Opinions on Oswald Spengler and his "Decline of the West" hypothesis

Odin2006

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What is everyone's opinion on Spenger's views on the life cycles of civilizations? Would the "fall" of a civilization reqire a Dark age folowing it, or could there be a smooth transition after the new cultural-religious synthesis Spengler requires for the birth of a new civilization?
 
Well, that would depend on a couple of definitions a priori: what defines a civilization and at which point should we say that a new civilization is born?
To my knowledge, several authors have done impressive work on these issues, but there has been some disagreement on exactly how many distinct civilizations can we say to have developped in world history. In my view this also defines the next question. It seems that much of what shapes a civilization is confined with its cultural and religious paradigm, but a change per se does not necessarily mean a new civilization has emerged. Take the west for example: when did it start? I guess there are several hypothesis, but the most accepted must be around 800 AD, when Charlemagne and the Pope established their alliance, that is, when the roles of both religious and secular power were cleared and separated, and at the same time Christianity was emerging from what became known as Dark Ages. So we might say that at the core of the West's identity lays an idea of separation of Church and State, although the kind I mentionbed above is a very primitive one, and we had to wait 1000 years for it to fully consolidate, at which point we stop calling Christianity to the West and start calling it the West.
Obviously new civilizations either descend directly from one or more earlier ones (like the west descends from the classical roman and greek civilizations and also the canaanite or hebrew one, a melting pot in which the cultural background of the germanic peoples, perhaps not a civilization on its own merit, also entered), or they evolve from earlier tribal pre-civilizations.

So, in the West's case, imo, there was definitly a collapse of an earlier civilization, but followed by a long gestation period in a which a new stabe world was erected. But that world didn't stay stactic after that, on the contrary. Though most scholars would agree that the civilization of William the Conqueror, or St. Francis of Assissi, or Dante Alighieri, or Leonardo da Vinci, or Louis XIV, or Napoleon Bonaparte, or Thomas Jefferson, or Karl Marx, or Charles Darwin, or Winston Churchill is always the same, and the same as ours, I doubt they would recognise it themselves, had they met each other for a chat in the after life. So, in my mind civilizations are very dinamic, even those that don't seem to be so turbulent as the west. There surely seem to have been periods when the west was about to be destroyed (the mongol, arabian or turk hordes), or split (the Reformation, WWII and the Cold War), etc.
Yet it stood, and stood because people felt there was something that united them and separated them from the alien worlds elsewhere, although, as we've seen with the recent cartoon crisis, we no longer seem to know what thing is that.

So I belive that what you call "smooth transition" depends very much in the context. How long is a smooth transition? 2 generations? 2 centuries? A 1000 years? I'm not an expert in neither of this, but it seems that North Africa, particulary earlier strongholds of (pre)West, like nowadays Lybia and Tunisia, made a quick transition to Islam. In fact Islam seems to be much better at expanding itself faster than the West, which took ages to bring Norther Europe, Scandinavia and the western slavic peoples to its family, and never quite achieved that with Russia. But in these cases, we're talking about a pre-existing civilization expanding its borders, not of a birth of a civilization proper. When we shift an entire region from one earsed civilization to a new born one, things are much more complex. But if you regard Byzantium or Orthodoxy as a different civilization from both West and Classical greco-roman, and I think it's perfectly legitimate to do so, the transition was much caler than in the former western roman empire. It was indeed faster and smoother, but that may be connected with political fragmentation. For the time that it took Byzantine civilization to emerge, there was always a universal empire, a civilization-state. That was never the case with the West, that until very recently was for a 1000 years in a period of warring states, and although they're no longer warrier, they're not unified either, despite the EU or NATO, which may be in future, the prototypes of such a unified empire.

To conclude, I think most civilization shifts and births have turmoil or conquest at its genesis, but that's not a universal rule and it can be obtained in a much easier bargain, especially if there is a previous unified culture, empire, and especially the notion of a common alien foe.
 
In brief, I personally favor Toynbee's work on the evolution of civilizations; he's reached somewhat stabler ground than the almost "Neitzschean" approach of Spengler. But Toynbee also had the benefit of another thirty or so years of archeological evidence with which to perform his comparative analysis.

One thing seems clear to me, though: The social dynamics of the civilization were fundamentally altered by the advent of industrial civilization, and more recently, globalization. Here I concur with Anthony Giddens. The models proposed Spengler and Toynbee are more applicable to preindustrial history than to post-industrial history. Some of the dynamics are no doubt the same, but new dynamics have emerged. The challenge of the comparative historian/historical sociologist is to weigh the one against the other.

As for the case of Islamic civilization, as discussed by MCdread. In terms of the history of civilizations, I've always considered Islamic civilization to be a special case in that its sudden emergence was the result of a fairly unique fusion of the traditional nomadism of the early Arabs combined with the specific orientation of the "salvation religion" that is Islam. As such, its developmental dynamic is different than that of other civilizations, that were largely dependent upon sedentary agriculture. Hence the dynamism that produced the phenomenal expansion very early in its existence as a distinct civilization.
 
Interesting discussion! I'm not really familiar with Spenger's works, but I have always wondered whether one can really define people nowadays in terms of 'civilizations', or if our technological advancements have simply created a new global civilization that is divided on thin ideological lines. I have a hard time imagining a latter-day 'dark age' following the decline of western civilization; I feel like we're simply too connected
 
Che Guava said:
I have a hard time imagining a latter-day 'dark age' following the decline of western civilization; I feel like we're simply too connected

Which is why I was thinking that there would be no "dark ages" in industrial society, just the old civilization being replaced by smoothly by the new one when the new cultural synthesis is complete, since in our modern world there we are so interconected that a region loosing scientific and technological knowledge is impossible. The spread of eastern religions and New Age mysticism in the West seems equivalent to all the cults spreading in the Roman Empire in the 3rd century CE, so prehaps a new great religion, which Spengler sees as a core of a new civilization, will form soon.

Where I disagree with Spengler is his distaste for democracy. I don't think it's democracy that is bad per se, it is populism that is bad, since populism often leads to demogoge despots, Spengler's "Caesars", which he sees as part of a civilization's terminal decline. Also, I am thinking that that sometime in the next 1000 years, this new civilization that will replace Western civilization will become the core of a global civilization, it will take a while for a global civilization to form because it will take a long time for the cultures of the world to mix enough for such a civilization to become possible.
 
Andu Indorin said:
As for the case of Islamic civilization, as discussed by MCdread. In terms of the history of civilizations, I've always considered Islamic civilization to be a special case in that its sudden emergence was the result of a fairly unique fusion of the traditional nomadism of the early Arabs combined with the specific orientation of the "salvation religion" that is Islam. As such, its developmental dynamic is different than that of other civilizations, that were largely dependent upon sedentary agriculture. Hence the dynamism that produced the phenomenal expansion very early in its existence as a distinct civilization.

This is where Spengler confuses he, he considers Islam as part of a "Magian" civilization, which also contains Byzantium, Zoroasterian Persia, and Russia pre-Peter the Great, which violoates his Religion-as-Basis-of-Civilization concept, since his "Magian" civilization would cover 3 religions, Islam, Zoroasterianism, and Orthodox Christianity.
 
On that, Toynbee more or less concluded that Western, Russian (Orthodox Christian), and Syriac (Islamic) civilizations were each distinct descendents of the classical Hellenic civilization (which includes Rome). He also wound up with something like twenty-three distinct civilizations compared to Spengler's twelve (iirc), including no less than three separate civilizations for China. It was only toward the end of his career that he made some adjustments on that account.

He also sees the Great Religions not as a part of civilizations, but as separate social organizations of a kind similar but different to civilizations; and these organizations serve as a kind of chrysalis for new civilizations to develop from the wreakage of their antecedents. This is where many historians cease to follow the overall structure of his argument -- i.e., basically too Catholic. Though, I must point out that Asimov put this basic structure to good use in the original "Foundation" trilogy.

As for the future of individual civilizations, I tend to agree that the global economy is slowing fusing current civilizations into a global civilization. The dynamics have changed ...
 
I think that for the moment I'm more on line with Huntington and will say that the globalised world is levelling the modernization, which is different from westernization (since I can't see how such a global civilization would be anything else than a western or post-western one). The west itself wasn't modern a few hundred years ago.
Japan for example is the 2nd world economy, and one of the most technologically advanced and modern countries in the world. It is a liberal democracy, thus following many of the western political institutions. But despite all this, despite 2 economic and technologic miracles (Meiji restoration and post-WWII), is it western? I don't think so. Japan is a scientific and economic leader at the world scale, but kept its fundamental civilizational traces.
For the vast majority of the islamic world westernizing trends like kemalism or socialist and secular pan-arabism failed, and Islam is not closer to merge with the rest of the world in a civilizational melting pot than it ever was in History. In many ways it even seems to be diverging, as deep religious and cultural sentiments are overcoming corrupt western friendly strong men and governments.
Modern civilizations world wide take from the west what they think they need to compete: scientific or political institutions and practices, but do not really adopt the west. It's the same thing the west has always done itself. It absorbed useful learnings from outside civilizations, especially pre-Rennaissence, but didn't turn out islamic or classical again.

As for where is the west going, or the question of its decline. I don't think the west is declining in absolute terms. The west still is and will continue to be for many many years the leader in most economic, scientific, cultural or social indicators, but in relative terms, other parts of the world are catching up.
 
After World War I, the Great Depression, and WWII, a lot of people wanted to reject Western values like capitalism, democracy, and progress.

Similar world-altering events could shake our confidence in the West such that we turn to something non-Western. But it would have to be devastating.
 
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