission
G{American troops should not be in Iraq}.

That would be an invalid argument. Now admittedly, inferences about what a person believes don't have much in common with inferences about possibility and impossibility. But they do have this in common: it's generally agreed that in neither case is it legitimate to narrow the scope of the operators (I{}, G{}) in such a way.

 

[Souron]

Yeah the analogy is weak because there is a much stronger connection between possibility and truth, then between George W Bush's thoughts and truth. But I can see that more intermediate steps would be useful.

What's wrong with this argument:

Combination {first event happens, second event doesn't} is impossible.
First event happens.
Therefore is is impossible for the second event no to happen.
Therefore, second event happens.

If that's deductively valid, It is impossible for the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false. It is impossible for the second event not to happen, given those premises.

 

[Ayatollah So]

What's wrong with this argument:

Combination {first event happens, second event doesn't} is impossible.
First event happens.
Therefore is is impossible for the second event no to happen.
Therefore, second event happens.

Line 3 doesn't follow. Line 4 does, though. But nothing interesting about free will follows from line 4.

 

[aronnax]

Free Will is something we will never possess, someone is always controling someone else

 

[Ziggy Stardust]

For my understanding:

I'm at a crossroads, roads go left and right and I'm deciding which way to go.

Someone else travels in time and sees I chose right.

Back in time to me, still trying to make my decision. Do I have free will at that instant? (not being aware of the 'someone who travelled in time")

 

[Mise]

First of all, Do we agree that besides that apparent falacy, warpus's and mine arguemnts hold water? Lets put forth all points of contention for debate.

Well, I'm not entirely sure what argument (or what part of what argument) you're referring to, but generally speaking, I don't think that anything that you are saying actually says anything about free will itself, i.e. the ability to choose at any given instant. I think that you are essentially saying that, if something will definitely happen, it means that you don't have any choice in that, whereas I don't think what will happen and your ability to choose are related in the way that you are saying they are. In other words, you choose what will happen, even if it is possible to determine what will happen (and therefore your choice) before you make the choice; and this says nothing about your ability to choose.

Seccond:
Atlas will choose to do <this>, therefore Atlas cannot choose to do anything else

Are you saying that that statement is analitically false? (that there is no way that statement could be true)

Yes, I'm saying that this is false. The implicit assumption is that "choose" implies free will (as per your * ). If the statement was "Atlas will do <this>, therefore Atlas cannot choose to do anything else", then the statement would be true if free will does not exist, and false if free will exists. This is independent of whether determinism is true or false. I'm not sure if this is what you're getting at, so I'll eliminate the implicit assumption of free will, and say that this may or may not be true, depending on whether he has free will.

If you are then I would agree. *
I would also say if Atlas could choose to do something else, then his choice is non-deterministic.

I disagree. He can choose whatever he wants to choose, even if we know in advance what he will actually choose. All determinism says is that we can determine what someone will choose to do. This does not restrict his ability to choose in any way.

Are you saying that that statement may be true, but is not necessairily true, even in a deterministic world?

I'll answer this as per the elimination of the implicit assumption of free will in the statement.

If you are, then I would assert that the statement is necessairily true in a deterministic world.*
Reasoning:
1) In a deterministic world the each set of events leading up to a choice, can result in exactly one desition. (Premise: follows from/is definition of determinism)
2) At any time, there is only one sent of events that happen. (Premise: related to definition of world)
3) Atlas makes disition to post ("desition A") at time t (Feb 14, 2007, 10:34 AM) (Premise)
4) At time t, there was exactly one set of events leading up to it. (form 2)
5) At time t, Atlas's choice could result in exactly 1 desition. (from 1 and 3)
6) At time t, Atlas's choice resulted in desition A (from 3)
7) At time t, Atlas's choice could not have resulted in any desition except A (from 5 and 6)

Again, as I say, the deterministic timeline does not say anything about our ability to choose, only about what we actually choose. The timeline is determined by our choices -- our choices are not determined by the timeline. In other words, even though the timeline is created before we make our choices, and hence it appears at any given instant that we don't really have a choice, our choices still define the timeline at the timeline's conception. The timeline knows what we are going to choose at time t, but it is our free will that sets what we are going to choose at time t, even before we ourselves reach time t.

Also, Mise, if you haven't already, please read post #323. That should put you on the same page as Ayatollah So.

Ayatollah So, As I understand, you argument centers around this idea: If something happens, that does not imply that that thing has to happen.

But to me that seems like a definition of an indeterministic world. One set of events happen, but not every event is the mechanical cause of something. Some things could have happened differently.

So what is the difference between a deterministic world and an indeterministic world?

I'm not really arguing Ayatollah So's corner, I'm arguing a conclusion that I reached based partly on some stuff that he said. Hence, I wouldn't word the "central idea" above in that way. I would rather say:
If something happens, that does not tell us anything about whether or not free will exists. All it says is that X will happen, not whether or not we were able to make a choice which lead to X happening.

 

[Bozo Erectus]

For my understanding:

I'm at a crossroads, roads go left and right and I'm deciding which way to go.

Someone else travels in time and sees I chose right.

Back in time to me, still trying to make my decision. Do I have free will at that instant? (not being aware of the 'someone who travelled in time")

No, if the universe was rewound over and over again, youd pick 'right' every single time, for the very same set of reasons you picked right the 'first' time. The fact that you feel like you have a choice what direction to pick, is irrelevant.

 

[Ayatollah So]

For my understanding:

I'm at a crossroads, roads go left and right and I'm deciding which way to go.

Someone else travels in time and sees I chose right.

Back in time to me, still trying to make my decision. Do I have free will at that instant? (not being aware of the 'someone who travelled in time")

Yes - or at least, the story gives no reason to think you don't.

By the way, the guy may not need to be a time traveler, if physicist John Cramer's hunch is right. See this thread, where he describes an experiment designed to send signals into the past.