The Cold War what if thread

[joycem10]

On the original question...

I read a book by former Soviet officer, Viktor Suvorov, about his time in the spetznaz (sorry forget thte title) and he states clearly that the Soviets had no concept of limited war in Europe.

His book states that in the event of a Soviet assualt on Germany and NATO from day one the Soviets would have been attacking with nuclear weapons and chemical weapons against NATO nuclear stores and sites, communication hubs, airfields, command centres, etc.

Since someone mentioned Red Storm Rising above, isnt that the point of one of the chapters? Specifically the DDR's refusal to allow chemical attacks due to fear of NATO retaliation. Clancy's deux ex machina to ensure the conflict remains conventional until the end.

Given that NATO policy was to respond to NBC weapons in kind, I tend to believe that a general nuclear exchange would have eventually occurred after a series of escalations.

 

[RedRalph]

Joycem you have to take eveything in context, that guy might have said that, but it still makes no sense. It would always have been in the Soviets interest to keep things conventional, , why would they court a nuclear war they couldnt win over a conventional one they would?

 

[joycem10]

Joycem you have to take eveything in context, that guy might have said that, but it still makes no sense. It would always have been in the Soviets interest to keep things conventional, , why would they court a nuclear war they couldnt win over a conventional one they would?

The belief that NATO would respond with tactical nuclear weapons in theatre in the event of a massive Soviet breakout in a surprise attack would lead to the obvious conclusion that Soviet forces should move to neutralize both the weapons and the command and control associated with those weapons as part of an attack.

There was a belief in both the Soviet and NATO leadership that tactical nukes would not necessarily lead to a full blown exchange, and that such a war could be contained in Europe. I dont agree.

 

[Dachs]

I read a book by former Soviet officer, Viktor Suvorov, about his time in the spetznaz (sorry forget thte title) and he states clearly that the Soviets had no concept of limited war in Europe.

I have his (by the way, Suvorov is just a pseudonym; his name is actually Vladimir Rezun, and he was GRU and a tanker, not Spetsnaz) book, Inside the Soviet Army. He does refer to the concept of "limited war" as being awfully silly, He calls it the "axe theory", and illustrates it with an example from American cowboy films.

It became clear to me that a modern American cowboy who is working up to a decisive fight will always expect to begin by spitting at and insulting his opponent and to continue by throwing whisky in his face and chucking custard pies at him before resorting to more serious weapons. He expects to hurl chairs and bottles at his enemy and to try to stick a fork or tableknife into his behind and then to fight with his fists and only after all this to fight it out with his gun.

This is a very dangerous philosophy. You are going to end up by using pistols. Why not start with them? Why should the bandit you are fighting wait for you to remember your gun? He may shoot before you do, just as you are going to slap his face. By using his most deadly weapon at the beginning of the fight, your enemy saves his strength. Why should he waste it throwing chairs at you? Moreover, this will enable him to save his own despicable life. After all, he does not know, either, when you, the noble hero, will decide to use your gun. Why should he wait for this moment? You might make a sudden decision to shoot him immediately after throwing custard pie at him, without waiting for the exchange of chairs. Of course he won't wait for you when it comes to staying alive. He will shoot first. At the very start of the fight.

I consoled myself for a long time with the hope that the theory of escalating in a nuclear war had been dreamed up by the American specialists to reassure nervous old-age pensioners. Clearly, the theory is too fatally dangerous to serve as a basis for secret military planning. Yet, suddenly, the American specialists demonstrated to the whole world that they really believed this theory would apply to a world-wide nuclear war. They really did believe that the bandit they would be fighting would give them time to throw custard pies and chairs at him before he made use of his most deadly weapon.

This demonstration was as public as it possibly could be. At the end of the 1960s the Americans began to deploy their anti-missile defence system. They could not, of course, use it to defend more than one vitally important strategic objective. The objective they chose to protect was their strategic rockets. They did not decide to guard the heart and mind of their country - the President, their government or their capital. Instead they would protect their pistol - in other words they were showing the world that, in the event of a fight, they did not intend to use it.

This revelation was greeted with the greatest delight in the Kremlin and by the General Staff.

The philosophy of the Soviet General Staff is no different from that of the horsemen whom I had watched riding the desert. 'If you want to stay alive, kill your enemy. The quicker you finish him off, the less chance he will have to use his own gun.' In essence, this is the whole theoretical basis on whcih their plans for a third world war have been drawn up. The theory is known unofficially in the General Staff as the 'axe theory'. It is stupid, say the Soviet generals, to start a fist-fight if your opponent may use a knife. It is just as stupid to attack him with a knife if he may use an axe. The more terrible the weapon which your opponent may use, the more decisively you must attack him, and the more quickly you must finish him off. Any delay or hesitation in doing this will just give him a fresh opportunity to use his axe on you. To put it briefly, you can only prevent the enemy from using his axe if you use your own first.

Now granted, this is the same chappie who says that Hitler invaded the Soviet Union in 1941 mostly because it was to launch a preemptive strike on the Red Army, which was supposed to launch its own offensive slightly later in the summer (of course, if you think about it briefly, it makes some sense: the Soviet troops could be encircled extremely easily if they had their noses to the frontier in preparation for an invasion...), and he was a defector, so you may want to take this with a grain of salt. Then again, if anyone were to be right about such a plan, it would be him.

Joycem you have to take eveything in context, that guy might have said that, but it still makes no sense. It would always have been in the Soviets interest to keep things conventional, , why would they court a nuclear war they couldnt win over a conventional one they would?

Because the Americans wouldn't let the war stay conventional if the Soviets were about to win it. The French sure as hell wouldn't just stand there while West Germany got swallowed, for another thing, as has been mentioned previously.

There was a belief in both the Soviet and NATO leadership that tactical nukes would not necessarily lead to a full blown exchange, and that such a war could be contained in Europe. I dont agree.

On one level it does make some sense, because any Third World War would be so short that attacking the enemy's heartland would be pointless; there would be little if any time for war production to kick in and the only recruits that would be called to the colors in time would be the reserves and national guard type formations. Then again, the use of strategic nuclear weapons to make a political point and perhaps rectify any failures in-theater seems like it would follow on. Tactical nuclear weapons: the ultimate gateway drug.

 

[holy king]

the usa had nuclear weapons stationed in germany. i dont see them not using them before the respective military bases get overrun by the red army.

edit: suvorov has it right anyway.

 

[Patroklos]

so you think NATO could defend Germany? in all the war games they had they couldnt, and had to use tactical nukes...

One thing we learned post Cold War is that the Soviet forces, and especially the Warsaw Pact forces, were EXTREMELY overrated by NATO. Looking back the forces of East Germany and Poland were little more than human waves which is exactly why the Soviet equipement and tactics were immediately abandoned by these nations (with the exception of some aerospace gear). Soviet tanks proved to be deathtraps, their personel carriers unarmored tin cans. That and there were not nearly as many of them as we had guessed.