The case for China as the most powerful empire of all times

[Khaghan]

Because Britain capabilities were always skewed in favor of naval and commercial power, it never had the aggregate advantage implied by its early industrialization. Indeed, it was not even the international system's unambiguous leader until Russia's defeat in Crimea in 1856.
The Napoleonic Wars yielded three potential hegemons: Britain, the decisive naval and financial power; Russia, the preeminent military power on the continent; and France, the state whose military prowess had called forth coalitions involving all the other great states.
From 1815 to 1856, Britain had to share leadership of the system with Russia, while the power gap between these two empires and France remained perilously small.
Russia's defeat in Crimea punctured its aura of power and established Britain?s uncontested primacy But even after 1856, the gap between London and continental powerhouses such as France, Russia, and Prussia remained small because Britain never translated its early-industrial potential into continental-scale military capabilities.
British security has always depended on a global deadlock between powerhouses in europe, at least befoire the end of the Crimean war, as well as British wealth on its trade with the continent. Even during the height of its influence after 1856, Britain was never a major land power and could not perform the conflict-dampening role that a unipolar state can play.

 

[blindside]

Because Britain capabilities were always skewed in favor of naval and commercial power, it never had the aggregate advantage implied by its early industrialization. Indeed, it was not even the international system's unambiguous leader until Russia's defeat in Crimea in 1856.
The Napoleonic Wars yielded three potential hegemons: Britain, the decisive naval and financial power; Russia, the preeminent military power on the continent; and France, the state whose military prowess had called forth coalitions involving all the other great states.
From 1815 to 1856, Britain had to share leadership of the system with Russia, while the power gap between these two empires and France remained perilously small.
Russia's defeat in Crimea punctured its aura of power and established Britain?s uncontested primacy But even after 1856, the gap between London and continental powerhouses such as France, Russia, and Prussia remained small because Britain never translated its early-industrial potential into continental-scale military capabilities.
British security has always depended on a global deadlock between powerhouses in europe, at least befoire the end of the Crimean war, as well as British wealth on its trade with the continent. Even during the height of its influence after 1856, Britain was never a major land power and could not perform the conflict-dampening role that a unipolar state can play.

My views more eloquently stated. Even at the height of their power in the late 19th / early 20th century, there were a number of countries that could defeat Britain, Germany being one of them (I'd put France, and arguably Russia and the USA up there as well).

 

[Khaghan]

Now thats not get too carried away, even though British might was not absolute or unipolar, it was still the greatest power of the time as the term victorianage indicate. While the height of British power isn't actually the 20th century but the mid 1860s. The German Empire didn’t even exist for most of the Victorian era; rather France was the leading European state and yet demonstrably no match for the United Kingdom, and even later German power was caged inside continental Europe. The German trophy colonies were a useless adornment. The Anglo-German naval race really only developed in the Edwardian era of the twentieth century, and even then the German shipbuilding industry was still too small and her geography too disadvantageous to enable her to mount a serious challenge to Britain’s global preponderance. This is guranteed by the dominance of the British navy for no two navy in the world combined could defeat that of the Royal navy.
At market prices in 1960 US dollars, the GNP of the United Kingdom in 1860 was $16 billion. GNP of the combined German states was $12.7 billion. In terms of wealth (and therefore potential tax revenue), British per capita GNP was $558, compared with the German average of $354.

Even more pointedly Prussia was an industrial pygmy: all told the combined German states had only a quarter of Britain’s share of world manufacturing output and a quarter of the level of its per capita productivity. And whereas 70 percent of British manufacturing was devoted to the high technology industries with decisive military applications, the average share in high technology for all other developed countries including Prussia was only 24 percent. It had only been after 1860 that Prussia had begun to emerge from economic and political backwardness and its secondary status among continental powers. Had it come down to a war of attrition, Prussia would have been severely disadvantaged by the massive imbalance of production.

The Prussian Navy was incapable of effective resistance, as witnessed by its unimpressive performance against the Danes. Shore batteries would have impeded but not prevented a British force landing and establishing beachheads, since both the Royal Artillery and Navy had already adopted battlefield-dominating Armstrong rifled breech-loading ordnance in 1861, which would have served as a useful force multiplier because the contemporary Prussian artillery still consisted of muzzle-loading smoothbores inferior to the big guns deployed by the Austrians in 1866. In terms of small calibre shoulder arms the Dreyse didn’t enjoy the same margin of superiority over the Enfield it had over the Lorenz or the Minié, and the Enfield was also being converted into a breech-loader. In emerging technology the British were ahead of the Prussians in developing the brass cartridge – which tripled range – and block breech action, so technologically the British Army of the mid 1860s would have proven a more formidable adversary for Prussia than either the Austrians or the French.



In 1864 the British Army establishment stood at 223,500. All told there were 140 battalions, of which, before the landmark Caldwell reforms of 1869, forty battalions or over 60,000 men were generally stationed in the United Kingdom, with the remaining hundred garrisoning the colonies. That year the British Army was engaged in fighting the First Ashanti War in Africa, the Maori War in New Zealand, and separate offensives against Japan, Bhutan, and the Mohmands of Central Asia. Sepoys of the Indian Army numbered a further 120,000, bringing the Empire’s total land forces to 343,500.



The Prussian Army establishment was smaller, totalling 201,000 in 1860. But its military system possessed one great advantage: it was based on universal obligation to serve, and in 1867 it proved itself capable of fielding 400,000 men, the majority reservists. This organisational capacity was being rapidly developed through the extensive military use of railways. Over 18 days in 1870, the Prussians proved themselves capable of mobilising 1,183,000 troops and transporting 462,000 of them to the French frontier.

If Palmerston had followed up his threat to intervene on Denmark’s behalf, his government’s immediate problem would have been how to concentrate an adequate force for continental service. General Peel, former Secretary State for War, recommended the dispatch of 60,000 troops from Britain to the Baltic to prevent the Prussian-Austrian invasion of Holstein, but in the event only 20,000 proved ready for rapid deployment. Nonetheless Palmerston was confident that – contingent on Danish and Swedish support – a thin red line of 20,000 “could achieve a good deal”, though obviously they would need to receive heavy reinforcements if they were to face down a potential 200,000 to 300,000 Prussians and Austrians.

In European affairs the United Kingdom had for fifty years been content to remain an offstage superpower. Mobilisation and deployment would have been slow because so many units would have to have been recalled from Canada, Africa and Australasia. Moreover Whitehall was wedded to the maritime lobby and had not given priority to the kind of continental obligations that would have burdened the Treasury with the responsibility of maintaining a permanent conscript army. Public opinion was sensitive on this issue, and the government was conscious of the constitutional responsibilities involved in safeguarding a free society, and had maintained only minimal land forces during peacetime, preferring to field a modest long-service professional Army, and disdaining reliance on conscription as the device of repressive regimes. There was no strategic necessity because control of the oceans rendered the Home Islands and the Empire unassailable.

 

[samildanach]

When strategists talk of a state being a unipolar power. They talk in terms of a unipolar moment. This is because no state has actually translated the unipolar moment into true unipolarity. Britain had its unipolar moment when it led the industrial revolution but failed to translate that into becoming a true unipolar power as Khaghan described.
The United States it is argued had a unipolar moment when it was first to the atom bomb but again failed to translate this into becoming the unipolar power.
Khaghan argues that china was the unipolar power in 660. I fail to see how that even qualifies as a unipolar moment let alone being the unipolar power. To qualify as having a unipolar moment a state must have technology and resources that would enable it to gain dominion over the entire world. To be the unipolar power it must do just that.
The whole premise of khaghans argument- that unipolar powers have existed is obviously incorrect. Regional superpowers have existed. States that have achieved a unipolar moment have existed arguably. But a unipolar power? It has not happened.
One wonders at the level of rabid nationalism and egotism that would be necessary to even argue a case for unipolarity, especially for China at any time in its history. Its disturbing, more so because the chinese posters seem to agree with it. Perhaps the americans are right about China.

 

[Xen]

I conceed my poitn then; whiel i still have my opinions on the subject, these days I no longer have areal will to "fight" on with fac tover fac tover much of anything online, unless it involves my direct person being offended; I can onl say that it is regretful that you did not post all of this here 7 months ago when I was in my prime of argument, so to speak, and perhaps i could have given soem real compittion for debate.

as it is, I can only await until someone comes along whom has the evidence to either refute your claims, or put the spotlight on soem other civlization whom could outproduce even china, (and I assure youy, someone whom has such knowledge always invaribaly comes along with such knowledge, no matter how erroadable anyone migth think thier position is, or how good a debater one might think themselves) I am truthfully saddend I no longer have the drive, nor the knack atdefendign my own arguments. I respectfully bow out of the argument, your knowledge in these areas is bette rthen my own, your [resentation mazing, though i could only wish i could express why they havent really impacted my own assumption in far more able way then the pitiful comments I have been religated to in this thread.

 

[jonatas]

One wonders at the level of rabid nationalism and egotism that would be necessary to even argue a case for unipolarity, especially for China at any time in its history. Its disturbing, more so because the chinese posters seem to agree with it. Perhaps the americans are right about China.

actually what i wonder at is your suspicion of chinese posters, and what you mean by "americans being right about china"...

 

[samildanach]

actually what i wonder at is your suspicion of chinese posters, and what you mean by "americans being right about china"...

I explained why unipolarity was a faulty premise on which to base an argument on the relative worth of various empires. It follows on ,obviously IMO, to ask why that argument was based on that premise and why is it attractive to chinese posters?
Perhaps you could explain?

When refering to "americans" I was alluding to PNAC.

 

[Knight-Dragon]

Its disturbing, more so because the chinese posters seem to agree with it.

Transplanted Chinese posters. We don't have any active Mainland posters that I know of.

And Kaghan is American I believe... fr his IP add...

It follows on ,obviously IMO, to ask why that argument was based on that premise and why is it attractive to chinese posters?

Because in this case, the option for China wasn't even there, in that ancient poll... (while Israel was in it!).

And it's interesting to know; most Chinese wouldn't even be aware of the facts Kaghan presented. Americans can be patriotic; so can Chinese. Even transplanted ones.

 

[samildanach]

. According to a more potent source, “History of military and warfare” it states, the Roman legions lost the battle of Sogdiana because of the Han soldier’s superior weapons. I would gladly give more detail of the Battle of Sogdiana, (assumed by many to be the only battle between Romans and Han troops) if any of you want to know more about it.

This has been discussed here. You seem very sure that it happened. Results from genetic tests haven't been made public as far as I'm aware. And no romans with crossbow bolts in them or perforated scutums have been unearthed.

Study of crossbows exacavated from the terracotta warrior confirm that the bolts of these powerful weapons could rip straight through a Roman scutum.

At lot of things could rip through a Roman scutum if they were to hit at the right angle. What angle of incidence was used in the tests ? Their strength was in their curvature the purpose being to deflect rather than stop. There is massive variability in scutum design anyway. Again have they dug up a scutum in China?
Also one must remember that even if it penetrates the scutum it has the lorica segmentata to go through as well. The obvious question is can a bolt from a Han crossbow penetrate a scutum and lorica segmentata?

 

[alex994]

You showed them all man, very good and you knocked xen down a peg.

 

[Khaghan]

"Khaghan argues that china was the unipolar power in 660. I fail to see how that even qualifies as a unipolar moment let alone being the unipolar power. To qualify as having a unipolar moment a state must have technology and resources that would enable it to gain dominion over the entire world. To be the unipolar power it must do just that.
The whole premise of khaghans argument- that unipolar powers have existed is obviously incorrect. Regional superpowers have existed. States that have achieved a unipolar moment have existed arguably. But a unipolar power? It has not happened. "

No, the definition of a unipolar power simply means a state that have no challenge to its authority. Its irregarldess of global dominance or regional. Tang china is not a world power, or a superpower, except regional, but it is a unipolar power for Tang did however achieve unrivalled hegemony of East Asia, and in relative terms the dynasty probably represents China’s zenith as a world power. The far western frontier reached the oases of Transoxiana and the mighty Chinese armies established six military protectorates (Du-Du-fu) on the frontiers: An-nan (Hanoi), Bei-ting (Beshbalik in Jungaria or Eastern Turkestan), An-Xi in western Kansu, An-Dong in Liaoning (southern Manchuria), An-bei in the north-west of the Ordos plateau, and of Chang-yü in the north-east of the Ordos plateau, on the Yellow River. These territory are subdivided into even more prefectures, after 647, when the Xue Yang Tuo tribe were defeated, An Bei was set up and aoned into 6 separate du du fu. In 625, Wei Shi of northern manchuria submit to Tang, protectorate was set up their and the tribes were granted Du Du title. In 629, the subjected Kitan was also placed under the An Dong. During the height of Tai Zong's reign, there were 360 Zhou and 1557 protectorates stretching from Manchuria to the Aral Sea, From Siberia into Vietnam.
In Kansu submission was wrung from the Tanguts, opening a narrow corridor to the west, through which the relentless T’ang armies poured. In the dusk of T’ai-tsung’s reign eighty-eight Asiatic peoples recognised Chinese overlordship. The great Tang empire was easily the most populous state in the world, with 52,910,000 people counted in the census of 755. While close to 50 milllion in 660s. Thats not including the Protectorates of the empire. Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient, 18 (1975), pp. 271-299, estimates the total population of the Inner Asian Steppe in 1251 as approximately 4,250,000 nomads. This total included approximately 850,000 nomads in Outer Mongolia, approximately 850,000 nomads in Inner Mongolia, a sedentary population of approximately 1,150,000, and approximately 850,000 nomads in Transoxiana, Semirecheiye and parts of Jungaria and the Tarim Basin (but excluding most of Kazakhstan). While Tang territory in Paekche which having a census of 760,000 houshold, roughly equivalent to 4 million individuals, Nan Zhao's appromimately 2.1 million souls, Tang empire with all its protectorate would have reached something roughly equivalent of 65 million souls in a world that has roughly 210 million population, or nearly a third of it. The Islamic empire which is only on the infancy of expansion only has some 20 million souls, 2.5 million sq miles, with a revenue only a third that of Tang and the population of the Byzantine Empire had fallen to only 7,000,000. Tubo was only a growing power, and the sino tibetan competition haven't actually began until the late 660s when Tubo secured its conquest in Qin Hai as a base of operation against Central Asia. Indeed in 660, no power came close to that of Tang in dominance.
Of course as already mentioned, its impossible to compare modern power with ancient power due to the absense of global interaction for the later. But since no power could achieve global predomenence, regional dominance and share of the world;s wealth, subject, military and the like is the key to estimation.


"At lot of things could rip through a Roman scutum if they were to hit at the right angle. What angle of incidence was used in the tests ? Their strength was in their curvature the purpose being to deflect rather than stop. "


The angle was refered to composite bow of the Syrians and Parthians. In the case of crossbow, ripping through at given range is guaranteed.


"There is massive variability in scutum design anyway. Again have they dug up a scutum in China? "

No, but the scutum design is of the Late Republic, which is already the curved rectangular type idnetical to the imperial age.


"Also one must remember that even if it penetrates the scutum it has the lorica segmentata to go through as well. The obvious question is can a bolt from a Han crossbow penetrate a scutum and lorica segmentata? "


It depend on the distance and angle of the hit in this case. The military manual of the Tang mention specifically the distance required to pierce heavy iron armour at whats equivalent of 230 yards, while under 100 yards, its virtually pierless. Dipped in poison with a lead content of 60 percent, a small puncture would be fatal. But one must also remember the obvious; the hand and feet of the legionaire are still unprotected, causing vulnerability, which was demonstrated by the arrow assault of the Parthian archers ar Carhhae.

 

[Khaghan]

"The United States it is argued had a unipolar moment when it was first to the atom bomb but again failed to translate this into becoming the unipolar power. "

No, the affect of the early atom bomb as I already pointed out, has severe limit and is no way a decive weapon. In purely military terms, the atomic bomb was actually no more devastating than a conventional strategic bombing fleet. On 10 March 1945, at a cost of £53 million, a reusable fleet of 334 B-29s had destroyed 16 square miles of Tokyo, killed 83,793 people, wounded 40,918, destroyed 267 buildings, and burnt down the homes of over 1 million people. In comparison the Manhattan Project had cost US taxpayers a total of £496 million, but the early fission bombs, with an explosive yield of 20 kilotons, created a blast radius of only four thousand feet. The gun-type bomb Little Boy destroyed 4 square miles of Hiroshima, killed 78,000 people, injured 51,000, and damaged or destroyed 48,000 buildings, while in Nagasaki the implosion bomb Fat Man killed 35,000 and wounded 60,000. Returning now to a less outlandish scenario, with a payload of 10 tons the twenty-seven B-29s of the 509th Composite Group had a range of 1,500 miles. In the late forties American engineers were yet to come up with a viable delivery system with the range to seriously threaten many major Soviet industrial centres. So the atomic bomb’s mere existence was not going to impinge on Communist encroachment in Eastern Europe and the Near East, and in practical terms it had not transformed the balance of world power. In no way did the nited State was ever a unipolar power prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and that includes the 4 year of its nuclear monoply.

 

[Dann]

Transplanted Chinese posters. We don't have any active Mainland posters that I know of.

I'm posting from the mainland, but I'm not originally from here. Merely visiting. But perhaps I might settle here.

And it's interesting to know; most Chinese wouldn't even be aware of the facts Kaghan presented.

Yes. I learned a lot of ancient Chinese military history reading this thread. Our education then with regards China's history certainly didn't focus a lot on military matters.

One wonders at the level of rabid nationalism and egotism that would be necessary to even argue a case for unipolarity, especially for China at any time in its history. Its disturbing, more so because the chinese posters seem to agree with it. Perhaps the americans are right about China.

Americans can be patriotic; so can Chinese. Even transplanted ones.

Well the argument was about historical China, which all Chinese all over the world, whether democratic, communist or whatnot, will be understandably proud of. XIII said Khaghan's IP is from the US. That means every last one of us Chinese posters here is actually Hua Qiao - overseas Chinese. (Except Civclub. But he never comes to History or OT anyway.) Our nationalism is not directed towards the current political China but rather China as a nation or a cultural identity. And our nationalism is more subtle. We have no trouble adopting to the ways of our host countries, but openly embrace them instead. But once the means are available, some of us eventually take steps to improve conditions in their hometown. Building a school here, a factory there... Why the early development of Taiwan was due in no small part to investment by earlier generations of overseas Chinese.

 

[Knight-Dragon]

Well the argument was about historical China, which all Chinese all over the world, whether democratic, communist or whatnot, will be understandably proud of. XIII said Khaghan's IP is from the US. That means every last one of us Chinese posters here is actually Hua Qiao - overseas Chinese. (Except Civclub. But he never comes to History or OT anyway.) Our nationalism is not directed towards the current political China but rather China as a nation or a cultural identity. And our nationalism is more subtle. We have no trouble adopting to the ways of our host countries, but openly embrace them instead. But once the means are available, some of us eventually take steps to improve conditions in their hometown. Building a school here, a factory there... Why the early development of Taiwan was due in no small part to investment by earlier generations of overseas Chinese.

Yup, you said it better than I did.

Personally, I wouldn't even consider moving to China. But I do wish my ancestral homeland the very best.

 

[Dann]

Personally, I wouldn't even consider moving to China.

Believe me, neither would I 5 years ago. If it were not for the Asian financial crisis of '97, I'd probably still be in Singapore today. And happier too.

Reason I'm here now: 2+ years ago my company in the Philippines assigned me here to China for a project. Having no language barriers, I saw what opportunities there might be here for someone like me. Thus after my contract was up, I jumped ship and transferred to a local company. This is only another stepping stone, of course. I'm merely learning the ropes now. I have bigger plans...

Another thing holding me here now is my current GF. I'm not getting any younger. It's about time I settle down.

 

[Your Usurper]

I think the US in 1945 is the only time in history one nation truly could have ruled the world if it wanted to (With the exception of the USSR; who would have been a whole lot weaker without the US's help during WW2)

So you're saying like every great empire in the history of the world the U.S. has reached its apex? You know what happens after that. How much longer do we have?

 

[Xen]

"The United States it is argued had a unipolar moment when it was first to the atom bomb but again failed to translate this into becoming the unipolar power. "

No, the affect of the early atom bomb as I already pointed out, has severe limit and is no way a decive weapon. In purely military terms, the atomic bomb was actually no more devastating than a conventional strategic bombing fleet. On 10 March 1945, at a cost of £53 million, a reusable fleet of 334 B-29s had destroyed 16 square miles of Tokyo, killed 83,793 people, wounded 40,918, destroyed 267 buildings, and burnt down the homes of over 1 million people. In comparison the Manhattan Project had cost US taxpayers a total of £496 million, but the early fission bombs, with an explosive yield of 20 kilotons, created a blast radius of only four thousand feet. The gun-type bomb Little Boy destroyed 4 square miles of Hiroshima, killed 78,000 people, injured 51,000, and damaged or destroyed 48,000 buildings, while in Nagasaki the implosion bomb Fat Man killed 35,000 and wounded 60,000. Returning now to a less outlandish scenario, with a payload of 10 tons the twenty-seven B-29s of the 509th Composite Group had a range of 1,500 miles. In the late forties American engineers were yet to come up with a viable delivery system with the range to seriously threaten many major Soviet industrial centres. So the atomic bomb’s mere existence was not going to impinge on Communist encroachment in Eastern Europe and the Near East, and in practical terms it had not transformed the balance of world power. In no way did the nited State was ever a unipolar power prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union and that includes the 4 year of its nuclear monoply.

you forget- atmoic bombs are the gift that keep on giving- while the intial destructive capabilties of early atomic weapons wer elimited, they certinalyl had a greater impact than all the bomber sof the US military combined in;

A)simpel intimidation- a bomber squadron coudl undoubtably do more damage- but this wasnt a bomber squadron, thsi wasnt severla bombers, this wasnt a single bomber payload in teh traditional sense- it was a single bomb

B)as fo rthr gift that keeps on giving, radiation good sir, radiation- no amoutn fo standar dbombvs dropped dropped will wreak the havic of f assorted cancers and denerativ egentic diseases that a nukc of any callibre will on particuler are, and in that way but a single atomic weapon is all teh more deadlly then every other.

 

[Khaghan]

The early atomic bomb is merely tactical advantage, not decisive, not different from the the Ak 47 and the Mig 15 advantage that the Soviet Union possesed over the United States.

 

[Xen]

No, but the scutum design is of the Late Republic, which is already the curved rectangular type idnetical to the imperial age.

nto ture- late republic era sheild (aka, the "Caesarian era") were of a different type, of a more oval design, often lacked the outer edge metal re-inforcement (make no doubt though, thsi is when it first appered in any siginicant amounts) and did not have at allt eh same metal umbo structure of later sheilds, even so soon as to after the agustian reforms of the military.

"Also one must remember that even if it penetrates the scutum it has the lorica segmentata to go through as well. The obvious question is can a bolt from a Han crossbow penetrate a scutum and lorica segmentata? "


It depend on the distance and angle of the hit in this case. The military manual of the Tang mention specifically the distance required to pierce heavy iron armour at whats equivalent of 230 yards, while under 100 yards, its virtually pierless. Dipped in poison with a lead content of 60 percent, a small puncture would be fatal. But one must also remember the obvious; the hand and feet of the legionaire are still unprotected, causing vulnerability, which was demonstrated by the arrow assault of the Parthian archers ar Carhhae.

A)the roman formations wer ebogged down by arrow fire, but the arrows themselves are not all recorded as winnige the battle indeed, the actual killing bow for the legions at carhae is described at beign the parthian speaermen, and thier heavy shock cavalry- not the archers

take this quote;"For if they decided to lock shields for the purpose of avoiding the arrows by the closeness of their array, the pikemen were upon them with a rush, striking down some, and at least scattering the others; and if they extended their ranks to avoid this, they would be struck with the arrows. Hereupon many died from fright at the very charge of the pikemen, and many perished hemmed in by the horsemen."

and while in all fiarness, it dose decribe the contued intimidaiton that the near constant rainfall arrows, and after the infantry clash how the arrows then began to inflict more significant casulties, and the lines before it describe significant carnage as well; but in realtion that the Romans could no longer deal with a charg eof the parthians heavy "mail clad" cavalry- not that the archers of the Parthians were actually winning the battle all by themselves

 

[Xen]

The early atomic bomb is merely tactical advantage, not decisive, not different from the the Ak 47 and the Mig 15 advantage that the Soviet Union possesed over the United States.

of course its desicsive- that fact is testiment in the fact thatthier was never a war between the soviet Union and the united states, for mutual fear of being ahnilated by such weapons