The Poles in 1938, if anything, were allied to Germany. At best - and most likely - the Allies could count them as neutral.In hindsight, the ideal Allied war plan was for France and Britain to occupy the Rhineland in 1938 while the German army was bogged down in the fortified Sudetenland and flanked by the Poles.
You're projecting the events of OTL 1939 back on 1938. The Polish government was perfectly willing to continue to be docile allies of Germany in 1938, and willingly jackaled loot from the Czechoslovak cadaver. They didn't "know they would be next" any more than the British and French did until March 1939.That's a tough one, but I think Poland felt pretty threatened by now from Germany; even if Stalin represented the traditional enemy. Without detente between the two superpowers, Poland may have at least contributed to the defense of Czechoslavakia, if the allies played their hand. They knew they would be next.
You're projecting the events of OTL 1939 back on 1938. The Polish government was perfectly willing to continue to be docile allies of Germany in 1938, and willingly jackaled loot from the Czechoslovak cadaver. They didn't "know they would be next" any more than the British and French did until March 1939.
If Hitler's intentions were so obvious, why did nobody but the political fringe see them until March 1939?In OTL Czech and Poland were also supposed to have a mutual defense pact, not that it meant much without the western allies. I truly don't know what Poland's attitude towards the Czech question was, but I doubt they felt secure as "allies of Germany". As I understood it, Poland was alarmed by the Munich agreement. By now Hitler's intentions must have been obvious.
Opinions changed from simply deriding him as an "appeaser" in the 1960s, when he was "cut some slack." During the 1980s it swung back to "appeaser," which is the correct opinion to have of him. He had all the information at his fingertips to recognise the problem; he simply failed to.What do historians think of Neville Chamberlain these days? Still the appeaser for "peace in our times", or cut some slack because GB wasn't ready for a war at that time?
As far as I know, the answer is "yes".![]()
Czechoslovakia alone could have held out the Germans for longer than a month in 1938. Since Hitler was not bluffing and would have invaded, it's too bad Goering went behind his back and orchestrated the Munich Pact, since without it Germany would likely have fallen in early-1939.We may say this with a bit of hindsight now, but Germany was even far less ready in the summer of 1938, and France would have had no better chance to check Hitler's power if Britain was on board. Without the stab in the back, even Poland and Czech combined may have been enough to put up some kind of a defense since they depended on eachother. The Czech army was nothing to sneer at either, so if this was where the allies drew the line, I think the war would have been over sooner. The fact is they, and the majority of the public, really didn't want another one and were willing to try appeasement at first; so in the end Hitler's bluff succeeded. Had they called him on it, things would have gone a lot differently.
This. Or even better, France could have re-occupied the Rhineland in 1936.In hindsight, the ideal Allied war plan was for France and Britain to occupy the Rhineland in 1938 while the German army was bogged down in the fortified Sudetenland and flanked by the Poles. The German war economy would've collapsed almost immediately without their vital western and Czech industries, international trade or Italian support.
I've often felt that way.It's quite astounding that it wasn't until the occupation of Norway that the Allied High Command figured it was a bad idea to let the Axis invade all of their allies in sequential order.
It most definitely was NOT the right decision. Even French leader Daladier recognised it was a bad call, but couldn't push through war preparations after Britain abandoned him at Munich.In 1938 None of the powers were prepared for war, Britain and France also faced severe political obstacles. While it was the wrong decision, I can see it as a reasonable, and likely the right, one one to make.
Not really allied. More opportunistic. That same opportunism would probably have brought them into the war on the side of the Allies in 1938, simply for territorial aggrandisement. But they certainly weren't on the side of the West or the Czechs.The Poles in 1938, if anything, were allied to Germany. At best - and most likely - the Allies could count them as neutral.
So did Poland and Romania, but it didn't lead to Romania helping the Poles later either. Poland joined Germany and Hungary in dismembering Czechoslovakia. Quite gleefully as a matter of fact. They also laughed off angry suggestions by Czechs that they were next. They felt that Germany had no interest in Poland; it wasn't until Germany violated the Munich Pact by occupying Bohemia and Moravia in March 1939 that they realised Hitler's territorial ambitions exceeded regaining the Sudetenland.In OTL Czech and Poland were also supposed to have a mutual defense pact, not that it meant much without the western allies. I truly don't know what Poland's attitude towards the Czech question was, but I doubt they felt secure as "allies of Germany". As I understood it, Poland was alarmed by the Munich agreement. By now Hitler's intentions must have been obvious.
The fringe has a nasty habit of seeing things as they really are - albeit often through an ideological lens - rather than simply seeing what they want to see, as those in power often do.If Hitler's intentions were so obvious, why did nobody but the political fringe see them until March 1939?
The fringe has a nasty habit of seeing things as they really are - albeit often through an ideological lens - rather than simply seeing what they want to see, as those in power often do.
Meh, I'll have to state that "fringe" in that statement refers more to people on the fringes of power such as Churchill was at the time, rather than communists and anarchists, which is probably what you thought I meant. Didn't think of that until I re-read it in your post.I'd be interested to hear some more examples of that.
I don't even Chamberlain thought this was a long term thing, I believe the "peace in our time" was just a political move.It most definitely was NOT the right decision. Even French leader Daladier recognised it was a bad call, but couldn't push through war preparations after Britain abandoned him at Munich.
The people were the real problem iin the equation. Daladier was surprised at the positive reception he received upon returning from Munich. He was greeted with cheers, when he expected derision.I don't even Chamberlain thought this was a long term thing, I believe the "peace in our time" was just a political move.
That wasn't the problerm, it was that both countries military leaders did not want a war (they did not think they were prepared, and they probably weren't, but the German military was even less prepared) nor did most of their governments or people want another war.
Remind me to dig up my copy of Hermann Goering's transcripts at the Nuremberg trials sometime. He made many comments about how easy it is to drum up the populace for a war; even in a democracy. If Britain and France had truly desired a war, they'd have convinced the people. It was a lack of political will on Chamberlain's - and to a lesser extent Daladier's - part that led to the Munich Pact; not the people's desire for peace.But people like Chamberlain knew that was going to happen.
The Nazi's breaking of Munich resulted in a significant shift in public opinion towards a war, resulting in a much more popular declaration of war in 1939. And when dealing with democratic nations (and even in most non-democratic ones), popular opinion is as important as military capabilities for such decisions, not that the British and French militaries wanted war in 1938 either.
Oh, I'm not saying that they weren't right - I'm saying that it wasn't blindingly obvious to most people that they were.The fringe has a nasty habit of seeing things as they really are - albeit often through an ideological lens - rather than simply seeing what they want to see, as those in power often do.
I wasn't saying that you were wrong. I know hindsight is 20-20, but it just seemed shockingly obvious.Oh, I'm not saying that they weren't right - I'm saying that it wasn't blindingly obvious to most people that they were.
I wasn't saying that you were wrong. I know hindsight is 20-20, but it just seemed shockingly obvious.
Wishful thinking is no substitute for an informed foreign policy. I fully expect the average person on the street to support moronic decisions. But for Prime Ministers and heads-of-state to do so is nothing short of criminal negligence. Even without hindsight, Hitler's plans were incredibly obvious. He spelt them out in his book, for Abraham's sake!It it may seem "schockingly obvious" to you, today, but, think about the mental outlook of the people in the 1930's. The adult population, of that period, was all too well aware of the carnage of the Great War and wanted no part of a repeat performance.
What was the last "religious" war in continental Europe before the Yugoslav Wars?