Vilfredo Pareto in 1920 wrote about the outcome of the war, among that he made an unfavourable comparison of the diplomatic work of Wilhelm II with that of Bismarck in his day. And because I’m far from sure it has circulated much in Germany or the English world – after all, it’s not part of any of his major works – I’d like to submit this morsel to the participants in this mightily interesting thread, to see his analysis commented.
“In 1865, on the political chessboard, Prussia, Austria and France held positions very similar to the ones that Prussia (Germany), France and England held in 1913, yet the pieces moved absolutely differently. Then the checkmate was prepared, on the international scene, with foreseeing care, worthy of an expert and most cautious player, no man was moved before every possible consequence of the move was evaluated; closer to us instead we saw a game not prepared by diplomacy and left entirely to the armies, reckless, fit to a player more enamoured with form instead of substance, which had no solution to any problem that wasn’t the fright a move should cause, instead of its far or indirect consequences.
Regarding the Biarritz conference between Bismarck and Napoleon III Ollivier writes, and rightly so: «[Bismarck]
only wanted to be sure of our neutrality, so as to be, at the critical moment, to concentrate his effort in Bohemia only, because notwithstanding the trust the King and Moltke had in their mighty army it wasn’t enough to hold it capable of holding its own against the united armies of Austria, the federation and France … If while they advanced in Bohemia Napoleon III had marched on the Rhine, they would have been forced to stop and turn back, instead of having the chance to give Vienna city a scare». [note: in French in the text, I hope I got it right]
And now one could write, following the above words almost literally: «
Those in charge of German politics didn’t go looking for British neutrality, which would have left them free, at the critical moment, on the seas, and to pressure the enemy border; because they had such trust in their mighty army that they thought it capable of facing at once the Russian and French armies, to say nothing of the Belgian one, forgetting the Italian one, and dismissing the British one as innocuous. If while it invaded France Britain had locked the sea lines and sent her soldiers on the continent, if the Italian army had pressured the Alpine passes, they would have been forced to stop and turn back, instead of going for Paris».
Bismarck went to Biarritz, Bethman Hollweg didn’t go or sent someone to London, made no impression to be aware that Italy was there. This not because of ignorance about the British power, about the consequences an Italian intervention could have. Truthfully, about Britain it’s enough to remember the amazement and grief Bethmann Hollweg felt when the British ambassador communicated him that the invasion of Belgium was a casus belli; and for italy, what marshal Conrad von Hötzendorf declared in an interview published by the Correspondenz Bureau (16 July 1919), that is: «
The Itailan intervention was the cause of the disaster; without it the central Empires would surely had won the war. It was hoped Italy would have remained faithful to the [Triple]
alliance».
Bravo! And was it cautious, wise behaviour not to make it sure? Not the prudent one that it would have been necessary to make a deal with Italy, that, to attain the supreme good of victory, it would have been helpful to make sacrifices, painful as they could be, instead the incautious, rash one that they should have declared war to Italy beforehand; he says: «
It was impossible to have a free hand in Serbia without subjugating Italy first. This is why a war against Italy was recommended in 1906, to later move against Serbia in 1908 and 1912».
Our good marshal disposes of the future as he wishes; that these nice little wars he had advocated could have spread to the entire Europe is indeed very removed from his mind set.
One could, although with difficulty, suppose that such events derive simply from mistakes, from which not even the brightest, most careful men of state are exempt; but this explanation fails once is taken into account that similar instances are repeated, which goes to show that they weren’t casual, but had an underlying constant cause.
Not even the outcome of the war sufficed to open the German politicians’ eyes. Take, for instance, G. von Jagow [Gottlieb; foreign minister 1913-1916], who demonstrates that he understands nary a thing about the consequences of facts which he saw very clearly.
He outlines [in “Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieg”, 1919] perfectly the feelings of the future opponents of Germany. He says: «(p.22)
Panslavist ideas found by the successor of Alexander II, the third emperor with that name, earnest favour. The alliance with France was struck in 1893. The tension with the Danubian monarchy in the Balkans, and us (p. 23) in Turkey, because of our Baghdad policy, rose. The Russian dictum, “the way to Constantinople passes through Berlin”, is well known … The matter of the Straits was in a way vital to Russia. And the dream of power over Byzantium has always been alive in the Russian people, always capable of exciting it to fight and sacrifice».
Later, almost forgetful of having written what’s quoted above, he comes out with the following statements: «(p. 152)
As said, our efforts tended to exclude an European conflagration, limiting the affair to an Austro-Serb conflict, in which the other powers shouldn’t have interfered». But how could he hope it to happen, knowing what he told? Some foresight has a statesman proceeding blindly, uncaring whether the enterprise he’s about to launch is feasible or not! «But
Serbian interests, in the eyes of Mr Sazonoff [Sergei Sazonov, Russian foreign minister] …
were in this case precisely “Russian interests”» Where’s the surprise, after what he wrote on page 23? «(p. 152)
A note from St Petersburg (p. 153) the 24 announced that Russia could not be indifferent to the Austro-Serb conflict».
But according to Jagow she should have stayed indifferent, this because of the patriotic faith of the author: «(p. 154)
The brusque attitude of Russia could appear even stranger as count Berchtold [Leopold, Austrian foreign minister]
had already explained to the Russian chargé d’affairs in Vienna … that had Austria been forced to move war against Serbia it would only have been for self-preservation, and that Austria had no plan to expand or diminish Serbian sovereignty». Some “strange attitude”! It was instead a perfectly natural consequence of what was written on pages 22 and 23. Also notice that the author shows, or pretends naiveté, because he can’t be so unaware of history as to ignore that a State’s dependence can’t be attained through other means but conquest. And if he seriously believes that Russia, leaving Serbia alone to fight Austria, could have retained her erstwhile authority in the Balkans, he should put aside political literature and take up writing children’s stories.”
…
“Jagow discusses French sentiments as well with good knowledge. «
France, Russia’s ally since 1893, was still irreconcilable since the 1870 war. The pride of France, an eminently bellicose nation, which also in this latest war confirmed her traditional valour, couldn’t adapt to the idea of defeat, of the marring of the past glory. Hatred and thirst for vengeance against the victorious adversary crystallised in suffering for the “stolen” provinces (p.32) without taking into account that those were ancient imperial German territories ([Pareto:] some argument this! Historical remembrances are puerile; to be excused with fanaticism, but extraneous to the truth of the facts),
and that still today are largely of German language ([Pareto:] of language, not of feelings).
Every attempt to reach a compromise on this were in vain…». This was predictable, given what the very author says, because Germany didn’t want to hear about the sacrifices mandatory to reach a deal.
The same could be said about the deal with Britain, which Jagow wanted but without having to pay a price for it. It was very much evident that such a deal couldn’t be anything but very uncertain, given that Germany was showing a desire to contend Britain her dominance of the seas.
From what he writes the circumstances altering the alliance with Italy weren’t unknown to him. «(p. 54)
The rancour for Tunis [note: when in 1881France gained control over Tunisia, the Italian government was seething, as they considered a gentlemen’s agreement with France that Tunisia was Italian sphere of influence]
had evaporated ([Pareto:] Bismarck kindled it, his successors let it “evaporate”
.
The tensions with France had been moving more and more in the background, disappearing, it was often talked about the “Latin sister”, underscoring that in her, along with “the allies” [Austria and Germany],
Italy also had a friend… More, especially in Northern Italy the ancient hatred for Austria was alive, and the attrition with the Danubian monarchy had been made even keener because of Italy’s ambitions in the Balkans». And not by Austria’s ambitions in the Balkans, as well? Only a religious faith can make one blind of so patent things.
But if in Germany they knew all this, and more, why did they proceed as if they didn’t? Why didn’t they ask themselves: «
What to do with such pieces on the board now? What interests, what feelings could we use; which ones should we counter? How to implement the divide et impera? Which ones are the enemies that, following Machiavelli, we should appease, because we can’t extinguish them? What should we sacrifice to triumph? Should we give up our pursuit for a future and not granted dominance over the seas, to ingratiate Britain? Or hand back Lorraine and Alsace to France? Should Austria compensate, giving up Trento and Trieste, the faculty of expanding Eastwards, in the Balkans?» And so on: studying what was there, and how to exploit it.”
