That doesn't make a whole lot of sense, because as far as opportunity goes, the Sinai was somewhat more fertile than was the Caucasus in 1914, both in terms of what a successful - even a marginally successful - operation could accomplish, and in terms of the force with which the Turks would have to reckon.
What were the Ottoman Empire's goals in WW1?
- Thread starter RedRalph
- Start date
Louis XXIV
Le Roi Soleil
Maybe I'm misremembering things, but I only seem to recall two major offensives in the Caucasus. Like I said, one was early on in the war (they planned their Sinai offensive early on as well) and one was later after Russia had run into some trouble. I could be completely wrong here, my memory is a bit fuzzy.
Communisto
Condottiere
Hmm, I was under the impression that the Italian adventure in Libya was some-what competant, specifically due to the use of dirigibles and air supremacy for the first time.
How many offensives did the Ottomans mount in total?
They did a decent job at securing the major population centers in the west of the country, insofar as they existed, and immediately kicked off a vaguely pro-Ottoman rebellion in the interior that they were unable to extinguish for various reasons. Cyrenaica they didn't get under their control to any real degree until the twenties, and that was with British help in dealing with the Senussi.Hmm, I was under the impression that the Italian adventure in Libya was some-what competant, specifically due to the use of dirigibles and air supremacy for the first time.
r16
not deity
- Joined
- Nov 10, 2008
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the early operations of the Ottoman armies are indeed proof that there were no plans for a global war . The first attack on the Suez is reconnaissance in force , to see what is over there . It also suited the German desires to fix some Allied troops in Egypt so that Berlin could reach a Napoleonic conclusion in the all important European theatre . It worked for the Germans , didn't work for us as not many soldiers came back . The British had the canal and the firepower and even ı could have told it rightaway . The second attack some time into the future was of serious intentions ; roads were built for logistic support . Unfortunately the British were even stronger than the first, they got into Sinai beating the attack and their logistic prepations took - ı believe - a year and a half , costing us Palestine and the like .
sarıkamış is even worse . It is an opportunistic attack in the belief that the Russians were unbalanced after Tannenberg / Mazurian Lakes and there would be not much of a resistance . By the estimation of Ottoman command . The German perspective was once again tying down some number of Russian troops . The problem here is of course Enver himself . It is one thing conspiring in peace where things are kept in some sort of balance by the undisclosed desire to play it safe , it is distincly another affair in war where it is , well, war . Enver could do a lot of stuff in peace , he could rush cabinet meetings with pistol in hand and be respected by everybody including foreigners because he was Germany's man . Russians were fighting real Germans , they would have no issues with Enver the wannabe . Something any dictatorial wannabes forget all the time . Once Rubicons are crossed empty talk and bluster are revelead to be empty talk and bluster .
russians could have been tied up , they would have been tied up . Yet Enver needed a victory , no doubt to carve up his own empire . Dictators might be this or might be that but those with huge ambitions paired to lack of capability are open invitations to disaster . That is why Enver turned a small in scale , big in PR demonstration into a full blown offensive in winter where the heated Russian barracks were the ultimate temptation for ill equipped Turkish troops who were ordered to leave their supplies behind as their backpacks were cutting down the speed of the advance . Losing 78 000 men to freezing cold and illness was something that broke the back of the Ottoman armies . We lost 55 000 or so in the bloody Gallipoli for comparision and at least we hurt the enemy ; the losses were not in vain .
sarıkamış is even worse . It is an opportunistic attack in the belief that the Russians were unbalanced after Tannenberg / Mazurian Lakes and there would be not much of a resistance . By the estimation of Ottoman command . The German perspective was once again tying down some number of Russian troops . The problem here is of course Enver himself . It is one thing conspiring in peace where things are kept in some sort of balance by the undisclosed desire to play it safe , it is distincly another affair in war where it is , well, war . Enver could do a lot of stuff in peace , he could rush cabinet meetings with pistol in hand and be respected by everybody including foreigners because he was Germany's man . Russians were fighting real Germans , they would have no issues with Enver the wannabe . Something any dictatorial wannabes forget all the time . Once Rubicons are crossed empty talk and bluster are revelead to be empty talk and bluster .
russians could have been tied up , they would have been tied up . Yet Enver needed a victory , no doubt to carve up his own empire . Dictators might be this or might be that but those with huge ambitions paired to lack of capability are open invitations to disaster . That is why Enver turned a small in scale , big in PR demonstration into a full blown offensive in winter where the heated Russian barracks were the ultimate temptation for ill equipped Turkish troops who were ordered to leave their supplies behind as their backpacks were cutting down the speed of the advance . Losing 78 000 men to freezing cold and illness was something that broke the back of the Ottoman armies . We lost 55 000 or so in the bloody Gallipoli for comparision and at least we hurt the enemy ; the losses were not in vain .
