What if Patton's Plan.........

The Ruskies would win.
 
No more than half a year before organized Soviet military operations outside of Russia can no longer be conducted, at which point Patton's goal would already be achieved. Not much of a war of attrition, at least for the WAllies.

Half a year since when? Patton wanted to kick Russians out of Poland immediately after war with Germany ended. American 64 divisions in Europe were facing 264 equivalent Soviet ones. Nuclear weapons did not exist yet. War with Japan was not over yet. American war, not Soviet.

How?
 
Half a year since when? Patton wanted to kick Russians out of Poland immediately after war with Germany ended. American 64 divisions in Europe were facing 264 equivalent Soviet ones. Nuclear weapons did not exist yet. War with Japan was not over yet. American war, not Soviet.

How?

Well, Patton himself was a bit nuts, and had no political pull, so I'm assuming the war does not actually break out immediately with the fall of Germany, but rather late in 1945 once it becomes clear that Stalin had no intention of allowing free elections in Eastern Europe. This gives enough time for the Russophile Roosevelt to be replaced by Truman, and some of the Fellow Travelers in the administration to step down.

As for Patton's actual idea of immediate war, you have to take into account:

1) British and French and even Polish units, which can contribute a not insignificant number.

2) Many of Germany's minor allies, which had surrendered to the Soviets would have immediately thrown out the Soviet occupation troops if they thought they actually had a chance to avoid Soviet domination and before Stalin's purges and occupation troops could pacify them.

3) Divisons among the Western Allies were generally far closer to full strength in both men and equipment than Soviet.

4) The Soviet military had no offensive capability left. They had used up all their built up supplies, had outrun their supply lines, and their troops were exhausted because Stalin didn't trust the WAllies to turn over territory agreed upon at Yalta and so pushed them to grab as much as possible. The WAllies on the other hand, did generally trust Stalin, and so their armies had moved slower and retained much more combat capability. This plus the WAllies' massive aerial superiority means that no Soviet offensive can make much headway until after A-bombs become available.
 
Well, Patton himself was a bit nuts
This is what we are discussing here :)

As for Patton's actual idea of immediate war, you have to take into account:
1) British and French and even Polish units, which can contribute a not insignificant number.
Add 35 British and Dominion divisions, and 4 Polish. Don't forget that Churchill was somewhat sceptical about attacking USSR, despite his idea of operation "Unthinkable".

2) Many of Germany's minor allies, which had surrendered to the Soviets would have immediately thrown out the Soviet occupation troops if they thought they actually had a chance to avoid Soviet domination and before Stalin's purges and occupation troops could pacify them.
Even if they decided to thrown out Soviets, they didn't have military forces enough to do that. I believe most of them would prefer to stay out of such trouble.

3) Divisons among the Western Allies were generally far closer to full strength in both men and equipment than Soviet.
No, I mentioned not actual number of Soviet divisions, but number recalculated to equivalent American divisions, in terms of manpower and armament.

4) The Soviet military had no offensive capability left. They had used up all their built up supplies, had outrun their supply lines, and their troops were exhausted because Stalin didn't trust the WAllies to turn over territory agreed upon at Yalta and so pushed them to grab as much as possible.
Berlin operation demonstrated the opposite. It was demonstration of Soviet offensive capability, just as Dresden and Hiroshima was demonstration of Allies strategic aviation capabilities.

The WAllies on the other hand, did generally trust Stalin, and so their armies had moved slower and retained much more combat capability.
:eek: Who trusted Stalin, except Roosevelt, who died in April? Churchill? Truman?

This plus the WAllies' massive aerial superiority means that no Soviet offensive can make much headway until after A-bombs become available.
For strategical air forces superiority, agree. But I don't think it would be decisive factor.
 
Even if they decided to thrown out Soviets, they didn't have military forces enough to do that. I believe most of them would prefer to stay out of such trouble.

Well, depends on when we are talking about. If Patton's immediate attack, then their militaries would have yet to be demobilized, and with war on, there's no way the Soviets could divert enough troops to make sure they do.

No, I mentioned not actual number of Soviet divisions, but number recalculated to equivalent American divisions, in terms of manpower and armament.

My apologies, though I wonder if your calculation takes into account Soviet penal units and other low grade units that have no Western equivalent.

Berlin operation demonstrated the opposite. It was demonstration of Soviet offensive capability, just as Dresden and Hiroshima was demonstration of Allies strategic aviation capabilities.

The Berlin operation demonstrated Soviet capability by burning up their last reserves of fuel and supplies and completely burning out their troops. This is not even in much dispute among historians thanks to Soviet documents released after the end of the Cold War.

Who trusted Stalin, except Roosevelt, who died in April? Churchill? Truman?

An impressive number of people in the Roosevelt administration were Fellow Travelers, though admittedly, many ended up leaving or being removed after Truman assumed the Presidency. Surely, you can't dispute that they had great influence on U.S. military operations in the final months of the war?

For strategical air forces superiority, agree. But I don't think it would be decisive factor.

Well, no need to really even mention strategic air, since the Soviets basically didn't have any. The WAllies also had a pretty big advantage in interceptors, superiority fighters, and jets. The Soviets had a good number of ground attack aircraft and low altitude fighters, but neither the aircraft, nor the crew training were up to Western standards.
 
My apologies, though I wonder if your calculation takes into account Soviet penal units and other low grade units that have no Western equivalent.
Penal units were ~1% of total Red Army manpower. They won't change whole picture.

The Berlin operation demonstrated Soviet capability by burning up their last reserves of fuel and supplies and completely burning out their troops. This is not even in much dispute among historians thanks to Soviet documents released after the end of the Cold War.
Do you have sources? I would like to read about that. Anyway, fuel and supplies reserves could be restored quickly, as for manpower, it was still far superior comparing to Allies forces in Europe.
 
Oh Gods, this is getting repetitive. I believe I've already made my point, so I'll wait until someone comes with a some good arguments against.

@Red Elk:

Most of what you said had been rebutted before you wrote it. About the Soviet agression:

the premise of this thread is that the Allies could have tried to enforce the agreements they had with Stalin. Soviet Union had violated these agreements and established puppet communist governments in most countries it "liberated". Therefore, the Allied ultimatum and ensuing military action against the Soviets would hardly have been an aggression. When a policeman warns a suspect that he'll use force if he resists arrest, that any violence that might follow is the fault of the suspect.

The scenario is: Soviets would be given an ultimatum - get the hell out of Central and Eastern Europe or we'll kick you out. It would be up to the Soviets to decide.

I know that for a Russian it is extremely difficult to understand that smaller countries should have a right to choose their own government, but that's the accepted standard in the democratic world :p When the USSR denied Poland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, eastern parts of Germany and the Baltic states the right to choose their government, it commited an act of aggression against them and violated the agreements with the Western allies. Any military action taken against the Soviets in order to liberate the occupied countries would thus NOT be an aggression.
 
It's pathetically easy to win as the USSR in Doomsday.

And the other way round ;) I encircled and crushed most of the Soviet armies in Northern Germany, then I did the same in Korea and then it was a walk in the park. Soviet industrial centers were nuked, their airforce crushed and my armies swept through Central and Eastern Europe.

I blame the AI ;)
 
Oh Gods, this is getting repetitive. I believe I've already made my point, so I'll wait until someone comes with a some good arguments against.

Well, sorry, but I'm just not convinced. Your "points" are too weak on facts and too heavy on one-liners, smarm, and smiley faces. I'm a bit of a rivet-counter and I just don't understand why these things need to be present in an argument; I immediately sense that the presenter isn't entirely convinced by his own argument.
 
Well, sorry, but I'm just not convinced. Your "points" are too weak on facts and too heavy on one-liners, smarm, and smiley faces.

I've given my arguments, you didn't even touch them. After you do it, we can talk.

---

About soviet logistics - this is what I fould on google (I rely on translation provided with the image as I don't speak/read Russian):

Here is the RKKA truck losses VS. new deliveries for the whole war:

Legend:
brown - losses.
pinkish - Soviet made
greenish - German captured
yellowish - Lend-Lease

00056f9y


Looks pretty bad for the Red Army.

The subject has been previously covered by such books as Hubert van Tuyll’s Feeding the Bear (1989), but the present well-written text has the advantage of access to Russian sources, which were put to good use by Albert Weeks. The author makes a clear case that the program was a major factor in the survival of the Soviet Union and the victory over Nazism.

In two particular areas the help was indispensable. With major agricultural regions of the Soviet Union under enemy occupation, and the unsatisfactory system of distribution and transportation, to say nothing of mismanagement, the Soviet state had more than a nodding acquaintance with famine. Without Western aid, during the war the Soviet population would have been in danger of sharing the fate of those trapped in Leningrad and the earlier victims of collectivization. Even with the American aid, many Russians died from lack of food. Equally important was Lend-Lease’s contribution to transportation. It would have been impossible for the Red Army to move the masses of troops and supplies on the primitive roads to the front lines without American Studebaker trucks, which also served as the launching pads for the dreaded Soviet rocket artillery. The trucks were also used for more sinister activities, including the deportation of the North Caucasus Muslims.

Besides weaponry and food, Lend-Lease provided the Soviet Union with other resources, ranging from clothing to metals. With the start of the Cold War, Lend-Lease became a forgotten chapter in Soviet history and was only revived after glasnost. Now, thanks to Russian researchers and this excellent study, the West will have access to the real story. Lend-Lease provided vital help for the Soviet Union when the country was in desperate straits and made a significant contribution to the final victory. It also strengthened Josef Stalin, a fact that did not bother its chief architect, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who saw beyond the Allied victory and looked at Stalin as a counterbalance to the European colonial powers.

The victory over Nazi Germany was achieved through the economic power of the United States and the lives of millions of Soviets, who for reasons that defy logic made the ultimate sacrifice to keep in power a regime as brutal as their Nazi enemy. What the Soviet Union needed after the war was a peacetime version of Lend-Lease, in this case the Marshall Plan, which Stalin rejected. Misled by the victory, the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors embarked on an imperial policy that would have put the tsars to shame, and one the USSR could hardly afford. Resources were deployed on military and space programs and every Third World thug, including those who had jailed the local Communists or became Soviet clients. To the USSR’s eternal shame, anti-Semitism became national policy.

(a review of a book)

The point repeated in this thread time and again is that the Red Army in summer 1945 wasn't a well-oiled military machine which could afford further fighting, but an exhausted behemoth supported by an impoverished, devastated country which could never have afforded it without extensive Western (=mostly American) help. By the end of the war, the Soviet manpower reserves were stretched to the limit, the logistical situation was critical (which explains why it took the Soviets so long to finish off Germany between 1944-1945), the country was desperately low on food and famine was a reality in many parts of the USSR.

And still, some people storm this thread making ridiculous assertions that the USSR would have somehow (probably by using magic :lol: ) soundly defeated the Western Allies even if they had used their all their strategic assets against it (logistical strikes, economic strangulation, strategic/nuclear bombing etc.).

That's an ASB scenario (even more that the actual "Patton's plan").
 
frekk said:
Well, sorry, but I'm just not convinced. Your "points" are too weak on facts and too heavy on one-liners, smarm, and smiley faces. I'm a bit of a rivet-counter and I just don't understand why these things need to be present in an argument; I immediately sense that the presenter isn't entirely convinced by his own argument.

It goes both ways... asymmetrical conflict lulz?
 
Most of what you said had been rebutted before you wrote it.
I gave you a numbers and show that you were wrong about German and Soviet forces in 1941.
In particular, that Germans "trashed" several times bigger Soviet forces.
And here is your answer.
Great argument. Can I also use it?

About soviet logistics - this is what I fould on google (I rely on translation provided with the image as I don't speak/read Russian):
Pink part is not all Soviet trucks, only those which were made during war.

What should we understand from this diagram?
That Soviet industry managed to compensate all truck losses, including huge losses in the first months of war?
Ok, but it seems to disprove your point.
 
red_elk said:
That Soviet industry managed to compensate all truck losses, including huge losses in the first months of war?

That would make sense if it hadn't I don't know the Red Army hadn't swelled in numbers.
 
What if Patton's Plan to push the Soviets out of Eastern Europe following WWII was approved?

Then we'd all be living in the world of Bradley Denton's novel Wrack and Roll.*

* Actually, that required FDR choking on a chicken bone, too.
 
I enjoyed reading most of this. Thanks guys! There is still a chance that the goal of pushing the soviets back could be achieved via peaceful means (perhaps by switching to liberalism and building lot of culture :rolleyes:).
No matter what the outcome Hitler and Stalin are the same class evils and its unfortunate that they didnt get chance to roast in hell next to each other.
So yes to pushing back the commies but prefarably no war till inevitable.
 
The point repeated in this thread time and again is that the Red Army in summer 1945 wasn't a well-oiled military machine which could afford further fighting, but an exhausted behemoth supported by an impoverished, devastated country which could never have afforded it without extensive Western (=mostly American) help. By the end of the war, the Soviet manpower reserves were stretched to the limit, the logistical situation was critical (which explains why it took the Soviets so long to finish off Germany between 1944-1945), the country was desperately low on food and famine was a reality in many parts of the USSR.

By 1945 and until 1948 famine was a reality all over Eurasia. Even the UK, which was barely touched by war, went into rationing, and things got especially bad in 1945-48. Rationing didn't end there until 1953.

The reality, which you refuse to see, was that the UK was even more exhausted that the USSR by 1945. You think they'd have left India go if they weren't? Or lost their grip on the Middle East? France was KO also until the 1950s, and so was occupied Germany. The USA did had more resources and manpower, but it was also politically impossible that they'd mobilize those. You also keep discounting the fact that fighting a war overseas is more difficult, both militarily and politically. Hell, they failed to win the Korean War in 1950-53 - which had political support - and you're raving about how they, by themselves, would win a Third World War 3 in 1945?!
 
By 1945 and until 1948 famine was a reality all over Eurasia. Even the UK, which was barely touched by war, went into rationing, and things got especially bad in 1945-48. Rationing didn't end there until 1953.

The reality, which you refuse to see, was that the UK was even more exhausted that the USSR by 1945. You think they'd have left India go if they weren't? Or lost their grip on the Middle East? France was KO also until the 1950s, and so was occupied Germany. The USA did had more resources and manpower, but it was also politically impossible that they'd mobilize those. You also keep discounting the fact that fighting a war overseas is more difficult, both militarily and politically. Hell, they failed to win the Korean War in 1950-53 - which had political support - and you're raving about how they, by themselves, would win a Third World War 3 in 1945?!

And the reality that you refuse to see is that the Atomic Bomb is a decisive paradigm shift in battle when one side has it and nobody else is even close. The Korean War occurred after a near total demobilization by the U.S. to the extent that the initial expedition took tanks from museums and the Navy was so weak it couldn't even blockade North Korea, but the U.S. was still able to destroy North Korean combat capability in short order. After Chinese entry, the U.S. didn't use the Atomic Bomb for fear of drawing Soviet intervention when the Sovs already had the Bomb, and indeed didn't even attempt to push North of the 38th parallel for the same reason. That's hardly an issue in 45 if the Russians are already at war and weren't close to getting a Bomb. Further, as you pointed out yourself, famine was a reality all over Eurasia, and mass starvation will occur if war breaks out again with the exception of American allies since U.S. and other Western Hemisphere surplus food production was quite capable of feeding Europe. The Soviet Union in particular will experience mass starvation if it doesn't demobilize a good proportion of its army back to the farms and start building tractors again instead of tanks.
 
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