German Army discussion (from Great Quotes III)

[Lexicus]

I do not believe that the germans had a superior airforce, there was plenty of experimenting at the time n each of the countries involved, a mix of plane models in service. The germans just had more planes committed to this battle . Had the british fully committed their aviation to the continent before the actual invasion started, the panzers could have been haled and german infantry would have entered a meat grinder in France.

That's fair, but what I mean by superior air force is basically: more experienced pilots, and better coordination - the Luftwaffe's techniques for operating in tandem with the German ground forces were more advanced than anything the Allies had developed.

Had the british fully committed their aviation to the continent before the actual invasion started, the panzers could have been haled and german infantry would have entered a meat grinder in France.

Maybe, maybe not. I don't see how having more planes could have hurt the Allies though.

 

[Ajidica]

That's fair, but what I mean by superior air force is basically: more experienced pilots, and better coordination - the Luftwaffe's techniques for operating in tandem with the German ground forces were more advanced than anything the Allies had developed.

The Royal Air Force (no idea about the French) was simply not set up to handle close ground-air coordination. Until the war started pilots had only rudimentary training in ground attack missions with functionally no weapons besides the machine guns mounted on the airplane - and those were set up for shooting other planes, not strafing runs. The heavy fighters and light bombers intended for use in ground attack roles got cut to pieces by the Luftwaffe.

Maybe, maybe not. I don't see how having more planes could have hurt the Allies though.

If they aren't be used well or aren't able to meaningfully contribute anything to the fighting additional airplanes would be a major drag. We often forget just how complex airplanes in WWII were given how basic they look to us. The Spitfire or Lancaster were cutting edge technology and required extensive support and logistic networks.

 

[PhroX]

The Royal Air Force (no idea about the French) was simply not set up to handle close ground-air coordination. Until the war started pilots had only rudimentary training in ground attack missions with functionally no weapons besides the machine guns mounted on the airplane - and those were set up for shooting other planes, not strafing runs. The heavy fighters and light bombers intended for use in ground attack roles got cut to pieces by the Luftwaffe.

To be fair, when the German ground attack planes ran into serious fighter resistance (e.g. during the Battle of Britain), they fared every bit as badly as the Battle, while conversely the latter actually did very well when not faced with significant fighter opposition. Late '30s ground attack planes across the board were simply not designed to deal with the fighters in service at the start of the war - to go back to the Battle, when it was designed, it was something like 50mph faster than any fighter plane in service. By WW2, it was faced with Bf109s which had 100mph on it.

If they aren't be used well or aren't able to meaningfully contribute anything to the fighting additional airplanes would be a major drag. We often forget just how complex airplanes in WWII were given how basic they look to us. The Spitfire or Lancaster were cutting edge technology and required extensive support and logistic networks.

While this is in true, I think had the British committed more fighters to the continent, it probably would've helped (though on its own, it wouldn't have been enough) - they generally used them pretty well, they just kept the vast bulk of their forces in Britain during the Battle of France. But if you really want better performance in the air war, what you need is to give the French air force a massive kick up the backside. On paper, they were a very good force, but even in the face of the collapse of their nation, they simply never properly committed to the fight. You'd have squadrons performing a couple of sorties per week at the height of the Battle of France - and that's the squadrons that were actually used.

 

[r16]

By everything I can tell, this is completely false. The Czech tanks were used in the Battle of France, but they weren't actually the "mainstay" of the Panzer divisions, at least not according to any other source I can find, most of which reference only a few hundred being used in Fall Gelb.

... despite facing a bunch of old men and kids, and something like a couple of hundred German tanks on the Western Front, took almost a whole year to push into Germany and win the damn war.

would have read the whole thread but the impression is kinda wrong . IV was yet a gun platform and III was designated battletank and 38 easily matched that at the time . And it was kept in production as the primary light paltform until the very end edging III in that capacity as well . The loss of the Czechs and even Slovaks is a really important reason why the WW II took so long .

second part mostly true , but it somehow ignores the question of where the Russian borders would be after the war .

 

[historix69]

For those interested in WW2 Battle of France 1940 :

There is a very detailed book by a leading German Military Historian from 2005 : Karl-Heinz Frieser : The Blitzkrieg Legend: The Campaign in the West, 1940

(Some may know him from tv-documentaries about this theme.)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Karl-Heinz_Frieser

 

[Hrothbern]

Interesting thread.
For me the eye opener was that the masterplan of Germany was changed all the time beforehand and apparently also during the attack: the troops disobeyed orders from Hitler and moved on much faster than planned.
Did not know all that.
Interesting to dig through all that now

I had in my recollection that the German army was just much bigger and modern and "prepared" for a Blitzkrieg.
Some figures I just digged up confirm that at least to some degree:
But perhaps there are other figures stating differently
1939:
1. Germany ($12,000M military yearly cost, 2.750M people in army)
2. USSR ($5,984M, 1.789M)
3. UK ($7,896M, 0.394M)
4. Japan ($1,700M, 0.957M)
5. France ($1,024M, 0.581M)
And the other thing I had in my recollection was that the French supreme command based her plans also on that the German army would also turn south quickly to Paris.
Which was not the case.

 

[red_elk]

I had in my recollection that the German army was just much bigger and modern and "prepared" for a Blitzkrieg.
Some figures I just digged up confirm that at least to some degree:
But perhaps there are other figures stating differently
1939:
1. Germany ($12,000M military yearly cost, 2.750M people in army)
2. USSR ($5,984M, 1.789M)

To be fair, these figures don't reflect Soviet war preparations between 1939-1941. Soviet army increased to 5-6 millions, German army also increased but not as much.

 

[historix69]

In early 1940 the French Army was seen as the most powerful army in europe / in the world. Germany started a few years ago with rebuilding their army from the 100.000 men army enforced by versailles and they estimated to need at least 4-5 more years to be ready for war (in 1944) when the British and French declared war on sept. 3rd 1939.

To give numbers for german tanks in may 1940 :

Panzer I : 523
Panzer II : 955
Panzer III : 349
Panzer IV : 278
Panzer 35 (t) : 106
Panzer 38 (t) : 228
total : 2439

number of french tanks : 3254

If you are familiar with german tanks, the light models Panzer I and Panzer II hardly count as combat tanks due to lack of armor and firepower.

The germans won the battle for France mostly by movement, surprise and chaos, less by fighting. As you can see in statistics, overall casualties were rather low compared to WW1. A lot of casualties belong to the 2nd part of the campaign when resistance of french troops was higher.

 

[historix69]

On another note, there is one massive consistent failure on behalf of the German military - logistics.

In 1940, the german tank divisions had planned ahead and used jerry cans so they could refuel on the march. French tanks were using fuelling vehicles and it took several hours to refuel. After the german tanks broke through, they were able to destroy many of the french fuelling vehicles far behind the front.

Now, if you really want an incompetent military that somehow achieved remarkable success, look at the Japanese in the first 6 months of the Pacific side of WW2. Up until Midway, pretty much everything went perfectly for them, with their opposition being unbelievably stupid (seriously, there's no way an alt. hist. author would be able to get away with presenting the allies as useless as they were without being ridiculed) - which was utterly necessary for their crazy plans to work - and the moment something went wrong, it all fell apart and the next three years were basically mopping them up - they never actually posed any real offensive threat after that point.

Japan never had a chance against the US since
- the US outmatched Japan's industry about 10:1
- US had unlimited resources, Japan had not and was dependent from imports via merchant navy
- US had broken the Japanese Codes (-> Midway)
- Japan was fighting its major war in China.
After declaration of Oil embargo against Japan in 1941 by US and the european colonial empires and the Hull note, Japan could only surrender to the US and accept their terms or fight or risk to collapse economically in 1942 ... Japan decided to fight and the victories in the first 6 month emberassed western rassist politicians who believed that japanese/asians people were just yellow apes. The result was the end of western colonisation in Asia, the wars in Indochina, China, Korea, Vietnam, ...

 

[PhroX]

In 1940, the german tank divisions had planned ahead and used jerry cans so they could refuel on the march. French tanks were using fuelling vehicles and it took several hours to refuel. After the german tanks broke through, they were able to destroy many of the french fuelling vehicles far behind the front.

I probably didn't really word my point that well. The issue was that the German military leadership consistently failed to understand the limitations logistics put on their operations. It's not so much that they could have supplied their troops better, but that they put their troops in situations where they couldn't be supplied properly no matter how well their logistical operations were operating. The actual guys doing the supply were reasonable, and they did have some good tools available, such as the Jerry Can you mention - though they also had serious problems such as a lack of trucks (exasperated by the fact that those they had were of a ridiculous number of different models hugely overcomplicating maintenance and replacement) - but the people planning military operations basically assumed logistics would sort themselves out as long as they won enough battles. Needless to say, this didn't happen, and the Heer kept on running into the utterly predictable supply shortages which cost them the North African campaign and were a significant factor in the failure of Barbarossa.

There's an old maxim, "amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics", and based on that, German generals were, for the most part, amateurs.

Japan never had a chance against the US since
- the US outmatched Japan's industry about 10:1
- US had unlimited resources, Japan had not and was dependent from imports via merchant navy
- US had broken the Japanese Codes (-> Midway)
- Japan was fighting its major war in China.
After declaration of Oil embargo against Japan in 1941 by US and the european colonial empires and the Hull note, Japan could only surrender to the US and accept their terms or fight or risk to collapse economically in 1942 ... Japan decided to fight and the victories in the first 6 month emberassed western rassist politicians who believed that japanese/asians people were just yellow apes. The result was the end of western colonisation in Asia, the wars in Indochina, China, Korea, Vietnam, ...

Oh, certainly, Japan was screwed from the word go, but had the Allies had even a single senior commander in the Pacific capable of finding his own backside without a map and compass, they wouldn't have had the crazy successes they did in the first six months of the war. Their military really wasn't very good - they had some good equipment, and their elite were very well trained but overall there were massive flaws and their doctrines and operation planning were awful - but their opponents were beyond incompetent.

 

[Lexicus]

though they also had serious problems such as a lack of trucks (exasperated by the fact that those they had were of a ridiculous number of different models hugely overcomplicating maintenance and replacement)

That tends to happen when using a lot of captured equipment.

There's an old maxim, "amateurs study tactics, professionals study logistics", and based on that, German generals were, for the most part, amateurs.

I'm not sure that's 100% accurate. They weren't so focused on logistics because they knew they were doomed in a long war anyway. They had to win quickly or lose.

Guderian's response on being given his marching orders for the Kiev campaign: "Even if we are unopposed I doubt the machines will stand it."

 

[historix69]

German victory over France in just 6 weeks in 1940 changed the military view. In 1941, german generals believed to be able to knock out red army in 3 months, based on german experiences on eastern front in WW1, sowjet failures in the Winter War against Finland and the Blitzkrieg in France. In the first month they captured 3-4 million sowjet soldiers. At that time, it was unbelievable that Sowjet Union would continue the war. US and the allies expected a soon victory by Germany. The german logistics was based on a 3 month campaign and was a gamble ... today we know the whole picture, but in 1941, they believed to repeat the "Blitzkrieg" from 1940, otherwise they would not have attacked since Germany lacked (industrial and strategic) resources for a long war against the SU.

The same applies to Rommel in Africa. There was a german study by von Thoma from 1940 analysing the supply limitations of the North African theatre ... Rommel usually ignored rules and focused on speed, movement and surprise ... I'm sure he believed that he just needs to reach Kairo with a single tank and everything is fine.

There is a handy book about logistics : Martin van Creveld : Supplying War - Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton

 

[Lexicus]

German victory over France in just 6 weeks in 1940 changed the military view. In 1941, german generals believed to be able to knock out red army in 3 months, based on german experiences on eastern front in WW1, sowjet failures in the Winter War against Finland and the Blitzkrieg in France. In the first month they captured 3-4 million sowjet soldiers. At that time, it was unbelievable that Sowjet Union would continue the war. US and the allies expected a soon victory by Germany. The german logistics was based on a 3 month campaign and was a gamble ... today we know the whole picture, but in 1941, they believed to repeat the "Blitzkrieg" from 1940, otherwise they would not have attacked since Germany lacked (industrial and strategic) resources for a long war against the SU.

This relates to the trope that the Western Front was a 'gentlemen's war' compared to the East - the Western Allies just sort of followed the 'rules,' surrendering when they got cut off. The Germans were quite disconcerted that the Soviets weren't nice enough to do the same.

 

[PhroX]

That tends to happen when using a lot of captured equipment.

It wasn't just captured stuff (though that certainly didn't help). IIRC, they had about 20 models of truck in service pre-war. Some of that was justified by having different weight classes, but even then a couple of said classes had 5-6 different makes and models. It's just asking for logistical problems.

I'm not sure that's 100% accurate. They weren't so focused on logistics because they knew they were doomed in a long war anyway. They had to win quickly or lose.

Thing is, even in a quick war, you have to understand your logistics, particularly if operating a significant distance away from you supply lines as the Germans were in the Soviet Union and North Africa. Indeed, logistics are arguably more important in such a conflict, particularly one where your primary strategy is built around high mobility and speed as even short delays caused by supply can severely disrupt your plans. They ignored logistics not because of the type of war they were fighting, but because they didn't think it was important. And they were utterly wrong on that count.

And as I understand it, it wasn't just a matter of certain individuals overlooking these things, but an institutionalised ignorance within the German military command. I've read a couple of times (sorry, can't think of where off the top of my head) that OKW didn't even have a concept that was the equivalent of "logistics" - they certainly knew of supply and so forth, but the overarching concept of logistics as a single discipline wasn't present in German military thinking as of WW2.

 

[Lexicus]

It wasn't just captured stuff (though that certainly didn't help). IIRC, they had about 20 models of truck in service pre-war. Some of that was justified by having different weight classes, but even then a couple of said classes had 5-6 different makes and models. It's just asking for logistical problems.

I didn't realize that. I knew that the Germans used a lot of highly specialized military equipment - a lot of different types of vehicles, each good at its role. While this probably made the German forces more effective than they'd have been otherwise it also made their logistics a lot more complicated.

they certainly knew of supply and so forth, but the overarching concept of logistics as a single discipline wasn't present in German military thinking as of WW2.

That is very interesting, if you can find the source on that I would definitely like to read it.

 

[PhroX]

I didn't realize that. I knew that the Germans used a lot of highly specialized military equipment - a lot of different types of vehicles, each good at its role. While this probably made the German forces more effective than they'd have been otherwise it also made their logistics a lot more complicated.

Having specialised military vehicles makes sense if your economy and logistical chain can support it, especially if they have some commonality (such as having a tank, an assault gun, an AA vehicle and a mobile artillery built on the same chassis). Having 6 different models of 1.5 ton truck in service....doesn't.

That is very interesting, if you can find the source on that I would definitely like to read it.

Knowing me, it probably came from some unsupported websites that I've misremembered as proper sources (I've had that before when discussing history online, somewhat embarrassing). Still if I can remember where it's from I'll let you know.

I'll add that I have heard very good things about the Supplying War book that historix69 recommended and it's on my wishlist.

 

[historix69]

I think the Germans used all their available resources for logistics ... but it was so few that for example normal infantery divisions usually carried their supplies on horse wagons since most of their motorized vehicles were transferred to the few tank and mechanized divisions. (They used around 600.000 horses in 1941 in the east and another 400.000 in 1942.)

In the first 4 weeks of the invasion the tank divisions pushed up to 400 miles into enemy territory but then had to wait for supplies due to lack of roads, a different railroad-system (gauge) and (increasing) partisan activity. Some of the tank divisions were temporarely supplied via air. It is interesting how demand on fuel and ammo changes when a tank division cannot move. Moving tank divisions had a rather low consumption of ammo while tanks forced to hold their positions were frequently attacked and had a high ammo use quickly exhausting their ammo stock piles.

Supply of troops was easier near railway lines. Supply of German industry with rubber and oil (fuel) was low, so instead of producing vehicles for logistics, they mostly used what was at hand in central europe. (German forces used around 600.000 vehicles for 3.6 million men in 1941. Overy ("Why the Allies Won") writes that the Germans used around "2.000" different (european) types of vehicles for Barbarossa which where impossible to maintain. In 1942 German industry produced only 59.000 transport vehicles for the eastern front which could hardly replace the losses.)

 

[red_elk]

I read that a few German officers wrote in their diaries or letters that "the war is lost" as early as in August 1941. When it became apparent that USSR didn't collapse like France did and Germany was facing war on attrition.
Soviet POW casualties were indeed massive in the first months of war and it was at least partially due to Wehrmacht strategy and tactics which were superior in 1941.
Another thing is that Soviet soldiers were yet unaware of what kind of treatment they will receive in captivity. It was drastically different from what French and British soldiers got.

 

[historix69]

I think before 1941 it was unbelievable that any state would mobilize and equip 6 million soldiers per year for 5 years and would throw them to the front (waste them) like Soviet Union did ...

Casualties among soviet POWs were high, around 3 million died, mostly due to starvation, desease or frozen to death in the first winter ... on the other side the Germans also were not able to supply their own soldiers sufficiently so thousands of german soldiers in winter 1941 died due to lack of food and clothing, too. (They had to supply around 3.6 million soldiers and 3-4 million POWs in the east.) Denying food to soviet POWs was easy to justify in the Nazi ideology. Besides the Wehrmacht (German Army) there were also SS-troops and other nazi (police) units in the east, so not every Nazi crime in the east was automatically commited by the Wehrmacht. I don't know in detail who was responsible for the mass-starvation. Food supply for soviet POWs became better when they worked for german industry in 1942ff. From the 3 million german POWs in Soviet Union, around 1 million died in captivity, too.

Adam Tooze writes that the Germans had an average casualty rate of 60.000 soldiers per month on the eastern front.

Note:
Since Sept. 1939 Germany was under seablockade by the British limiting food and other imports. From Sept. 1939 to June 1941, Germany received food transfers from Soviet Union according to the Hitler-Stalin-Pact.

 

[red_elk]

I think before 1941 it was unbelievable that any state would mobilize and equip 6 million soldiers per year for 5 years and would throw them to the front (waste them) like Soviet Union did ...

Well, I think "waste" is not correct term, at least starting from 1942. Soviet commanders eventually learned to counter German tactics. And from 1944 Germans also begun to suffer catastrophic defeats, like in Jassy-Kishinev offensive.