I've been reading some papers on military logistics and wondering how important are some of the limitations mentioned.
On railways: was it common for steam engine locomotives to require protection overnight and very frequent maintenance? And to be tied to specific stretches of railway? OR was this a feature of some climates or some regions?
I read the first paper.
The author(s) seems to have assumed that the use of the captured eastern european railways would have worked
better if only the German civilian railway, rather than the military, authority had been put in charge from the outset.
There may be some truth in that, but it seems to reflect the sources of the information so it is certainly not unbiased.
The reputational rubbishing of the Russian railways was a convenient excuse for their failures to maintain what they captured.
Obviously the locomotives in occupied Eastern Europe would require protection overnight to stop them being
sabotaged from partisan attacks or just ad hoc acts of local resistance. Steam engine locomotives were tied to
specific stretches of tracks. The most important restriction was that imposed by the gauges of the track.
There were two gauges, rail separation and overhead gauges. The rail gauge was more critical as a locomotive
could only run on tracks with the same separation as the locomotive wheels, whereas a smaller German train
could fit through a tunnel designed for a larger Soviet train. There were probably other considerations such as
specialised maintenance equipment, supply of spare parts and engineers and workers familiar with maintaining
particular types, but a skilled workforce would have been able to maintain foreign engines albeit just not so easily.
The destruction of bridges also had the effect of partitioning a countries captured rail capability into segments.
What is not mentioned is the human factor. On the Soviet side the majority of the workers were not oppressed
prisoners, but civilians motivated by (a) top down Bolshevik rhetoric no doubt promulgated by a commissioner
(b) bottom up worker soviets where those with relevant expertise could contribute and (c) genuine annoyance at the
invasion of their country. Such a labour force could organically work together and intelligently address challenges.
Whereas in the occupied territories it was a hodge podge mix of forced labour speaking various languages
working only to avoid starvation, being shot or the execution of hostages. That sort of workforce would no doubt
try to do what it was told by the Wehrmacht/SS soldier, but it was hardly likely to seek out and volunteer the best ideas.
One can compare this with factory production: UK, US and USSR factories staffed by women
frequently outperformed German factories staffed with a few engineers but mainly forced labour.
On road transport: rather small limits to the amount of cargo that could be moved long distances even with trucks. Are these reasonable? And what are the present day limits of road transport on hostile (or deserted) territory?
Road transport requires fuel. The further one is from a refuel point, the more full one must carry with you.
Either as petrol cans in the lorry itself or by being accompanied by tankers. Remember the old jokes.
What is the difference between a fanatical Nazi and an ordinary Nazi or a fanatical tank and an ordinary tank.
The fanatical Nazi has not yet run out of ammunition, and the fanatical tank has not yet run out of petrol.
One of the reasons the US switched to gas turbine tanks is that the turbine was more efficient than the
intenal combustion engine both in terms of top speed and range. Conditon of terrain matters.
If it is rugged or swampy, the only route for non tracked vehicles may be rather convoluted with the
distance travelled in practice being very much more than the separation between start and target end points.
On pre-modern and early modern armies: living off the land was common. Still, provisions get spent on any given region if an army remains there too long, and there is such a thing as a scorched earth strategy. Was it common for cavalry to be regarded as a hindrance due to its supply requirements and armies that could posses cavalry to deliberately operate without horses? Or even for cavalry soldiers to campaign dismounted, as foot soldiers?
Horses could live off the land quite comfortably where there was grass or even better tasty crops planted.
Where horse were a hindrance was where there was no such food, snow (Napoleon and Moscow)
or desert (camels can be better) or mountains with very steep slopes and less forage.
Therefore cavalry were impacted by climate and season, far more than rail or road vehicles.
I was told that:
(a) Grunts do what they are told
(b) NCOs and junior officers stud
y tactics
(c) Seniors officers study
strategy
(d) Generals and commanders in chief study
logistics.