privatehudson
The Ultimate Badass
- Joined
- Oct 15, 2003
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This is the story of the last real Fallschirmjäger drop of WW2 and how men with such elite reputations failed so badly during the Battle of the Bulge. First some background on the Fallschirmjäger.
Background
The Fallschirmjäger’s origins began in 1933 with Goering forming a small company of men for the purpose. From this the force would expand to a battalion, then regiment, and finally 7th Flieger division by 1938 that included glider troops. By 1939 the high command had added 22nd airlanding division, essentially to fly troops into airfields and similar that the Fallschirmjäger had captured. These two divisions between them would see action in Poland, Belgium, Holland and Norway before the war was a year old. 7th Flieger was responsible for such feats as the capture of Eben Emael and numerous airfields and bridges in Holland and Norway. They fulfilled a vital role, capturing or putting out of action strategic points in advance of the ground forces.
1941 saw both divisions heavily engaged. 7th Flieger began with a drop on the Corinth Canal, which though the bridge was blown, succeeded in trapping and forcing the surrender of 12,000 British soldiers for a little under 300 looses to themselves. Then came the biggest operation of the war for the Fallschirmjäger, Crete. 7th Flieger assaulted the island by air, attacking at a number of points before finally securing Malame airport enough to airland troops into the area. With the arrival of mountain troops the allies were gradually forced to withdraw and Crete fell. The loss to the Fallschirmjäger and their Ju52 transports though was high, over 5,300 casualties and around 150 transport planes had been lost. The losses persuaded Hitler that massed airborne operations were futile. The year ended with 7th Flieger being redeployed to Russia, a theatre where airborne troops would retain a presence throughout the remaining years of the war.
1942 saw the Fallschirmjäger deployed to Africa, fighting in Tunisia and at El Alamein. During 1943 the Fallschirmjäger divisions began to rebuild and grow, 7th Flieger became 1st Fallschirmjäger division and more were added until the total reached around 11 with independent regiments. The divisions were now used on virtually every front, fighting from Sicily to Monte Cassino in Italy, in Normandy and across France, In Market Garden in Holland and during the battle of the Bulge. The divisions fought to the last gasp of the war in east and west.
During the 1941-45 period, the decision Hitler made after Crete had a telling effect. The Fallschirmjäger divisions no longer retained any realistic ability to deploy in their intended role. New recruits no longer had to be trained at jump schools, some had never even seen the inside of a Ju52, let alone made a combat jump. They became elite infantry, sent to defend positions that other infantry would withdraw from. Their stubborn tenacity was highly valued and respected by their opponents. Some of the Fallschirmjäger Divisions though were Fallschirmjäger in name only, formed from training school candidates or lightly wounded soldiers they were no match for the premier divisions like 1st FJ. Few airborne operations were ever carried out from 1941, and those that were were limited in either number or scope. Neither the opportunity nor skills were present anymore.
Thus we come to Operation Stösser, the final airborne operation of the war by the Fallschirmjäger which came during the battle of the bulge.
Operation Stösser – the plan
The overall plan for the battle of the bulge would see the deployment of two Fallschirmjäger divisions, 3rd FJ and 5th FJ. The high command saw potential for a small scale airborne drop behind allied lines to capture a strategic road junction, 11k north of Malmedy which would be vital for US troop movements to reinforce the front. A battalion or so of Fallschirmjäger dug in around the junction would significantly affect the operation, and if they failed in this task or were delayed, the secondary objective would be the bridges over the River Ambleve. Karl Student, commander of Army Group H chose Oberstleutnant Friedrich August Freiherr Von der Heydte to lead the operation, a veteran of Crete, Africa, Russia, Normandy and Holland.
Von der Heydte formed a Kampfgruppe for the operation of around battalion size consisting of 4 jäger (essentially rifle) companies, 1 heavy weapons company and detachments of pioneers and reconnaissance troops. To do so though, he knew he would need jump qualified soldiers and began to scour the area for them. Despite having two Fallschirmjäger divisions to call on, he received no more than 150 experienced troops! This was partly because of other commanders being unwilling to give up experienced soldiers on the eve of battle, but mainly due to the prevailing situation in the Fallschirmjäger divisions at this stage of the war. The simple truth was that the Fallschirmjäger divisions no longer retained much ability to operate in their intended role.
Nonetheless, Von Der Heydte gathered what he could and made preparations for the operation. His forces would be relieved by 6th Panzer army elements if all went to plan, but in this he was unfortunate. 6th Panzer’s commander, Josef Dietrich was of little help. He gave no intention of providing reconnaissance of the drop zones, information of the enemy forces was non-existent and Von Der Heydte knew he would face communication problems, the mountains might block radio contact. Aware of this he requested carrier pigeons, to which Dietrich’s reply was “I’m not running a f***ing zoo!” Dietrich’s only support was to provide some dummy paratroopers to drop and confuse the enemy.
Left with little choice, the operation went ahead anyway. Aware of the allies dominance of the air, the decision was taken to drop the troops at night, something never done before by the Fallschirmjäger. This, combined with the inexperience of the soldiers meant that the troops would drop mostly without their weapons, these being dropped in canisters with them. The scene was set…
Operation Stösser – the execution
In any event the operation got off to a bad start. Von Der Heydte’s men were delayed reaching their airfields by lack of transport leaving the operation behind schedule. They finally took off 8 hours late in terrible weather. Problems began almost immediatley, the Ju52 pilots lacked experience and strong winds drove many of course, some dropping their men in Holland and Germany! Of the 100 planes that began the operation, only 35 actually arrived over the right zone. These Fallschirmjäger jumped into high winds and were scattered over a wide area, meaning that when Von Der Heydte got his bearings he could find just 125 of his men. Some of these, due to the conditions and lack of experience were injured, and most had little or no weaponry due to the cannisters being lost, and no radio equipment (brought anyway) survived the drop.
Nonetheless, Von Der Hedyte set off for the objective anyway, but upon reaching it that morning discovered it occupied by a much larger allied force. With little weapons and few fit men he reluctantly decided to abbandon his mission objectives and try to withdraw. Attempts were made to contact 6th Panzer by runners, but these failed. His command melted back into the forest, and discovered some 150 men under the command of Kriegsberichter Oberleutnant Bruno von Kayser, one of his company commanders. Still woefully underarmed though, Von Der Heydte took the option to continue to attempt the withdrawl to German lines and the small group attempted to break through the encirclement. The attack was a failiure with heavy losses, and Von Der Heydte ordered the men to scatter into small groups and try to reach German lines. Von Der Heydte himself, suffering terrible pain from an injury sustained in the drop to his arm surrendered on Christmas Eve.
Below is one of the rare pictures of this operation. Von Der Heydte is on the right, his arm injury clearly visible. In the center is Von Kayser and to the left is one of the jäger involved in the operation. The stress of the operation clearly shows on Von Der Heydte's face. Von Der Heydte survived the war, returning to his law work and later the army in which he rose to the rank of general, dying in 1994. Von Kayser is also said to have survived the war, and became a famous ballroom dancer owning his own dance school in germany!
Operation Stösser – an Appraisal
Stösser was an operation doomed to fail, Von Der Heydte was tasked with an impossible mission. Airborne operations such as this require well trained, experienced soldiers, good intelligence and the opportunity to land in a reasonable condition. The prevailing situation in the Ardennes and the Fallschirmjäger left him with none of these. All Stösser really achieved was to create more havoc and confusion amongst the allied rear areas, drawing valuble troops from the front lines to protect road junctions, generals and supplies. In return it cost the lives of many of the few surviving veterans of the Fallschirmjäger, and saw many more captured. For such a high cost, and for so little chance of gain, the operation seems in hindsight to have been a dreadful mistake.
To link back to the title of this article, the last flight of the eagle was made with a broken wing, it was hardly suprising that it failed to soar high.
Background
The Fallschirmjäger’s origins began in 1933 with Goering forming a small company of men for the purpose. From this the force would expand to a battalion, then regiment, and finally 7th Flieger division by 1938 that included glider troops. By 1939 the high command had added 22nd airlanding division, essentially to fly troops into airfields and similar that the Fallschirmjäger had captured. These two divisions between them would see action in Poland, Belgium, Holland and Norway before the war was a year old. 7th Flieger was responsible for such feats as the capture of Eben Emael and numerous airfields and bridges in Holland and Norway. They fulfilled a vital role, capturing or putting out of action strategic points in advance of the ground forces.
1941 saw both divisions heavily engaged. 7th Flieger began with a drop on the Corinth Canal, which though the bridge was blown, succeeded in trapping and forcing the surrender of 12,000 British soldiers for a little under 300 looses to themselves. Then came the biggest operation of the war for the Fallschirmjäger, Crete. 7th Flieger assaulted the island by air, attacking at a number of points before finally securing Malame airport enough to airland troops into the area. With the arrival of mountain troops the allies were gradually forced to withdraw and Crete fell. The loss to the Fallschirmjäger and their Ju52 transports though was high, over 5,300 casualties and around 150 transport planes had been lost. The losses persuaded Hitler that massed airborne operations were futile. The year ended with 7th Flieger being redeployed to Russia, a theatre where airborne troops would retain a presence throughout the remaining years of the war.
1942 saw the Fallschirmjäger deployed to Africa, fighting in Tunisia and at El Alamein. During 1943 the Fallschirmjäger divisions began to rebuild and grow, 7th Flieger became 1st Fallschirmjäger division and more were added until the total reached around 11 with independent regiments. The divisions were now used on virtually every front, fighting from Sicily to Monte Cassino in Italy, in Normandy and across France, In Market Garden in Holland and during the battle of the Bulge. The divisions fought to the last gasp of the war in east and west.
During the 1941-45 period, the decision Hitler made after Crete had a telling effect. The Fallschirmjäger divisions no longer retained any realistic ability to deploy in their intended role. New recruits no longer had to be trained at jump schools, some had never even seen the inside of a Ju52, let alone made a combat jump. They became elite infantry, sent to defend positions that other infantry would withdraw from. Their stubborn tenacity was highly valued and respected by their opponents. Some of the Fallschirmjäger Divisions though were Fallschirmjäger in name only, formed from training school candidates or lightly wounded soldiers they were no match for the premier divisions like 1st FJ. Few airborne operations were ever carried out from 1941, and those that were were limited in either number or scope. Neither the opportunity nor skills were present anymore.
Thus we come to Operation Stösser, the final airborne operation of the war by the Fallschirmjäger which came during the battle of the bulge.
Operation Stösser – the plan
The overall plan for the battle of the bulge would see the deployment of two Fallschirmjäger divisions, 3rd FJ and 5th FJ. The high command saw potential for a small scale airborne drop behind allied lines to capture a strategic road junction, 11k north of Malmedy which would be vital for US troop movements to reinforce the front. A battalion or so of Fallschirmjäger dug in around the junction would significantly affect the operation, and if they failed in this task or were delayed, the secondary objective would be the bridges over the River Ambleve. Karl Student, commander of Army Group H chose Oberstleutnant Friedrich August Freiherr Von der Heydte to lead the operation, a veteran of Crete, Africa, Russia, Normandy and Holland.
Von der Heydte formed a Kampfgruppe for the operation of around battalion size consisting of 4 jäger (essentially rifle) companies, 1 heavy weapons company and detachments of pioneers and reconnaissance troops. To do so though, he knew he would need jump qualified soldiers and began to scour the area for them. Despite having two Fallschirmjäger divisions to call on, he received no more than 150 experienced troops! This was partly because of other commanders being unwilling to give up experienced soldiers on the eve of battle, but mainly due to the prevailing situation in the Fallschirmjäger divisions at this stage of the war. The simple truth was that the Fallschirmjäger divisions no longer retained much ability to operate in their intended role.
Nonetheless, Von Der Heydte gathered what he could and made preparations for the operation. His forces would be relieved by 6th Panzer army elements if all went to plan, but in this he was unfortunate. 6th Panzer’s commander, Josef Dietrich was of little help. He gave no intention of providing reconnaissance of the drop zones, information of the enemy forces was non-existent and Von Der Heydte knew he would face communication problems, the mountains might block radio contact. Aware of this he requested carrier pigeons, to which Dietrich’s reply was “I’m not running a f***ing zoo!” Dietrich’s only support was to provide some dummy paratroopers to drop and confuse the enemy.
Left with little choice, the operation went ahead anyway. Aware of the allies dominance of the air, the decision was taken to drop the troops at night, something never done before by the Fallschirmjäger. This, combined with the inexperience of the soldiers meant that the troops would drop mostly without their weapons, these being dropped in canisters with them. The scene was set…
Operation Stösser – the execution
In any event the operation got off to a bad start. Von Der Heydte’s men were delayed reaching their airfields by lack of transport leaving the operation behind schedule. They finally took off 8 hours late in terrible weather. Problems began almost immediatley, the Ju52 pilots lacked experience and strong winds drove many of course, some dropping their men in Holland and Germany! Of the 100 planes that began the operation, only 35 actually arrived over the right zone. These Fallschirmjäger jumped into high winds and were scattered over a wide area, meaning that when Von Der Heydte got his bearings he could find just 125 of his men. Some of these, due to the conditions and lack of experience were injured, and most had little or no weaponry due to the cannisters being lost, and no radio equipment (brought anyway) survived the drop.
Nonetheless, Von Der Hedyte set off for the objective anyway, but upon reaching it that morning discovered it occupied by a much larger allied force. With little weapons and few fit men he reluctantly decided to abbandon his mission objectives and try to withdraw. Attempts were made to contact 6th Panzer by runners, but these failed. His command melted back into the forest, and discovered some 150 men under the command of Kriegsberichter Oberleutnant Bruno von Kayser, one of his company commanders. Still woefully underarmed though, Von Der Heydte took the option to continue to attempt the withdrawl to German lines and the small group attempted to break through the encirclement. The attack was a failiure with heavy losses, and Von Der Heydte ordered the men to scatter into small groups and try to reach German lines. Von Der Heydte himself, suffering terrible pain from an injury sustained in the drop to his arm surrendered on Christmas Eve.
Below is one of the rare pictures of this operation. Von Der Heydte is on the right, his arm injury clearly visible. In the center is Von Kayser and to the left is one of the jäger involved in the operation. The stress of the operation clearly shows on Von Der Heydte's face. Von Der Heydte survived the war, returning to his law work and later the army in which he rose to the rank of general, dying in 1994. Von Kayser is also said to have survived the war, and became a famous ballroom dancer owning his own dance school in germany!
Operation Stösser – an Appraisal
Stösser was an operation doomed to fail, Von Der Heydte was tasked with an impossible mission. Airborne operations such as this require well trained, experienced soldiers, good intelligence and the opportunity to land in a reasonable condition. The prevailing situation in the Ardennes and the Fallschirmjäger left him with none of these. All Stösser really achieved was to create more havoc and confusion amongst the allied rear areas, drawing valuble troops from the front lines to protect road junctions, generals and supplies. In return it cost the lives of many of the few surviving veterans of the Fallschirmjäger, and saw many more captured. For such a high cost, and for so little chance of gain, the operation seems in hindsight to have been a dreadful mistake.
To link back to the title of this article, the last flight of the eagle was made with a broken wing, it was hardly suprising that it failed to soar high.
. I always admired the tough German
. In my computer wargames they never lose a battle 
,
.
Kinda like the way I read books I suppose 
? You can change the forces and make one side or the other
. I used to play it every day a long
