World War I
- Thread starter Becka
- Start date
Magnus
Diplocat
No. Austria had to get rid of Serbia, who was supporting Slavic nationalism within its borders and Russia was sworn to protect Serbia and Germany was sworn to support Austria. And France had to support Russia against Germany. Germany brought England in (who did not want to go to war) by attacking France through 'eternally neutral' Belgium for tactical reasons.
The war could have started for any number of reasons, Europe had nearly gone to the brink several times within the first few years of the new century already but cooler heads had heretofore prevailed.
Ironically, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke and heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary that started the war was a Slav SUPPORTER, he was killed by the Pan-Slavists because they thought if he ever got to the throne, he would have enacted reforms and thus defuse their movement; they wanted INDEPENDENCE, not new powers within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So he had to die because he was too nice. And then tens of millions of others found a subsequent grave...
The war could have started for any number of reasons, Europe had nearly gone to the brink several times within the first few years of the new century already but cooler heads had heretofore prevailed.
Ironically, the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, Archduke and heir to the throne of Austria-Hungary that started the war was a Slav SUPPORTER, he was killed by the Pan-Slavists because they thought if he ever got to the throne, he would have enacted reforms and thus defuse their movement; they wanted INDEPENDENCE, not new powers within the Austro-Hungarian Empire. So he had to die because he was too nice. And then tens of millions of others found a subsequent grave...
PinkyGen
Paper copying intern
It was unavoidable ever since Wilhem II took the throne.
Europe had operated under a Great Power system, where each great power controlled their sphere of influence and did not seek to conquer the other. Thus, when France was completely occupied in the Franco-Prussian War, it was shortly reconstituted.
However, the creation of Germany upset this equation. Germany was a serious threat to France, and also a threat to Russia. Thus France and Russia formed an alliance. Germany responded by latching on to the Austrian's Hungarian's, whose empire was in decline. Great Britain got pulled into the mess when Germany built its fleet. Instead of having the empire threatened, the Home Islands were threatened by this fleet. Thus Britain stopped competing with Russia in order to save it's home territories from the German threat.
With this polarization into definite alliances, and the shift of policy away from promoting stability, war was just a matter of time.
Europe had operated under a Great Power system, where each great power controlled their sphere of influence and did not seek to conquer the other. Thus, when France was completely occupied in the Franco-Prussian War, it was shortly reconstituted.
However, the creation of Germany upset this equation. Germany was a serious threat to France, and also a threat to Russia. Thus France and Russia formed an alliance. Germany responded by latching on to the Austrian's Hungarian's, whose empire was in decline. Great Britain got pulled into the mess when Germany built its fleet. Instead of having the empire threatened, the Home Islands were threatened by this fleet. Thus Britain stopped competing with Russia in order to save it's home territories from the German threat.
With this polarization into definite alliances, and the shift of policy away from promoting stability, war was just a matter of time.
Ah, a thread after me own historical heart...
I'm not sure about whether it was inevitable or not. You must remember that the European powers did manage to keep the continent relatively peaceful after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, for almost exactly 100 years. That's not a bad record. Yes, there were several smaller, regional wars throughout that period (1815-1914), but none of them threatened to de-stabilize the whole continent by turning into a general European melee, a la the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War or the Napoleonic wars. When one did - the Belgian/Polish rebellions of 1830-31, the 1848 Revolts, the the Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Balkan wars, the Russo-Ottoman Turkish wars - the Great Powers met and conferred on how to resolve the situation. The 'balance of power' policies that are frequently blamed for World War I's outbreak really had kept the general peace in Europe for a century.
Their breakdown is due to two outside forces that few could have seen in 1815: Industrialization (and the creation of mass society, with its universal education, etc.) and ethno-linguistic Nationalism. Simply said, the world of 1815 did not look anything like the world of 1914 - which was a problem because the Diplomacy and Politics of 1914 had largely been designed in 1815.
It's not very easy to assign blame for the war's outbreak, though many history books today make it seem so easy. Just about everyone comes out looking quite guilty of having contributed to the general breakdown in Great Power relations in July, 1914. (On a side note I found it heartening to discover that U.S. President John Kennedy and his brother Robert had consulted Barbara Tuchman's excellent history of the events leading up to the outbreak of World War I, The Guns of August, during the very ugly Cuban Missile Crisis. I have this fear that President George W. Bush now is reading comic books during our current crisis...)
Serbia, while having legitimate border issues with the Habsburg empire, was a nest of terrorism. (Where have I heard that recently...?) The Crna Ruka group led by Apis had heavily infiltrated the Serbian Army and government, and while Pasic almost certainly did not have a hand in the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo, he almost equally certainly knew about it before-hand. The Austrians had to respond, as any country would. However, the Austrians (under Berchtold) refused any solution but all-out war. They were also dogged by the rise of nationalism among the many nationalities of their empire but in reality most of their nationality policies would be considered enlightened even in today's modern Europe. As well, in their defense while the Habsburg Empire did indeed divide and cross many ethnic boundaries, Europe would learn throughout the rest of the 20th century that despite Woodrow Wilson's optimism about "The nations' right to self-determination" it is impossible to draw national borders in Europe that don't leave substantial minorities somewhere. Berchtold drove ill-equipped Austria to war, while Russia fumbled with mystical ideas of Slav brotherhood and clumsily ordered partial, then full mobilization of its army - which is the linchpin of how a small regional war became a continental-wide war. The Germans, fearing a future powerful Russia, decided to seize the moment and start the war to defeat her enemies before they had fully matured in strength. The Germans had the infamous Schlieffen Plan to first defeat France, then Russia in a swift two-front war. As many military historians point out, this plan was highly flawed and called for the movement of resources on a scale that hadn't actually existed at the time Schlieffen wrote the plan. In other words, it was based on lots of guesses and wishful thinking. With the ball already rolling between St. Petersburg and Vienna, the Germans decided that if there was going to be a war they might as well use it to sort out their traditional enemies, the Russians and the French, while Germany still had an edge.
Britain is usually portrayed as sitting innocently on the sidelines, not getting involved until the Germans violated Belgian neutrality. However, as someone once convincingly demonstrated to me through their research, Britain's ultimate reason for joinging the war was a fear that Germany would challenge Britain's world-wide hegemony. Usually cited is that Wilhelm II started building a massive navy in the 1890s. The Germans saw the British navy as the real reason behind British success and imperial power, so they wanted one of their own. They wanted to seize some of the Portuguese, Spanish and maybe even some of the French colonial possessions and establish a German empire comparable to the British. The British, however, only saw the German navy as a rival and a threat - London assumed the Germans wanted to seize British colonies and maybe even the British Isles, although this wasn't the case. An acquaintance spent much time reading popular novels and fiction from Britain in the period from the 1890s til 1914, and he said many of them were obssessed with the idea of a foreign invasion of Britain, at first by the Russians, then by the Germans. The point was, Britain was caught up in a hysteria that Continental barbarians would soon scale the Cliffs of Dover and re-create the battle of Hastings. The bottom line is that while the Germans certainly decided sometime in mid-July 1914 that they wanted a war with France and Russia (and possibly even Britain), it could have been avoided just a sseveral other international crises had averted war recently (the Moroccan crisis, for instance). The British in 1914 thought the Germans wanted to invade (they didn't), so the Foreign Office acted accordingly and defensively. John Keegan makes the point strongly in his book last year on WW I that all the Great Powers fumbled and failed in 1914 to stop a crisis that could have been resolved diplomatically.
This is for me the most fascinating period of history, as indeed we seem to be at a similar crossroads today with two civilizations glaring at each other through propaganda and stereotypes, both ready for war without really understanding what war means or what the other wants.
I'm not sure about whether it was inevitable or not. You must remember that the European powers did manage to keep the continent relatively peaceful after the 1815 Congress of Vienna, for almost exactly 100 years. That's not a bad record. Yes, there were several smaller, regional wars throughout that period (1815-1914), but none of them threatened to de-stabilize the whole continent by turning into a general European melee, a la the Thirty Years War, the Seven Years War or the Napoleonic wars. When one did - the Belgian/Polish rebellions of 1830-31, the 1848 Revolts, the the Crimean War, the Austro-Prussian War, the Franco-Prussian War, the Balkan wars, the Russo-Ottoman Turkish wars - the Great Powers met and conferred on how to resolve the situation. The 'balance of power' policies that are frequently blamed for World War I's outbreak really had kept the general peace in Europe for a century.
Their breakdown is due to two outside forces that few could have seen in 1815: Industrialization (and the creation of mass society, with its universal education, etc.) and ethno-linguistic Nationalism. Simply said, the world of 1815 did not look anything like the world of 1914 - which was a problem because the Diplomacy and Politics of 1914 had largely been designed in 1815.
It's not very easy to assign blame for the war's outbreak, though many history books today make it seem so easy. Just about everyone comes out looking quite guilty of having contributed to the general breakdown in Great Power relations in July, 1914. (On a side note I found it heartening to discover that U.S. President John Kennedy and his brother Robert had consulted Barbara Tuchman's excellent history of the events leading up to the outbreak of World War I, The Guns of August, during the very ugly Cuban Missile Crisis. I have this fear that President George W. Bush now is reading comic books during our current crisis...)
Serbia, while having legitimate border issues with the Habsburg empire, was a nest of terrorism. (Where have I heard that recently...?) The Crna Ruka group led by Apis had heavily infiltrated the Serbian Army and government, and while Pasic almost certainly did not have a hand in the assassination of the Archduke in Sarajevo, he almost equally certainly knew about it before-hand. The Austrians had to respond, as any country would. However, the Austrians (under Berchtold) refused any solution but all-out war. They were also dogged by the rise of nationalism among the many nationalities of their empire but in reality most of their nationality policies would be considered enlightened even in today's modern Europe. As well, in their defense while the Habsburg Empire did indeed divide and cross many ethnic boundaries, Europe would learn throughout the rest of the 20th century that despite Woodrow Wilson's optimism about "The nations' right to self-determination" it is impossible to draw national borders in Europe that don't leave substantial minorities somewhere. Berchtold drove ill-equipped Austria to war, while Russia fumbled with mystical ideas of Slav brotherhood and clumsily ordered partial, then full mobilization of its army - which is the linchpin of how a small regional war became a continental-wide war. The Germans, fearing a future powerful Russia, decided to seize the moment and start the war to defeat her enemies before they had fully matured in strength. The Germans had the infamous Schlieffen Plan to first defeat France, then Russia in a swift two-front war. As many military historians point out, this plan was highly flawed and called for the movement of resources on a scale that hadn't actually existed at the time Schlieffen wrote the plan. In other words, it was based on lots of guesses and wishful thinking. With the ball already rolling between St. Petersburg and Vienna, the Germans decided that if there was going to be a war they might as well use it to sort out their traditional enemies, the Russians and the French, while Germany still had an edge.
Britain is usually portrayed as sitting innocently on the sidelines, not getting involved until the Germans violated Belgian neutrality. However, as someone once convincingly demonstrated to me through their research, Britain's ultimate reason for joinging the war was a fear that Germany would challenge Britain's world-wide hegemony. Usually cited is that Wilhelm II started building a massive navy in the 1890s. The Germans saw the British navy as the real reason behind British success and imperial power, so they wanted one of their own. They wanted to seize some of the Portuguese, Spanish and maybe even some of the French colonial possessions and establish a German empire comparable to the British. The British, however, only saw the German navy as a rival and a threat - London assumed the Germans wanted to seize British colonies and maybe even the British Isles, although this wasn't the case. An acquaintance spent much time reading popular novels and fiction from Britain in the period from the 1890s til 1914, and he said many of them were obssessed with the idea of a foreign invasion of Britain, at first by the Russians, then by the Germans. The point was, Britain was caught up in a hysteria that Continental barbarians would soon scale the Cliffs of Dover and re-create the battle of Hastings. The bottom line is that while the Germans certainly decided sometime in mid-July 1914 that they wanted a war with France and Russia (and possibly even Britain), it could have been avoided just a sseveral other international crises had averted war recently (the Moroccan crisis, for instance). The British in 1914 thought the Germans wanted to invade (they didn't), so the Foreign Office acted accordingly and defensively. John Keegan makes the point strongly in his book last year on WW I that all the Great Powers fumbled and failed in 1914 to stop a crisis that could have been resolved diplomatically.
This is for me the most fascinating period of history, as indeed we seem to be at a similar crossroads today with two civilizations glaring at each other through propaganda and stereotypes, both ready for war without really understanding what war means or what the other wants.
Blackadder
Rooted to the spot
When mentioning the assasination, I feel I must point out the Black Hand gang. Not only were the assasins members of this organisation, but the Black hand gang also murdered another royal family (possibly the Serbian? It was a pricipality).
Considering Kaiser Wilhelm's blatent attempts to control or show mastery before the war, the war was practically inevitable. His actions in Morroco showed the World Britian would stand with France....... even if war was not declared until Belgium's invasion.
(Ah, but remember, Italy is also an innocent fence sitter.)
Considering Kaiser Wilhelm's blatent attempts to control or show mastery before the war, the war was practically inevitable. His actions in Morroco showed the World Britian would stand with France....... even if war was not declared until Belgium's invasion.
(Ah, but remember, Italy is also an innocent fence sitter.)
Sayhueque
Chieftain
After Bismarck was removed, the countdown began.
Kahran Ramsus
Warlord
Indeed, without Bismarck the war probably would have started earlier. Russia & Austria never did get along.
redtom
Proudhonist
I've heard of both those books, the Guns of August and I have read Dreadnought as part of a history essay:
Causes of the First World War
and
How significant a factor was the naval race between Germany and Britain in explaining why the First World War broke out?
The First World War had many causes. Many were long-term such as the formation of the German Empire, or they were relatively short term for example the Agadir crisis. The trigger of the First World War can almost certainly be blamed on the Bosnian nationalist shooting the heir to Habsburg crown: Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This was later known as the July Crisis. By then war was inevitable with each side with their own military aims and plans and the alliance system repulsing any chance of peace. The naval race only made problems within Germany worse; the increased taxes directly affected the poor and only made Germany more chaotic.
Germany was in a mess due to a power struggle of a chaotic government. The Reichstag was unpopular with the military due to the Reichstag controlled military expenditure also the Reichstag wished for more power which made unpopular with the Kaiser. (The Kaiser called the Reichstag "a house of apes"). The Reichstag also in chaos as it had no clear leader despite having a clear majority. This lack of a clear leader made the Reichstag chaotic in itself. The Kaiser feared a revolution due to the growing strength of the Socialists parties; the SPD was the main socialist party had the majority of the seats within the Reichstag. Socialists were particularly hated due to they are ideologically opposed imperialism. This opposed Kaiser's ideal, the "Weltpolitik" in 1897 (World Policy) calling for a large German navy, an overseas empire and to use foreign policy to increase support for an authoritarian rule. The latter was also known as the "Sammslungpolitik". This concept was put forward by the army who had a lot to gain from "Weltpolitik" as nearly all army officers were Junkers, they feared a revolution just as much as the Kaiser. The impact was militancy, jingoism, and a naval race with Britain and soured international relations. The army also hoped for increased armament expenditure what the Reichstag controlled. The army was considered a state within a state (just like the future SS was under Himmler). Or as Mirabeau said about the Prussian (the leading state within the German Empire) after Napoleonic Wars, can also be very relevant here: 'other states have an army, in Prussia the army has a state'. The other great problem was the army sometimes went above or persuaded Kaiser, for example the Kaiser wished no bombardment of British territory but the navy and the air force bombarded Britain several times. AJP Taylor said that the war "needed the feebleness of... Chancellors and the fickleness of William II [Wilhelm II] for Schlieffen to be free to dictate plans which made general war inevitable". Between 1912 and 1914, there was deadlock between these two powers within the Germany. Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister said of Germany: "Who rules in Berlin, Bethmann [the Chancellor] or Moltke [the leading military power]? He was suggesting the army was the effective power in Germany. AJP Taylor says that Germany had an 'organised anarchy' instead of an authoritarian or democratic rule. This deadlock was broken by war, and military dictatorship and the Kaiser virtually became a figurehead. It has long been suspected by historians that war was forced to increase military spending and power. The First World War may have been made to suit the policies of Weltpolitik and the army may have pushed for war for more armaments expenditure.
The alliance system brought about two opposing camps the Ententé and the Central Powers. The Ententé was France, Russia and Britain and the Central Powers was Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. These alliances in Schmitts view were:
"The alliances which had originally served the cause of peace, when put to the final test, almost mechanically operated to local quarrel into a general war."
Few historians would disagree that the alliance system was important in encouraging the build up of European tension. Nevertheless, they do disagree about effectiveness of such alliances; for example, AJP Taylor considered the pre-war alliance systems were so precarious and fragile that they cannot be seen as the major cause of the war. Britain had no clear agreement to go to war if France did. Italy did not go to war when Germany and Austria-Hungary despite a binding alliance. The problem is the lack of unbiased evidence considering that at the end of the war each government released its own view of what each treaty meant in order to separate itself from the causes of the First World War. Germany was researched its own part in international diplomacy before 1914. Germany wanted to officially deny the War Guilt Clause or Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles but failed and ended in convicting itself of war guilt (at least diplomatically). James Joll, an English historian has argued that no European power really accepted that the alliance system consisted of two firm and balanced power blocks. In addition, no European power saw the alliances as to a complete deterrent to war.
By studying the evidence it seems clear that war was not claimed for the sake of a small nation as Tsar Nicholas II appeals to Kaiser Wilhelm II for Germany to not get involved with Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia and it would remain neutral. Neither was it claimed for moral reasons (this only happened once the US entered the war with its 14 points for peace) or for the alliances to be kept but for war itself. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and France all had their war plans and were waiting to use them. France was dithering on whether to use their Plan XVII but wasn't as influenced by her generals as Germany or Austria-Hungary. As I have explained above Germany was heavily influenced by its army and the same with Austria-Hungary. Russia had no visible plans in the shape of Germany but was prepared to attack East Prussia and Austria-Hungary in two attacks at the same time. This was of some significants for the cause of the First World War.
Slav nationalism is the most direct cause of the First World War as it was a Bosnian (Slav) armed by a Serbian Terrorist group who supported an idea of a pan-Slavic nation in the Balkans. Martel has argued that the First World War grew out of the clash between 'Slav nationalism' and the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Most historians do accept the idea that European powers tried to supplant the power of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in the Balkans with a new empire. This space had been fought over between Russia (who caused the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878) and Austria-Hungary intermittently since the Bulgarian crisis. The shooting of Archduke Franz Ferdinand should have come of very little surprise as he was in a very hostile place when he was assassinated. The Austrians used this to gain support for an offensive against Serbia and to gain 'mastery in the Balkans'. Joachim Remak view was that Serbia and Austria-Hungary knew they were on the road to war and they did not care whether it caused a general war in Europe. However, I would disagree, as Serbia clearly did not want war after being exhausted in the previous two Balkan wars. Recent investigation has also revealed Serbia wanted a peaceful result of the July Crisis. Martel describes the Balkans as a 'vortex' that everyone was dragged into. Joachim Remaks view agrees with Martels. Remaks view was that the rest of Europe was dragged in to what Remak terms 'the Third Balkan War'. I wouldn't deny it could have been the Third Balkan War but I do disagree that they were dragged into it as I have shown the Central Powers wilfully went into war for the 'mastery of Europe' or to prevent it in the case of the Ententé.
The naval race was a small factor as it added problems to an already unstable Germany. The Kaiser and the Junkers devised complex strategies to weaken the influence of organised labour, and used foreign policy and imperialism to rally the middle class to the support of the ruling elite. As Stuart T., Miller puts it "in default of any internal reform programmes, the solutions [of the rising aspiration of democracy were] looked outside the Reich". The ruling elite wanted to distract the working and middle class from democratic reform by the policy of 'togetherness' (Sammlung). This had huge support from right-wingers (who ideologically oppose true democracy) especially by industrialists who hoped to gain from cheap resources from an empire; and several interest groups, particularly 'The Navy League' founded by Admiral Tirpitz. The empire would need a large navy to protect it. Also another policy (the weltpolitik) hoped a large navy would encourage Britain to opt for neutrality in any future European. Instead of Britain remaining neutral, Britain increased it size of navy to one and a half the size of Germany's navy by 1914.
The main influence in the naval race was Mahan's 'The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783', published in 1890. The Kaiser became obsessed with the book and in 1898, he ordered under the Naval Law the building of a huge navy to match 'that of the strongest naval power'. This was to be under the command of General Tirpitz. This soon caused suspicion in Britain and dragged her out of the 'splendid isolation', as it was the strongest naval power. (Previously Britain had taken the policy of the 'Two Power Standard', this meant Britains navy had be as strong as the next two biggest naval power.) In 1906, Britain began sea trials of the 'HMS Dreadnought', this ship was faster, better armed, thicker shielded and this led to the Germans building of a similar craft. Then in 1907 Britain began its sea tests of the 'HMS Queen Mary', this was known as a super dreadnought, and was followed by more building of dreadnoughts on both sides. This caused panic as Germany and Britain wished to outgun each other. By 1914, Germany had a navy so big it compelled the British Admiralty gradually to withdraw almost all its capital-ship squadrons from overseas stations into the North Sea. By the start of the war, Britain was straining to find enough sailors and Germany was straining due to financial crisis caused by the cost of her massive navy.
The financial crisis in Germany was quickly spread to the working and middle classes. This was paradoxical considering the navy was made for the empire and empire was made to distract the working and middle classes from the problems of high taxes and lack of democracy. The money for the navy came from the indirect taxes on food and goods that affected the middle and the working classes. These taxes were not enough to finance the fleet by 1910. Reichstag wanted to reduce taxes and wanted to reduce armament expenditure. This caused major infighting between the Junkers whom made up the majority of officers in the army and the Reichstag. This fighting ended due to war when the army and navy were able to spend as much as they liked. Many historians claim the army pushed for war so it could get the necessary expenditure.
My conclusion is that Germany stumbled into war by its constant power struggle within its country. The 'organised anarchy' within Germany with the army constantly wanting more and the Reichstag giving less, caused the war to overspill from simply foolish generals thinking the only way to increase armament expenditure is to have war. This is greatest tragedy that the army could not understand democracy, it wanted to rule unrestrained and finally could during the war but only for a while. My conclusion is that in AJP Taylors words, the war:
"needed the feebleness of... Chancellors and the fickleness of William II [Wilhelm II] for Schlieffen to be free to dictate plans which made general war inevitable".
It was not the Alliance system or the July Crisis or any other reason that caused the First World War they were mere milestones in the path to war. Naval expenditure added to an already desperate situation by increasing taxing.
The greatest sadness is this 'organised anarchy' within Germany reappeared less than a generation after the First World War. The continuity of German politics from 1871 to 1945 was the greatest catastrophe of the modern era.
Causes of the First World War
and
How significant a factor was the naval race between Germany and Britain in explaining why the First World War broke out?
The First World War had many causes. Many were long-term such as the formation of the German Empire, or they were relatively short term for example the Agadir crisis. The trigger of the First World War can almost certainly be blamed on the Bosnian nationalist shooting the heir to Habsburg crown: Archduke Franz Ferdinand. This was later known as the July Crisis. By then war was inevitable with each side with their own military aims and plans and the alliance system repulsing any chance of peace. The naval race only made problems within Germany worse; the increased taxes directly affected the poor and only made Germany more chaotic.
Germany was in a mess due to a power struggle of a chaotic government. The Reichstag was unpopular with the military due to the Reichstag controlled military expenditure also the Reichstag wished for more power which made unpopular with the Kaiser. (The Kaiser called the Reichstag "a house of apes"). The Reichstag also in chaos as it had no clear leader despite having a clear majority. This lack of a clear leader made the Reichstag chaotic in itself. The Kaiser feared a revolution due to the growing strength of the Socialists parties; the SPD was the main socialist party had the majority of the seats within the Reichstag. Socialists were particularly hated due to they are ideologically opposed imperialism. This opposed Kaiser's ideal, the "Weltpolitik" in 1897 (World Policy) calling for a large German navy, an overseas empire and to use foreign policy to increase support for an authoritarian rule. The latter was also known as the "Sammslungpolitik". This concept was put forward by the army who had a lot to gain from "Weltpolitik" as nearly all army officers were Junkers, they feared a revolution just as much as the Kaiser. The impact was militancy, jingoism, and a naval race with Britain and soured international relations. The army also hoped for increased armament expenditure what the Reichstag controlled. The army was considered a state within a state (just like the future SS was under Himmler). Or as Mirabeau said about the Prussian (the leading state within the German Empire) after Napoleonic Wars, can also be very relevant here: 'other states have an army, in Prussia the army has a state'. The other great problem was the army sometimes went above or persuaded Kaiser, for example the Kaiser wished no bombardment of British territory but the navy and the air force bombarded Britain several times. AJP Taylor said that the war "needed the feebleness of... Chancellors and the fickleness of William II [Wilhelm II] for Schlieffen to be free to dictate plans which made general war inevitable". Between 1912 and 1914, there was deadlock between these two powers within the Germany. Berchtold, the Austrian foreign minister said of Germany: "Who rules in Berlin, Bethmann [the Chancellor] or Moltke [the leading military power]? He was suggesting the army was the effective power in Germany. AJP Taylor says that Germany had an 'organised anarchy' instead of an authoritarian or democratic rule. This deadlock was broken by war, and military dictatorship and the Kaiser virtually became a figurehead. It has long been suspected by historians that war was forced to increase military spending and power. The First World War may have been made to suit the policies of Weltpolitik and the army may have pushed for war for more armaments expenditure.
The alliance system brought about two opposing camps the Ententé and the Central Powers. The Ententé was France, Russia and Britain and the Central Powers was Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy. These alliances in Schmitts view were:
"The alliances which had originally served the cause of peace, when put to the final test, almost mechanically operated to local quarrel into a general war."
Few historians would disagree that the alliance system was important in encouraging the build up of European tension. Nevertheless, they do disagree about effectiveness of such alliances; for example, AJP Taylor considered the pre-war alliance systems were so precarious and fragile that they cannot be seen as the major cause of the war. Britain had no clear agreement to go to war if France did. Italy did not go to war when Germany and Austria-Hungary despite a binding alliance. The problem is the lack of unbiased evidence considering that at the end of the war each government released its own view of what each treaty meant in order to separate itself from the causes of the First World War. Germany was researched its own part in international diplomacy before 1914. Germany wanted to officially deny the War Guilt Clause or Article 34 of the Treaty of Versailles but failed and ended in convicting itself of war guilt (at least diplomatically). James Joll, an English historian has argued that no European power really accepted that the alliance system consisted of two firm and balanced power blocks. In addition, no European power saw the alliances as to a complete deterrent to war.
By studying the evidence it seems clear that war was not claimed for the sake of a small nation as Tsar Nicholas II appeals to Kaiser Wilhelm II for Germany to not get involved with Austria-Hungary's attack on Serbia and it would remain neutral. Neither was it claimed for moral reasons (this only happened once the US entered the war with its 14 points for peace) or for the alliances to be kept but for war itself. Germany, Austria-Hungary, Russia and France all had their war plans and were waiting to use them. France was dithering on whether to use their Plan XVII but wasn't as influenced by her generals as Germany or Austria-Hungary. As I have explained above Germany was heavily influenced by its army and the same with Austria-Hungary. Russia had no visible plans in the shape of Germany but was prepared to attack East Prussia and Austria-Hungary in two attacks at the same time. This was of some significants for the cause of the First World War.
Slav nationalism is the most direct cause of the First World War as it was a Bosnian (Slav) armed by a Serbian Terrorist group who supported an idea of a pan-Slavic nation in the Balkans. Martel has argued that the First World War grew out of the clash between 'Slav nationalism' and the multi-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire. Most historians do accept the idea that European powers tried to supplant the power of the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in the Balkans with a new empire. This space had been fought over between Russia (who caused the disintegrating Ottoman Empire in the Russo-Turkish War of 1878) and Austria-Hungary intermittently since the Bulgarian crisis. The shooting of Archduke Franz Ferdinand should have come of very little surprise as he was in a very hostile place when he was assassinated. The Austrians used this to gain support for an offensive against Serbia and to gain 'mastery in the Balkans'. Joachim Remak view was that Serbia and Austria-Hungary knew they were on the road to war and they did not care whether it caused a general war in Europe. However, I would disagree, as Serbia clearly did not want war after being exhausted in the previous two Balkan wars. Recent investigation has also revealed Serbia wanted a peaceful result of the July Crisis. Martel describes the Balkans as a 'vortex' that everyone was dragged into. Joachim Remaks view agrees with Martels. Remaks view was that the rest of Europe was dragged in to what Remak terms 'the Third Balkan War'. I wouldn't deny it could have been the Third Balkan War but I do disagree that they were dragged into it as I have shown the Central Powers wilfully went into war for the 'mastery of Europe' or to prevent it in the case of the Ententé.
The naval race was a small factor as it added problems to an already unstable Germany. The Kaiser and the Junkers devised complex strategies to weaken the influence of organised labour, and used foreign policy and imperialism to rally the middle class to the support of the ruling elite. As Stuart T., Miller puts it "in default of any internal reform programmes, the solutions [of the rising aspiration of democracy were] looked outside the Reich". The ruling elite wanted to distract the working and middle class from democratic reform by the policy of 'togetherness' (Sammlung). This had huge support from right-wingers (who ideologically oppose true democracy) especially by industrialists who hoped to gain from cheap resources from an empire; and several interest groups, particularly 'The Navy League' founded by Admiral Tirpitz. The empire would need a large navy to protect it. Also another policy (the weltpolitik) hoped a large navy would encourage Britain to opt for neutrality in any future European. Instead of Britain remaining neutral, Britain increased it size of navy to one and a half the size of Germany's navy by 1914.
The main influence in the naval race was Mahan's 'The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783', published in 1890. The Kaiser became obsessed with the book and in 1898, he ordered under the Naval Law the building of a huge navy to match 'that of the strongest naval power'. This was to be under the command of General Tirpitz. This soon caused suspicion in Britain and dragged her out of the 'splendid isolation', as it was the strongest naval power. (Previously Britain had taken the policy of the 'Two Power Standard', this meant Britains navy had be as strong as the next two biggest naval power.) In 1906, Britain began sea trials of the 'HMS Dreadnought', this ship was faster, better armed, thicker shielded and this led to the Germans building of a similar craft. Then in 1907 Britain began its sea tests of the 'HMS Queen Mary', this was known as a super dreadnought, and was followed by more building of dreadnoughts on both sides. This caused panic as Germany and Britain wished to outgun each other. By 1914, Germany had a navy so big it compelled the British Admiralty gradually to withdraw almost all its capital-ship squadrons from overseas stations into the North Sea. By the start of the war, Britain was straining to find enough sailors and Germany was straining due to financial crisis caused by the cost of her massive navy.
The financial crisis in Germany was quickly spread to the working and middle classes. This was paradoxical considering the navy was made for the empire and empire was made to distract the working and middle classes from the problems of high taxes and lack of democracy. The money for the navy came from the indirect taxes on food and goods that affected the middle and the working classes. These taxes were not enough to finance the fleet by 1910. Reichstag wanted to reduce taxes and wanted to reduce armament expenditure. This caused major infighting between the Junkers whom made up the majority of officers in the army and the Reichstag. This fighting ended due to war when the army and navy were able to spend as much as they liked. Many historians claim the army pushed for war so it could get the necessary expenditure.
My conclusion is that Germany stumbled into war by its constant power struggle within its country. The 'organised anarchy' within Germany with the army constantly wanting more and the Reichstag giving less, caused the war to overspill from simply foolish generals thinking the only way to increase armament expenditure is to have war. This is greatest tragedy that the army could not understand democracy, it wanted to rule unrestrained and finally could during the war but only for a while. My conclusion is that in AJP Taylors words, the war:
"needed the feebleness of... Chancellors and the fickleness of William II [Wilhelm II] for Schlieffen to be free to dictate plans which made general war inevitable".
It was not the Alliance system or the July Crisis or any other reason that caused the First World War they were mere milestones in the path to war. Naval expenditure added to an already desperate situation by increasing taxing.
The greatest sadness is this 'organised anarchy' within Germany reappeared less than a generation after the First World War. The continuity of German politics from 1871 to 1945 was the greatest catastrophe of the modern era.
Mattaba
Chieftain
Hey I'm reviving this thread because there is lack of attention to WW1 and way too much for WW2 in my opinion.
Mattaba
Chieftain
About the war I have question: Do you think that the Central Powers could have won the war at the beginning of 1918 before the kaiserschlacht?
I think that if things were planned better Germany could have won by then, but dunno for sure, some experts around here?
I think that if things were planned better Germany could have won by then, but dunno for sure, some experts around here?
joespaniel
Unescorted Settler
Two things of monumental importance happened in 1917, the fall of Russia and the entry of the US into the war.
Germany was finaly able to bring its full "attention" upon the Western Allies, and may have eventually wore down the French enough to force a treaty.
The US countered that, with fresh troops, arms and supplies that Germany could never hope to match.
The tenacity of all the Allied troops won the war in 1918. It was no picnic.
I disagree with an earlier statement regarding Britains position. The English, as far as I've read, never feared a Teutonic invasion of the Home Isles. Rather they saw Germany as a rival for hegemony.
The government had made plans to assist France, but it was a secret arrangement, kept from the public (and most goverment officials, especialy pacifists and isolationists).
The massive German invasion of neutral Belgium gave Britain her moral incentive to fight, to defend their treaty obligations.
As also stated already, WWI was the product of German militarism gone wild. The masters of the second reich had decided on war many years earlier.
I dont see how it was avoidable from the Allied side. The Germans had to be beat down. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Versailles only opened the door to the next, and worst World War.
Germany was finaly able to bring its full "attention" upon the Western Allies, and may have eventually wore down the French enough to force a treaty.
The US countered that, with fresh troops, arms and supplies that Germany could never hope to match.
The tenacity of all the Allied troops won the war in 1918. It was no picnic.
I disagree with an earlier statement regarding Britains position. The English, as far as I've read, never feared a Teutonic invasion of the Home Isles. Rather they saw Germany as a rival for hegemony.
The government had made plans to assist France, but it was a secret arrangement, kept from the public (and most goverment officials, especialy pacifists and isolationists).
The massive German invasion of neutral Belgium gave Britain her moral incentive to fight, to defend their treaty obligations.
As also stated already, WWI was the product of German militarism gone wild. The masters of the second reich had decided on war many years earlier.
I dont see how it was avoidable from the Allied side. The Germans had to be beat down. Unfortunately, the Treaty of Versailles only opened the door to the next, and worst World War.
Mattaba
Chieftain
I don't agree that Germany was the main cause of the outbreak of the war, they hadn't decided on war they had just made plans in case of a war.
There is no side the main cause IMO, but if Germany hadn't begun a vast fleet build up and hadn't given Austria a carte blanche vs Serbia, things might have looked quite different.
There is no side the main cause IMO, but if Germany hadn't begun a vast fleet build up and hadn't given Austria a carte blanche vs Serbia, things might have looked quite different.
Richard III
Duke of Gloucester
In fact, only some Brits saw Germany as a rival for hegemony, where many - even as late as 1914 - saw them as their natural ally in Europe. Britain was going through a wave of "german friendship" events when war broke out. Your comments on the secret treaty obligations are bang on: it was probably a surprise to most Britons that they were likely to be effected by the war at all until the Belgian element became a factor...
However, there certainly was a large anti-german sentiment as well, fuelled in part by a decade of plays, films and books about the threat of German invasion. The constant invasion scares were so bad that one book - 1909's "How Clarence Saved England" satirized the trend to make up German invasion stories by having Britain invaded by Germans, Chinese, Swiss, Monacans and Moroccans. Red Dawn, version 1.1.
In fact, in the first weeks of the war, british divisions that had originally been scheduled to join the French left flank were held back because of fears of invasion.
R.III
onejayhawk
Afflicted with reason
I asked this question elsewhwere and never got a solid response. Did Roosevelt and Churchill conspire to bring the USA into the war by creating an incident, which turned out to be the Lusitania. There is some decent reasoning in support of the proposition, but I have never seen any concrete evidence. Does any one here have some?
You do him a disservice. Look at the people he picks. Yet those in the know say there is never any doubt that he is the man in charge.
J
You do him a disservice. Look at the people he picks. Yet those in the know say there is never any doubt that he is the man in charge.
J
Richard III
Duke of Gloucester
I tried to answer; let me try it another way. I don't know if there was a conspiracy. Perhaps. Perhaps not. If there was a conspiracy, I think the evidence suggests that it might have been British/Churchill. I have never heard anything to suggest any involvement by the Americans.
R.III
LionQ
Noble
Avoiding was not possible. The feodalism had to die in a massive war. And that became the WWI.
AnarchyBoy
Despot
Civilopediacity, you are absolutely right on! When it was obvious that the Ottoman Empire was going to collapse, the super-powers of Europe were watching greedily, preparing to divide it up. The Empire's collapse disturbed the delicate balance of power that had existed in Europe for centuries, and presto! A pan-European war. Assasinating the Archduke just cinched it.
As for the US getting involved, we resisted for as long as we could, but it was a globalized economy. No nation was an island by that point.
As for the US getting involved, we resisted for as long as we could, but it was a globalized economy. No nation was an island by that point.
Magnus
Diplocat
The USA did 90+% of its business with the Entente powers, naturally, they would come to their aid, instead of the Central Powers, who were blockaded by the British and could not trade with them.
My question is would things have gone differently in the war if Germany had won a decisive victory at Jutland?
My question is would things have gone differently in the war if Germany had won a decisive victory at Jutland?
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