No more than half a year before organized Soviet military operations outside of Russia can no longer be conducted, at which point Patton's goal would already be achieved. Not much of a war of attrition, at least for the WAllies.
Half a year since when? Patton wanted to kick Russians out of Poland immediately after war with Germany ended. American 64 divisions in Europe were facing 264 equivalent Soviet ones. Nuclear weapons did not exist yet. War with Japan was not over yet. American war, not Soviet.
How?
This is what we are discussing hereWell, Patton himself was a bit nuts
Add 35 British and Dominion divisions, and 4 Polish. Don't forget that Churchill was somewhat sceptical about attacking USSR, despite his idea of operation "Unthinkable".As for Patton's actual idea of immediate war, you have to take into account:
1) British and French and even Polish units, which can contribute a not insignificant number.
Even if they decided to thrown out Soviets, they didn't have military forces enough to do that. I believe most of them would prefer to stay out of such trouble.2) Many of Germany's minor allies, which had surrendered to the Soviets would have immediately thrown out the Soviet occupation troops if they thought they actually had a chance to avoid Soviet domination and before Stalin's purges and occupation troops could pacify them.
No, I mentioned not actual number of Soviet divisions, but number recalculated to equivalent American divisions, in terms of manpower and armament.3) Divisons among the Western Allies were generally far closer to full strength in both men and equipment than Soviet.
Berlin operation demonstrated the opposite. It was demonstration of Soviet offensive capability, just as Dresden and Hiroshima was demonstration of Allies strategic aviation capabilities.4) The Soviet military had no offensive capability left. They had used up all their built up supplies, had outrun their supply lines, and their troops were exhausted because Stalin didn't trust the WAllies to turn over territory agreed upon at Yalta and so pushed them to grab as much as possible.
The WAllies on the other hand, did generally trust Stalin, and so their armies had moved slower and retained much more combat capability.
For strategical air forces superiority, agree. But I don't think it would be decisive factor.This plus the WAllies' massive aerial superiority means that no Soviet offensive can make much headway until after A-bombs become available.
Even if they decided to thrown out Soviets, they didn't have military forces enough to do that. I believe most of them would prefer to stay out of such trouble.
No, I mentioned not actual number of Soviet divisions, but number recalculated to equivalent American divisions, in terms of manpower and armament.
Berlin operation demonstrated the opposite. It was demonstration of Soviet offensive capability, just as Dresden and Hiroshima was demonstration of Allies strategic aviation capabilities.
Who trusted Stalin, except Roosevelt, who died in April? Churchill? Truman?
For strategical air forces superiority, agree. But I don't think it would be decisive factor.
Penal units were ~1% of total Red Army manpower. They won't change whole picture.My apologies, though I wonder if your calculation takes into account Soviet penal units and other low grade units that have no Western equivalent.
Do you have sources? I would like to read about that. Anyway, fuel and supplies reserves could be restored quickly, as for manpower, it was still far superior comparing to Allies forces in Europe.The Berlin operation demonstrated Soviet capability by burning up their last reserves of fuel and supplies and completely burning out their troops. This is not even in much dispute among historians thanks to Soviet documents released after the end of the Cold War.
It's pathetically easy to win as the USSR in Doomsday.
Oh Gods, this is getting repetitive. I believe I've already made my point, so I'll wait until someone comes with a some good arguments against.
Well, sorry, but I'm just not convinced. Your "points" are too weak on facts and too heavy on one-liners, smarm, and smiley faces.
Here is the RKKA truck losses VS. new deliveries for the whole war:
Legend:
brown - losses.
pinkish - Soviet made
greenish - German captured
yellowish - Lend-Lease
The subject has been previously covered by such books as Hubert van Tuyll’s Feeding the Bear (1989), but the present well-written text has the advantage of access to Russian sources, which were put to good use by Albert Weeks. The author makes a clear case that the program was a major factor in the survival of the Soviet Union and the victory over Nazism.
In two particular areas the help was indispensable. With major agricultural regions of the Soviet Union under enemy occupation, and the unsatisfactory system of distribution and transportation, to say nothing of mismanagement, the Soviet state had more than a nodding acquaintance with famine. Without Western aid, during the war the Soviet population would have been in danger of sharing the fate of those trapped in Leningrad and the earlier victims of collectivization. Even with the American aid, many Russians died from lack of food. Equally important was Lend-Lease’s contribution to transportation. It would have been impossible for the Red Army to move the masses of troops and supplies on the primitive roads to the front lines without American Studebaker trucks, which also served as the launching pads for the dreaded Soviet rocket artillery. The trucks were also used for more sinister activities, including the deportation of the North Caucasus Muslims.
Besides weaponry and food, Lend-Lease provided the Soviet Union with other resources, ranging from clothing to metals. With the start of the Cold War, Lend-Lease became a forgotten chapter in Soviet history and was only revived after glasnost. Now, thanks to Russian researchers and this excellent study, the West will have access to the real story. Lend-Lease provided vital help for the Soviet Union when the country was in desperate straits and made a significant contribution to the final victory. It also strengthened Josef Stalin, a fact that did not bother its chief architect, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who saw beyond the Allied victory and looked at Stalin as a counterbalance to the European colonial powers.
The victory over Nazi Germany was achieved through the economic power of the United States and the lives of millions of Soviets, who for reasons that defy logic made the ultimate sacrifice to keep in power a regime as brutal as their Nazi enemy. What the Soviet Union needed after the war was a peacetime version of Lend-Lease, in this case the Marshall Plan, which Stalin rejected. Misled by the victory, the Soviet Union under Stalin and his successors embarked on an imperial policy that would have put the tsars to shame, and one the USSR could hardly afford. Resources were deployed on military and space programs and every Third World thug, including those who had jailed the local Communists or became Soviet clients. To the USSR’s eternal shame, anti-Semitism became national policy.
(a review of a book)
frekk said:Well, sorry, but I'm just not convinced. Your "points" are too weak on facts and too heavy on one-liners, smarm, and smiley faces. I'm a bit of a rivet-counter and I just don't understand why these things need to be present in an argument; I immediately sense that the presenter isn't entirely convinced by his own argument.
I gave you a numbers and show that you were wrong about German and Soviet forces in 1941.Most of what you said had been rebutted before you wrote it.
Pink part is not all Soviet trucks, only those which were made during war.About soviet logistics - this is what I fould on google (I rely on translation provided with the image as I don't speak/read Russian):
red_elk said:That Soviet industry managed to compensate all truck losses, including huge losses in the first months of war?
If this happened, then we would not have all the jokes about Communism.![]()
The point repeated in this thread time and again is that the Red Army in summer 1945 wasn't a well-oiled military machine which could afford further fighting, but an exhausted behemoth supported by an impoverished, devastated country which could never have afforded it without extensive Western (=mostly American) help. By the end of the war, the Soviet manpower reserves were stretched to the limit, the logistical situation was critical (which explains why it took the Soviets so long to finish off Germany between 1944-1945), the country was desperately low on food and famine was a reality in many parts of the USSR.
Good point, forgot about this.Hell, they failed to win the Korean War in 1950-53 - which had political support - and you're raving about how they, by themselves, would win a Third World War 3 in 1945?!
By 1945 and until 1948 famine was a reality all over Eurasia. Even the UK, which was barely touched by war, went into rationing, and things got especially bad in 1945-48. Rationing didn't end there until 1953.
The reality, which you refuse to see, was that the UK was even more exhausted that the USSR by 1945. You think they'd have left India go if they weren't? Or lost their grip on the Middle East? France was KO also until the 1950s, and so was occupied Germany. The USA did had more resources and manpower, but it was also politically impossible that they'd mobilize those. You also keep discounting the fact that fighting a war overseas is more difficult, both militarily and politically. Hell, they failed to win the Korean War in 1950-53 - which had political support - and you're raving about how they, by themselves, would win a Third World War 3 in 1945?!